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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 574
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 574
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Six family members—Dharambir, Joginder Singh, Karambir, their brothers Jagbir Singh and Jasbir Singh, and their mother Vanaspati—were charged with conspiring to murder Dalbir, Vijender and Smt. Kitabo in Village Mayyar, Haryana. The killings occurred on 29 June 2000 at about 10:30 p.m. Although the first information report was lodged by accused Dharambir, the investigation concluded that he and two others were the assailants.

The Sessions Judge, Hissar, convicted Dharambir, Joginder and Karambir under Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Dharambir and Joginder received the death penalty, whereas Karambir was sentenced to life imprisonment; each was fined ₹25,000. The Punjab and Haryana High Court confirmed the convictions but commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. Two separate Supreme Court appeals followed: (i) Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 2003 by the convicted persons and (ii) Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 2003 by informant Prem Sagar challenging the commutation. Joginder died pending appeal, causing his appeal to abate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the convictions of Dharambir and Karambir for the three murders were sustainable on the evidence, particularly the testimony of eyewitness PW-15 Prem Sagar.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in commuting the death sentences of Dharambir and Joginder to life imprisonment, given the “rarest of rare” doctrine governing capital punishment in India.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Accused)

  • Eyewitness PW-15’s testimony was unreliable because his post-incident conduct was implausible (e.g., walking long distances despite available transport).
  • No direct role was proven against Karambir; Section 34 IPC was wrongly invoked as PW-15 stated Dharambir, not Karambir, caused Vijender’s fall.
  • The High Court correctly commuted the death sentences in light of mitigating circumstances.

State's Arguments

  • Section 34 IPC applied to Karambir; the reference to Dharambir causing Vijender’s fall was a mere slip of tongue by PW-15 and should not exonerate Karambir.

Informant's Arguments

  • The brutal murder of three persons warranted retention of the death penalty; the High Court erred in reducing the sentence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised PW-15’s testimony, finding it “cogent, truthful and trustworthy.” His familial relationship to both victims and accused reduced the likelihood of false implication, and extensive cross-examination revealed no material inconsistencies. Consequently, the conviction of Dharambir was upheld.

Regarding Karambir, the Court noted that PW-15 unequivocally attributed Vijender’s fall—and the associated fatal assault—to Dharambir alone. The prosecution did not seek clarification or recall the witness before the trial court. In these circumstances, applying Section 34 IPC to Karambir was unwarranted; his conviction was therefore set aside and he was ordered to be released.

On sentencing, the Court reaffirmed the principle that life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception, reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases. Although multiple murders were committed, the High Court had weighed mitigating factors. Finding no compelling reason to disturb that assessment, the Supreme Court declined to reinstate the death penalty.

Holding and Implications

Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 2003: Allowed in part—Karambir is acquitted and directed to be released; Dharambir’s conviction and life sentence are affirmed. (Joginder’s appeal had already abated due to his death.)

Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 2003: Dismissed—the commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment remains undisturbed.

Implications: Karambir gains immediate freedom absent other pending cases; Dharambir continues to serve a life sentence. The judgment re-emphasises the Supreme Court’s adherence to the “rarest of rare” framework without creating new substantive precedent.

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    Prem Sagar v. Dharambir And Others

    Arijit Pasayat, J.— These two appeals are interlinked being directed against the same judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. While Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 2003 is by the convicted persons, Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 2003 is by the informant. The three appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 2003 have been found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). While accused-appellants Dharambir and Joginder were awarded death sentence by the learned Sessions Judge, Hissar, appellant Karambir was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Each of the accused persons was asked to pay a fine of Rs 25,000. In appeal before the High Court, the death sentence was commuted to life sentence in case of accused Dharambir and Joginder. The convictions, however, were maintained. It is to be noted that accused Joginder, as per the information given to this Court by the learned counsel for the appellants, has died during pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appeal so far as he is concerned, has abated.

    2. The background facts are as under:

    Appellants (Dharambir, Joginder Singh and Karambir) along with their two real brothers Jagbir Singh and Jasbir Singh and their mother Vanaspati, in all six accused, were charged-sheeted by the learned trial court on the allegation that about 7-8 days prior to the date of occurrence i.e 29-6-2000, in the area of Village Mayyar, resolved to do an illegal act — to commit the murder of Dalbir, Vijender and Smt Kitabo and they murdered them in pursuance of the said agreement and thereby committed offence under Section 120-B IPC. The second charge against the appellants was that on 29-6-2000 at about 10.30 p.m in the area of the said village and in pursuance of their conspiracy, they murdered Dalbir, Vijender and Smt Kitabo and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. Thirdly, on the same day, time and place, appellant Dharambir in furtherance of the common intention of co-accused Joginder and Karambir committed murder by intentionally causing the death of Dalbir and thereby he committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC while his co-accused Joginder and Karambir committed an offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC. Fourthly, on the same day and in the said area of Village Mayyar and in furtherance of the common intention Dharambir and Joginder committed murder by intentionally causing the death of Kitabo and thereby they committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Fifthly, on the same day, time and place and in furtherance of their common intention, all the three appellants did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of Vijender and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC.

    3. Interestingly, in this case the first information report was lodged by accused-appellant Dharambir before ASI Vinod Kumar (PW 12) but during investigation he found that Dharambir along with two others were the assailants and after investigation charge-sheet was placed.

    4. During trial and before the High Court, the prosecution relied on the version of Prem Sagar (PW 15) who claimed to be an eyewitness. The trial court and the High Court found his evidence to be credible, cogent and acting on it directed conviction and imposed sentence as aforesaid. In view of the death sentence imposed on two persons, reference was made to the High Court for confirmation under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). As noted above, the High Court converted the death sentence into life sentence. While the accused persons have questioned the correctness of the judgment so far as their conviction and sentence are concerned, the informant has contended that the High Court was not justified in altering the death sentence to life sentence. It is accepted by the learned counsel for the State that no appeal has been preferred by the State for alteration of death sentence to life sentence.

    5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the evidence of PW 15 does not inspire confidence, and is highly doubtful. His conduct after the occurrence, when he is supposed to have travelled his village side at great distance on foot, when transport facilities were available, to have returned to the place of occurrence on foot or by an inconvenient mode of transport is highly unusual and lacks credibility. It is further submitted that so far as accused Karambir is concerned, the prosecution has not established his role. He has been convicted by application of Section 34 IPC. In fact, PW 15 has clearly stated that he was not present when Kitabo and Dalbir were assaulted. He is supposed to have followed deceased Vijender and to have prevented him while he was trying to run away. PW 15 in his cross-examination has clearly accepted that it was accused Dharambir who caused his fall. It is also submitted that in the circumstances noticed by the High Court there is no scope for interference with the life sentence awarded. The learned counsel for the State submitted that Section 34 is clearly applicable to the accused Karambir. The slip of tongue committed by PW 15 to say that accused Dharambir had caused the fall of deceased Vinod cannot be magnified to such an extent as to rule out the involvement of accused Karambir. The learned counsel for the informant appellant Prem Sagar submitted that in a case of such brutal murders where three persons lost their lives, death sentence had rightly been awarded by the trial court and the High Court should not have interfered.

    6. We have perused the judgment and the evidence on record. The evidence of PW 15 has been rightly acted upon by the trial court and the High Court. This witness is a relative of both the deceased and the accused. Therefore, there is no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the accused persons. Added to that in spite of the elaborate cross-examination nothing fragile in his testimony has surfaced. His evidence is cogent, truthful and trustworthy. Therefore, the conviction so far as accused Dharambir is concerned, cannot be faulted. Similar is the case of accused Joginder in respect of whom the appeal has abated because of his death. So far as accused Karambir is concerned, in view of the scenario as highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellants, the prosecution has not linked him with the occurrence in a manner as to attract the applicability of Section 34 IPC. When the eyewitness (PW 15) himself has stated that it was accused Dharambir who caused the fall of deceased Vijender, it was not for the High Court to say it was a slip of tongue. Had it really been so, different course was to be adopted before the trial court, which the prosecution did not do. That being so, the conviction of accused-appellant Karambir cannot be maintained and is set aside. He be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

    7. Coming to the appeal filed by the informant, we find that the High Court has taken note of various decisions of this Court and the principles laid down as to when a death sentence would be appropriate. Brutality is inbuilt in every murder but in the case of every murder death sentence is not imposed. Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is the exception. The latter sentence is imposed in rarest of rare cases. Taking note of the mitigating circumstances indicated by the High Court, we do not find any scope for interference with the life sentence awarded and to alter the same to death sentence.

    8. In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 242 of 2003 is allowed to the extent of acquittal so far as accused Karambir is concerned, but conviction of accused Dharambir is affirmed. Criminal Appeal No. 243 of 2003 filed by the informant Prem Sagar is dismissed.

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    Prem Sagar v. Dharambir And Others
    (Oct 29, 2003)