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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 586
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877
  • Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2), Explanation I appended to Section 20 of the Act, Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 586
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877
  • Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 20(2), Explanation I appended to Section 20 of the Act, Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 14-6-1979 R. Srinivasan (vendor) executed an agreement (Ext. P-1) to sell premises No. 15/18/1, Cambridge Road, Ulsoor, Bangalore to Chidambaram (plaintiff) for ₹16,000, promising to convey an unencumbered title by 13-11-1979. An advance of ₹3,000 was paid and a further ₹1,000 was later given to redeem title deeds from a money-lender. Alleging breach by the vendor and learning that the property had been conveyed on 29-11-1979 to Smt. Sargunam (Defendant 2) through sale deed Ext. P-17, the plaintiff filed Suit OS No. 8296/1980 for specific performance.

The VI Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore dismissed the suit on 24-9-1992, holding that time was of the essence, the plaintiff had defaulted, and Defendant 2 was a bona fide purchaser without notice. On appeal, the High Court of Karnataka (RFA No. 464/1992) re-appreciated evidence, found Ext. D-4 (an alleged prior agreement of 15-4-1978 in favour of Defendant 2) to be concocted, concluded that Defendant 2 had notice of Ext. P-1, and decreed specific performance in favour of the plaintiff on 24-2-1999. The legal representative of Defendant 2 appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Defendant 2 established that she was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior agreement Ext. P-1 within the meaning of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
  2. Whether the plaintiff proved that the sale deed Ext. P-17 in favour of Defendant 2 was sham, bogus, or nominal and executed to defeat the plaintiff’s rights under Ext. P-1.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Original Defendant 2)

  • The trial court rightly exercised discretion in refusing specific performance; the High Court should not have interfered with concurrent factual findings.
  • A prior agreement dated 15-4-1978 (Ext. D-4) existed in favour of Defendant 2, making her a prior purchaser; Ext. P-17 was executed in pursuance of that agreement and the balance consideration of ₹11,500 was paid.
  • Defendant 2 had no notice of Ext. P-1 when Ext. P-17 was executed and thus falls within the exception of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.
  • Defendant 2’s family has been in possession for several years; granting specific performance would cause greater hardship to her than non-performance would cause to the plaintiff (Section 20(2)(b) of the Act).

Respondent (Plaintiff)

  • Ext. D-4 was never acted upon and was fabricated after the suit was filed; signatures on Ext. D-4 do not tally with those on Ext. P-17.
  • Defendant 2 had knowledge of the subsisting tenancy of the plaintiff and of the agreement Ext. P-1; she therefore cannot claim the status of a bona fide purchaser without notice.
  • Ext. P-17 was executed solely to defeat the plaintiff’s contractual rights; hence specific performance should be granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagan Nath v. Jagdish Rai (1998) 5 SCC 537; AIR 1998 SC 2028 A transferee put on enquiry who would have discovered a prior agreement cannot claim to be without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Used to hold that knowledge of circumstances (tenant’s possession, statements by vendor) put Defendant 2 on enquiry; hence she cannot be treated as a transferee without notice.
Baburam Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pallay, AIR 1914 Cal 333 Purchaser is affected with notice of rights of a person in possession; failure to enquire defeats claim of bona fide purchase without notice. Reinforced the conclusion that the plaintiff’s open tenancy charged Defendant 2 with constructive notice of Ext. P-1.
Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405; (1965) 2 SCR 221 Specific performance is discretionary; where Section 20(2) factors exist, the court may refuse the decree. Cited to examine—but ultimately reject—the appellant’s plea that hardship under Section 20(2)(b) justified refusal of specific performance.
P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu (2004) 6 SCC 649 Explanation I to Section 20: mere onerousness or improvidence of contract does not amount to unfair advantage. Applied to negate the argument that execution of Ext. P-1 would be unfair or cause undue hardship to Defendant 2.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first identified the governing test: a purchaser who had actual or constructive notice of a prior contract cannot invoke Section 19(b) protection. It then assessed the evidence as follows:

  • Conduct and pleadings of defendants: Defendant 1’s written statement (9-7-1981) did not deny the plaintiff’s allegation that Ext. D-4 was inoperative; Defendant 2 waited five years to file an amended defence asserting Ext. D-4, undermining its credibility.
  • Lack of linkage between documents: Ext. P-17 made no reference to Ext. D-4; no evidence showed any extension of time under Ext. D-4.
  • Notice to Defendant 2: Testimony of DW 1 (husband and attorney of Defendant 2) revealed that before executing Ext. P-17 he was told of Ext. P-1; this provided actual notice.
  • Constructive notice through possession: Plaintiff had been tenant since 1945; long-standing possession coupled with a pending eviction suit (HRC No. 10561/1981) put Defendant 2 on enquiry.
  • Authenticity of Ext. D-4: Expert and attesting witness evidence showed vendor’s signatures on Ext. D-4 differed from those on Ext. P-17; the High Court correctly found Ext. D-4 concocted.
  • Hardship plea under Section 20(2)(b): The Court observed that Defendant 2, aware of the pending suit and possible eviction order’s qualification, could foresee the consequences; therefore no comparative hardship warranting denial of specific performance was established.

On these findings, the Court affirmed the High Court’s view that Defendant 2 failed to prove bona fide purchase without notice and that the sale deed Ext. P-17 was executed to defeat the plaintiff’s contractual rights.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court decree ordering specific performance in favour of the plaintiff and confirmed that Defendant 2’s sale deed is not protected. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reiterates that purchasers can rarely claim the shield of Section 19(b) where circumstances, including the possessor’s status and statements by the vendor, impose a duty of enquiry. It also affirms that fabricated prior agreements will not undermine the equitable remedy of specific performance. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing principles on notice and discretionary relief were reinforced.

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    Sargunam (Dead) By Lr. v. Chidambaram And Another

    S.H Kapadia, J.— This civil appeal, by grant of special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated 24-2-1999 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in RFA No. 464 of 1992 decreeing the suit filed by Respondent 1 herein in the Court of VIth Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, being suit OS No. 8296 of 1980.

    2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as they are arrayed in the trial court.

    3. The facts giving rise to this civil appeal are as follows:

    By an agreement for sale dated 14-6-1979, R. Srinivasan (since deceased) agreed to sell the suit premises bearing No. 15/18/1, Cambridge Road, Ulsoor, Bangalore to Shri Chidambaram (Respondent 1 herein) for a sum of Rs 16,000. Under the said agreement, Srinivasan agreed to complete the sale by 13-11-1979. Under the said agreement, the vendor agreed to sell the suit premises free from all encumbrances. The vendor agreed to deliver the title deeds to the plaintiff. On the execution of the agreement, the vendor received Rs 3000 from the plaintiff. However, the said vendor, Defendant 1, failed to carry out his obligations under the agreement. He failed to deliver the title deeds. He failed to clear the property free from encumbrances.

    4. In the circumstances, the plaintiff issued legal notices on 5-11-1979 and 9-11-1979 to the vendor to carry out his obligations under the said agreement. On 29-11-1979, the plaintiff came to know that the vendor, Defendant 1, had purported to sell the suit premises in favour of Smt Sargunam (since deceased), Defendant 2. In the circumstances, the plaintiff instituted suit bearing No. 8296 of 1980 in the Court of VIth Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as “the trial court”).

    5. In the suit, it was alleged by the plaintiff that the conveyance dated 29-11-1979 executed by Defendant 1 in favour of Defendant 2 was sham and bogus. That Defendant 2 had notice of the suit agreement. The plaintiff further submitted that he was always ready and willing to comply with his obligations under the suit agreement; that Defendant 1 had committed breach thereof and consequently, he was entitled to specific performance of the suit agreement.

    6. By written statement dated 9-7-1981, Defendant 1 alleged that he had terminated the suit agreement as the plaintiff had failed to complete the sale within the time stipulated in the suit agreement; that Defendant 1 had given notice of termination to the plaintiff which notice came to be returned with the postal remark “refused” and, consequently, he had sold the property to the second defendant.

    7. On 7-8-1981, Defendant 2 filed a memo adopting the written statement of Defendant 1 dated 9-7-1981.

    8. On 20-11-1986, Defendant 2 filed her amended written statement. By the said written statement, Defendant 2 alleged that the sale in her favour dated 29-11-1979 was in pursuance of the agreement dated 15-4-1978 executed by Defendant 1; that she was the bona fide purchaser for value without notice; that she had no notice of the suit agreement when she entered into the conveyance with Defendant 1 on 29-11-1979; that she was the prior purchaser and in the circumstances, the sale in her favour was protected.

    9. After framing the issues and after recording evidence, the trial court inter alia held that the time was essence of the suit agreement (Ext. P-1); that the plaintiff had failed to complete the sale by 13-11-1979; that the plaintiff had failed to pay the balance amount by 13-11-1979, which period was essence of the contract; that Defendant 1 was always ready and willing to comply with his part of the contract and, therefore, he had every right to sell the suit premises vide Ext. P-17 dated 29-11-1979 to the second defendant. The trial court further held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that Defendant 2 had notice of the suit agreement (Ext. P-1); that Ext. P-17 was pursuant to the agreement dated 15-4-1978 (Ext. D-4) and in the circumstances, the plaintiff had failed to prove that Ext. P-17 was sham, bogus and nominal. Consequently, vide judgment and order dated 24-9-1992, the trial court dismissed the suit.

    10. In appeal, the High Court, as the first appellate court, reappreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the second defendant had notice of Ext. P-1 dated 14-6-1979 at the time of the sale, Ext. P-17; that Ext. D-4 dated 15-4-1978 was concocted and was made to defeat the claim of the plaintiff; that the signatures of the vendor on Ext. D-4 differed from signatures on Ext. P-17; that Defendant 2 did not prove her signature on Ext. D-4; and in the circumstances, Ext. P-17 was not protected. In the circumstances, the High Court reversed the findings of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

    11. Being aggrieved, legal representative of Defendant 2 has come to this Court by way of this civil appeal.

    12. Mr S. Muralidhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original Defendant 2 (appellant herein) submitted that the trial court had exercised its discretion on the basis of evidence on record in refusing the relief for specific performance sought by the plaintiff and in the circumstances the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court. He contended that prior to the suit agreement, Ext. P-1, Defendant 2 had agreed to purchase the suit premises from Defendant 1 as far back as 15-4-1978 vide Ext. D-4, and, therefore, Defendant 2 was the prior purchaser of the suit premises. He contended that in pursuance of Ext. D-4, Defendant 1 had executed Ext. P-17 in favour of Defendant 2; that the balance consideration of Rs 11,500 was paid by Defendant 2 to Defendant 1 at the time of the conveyance Ext. P-17; that Ext. D-4 has been duly signed by the vendor and the vendee and was duly attested and, therefore, the High Court had erred in coming to the conclusion that Ext. D-4 was concocted. Learned counsel further submitted that Defendant 2 had no notice of Ext. P-1 when she entered into the conveyance Ext. P-17 and that Defendant 2 had paid the balance consideration of Rs 11,500 without notice of Ext. P-1. In the circumstances, it was urged that the trial court was right in dismissing the suit.

    13. Lastly, it was urged that Defendant 2 was in possession of the suit premises for the last couple of years and consequently the High Court ought to have refused the decree for specific performance as passing of such a decree would cause greater hardship to the second defendant as compared to the plaintiff.

    14. In this civil appeal, two points arise for determination viz. — whether it is proved before the trial court that Defendant 2 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and whether the plaintiff has proved that Ext. P-17 was sham, bogus and nominal sale entered into to defeat the claim of the plaintiff.

    15. In the case of Jagan Nath v. Jagdish Rai (1998) 5 SCC 537, AIR 1998 SC 2028 it has been held that where a transferee has knowledge of facts which would put him on enquiry which if prosecuted would have disclosed a previous agreement, such transferee is not a transferee without notice of the original contract within the meaning of exception in Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

    16. Similarly, in the case of Baburam Bag v. Madhab Chandra Pallay AIR 1914 Cal 333 it has been held that possession of a property by a tenant affects subsequent purchaser with notice of the tenant's rights, and if the purchaser fails to make enquiry into the nature of that possession, he cannot claim to be a transferee without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

    17. In the light of the above tests, we may now examine the evidence on record. At the outset, it may be noted that on 12-2-1980, the above suit was filed in which the plaintiff inter alia alleged that Ext. D-4 was never acted upon by Defendants 1 and 2 and that Ext. P-17 was not entered into pursuant to Ext. D-4. It was further alleged that Defendant 2 had notice of Ext. P-1 at the time she entered into the conveyance Ext. P-17. On 9-7-1981, Defendant 1 filed his written statement. He did not deny the above allegations mentioned in the plaint. On 7-8-1981, Defendant 2 adopted the written statement of Defendant 1. She filed a short memo stating that she was adopting the written statement of Defendant 1. On 20-11-1986, after five years, Defendant 2 files an amended written statement in which she denies for the first time the aforestated allegations of the plaintiff concerning Ext. D-4. She does not explain the delay in not filing the written statement for five years. In his evidence, DW 1 conceded that Ext. P-17 does not refer to Ext. D-4. He further conceded that in the conveyance Ext. P-17 there was no recital stating that the conveyance was being executed pursuant to Ext. D-4. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that Ext. P-17 was executed pursuant to Ext. D-4. Further, there is no evidence to show that time to complete the sale under Ext. D-4 was ever extended by Defendant 1.

    18. PW 1 in his evidence has deposed that he was a tenant of the suit premises from 1945; that Defendant 2 had instituted an eviction suit under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 on the ground of bona fide requirement after she had entered into the conveyance Ext. P-17. PW 1 in his evidence has further stated that he had entered into the agreement Ext. P-1 with Defendant 1 when he came to know that Defendant 1 intended to sell the suit premises. It is at this stage that PW 1 offered to purchase the suit premises. PW 1 has further deposed that the agreement Ext. P-1 was for Rs 16,000 whereas the conveyance Ext. P-17 was for Rs 12,000. PW 1 further deposed that he had paid Rs 3000 as advance on 14-6-1979, at the time of entering into the agreement Ext. P-1. PW 1 in his evidence has further deposed that Defendant 1 had agreed to deliver title deeds of the suit premises to him; that Defendant 1 had agreed to sell the suit premises free from all encumbrances; that the final sale was to be completed by 13-11-1979, by which time Defendant 1 had agreed to free the suit premises from all encumbrances; that after entering into the agreement Ext. P-1, Defendant 1 informed PW 1 that the title deeds were with the moneylender; and accordingly on 5-10-1979 PW 1 paid a further sum of Rs 1000 to the first defendant to enable him to get back the title deeds. PW 1 in his evidence has further deposed that he had given legal notices on 5-11-1979 and 9-11-1979 calling upon Defendant 1 to complete the sale; that, however, Defendant 1 had failed to carry out his contractual obligations and in the circumstances PW 1 instituted the suit for specific performance.

    19. On behalf of Defendant 1, DW 1 was examined. DW 1 is the husband of Defendant 2. DW 1 is the constituted attorney of Defendant 2. DW 1 deposed in his evidence that before entering into the conveyance Ext. P-17, Defendant 1 had informed DW 1 that Ext. P-1 was executed on account of coercion and threats given by PW 1. This evidence has been rightly relied upon by the High Court to come to the conclusion that Defendant 2 had notice of Ext. P-1 when she entered into conveyance, Ext. P-17, on 29-11-1979. DW 1 has not given any reason as to why there is no reference to Ext. D-4 and Ext. P-1 in the conveyance Ext. P-17. DW 1 has not produced any evidence to show that Defendant 1 had extended the time to complete the sale under Ext. D-4, as alleged by Defendant 2. In the circumstances the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion, on the above evidence, that Defendant 2 has failed to prove that she was a bona fide purchaser of the suit premises for value without notice.

    20. Lastly, the evidence on record indicates that Ext. P-17 was a nominal sale. It was executed in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim. In this connection, the evidence on record shows that the signatures of the vendor on Ext. D-4 do not tally with the signatures with Ext. P-17. There were two attesting witnesses who were examined on behalf of the defendants. Both the attesting witnesses have deposed that the signatures of Defendant 1 on Ext. D-4 did not tally with the signatures on Ext. P-17. Therefore, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that Ext. D-4 was a concocted document. In the circumstances, we do not see any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the High Court.

    21. As stated above, it was urged on behalf of Defendant 2 that the present case falls under Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; that in the present case, the family of Defendant 2 is in possession of the suit premises for the last couple of years; that the performance of the contract Ext. P-1 would involve hardship on the defendant whereas its non-performance would involve no hardship on the plaintiff. We do not find any merit in this argument.

    22. In the case of Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao AIR 1965 SC 1405, (1965) 2 SCR 221 it has been held that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; that in cases where one of the three circumstances mentioned in Section 20(2) is established, no question of discretion arises. Hence, in this case, we are required to examine, on facts, whether the circumstances in Section 20(2)(a) or Section 20(2)(b) are established.

    23. In the case of P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu (2004) 6 SCC 649 it has been held that Explanation I appended to Section 20 clearly stipulates that mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature would not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Section 20(2).

    24. Applying the above tests to the facts of the present case, we find that Defendant 2 was aware of the plaintiff's possession in the suit premises as a tenant. Defendant 2 had filed, in the Court of Small Causes, Bangalore, HRC No. 10561 of 1981 for eviction of the plaintiff herein, under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. A bare reading of the order dated 14-10-1985 passed by the Small Cause Court in the above eviction suit indicates that Defendant 2 was put to notice that in case the plaintiff succeeds in the suit for specific performance, Defendant 2 will have to vacate. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the second defendant was not in a position to foresee the ensuing hardship. Hence, Section 20(2)(b) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In any event, as stated above, Defendant 2 had notice of Ext. P-1 when she entered into the conveyance Ext. P-17.

    25. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

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    Sargunam (Dead) By Lr. v. Chidambaram And Another
    (Oct 7, 2004)