Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
  • Section 21 of the old Act
  • Section 21 of the Act
  • Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
  • one of the prohibited drugs under the Act
  • Section 2(xi) of the Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
  • Section 21 of the old Act
  • Section 21 of the Act
  • Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
  • one of the prohibited drugs under the Act
  • Section 2(xi) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 3 August 1999, PW-1 (Sub-Inspector, Nadakkavu Police Station) received specific information that a middle-aged woman was selling brown sugar behind the Industrial Estate canteen in Sathinagar Colony, Kannur. After informing his superiors, he proceeded to the location with a lady constable (PW-2). The appellant was found at the spot, informed of her right under Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), and searched by PW-2 after allegedly waiving that right. A purse containing four packets (total 750 mg) of brown sugar was recovered, weighed, sampled, sealed, and sent for chemical examination, which confirmed the substance as an impure form of heroin.

A charge sheet was filed for an offence under Section 21 of the NDPS Act (as it then stood). The Special Judge (NDPS Cases), Vadakara, convicted the appellant, sentencing her to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1 lakh (with three months’ simple imprisonment in default). The High Court of Kerala dismissed her appeal. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the date of seizure (3-8-1999), possession or sale of “brown sugar” fell within the ambit of Section 21 of the NDPS Act, given the statutory definitions and Schedule then in force.
  2. Whether the small quantity of 750 mg could exempt the appellant from liability, particularly in light of a later (19-10-2001) notification distinguishing “small” and “commercial” quantities.
  3. Whether alleged discrepancies between the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, and the lack of support from independent panch witnesses, undermined the prosecution’s proof of seizure and possession.
  4. Whether the sealing and chain-of-custody of the contraband were sufficiently proved.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • At the time of the incident, the statutory definition in Section 2(xi) and the then Schedule did not list “brown sugar”; offences under Section 21 were confined to manufacture or preparation, not sale.
  • The 750 mg quantity was for personal consumption and should not attract the severe penalty meant for commercial quantities.
  • Contradictions between PW-1 and PW-2 regarding who wrote or prepared the seizure mahazar, and about the sealing process, cast doubt on the prosecution case.
  • Independent panch witnesses did not corroborate the seizure, weakening its credibility.

Respondent State’s Arguments

  • Sections 2(xvi)(b) and 2(xi) classified brown sugar (an opium derivative containing heroin) as contraband; possession for sale was clearly an offence under the then Section 21.
  • The later 2001 notification creating “small” and “commercial” categories was prospective and inapplicable to an offence committed in 1999.
  • Alleged contradictions between PW-1 and PW-2 were minor and did not impair the reliability of the seizure.
  • Convictions can rest on official witnesses when their evidence is credible; absence of supportive panch testimony is not fatal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s statutory construction argument, holding that the definitions in Sections 2(xi) and 2(xvi)(b) clearly covered brown sugar, a heroin derivative, and that possession for sale was punishable under Section 21 even before the 2001 notification. The Court emphasized that legislative amendments distinguishing small and commercial quantities were prospective and thus irrelevant.

Alleged testimonial contradictions were deemed immaterial. The Court reconciled PW-1’s statement that a constable “wrote” the mahazar with PW-2’s assertion that PW-1 “prepared” it, explaining that PW-1 dictated while the constable physically penned the document. The existence of another purse later deposited with the jailor did not undermine the seizure because only one handbag containing the contraband was found at the scene, properly sealed, and sent for chemical analysis. The Chemical Examiner confirmed intact seals, validating chain-of-custody.

The Court reiterated its settled position that non-supportive panch witnesses do not automatically vitiate seizures where official testimony is otherwise trustworthy. Finding the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 credible, it concluded that the prosecution proved possession of a prohibited drug beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed; the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Judge, affirmed by the High Court, were upheld.

Immediate consequence: the appellant remains liable to serve 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and pay the Rs 1 lakh fine (or undergo three months’ simple imprisonment in default). The Supreme Court directed payment of Rs 750 to the amicus curiae for assistance rendered. No new legal precedent was established; the judgment reinforces existing interpretations of Section 21 and evidentiary standards under the NDPS Act.

    P.P Fathima v. State Of Kerala .

    N. Santosh Hegde, J.— The appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act as it stood then (the Act) by the Special Judge (NDPS Cases), Vadakara, and was sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years, and a fine of Rs 1 lakh was imposed; in default the appellant was directed to undergo further sentence of simple imprisonment for 3 months. The appellant's appeal to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam as against the judgment of the said Special Court came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment of the High Court. Hence, the appellant is in appeal against the said judgment.

    2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that on 3-8-1999 PW 1 Sub-Inspector of Police of Police Station Nadakkavu received information that a middle-aged lady was selling brown sugar in Sathinagar Colony, Kannur behind the canteen of the Industrial Estate. On receipt of the said information PW 1 sent a report to his superior officers and proceeded to the place mentioned in the information along with a lady constable. They found the appellant at the place as mentioned in the information. Then on the suspicion that the appellant was carrying contraband goods, PW 1 expressed his desire to search the appellant. He informed her of her right under Section 50 of the Act to be searched by a gazetted officer or a Magistrate which right the appellant allegedly waived. On such waiver, the lady constable, PW 2 accompanying the search squad, searched the appellant and found in a purse carried by the appellant 750 mg of brown sugar packed in four packets. The said contraband was then weighed, sample taken and sealed in the presence of panch witnesses. On an analysis of the sample sent to the Chemical Examiner, it was found that the contraband contained impure heroin which was known in the market as brown sugar. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was laid for an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Act as stated above. The trial court as well as the High Court have found the appellant guilty.

    3. In this appeal, Ms Santosh Singh, learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae, contended that as the law stood on the date of the seizure, sale of brown sugar was not an offence because such an offence was confined to manufacture and preparation only. For the said purpose she relied upon the definition found in Section 2(xi) of the Act and also submitted that the Schedule at that time did not include brown sugar as one of the contraband articles. She also alternatively contended that since the quantity of brown sugar allegedly seized from the appellant was only 750 mg, the same cannot be treated as a quantity kept for commercial use and could only be for personal consumption. She further contended that there is a discrepancy in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in regard to the seizure of the contraband as also in regard to the factum of the contraband being sealed at the time of seizure. She further contended that independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case.

    4. Mr John Mathew, learned counsel appearing for the respondent State submitted that Sections 2(xvi)(b) and 2(xi) show that the seized brown sugar contraband even under the Act then applicable, being an opium derivative, is treated as a contraband article, if possessed for sale. He also pointed out from the definition that the possession of the said contraband was an offence even under Section 21 of the old Act. The learned counsel rebutting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the contradictions pointed out by the learned counsel in regard to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 are of such minor nature that it would not in any manner affect the credibility of the seizure of the contraband from the appellant. So far as the quantum of contraband seized from the appellant is concerned, under the law then applicable, even 750 mg of brown sugar being a prohibited drug, possession thereof attracted punishment imposed under Section 21 of the Act, as it stood then. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that both the courts below have chosen to place reliance on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the fact that independent eyewitnesses to the seizure did not support the prosecution case would not in any manner make the prosecution case any less acceptable.

    5. Having heard arguments of the learned counsel and having perused the records, we are in agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent State. In our opinion, there is no substance in the legal argument of the learned counsel that Section 21 is not attracted to the facts of the case or that the seized goods are not contraband drugs as contended by the learned counsel. A perusal of the definition section clearly shows that brown sugar contains heroin which is a prohibited drug, possession of which is punishable under Section 21 of the Act. The argument that the quantity of brown sugar possessed by the appellant did not amount to an offence, is based on a notification issued on 19-10-2001 which made a distinction between small quantity and commercial quantity in its Schedule. That notification will also not apply to the facts of the case because that notification came much later than the date of offence which was on 3-8-1999, nearly 2 years before the issuance of that notification. At the relevant point of time this distinction between small quantity and commercial quantity not being there, the benefit of a subsequent notification would not be available to the appellant because she was convicted by the Special Judge of the offence as constituted before the notification in question came into force.

    6. Even the so-called contradictions in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, in our opinion, are not at all material as to make the prosecution case unacceptable. As a matter of fact, there are no contradictions at all in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. PW 1 had stated in his evidence that the mahazar in question was written by a Police Constable while PW 2 stated that the mahazar of the seizure was prepared by PW 1 himself. We find no contradiction in these two statements because the constable in question obviously prepared the mahazar on the dictation of PW 1 which PW 2 interpreted to mean that the mahazar was prepared by PW 1. Preparation of mahazar and writing down of the contents of the mahazar are two different things, therefore, there will be no contradiction in terms when PW 1 says that the mahazar was written by the constable and PW 2 says that the mahazar was prepared by PW 1. Assuming that there is any such contradiction, we are of the opinion that this is not a material contradiction affecting the merits of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that from the evidence on record it is seen that while only one handbag was seized at the time of seizure when the appellant was arrested, from the record it is seen that one more purse was deposited with the jailor at the time the appellant was sent into custody. From the seizure mahazar we see that a purse was seized from the appellant which contained 750 mg of brown sugar. This part of the seizure has been accepted by both the courts below but from the record it is seen that at the time when the appellant was sent into custody she had also handed over a purse to the jail authorities. From this the learned counsel for the appellant wants to contend that the seizure in question cannot be accepted. We are not inclined to accept this argument addressed on behalf of the appellant also. It is the prosecution case that at the time of the seizure the appellant was carrying one handbag and that handbag contained the quantity of brown sugar seized. It is true, at that point of time, on search nothing more was found, hence, that handbag as well as the contraband were seized by the IO. Therefore, so far as the seizure of the contraband is concerned, the same stands proved and the factum of the appellant handing over one more handbag to the jailor even if it is true will not in any way affect the genuineness of the seizure. The contraband which was found in the purse carried by the appellant was properly sealed and sent to the Chemical Examiner who found the same to be a derivative of heroin locally known as brown sugar which is one of the prohibited drugs under the Act, therefore the prosecution having established the fact that the appellant on the said date was found in possession of the said contraband, the factum that there was another bag with the appellant at the time when she went into custody, would not in any manner affect the seizure made by the investigating agency, therefore, the said argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is also liable to be rejected. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the seized goods were not properly sealed has only to be mentioned to be rejected because from the record it is clear that the contraband was put in a plastic bag and was sealed and thereafter a label containing the signatures of the appellant, the panch witnesses and the IO was put on the same. The Chemical Examiner in his report has clearly stated that he received the sample of the contraband in the same sealed condition, therefore, this argument also has no merit.

    7. The learned counsel then contended that in view of the fact that the panch witness to the seizure has not supported the prosecution case, the seizure cannot be accepted. We have repeatedly held that the mere fact that a panch witness does not support the prosecution case by itself would not make the prosecution case any less acceptable, if otherwise the court is satisfied from the material on record and from the evidence of the seizing authority that such seizure was genuinely made. In the instant case also we are satisfied that from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 the seizure has been proved by the prosecution. Therefore, this argument also fails.

    8. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

    9. We place on record our appreciation for the services rendered by the learned amicus curiae and direct that a sum of Rs 750 be paid to her for her valuable assistance.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    P.P Fathima v. State Of Kerala .
    (Nov 4, 2003)