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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 107 of the Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 107 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a landlord-tenant dispute in which the landlord sought eviction under Section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 on multiple grounds, including bona fide personal requirement, alleged erection of permanent structures, and change of user by the tenant. The trial court decreed eviction solely on the ground of the landlord’s bona fide need. The tenant appealed to the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Pune.

During the pendency of the first appeal, the tenant filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to introduce three sets of documents that were either unavailable during trial or came into existence after judgment. The appellate court allowed the application. The landlord then invoked the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC; the High Court reversed the appellate court’s order, holding that the tenant had not met the “due diligence” requirement for admitting additional evidence. The present Supreme Court decision reviews that High Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant satisfied the statutory conditions under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC—particularly the “due diligence” requirement—for production of additional evidence at the appellate stage.
  2. Whether the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, was justified in overturning the discretionary order of the first appellate court permitting such additional evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 Defines “bona fide requirement” as a sincere and honest need, not a mere pretext. Used to illustrate that evidence negating the landlord’s genuine need is materially relevant to the appeal, thereby supporting admission of additional documents.
Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (2001) 5 SCC 705 Reiterates that bona fide requirement must be distinguished from whimsical or fanciful desire. Cited to underline that documents casting doubt on the landlord’s need directly affect the central issue and hence warrant consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by noting its power under Section 107(1)(d) CPC and the specific grounds in Order 41 Rule 27 that permit additional evidence. It emphasized that the decree under challenge was founded exclusively on the landlord’s bona fide requirement, making any material affecting that requirement directly relevant.

Assessing the three categories of documents—(a) correspondence with M/s Godrej & Boyce, (b) a modified construction plan submitted after the trial judgment, and (c) a public brochure soliciting funds for construction—the Court observed:

  • Two documents post-dated the trial judgment and therefore could not have been produced earlier.
  • The correspondence with a third party was outside the tenant’s knowledge and control despite due diligence.
  • If proved, the documents could materially undermine the landlord’s claim of genuine need by showing an intent to sell, altered construction intentions, or lack of funds.

Given these factors, the first appellate court’s discretionary decision to admit the documents was neither arbitrary nor perverse. The High Court, under Section 115 CPC, should not have interfered because the tenant’s inability to produce the documents earlier was “highly probable,” satisfying the due-diligence threshold.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court order dated 13-6-2002 set aside; order of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Pune dated 5-1-2000 restoring the tenant’s right to adduce additional evidence is reinstated.

Direct Effect: The first appellate court will now consider the additional documents when adjudicating the tenant’s appeal against the eviction decree. The decision reaffirms the limited scope of revisional interference under Section 115 CPC and underscores that appellate courts may admit additional evidence where the due-diligence criteria and relevancy are met. No broader precedent was expressly created beyond applying settled principles to the facts.

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    Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) By Lrs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust And Others

    P.P Naolekar, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The IIIrd Additional District Judge, Pune, seized of hearing a first appeal, allowed an application under Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “the Code” for short) seeking production of four documents in additional evidence. The High Court has, by its impugned order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, set aside the order of the first appellate court.

    3. This is a landlord-tenant suit in which the eviction of the tenant is sought for under Section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 on several grounds, namely, that the landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for occupation by himself, that the tenant had, without the landlord's consent, erected on the premises a permanent structure and that the tenant had changed the user of the tenancy premises by conducting coaching classes therefrom.

    4. The trial court decreed the suit and directed the appellant tenant to be ejected but only on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord. The availability of other grounds for ejectment was held not to have been made out. The tenant preferred the first appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the tenant moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code seeking permission to lead additional evidence by way of production of documents, on the ground that the said documents were not available during trial before the trial court and that the said documents were necessary for the just and fair decision on the issues involved in the case. The documents sought to be produced are: (a) correspondence between the landlord and M/s Godrej & Boyce Co. Ltd. indicating negotiation for sale or use of suit premises for a showroom by the Company; (b) modified plan for construction of building submitted before the authorities by the landlords in May 1998 after the judgment passed by the trial court wherefrom it appears that the landlord does not wish to demolish the superstructure to put up the new construction; (c) public brochure issued by the landlords inviting donation and funds for construction, indicating lack of funds for construction with the landlord. As per the tenant, document (a) was not available to the tenant in spite of due diligence and documents (b) and (c) are documents which came into existence after the trial court passed its judgment on 29-1-1999.

    5. The first appellate court allowed the application holding inter alia that the tenants were not parties to the correspondence between the landlord and M/s Godrej & Boyce Co. Ltd. and the fact of such negotiations had been denied by the landlords and that they could not have earlier obtained the knowledge of the document in spite of due diligence. The Court has also held that the documents are necessary for a just decision of the case.

    6. The High Court has, while setting aside the order of the first appellate court, held that the defendant tenant (appellant in the first appeal) had failed to establish that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed.

    7. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 107 of the Code empowers an appellate court to take additional evidence. Rule 27 of Order 41 provides for the grounds on the availability of which alone, the parties to an appeal may be allowed to produce additional evidence.

    8. The decree of the trial court is based on the landlords' bona fide requirement of the accommodation. In appeal, the question before the court for adjudication was whether the trial court was justified in passing the decree in favour of the landlords on the ground of bona fide need and the tenants obviously were within their rights to show that the need of the landlords was not genuine. The evidence produced in that direction would be relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the question of need of the landlords. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court has held that a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. In Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (2001) 5 SCC 705 this Court reiterated that bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.

    9. It cannot be denied that the documents sought to be produced by the tenants are material and if substantiated, would have a material effect on the case of the landlords of their bona fide need of the suit premises. If, in fact, the landlord has entered into negotiations with M/s Godrej & Boyce Co. Ltd. for selling or use by them of the property, the need cannot be said to be genuine. Similarly, a change in the construction plan may show that the alleged need of the landlord for the construction may not be genuine. The third document proposes to demolish the case of availability of the funds for construction with the landlord. Two of the documents came into existence after the passing of the decree by the trial court. Similarly, the correspondence entered into by the landlord with a third party could not have been within the knowledge of the tenant and therefore, the tenant's statement that the documents could not have been produced before the trial court, in spite of the exercise of due diligence, was highly probable. In such circumstances, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the first appellate court permitting additional evidence.

    10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 13-6-2002 is set aside. The order of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Pune dated 5-1-2000, allowing the defendant-appellant's application dated 20-11-1999 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code is restored. No order as to the costs.

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    Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) By Lrs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust And Others
    (Feb 14, 2005)