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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 428
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147/148/149/504/302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Goonda Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 428
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147/148/149/504/302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Goonda Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 26 April 2002 Jamaluddin (the deceased) was travelling on a scooter with his wife (the appellant/informant) and their daughter when Respondent 1, allegedly harbouring animosity due to prior litigation, surrounded and shot him with a double-barrelled gun, aided by others. An FIR was lodged the same evening. The Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, rejected Respondent 1’s bail application after noting eyewitness statements that directly implicated him. Respondent 1 then applied for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, which granted bail in a brief, two-paragraph order. The informant challenged that order in the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court. Leave to appeal was granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in granting bail to Respondent 1 by a non-speaking, unreasoned order.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the grant of bail should be cancelled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant/Informant

  • The High Court furnished no reasons for granting bail despite clear eyewitness evidence implicating Respondent 1.
  • Respondent 1 is the main accused, involved in several other serious offences and is even facing proceedings under the Goonda Act.
  • The trial court had already undertaken a detailed analysis and rejected bail; the High Court’s unexplained reversal was unjustified.

State of Uttar Pradesh (Respondent 2)

  • Supported the appellant’s position that bail ought not to have been granted in such serious circumstances.

Respondent 1 (Accused)

  • No appearance was entered and no arguments were advanced before the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul, 2005 SCC (Cri) 157 Bail orders that reverse lower-court decisions must state reasons; non-speaking orders are improper. Court relied on this authority to criticise the High Court’s cryptic order.
State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596 Deprecates non-speaking orders in appealable matters. Cited to reinforce the necessity of reasoned orders, even at the bail stage.
V.D. Chaudhary v. State of U.P., (2005) 12 SCC 304 Re-emphasises requirement of reasons in bail orders. Used to support cancellation where High Court acted without reasons.
Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 Orders without reasoning reflect non-application of mind. Relied upon to characterise the impugned order as legally infirm.
Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 Enumerates factors courts must consider before granting bail. Court held those factors were ignored by the High Court.
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 Sets criteria and necessity of judicial discretion in bail matters. Invoked to show High Court’s failure to exercise proper discretion.
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 Highlights that cryptic bail orders are indefensible. Cited to justify setting aside the High Court’s order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s order “completely non-speaking” and therefore a product of non-application of mind. While acknowledging that bail orders should avoid an exhaustive examination of the merits, the Court reiterated that a judge must still record the basic reasons that led to a conclusion on:

  • Nature and gravity of the accusation and supporting evidence;
  • Possibility of tampering with witnesses or threatening the complainant; and
  • Prima-facie satisfaction of the court on the charge.

Referring to the string of precedents listed above, the Court underscored that the requirement of a reasoned order is a settled principle of law, especially where serious offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 504 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code are alleged. Because the High Court’s order lacked any such reasoning, it was declared “clearly indefensible.”

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail and cancelled Respondent 1’s bail, directing him to surrender forthwith. The appeal was allowed.

Implications: The judgment reinforces the mandatory duty of courts to provide at least brief reasons when granting or refusing bail, particularly in serious criminal cases. It serves as a caution that non-speaking bail orders are liable to be overturned and underscores the parameters to be weighed—gravity of offence, evidence, and risk factors—before liberty is granted.

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    Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad And Another

    Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This appeal is by the informant questioning grant of bail to Respondent 1 (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) by the impugned judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench.

    3. Factual position, as highlighted by the appellant is as follows:

    On 26-4-2002, Respondent 1 and others in pursuance of their common object, surrounded Jamaluddin, husband of the appellant, (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) while he was coming by scooter along with the appellant and their daughter. Because of some previous litigations, Respondent 1 accused had animosity with the deceased and with the intention of causing his death Respondent 1 accused who was armed with a double-barrelled gun, shot at the deceased. Others also participated in the attack. The informant and her daughter started crying for help, hearing which the co-villagers came to the spot. Respondent 1 and others fled away but they were still firing and had threatened to wipe out the entire family of the deceased. The occurrence took place at about 6.00 p.m and the first information report was lodged immediately thereafter. Respondent 1 and others filed an application for bail before the trial court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur rejected the application taking note of the fact that the incident had been witnessed by eyewitnesses and their statements recorded during the investigation clearly implicated Respondent 1. An application for bail in terms of Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) was filed by Respondent 1 before the High Court. By the impugned order, the prayer for bail has been accepted.

    4. According to learned counsel for the appellant, no reason has been assigned by the High Court as to why the prayer for bail was accepted, notwithstanding the fact that Respondent 1 was clearly implicated by the persons whose statements were recorded during the investigation. Respondent 1 is the main accused and the accusations against him were clearly established. The trial court had elaborately analysed the factual position and keeping in view the statements of the eyewitnesses, who clearly implicated Respondent 1, had rejected the prayer for bail. There is no appearance on behalf of Respondent 1 in spite of service of notice. The learned counsel appearing for the State, Respondent 2 supported the stand of the appellant and submitted that this is not a case where bail is to be granted. It is pointed out that Respondent 1 is implicated in several cases involving heinous crimes and even proceedings under the Goonda Act have been initiated.

    5. We find that the High Court had disposed of the bail application without indicating any reason and in a very cryptic manner. The entire order reads as follows:

    “Heard learned counsel for the parties.
    Considering the overall facts and circumstances, I find that this is a fit case for bail. Let the applicant Sher Mohd. be enlarged on bail in Crime No. 149 of 2002 under Sections 147/148/149/504/302 IPC, PS Amethi, District Sultanpur on his furnishing a personal bond of Rs 5000 (Rupees five thousand only) and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the CJM, Sultanpur, subject to the condition that once every week he would report at PS Amethi, District Sultanpur.”

    The order of the High Court shows that there are allegations of commission of offences punishable under Sections 147/148/149/504/302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”).

    6. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of a decision of this Court in Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul 2005 SCC (Cri) 157, JT (2004) 2 SC 176. In para 10, it was observed as follows: [SCC (Cri) pp. 159-60]

    “10. However, before concluding, we must advert to another aspect of this case which has caused some concern to us. In the recent past, we had several occasions to notice that the High Courts by recording the concessions shown by the counsel in the criminal proceedings refrain from assigning any reason even in orders by which it reverses the orders of the lower courts. In our opinion, this is not proper if such orders are appealable, be it on the ground of concession shown by the learned counsel appearing for the parties or on the ground that assigning of elaborate reasons might prejudice the future trial before the lower courts. The High Court should not, unless for very good reasons, desist from indicating the grounds on which their orders are based because when the matters are brought up in appeal, the court of appeal has every reason to know the basis on which the impugned order has been made. It may be that while concurring with the lower court's order, it may not be necessary for the said appellate court to assign reasons but that is not so while reversing such orders of the lower courts. It may be convenient for the said court to pass orders without indicating the grounds or basis but it certainly is not convenient for the court of appeal while considering the correctness of such impugned orders. The reasons need not be very detailed or elaborate, lest it may cause prejudice to the cause of the parties, but must be sufficiently indicative of the process of reasoning leading to the passing of the impugned order. The need for delivering a reasoned order is a requirement of law which has to be complied with in all appealable orders. This Court in a somewhat similar situation has deprecated the practice of non-speaking orders in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi (1984) 1 SCC 596, AIR 1984 SC 444.”

    These aspects were recently highlighted in V.D Chaudhary v. State of U.P (2005) 12 SCC 304, (2005) 7 Scale 68

    7. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court's order shows complete non-application of mind. Though a detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the court while passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.

    8. There is a need to indicate in the order reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted, particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail, they are:

    1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;
    2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
    3. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

    Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-application of mind as was noted by this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598, Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528, JT (2004) 3 SC 442.

    9. The above position was highlighted by this Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P (2004) 7 SCC 525, JT (2004) 6 SC 540

    10. Above being the position, the cryptic non-reasoned order of the High Court, is clearly indefensible.

    11. The inevitable conclusion is that the grant of bail to the respondent by a non-speaking and non-reasoned order was not proper. Therefore, we set aside the order of the High Court. The bail granted to Respondent 1 stands cancelled. Respondent 1 shall surrender to custody forthwith.

    12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

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    Comments

    Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad And Another
    (Sep 19, 2005)