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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 32(3) and 32-F of the Act
  • Section 32-G of the Act
  • Section 43-A, Section 32 of the Act
  • Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Act)
  • Section 29(2) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2(6-A) of the Act
  • Section 29, declaration under Section 43-A and exemption certificate under Section 88-C of the Act
  • Section 32 of the Act, Section 31 read with Section 14 of the Act
  • Section 32 to 32-R of the Act
  • Section 32 read with Section 32-F of the Act
  • Chapter III of the Act
  • Section 43-A of the Act
  • the 1957 Land Reform Act (implied by 'Tillers' day')
  • Sections 32 and 32-F of the Act
  • Sections 32 to 32-R of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 32(3) and 32-F of the Act
  • Section 32-G of the Act
  • Section 43-A, Section 32 of the Act
  • Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Act)
  • Section 29(2) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2(6-A) of the Act
  • Section 29, declaration under Section 43-A and exemption certificate under Section 88-C of the Act
  • Section 32 of the Act, Section 31 read with Section 14 of the Act
  • Section 32 to 32-R of the Act
  • Section 32 read with Section 32-F of the Act
  • Chapter III of the Act
  • Section 43-A of the Act
  • the 1957 Land Reform Act (implied by 'Tillers' day')
  • Sections 32 and 32-F of the Act
  • Sections 32 to 32-R of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner–landlord owned agricultural lands situated in Village Arale, District Kolhapur. On the statutory “Tillers’ Day” (1 April 1957) the landlord was a minor, having been born on 18 February 1954. During the landlord’s minority, the tenant allegedly defaulted in paying rent for more than three consecutive agricultural years. Acting through his natural-guardian mother, the landlord:

  • Terminated the tenancy by a notice dated 17 January 1961 under Sections 31 and 14 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“the Act”).
  • Obtained an order for possession on 31 December 1969 in Tenancy Case No. 15 of 1969 under Section 29(2) of the Act.
  • Took physical possession on 26 May 1971.
  • Secured a finding under Section 43-A that the lands had been leased for sugar-cane cultivation, thereby excluding them from the protective provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R.
  • Obtained an exemption certificate under Section 88-C on 13 November 1972, the lands being classified as an “economic holding” with annual income not exceeding ₹1,500.

Each of these orders was affirmed successively in appeal and revision, culminating in dismissal of the tenant’s revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 23 October 1983.

Despite these final orders, the Additional Tahsildar-cum-Agricultural Lands Tribunal (ALT) initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 32-G to determine the tenant’s right to purchase the land. Finding that the tenancy had already been lawfully terminated and possession delivered, the ALT dropped the proceedings on 4 June 1978. The tenant’s appeal and revision were dismissed.

In Writ Petition No. 465 of 1984, however, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, relying on earlier Supreme Court decisions, held that the tenant had become a deemed purchaser on Tillers’ Day and remanded the matter to the ALT for fresh Section 32-G proceedings. The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether lands leased for sugar-cane cultivation and covered by an exemption certificate under Section 88-C are outside the scope of Sections 32 to 32-R, thereby precluding proceedings under Section 32-G.
  2. Whether the High Court could ignore final and unchallenged orders under Sections 29, 43-A and 88-C and revive the tenant’s purchase claim.
  3. Incidental (but left undecided): whether Tillers’ Day is postponed when the landlord is a minor.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Landlord

  • Because the landlord was a minor on Tillers’ Day, the statutory purchase, if any, stood postponed until one year after attaining majority.
  • Irrespective of that question, the lands had conclusively been declared:
    • Leased for sugar-cane cultivation (Section 43-A), and
    • Exempt as an economic holding (Section 88-C),
    • rendering Sections 32 to 32-R inapplicable and validating termination of tenancy and recovery of possession.
    • All relevant orders had attained finality; the High Court lacked jurisdiction to reopen them.

    Amicus Curiae (supporting the tenant’s position)

    • Chapter III of the Act contains no provision for postponing Tillers’ Day; the tenant became the deemed purchaser on 1 April 1957, with only the determination of price being postponed.

    Table of Precedents Cited

    Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
    Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457; (1965) 2 SCR 328 Effect of Tillers’ Day in conferring ownership on tenants and terminating the landlord-tenant relationship. Relied on by the High Court to hold that the tenant became a deemed purchaser on 1-4-1957; Supreme Court noted the case did not address the situation of a minor landlord.
    Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade, (1983) 3 SCC 437 Operation of Section 32 in favour of tenants. Also relied on by the High Court; Supreme Court distinguished it as not determinative of the present facts.
    Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi v. Ramchandra Tukaram, (2001) 8 SCC 616 Explained the Act’s policy of “land to the tiller” and the twofold strategy of deemed purchase and right to purchase. Cited by the Supreme Court only to outline the statutory scheme; not decisive of the appeal.

    Court's Reasoning and Analysis

    The Supreme Court chose not to decide the academic question of postponement of Tillers’ Day for a minor landlord. Instead, it allowed the appeal on alternative grounds:

    • Section 43-A Finding: Concurrent findings of all authorities, affirmed in revision, established that the lands were leased for sugar-cane cultivation. Under Section 43-A, a long list of provisions—including Sections 31 to 31-D and 32 to 32-R—does not apply to such leases.
    • Section 88-C Certificate: The landlord had secured an exemption certificate confirming that the lands constituted an “economic holding” with annual income below ₹1,500. This likewise removed the holding from the ambit of Sections 32 to 32-R.
    • Finality of Prior Orders: Orders under Sections 29 (termination and possession), 43-A and 88-C, and civil court decrees granting perpetual injunctions had all attained finality. The tenant had not challenged them in the High Court proceedings.
    • Error of High Court: The High Court wrongly assumed that some of the lands were not under sugar-cane cultivation and overlooked the binding nature of the earlier orders. Consequently, its direction to reopen Section 32-G proceedings was unsustainable.

    Holding and Implications

    APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment dated 17 November 1997 SET ASIDE; orders of the authorities under the Act RESTORED.

    Practical effect: the landlord’s possession remains undisturbed, and the dropped Section 32-G proceedings are not to be revived, extinguishing the tenant’s claim to purchase the land. The Court declined to establish any precedent on postponement of Tillers’ Day for minor landlords; its ruling is confined to the impact of final orders under Sections 43-A and 88-C on subsequent purchase proceedings.

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    Ramakant Dattatraya Deshpande v. Dadu Bhagoji Patil (Dead) Through Lrs. And Others

    D.M Dharmadhikari, J.— The petitioner is “landlord” of the lands involved, within the meaning of provisions contained in Chapter III of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The petitioner feels aggrieved by the impugned order dated 17-11-1997 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, whereby reversing concurrent findings and orders of the three forums under the Act, the case has been remanded to the original authority i.e Additional Tahsildar-cum-ALT, Karvir, District Kolhapur for deciding afresh the proceedings initiated under Section 32-G of the Act.

    2. The provisions of the Act came up for consideration of this Court in the cases of Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar AIR 1965 SC 1457, (1965) 2 SCR 328, Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437 and Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi v. Ramchandra Tukaram (2001) 8 SCC 616. In the case of Balchandra Anantrao Rakvi (2001) 8 SCC 616 the scheme of the Act was examined and it was stated:

    The scheme of the Act gives effect to the policy “land for the tiller” by clothing all the tenants with the right of ownership of the lands cultivated by them personally. A twofold strategy is adopted in the Act — first, by making every tenant a deemed purchaser of the land personally cultivated by him under Section 32 of the Act and secondly, by conferring on the tenant, in specified cases, the right to purchase the land from the landlord, under Section 32 of the Act, held by him under personal cultivation.

    3. The case of the landlord before the authorities was that on “Tillers' day” i.e on 1-4-1957, he was a minor and, therefore, in his case the “Tillers' day” gets postponed till the expiry of period of one year from the date he attained majority. Before the authorities under the Act, he had proved his date of birth from the school leaving certificate to be 18-2-1954 and, therefore, he became a major on 18-2-1972. The landlord's case is that during his minority the original respondent tenant (now deceased and represented by his legal representatives) had defaulted in payment of agreed rent consecutively for more than three agricultural years. His tenancy, therefore, was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 read with Section 14 of the Act by notice dated 17-1-1961. After termination of the tenancy, the landlord, through his natural guardian mother, instituted proceedings under Section 29(2) of the Act in the Court of Tenancy Aval Karkun, Taluka Karvir, (registered as Tenancy Case No. 15 of 1969) and obtained an order dated 31-12-1969 in his favour directing the tenant to hand over possession of the agricultural lands involved being Revenue Surveys Nos. 60 and 61 (now Block No. 131) in Village Arale. It is submitted that in the order passed in proceedings for obtaining possession of the land, it was held that as the lands were given for sugarcane cultivation, in accordance with provisions of Section 43-A, the provisions contained in Section 32 of the Act conferring status of “deemed purchaser” on the tenant on the “Tillers' day” were not applicable.

    4. The order dated 31-12-1969 of the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Taluka Karvir, allowing application of the landlord for grant of possession on the basis of termination of tenancy was challenged by the tenant in appeal, which was allowed. The landlord then preferred a revision petition before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which was allowed by order dated 13-8-1973. The Tribunal held in favour of the landlord that the lands involved having been given for sugarcane cultivation, the provisions of Section 32 conferring status of “deemed purchaser” were not attracted. It was also held that as the landlord was a minor and during minority through his guardian had terminated the tenancy and obtained possession of the lands, the tenant did not become “deemed purchaser” under Section 32 of the Act.

    5. On behalf of the landlord reliance is also placed on the order passed in his favour on 13-11-1972 by Tenancy Aval Karkun, Taluka Karvir, whereby on his application under Section 88-C of the Act, exemption certificate was granted to the landlord on a finding that the lands comprised in survey numbers constitute “an economic holding” as defined in Section 2(6-A) of the Act of which the total annual income to the landlord, including the rent from such land, does not exceed Rs 1500. It is submitted that the lands, which are “economic holdings” having “total annual income not exceeding Rs 1500”, on grant of a certificate to that effect, are exempt from application of provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R of the Act and on such holdings a cultivating tenant can claim no status of “deemed purchaser” on the “Tillers' day”. Against the order dated 13-11-1972 granting certificate of exemption under Section 88-C of the Act, the tenant went in appeal to the Court of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Tulshi Project (I), Kolhapur and the said appeal was dismissed in default by order passed on 14-4-1976.

    6. Despite the abovementioned orders directing grant of possession of the lands on termination of tenancy of the tenant to the landlord, declaration of exemption under Section 43-A of the Act for the lands being on lease for sugarcane cultivation and grant of exemption certificate to the lands being economic holdings having less-than-prescribed annual income, Additional Tahsildar-cum-ALT, Karvir, initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 32-G of the Act to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase of the land in accordance with the provisions of Section 32 read with Section 32-F of the Act. The landlord produced all the previous orders mentioned above in his favour showing non-applicability of the provisions in Sections 32 and 32-F of the Act, termination of tenancy and obtaining of the possession of the land. On the above facts having been pointed out, the Additional Tahsildar-cum-ALT, Karvir recorded the fact that the lands having already been taken possession of on 26-5-1971 by the landlord after due termination of the tenancy and the proceedings having become final, there was no justification to proceed under Section 32-G of the Act. The Additional Tahsildar, therefore, dropped the proceedings by order dated 4-6-1978. Against the said order, Appeal No. 39 of 1979 preferred by the tenant to the Special Land Acquisition Officer (I), Kolhapur was rejected on 23-10-1981. The tenant thereafter approached by way of a revision petition the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur which also by its order dated 23-10-1983 dismissed the revision of the tenant and upheld the claim of the landlord by recording in his order the following conclusions:

    “After hearing both the sides and going through the record, it is an admitted fact that the tenant's actual possession is taken by the landlord under default proceeding. The contention now raised that on 1-4-1957 the tenant had become deemed purchaser ought to have been taken in previous proceedings and if negatived, rightly or wrongly, as no further action is taken in that proceedings, it is binding on both the sides. If it was not taken in present inquiry it cannot be raised as there is record to show that default proceeding. There is also a difficulty in the way of the tenant, as could be seen, that the lands appear to have been leased for the purpose of sugarcane crop, p. 71 MRT order in No. KP−394 of 1972 decided on 13-8-1973 in default proceeding. So it has become final. So there is no merit in the present revision. Hence the following order is passed:
    Revision application is dismissed.”

    7. The tenant challenged the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and all other orders of the lower authorities confirmed by it in Writ Petition No. 465 of 1984 in the High Court of Bombay. The High Court relied on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar AIR 1965 SC 1457, (1965) 2 SCR 328 and Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437. By the impugned judgment it held that on the “Tillers' day” i.e on 1-4-1957, by operation of law in Section 32 of the Act the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased even though the landlord was a minor and after the “Tillers' day” his tenancy was terminated. According to the High Court, all the proceedings of termination of tenancy have to be ignored as invalid in law. The High Court also observed at one place in its judgment that not all the lands involved were found to have been leased for sugarcane cultivation. The High Court, therefore, set aside all the orders passed by the authorities under the Act and remanded the case to the original authority i.e Additional Tahsildar-cum-ALT, Karvir to take up fresh proceedings under Section 32-G of the Act.

    8. Learned counsel Shri U.U Lalit appearing for the landlord made strenuous effort by taking us through the scheme of the Act and various provisions of the Act to contend that where the landlord is a minor the statutory effect of deemed purchase on “Tillers' day” under Section 32 gets postponed by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 31 and other provisions in the said Chapter III, till expiry of period of one year from the date of attainment of majority by the landlord. In the alternative, the learned counsel for the landlord submitted that the order passed granting delivery of possession to the landlord under Section 29, on termination of tenancy, declaration under Section 43-A that the lands were leased for sugarcane cultivation and the exemption certificate granted under Section 88-C for the lands as “economic holdings” having prescribed limited annual income, had all attained finality. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in annulling all those orders of original, appellate and revisional authorities and setting aside the orders dropping proceedings under Section 32-G of the Act. It is submitted that the tenant had lost his right to purchase land by paying price to the landlord and, in fact, no such right was ever claimed by the tenant in initial proceedings instituted by the landlord under the Act.

    9. The original tenant died during pendency of appeal in this Court and his legal representatives have been duly substituted on record. They have been served with notices of the appeal but no one appears to represent them. Since legal questions were involved and the impugned order of the High Court was in favour of the tenant, on our request, learned Senior Advocate Shri Ashok Desai appeared as amicus curiae to assist the Court. We thankfully acknowledge his assistance. The learned amicus curiae submitted that the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act do not provide or contemplate postponement of “Tillers' day” even in case of a minor landlord. According to him, what is postponed is merely the formality of obtaining ownership by the tenant on payment of purchase price in accordance with provisions contained in Sections 32(3) and 32-F of the Act.

    10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we have looked into the record of this case and also examined the relevant provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act. We have also gone through the decisions cited at the Bar. We have come to the conclusion that the main legal contention advanced as to the postponement or otherwise of the “Tillers' day” under Section 32 in case of a minor landlord is not required to be decided by us. The three decisions of this Court cited before us do not directly cover the point because those were not the cases on statutory effect of Section 32 on “Tillers' day” in a case where the landlord is a minor.

    11. In our considered opinion, the landlord deserves to succeed in this appeal on the alternative grounds. There is clear concurrent finding of the authorities under the Act that the lands involved were given for sugarcane cultivation and to leases of such lands, by virtue of provisions contained in Section 43-A, the provisions mentioned in the said section including in Section 32 are not applicable. The relevant provision reads:

    “43-A. Some of the provisions not to apply to leases of land obtained by industrial or commercial undertakings, certain cooperative societies or for cultivation of sugarcane or fruits or flowers.—(1) The provisions of Sections 4-B, 8, 9, 9-A, 9-B, 9-C, 10, 10-A, 14, 16, 17, 17-A, 17-B, 18, 27, 31 to 31-D (both inclusive), 32 to 32-R (both inclusive), 33-A, 33-B, 33-C, 43, 63, 63-A, 64 and 65, shall not apply to—
    (a) land leased to or held by any industrial or commercial undertaking (other than a cooperative society) which in the opinion of the State Government bona fide carries on any industrial or commercial operations and which is approved by the State Government;
    (b) leases of land granted to any bodies or persons other than those mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of livestock;
    (c) to lands held or leased by such cooperative societies as are approved in the prescribed manner, by the State Government which have for their objects the improvement of the economic and social conditions of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture and allied pursuits.”

    (underlining to add emphasis)

    12. We have also mentioned above that the landlord had instituted proceedings under Section 88-C of the Act seeking certificate of exemption of the lands from operation of the provisions contained in Sections 32 to 32-R of the Act as the lands were “economic holdings” within the definition of the Act having annual income not exceeding Rs 1500. On the said application under Section 88-C of the Act, a certificate was issued in favour of the landlord. The proceedings declaring the lands to have been granted for sugarcane cultivation under Section 43-A and the certificate granted under Section 88-C of the Act clearly took out the lands in question from the purview of provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R of the Act. The above orders in favour of the landlord under Sections 43-A and 88-C were taken up by the tenant to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and they have attained finality in favour of the landlord. Those orders were not separately challenged by the tenant in further proceedings before the High Court. Since the above orders under Section 43-A and Section 88-C have become final and conclusive between the parties, the authorities under the Act rightly held that proceedings under Section 32-G, to enable the tenant to purchase the land as “deemed purchaser” under Section 32, were liable to be dropped. It has also come on record that during his minority the landlord, through his natural guardian, had terminated the tenancy of the tenant on the ground of continuous defaults in payment of rent. He thereafter instituted proceedings under Section 29(2) of the Act and obtained possession of the lands. When the tenant tried to interfere with the possession of the landlord, a civil suit was filed in the Court of Second Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Kolhapur being Civil Suit No. 464 of 1971 and a decree of permanent injunction was obtained against the tenant by judgment dated 30-4-1974. A second suit being Civil Suit No. 1005 of 1977 was again filed by the landlord against the tenant and others for grant of a perpetual injunction against them not to cause interference and obstruction in the possession of the landlord over the lands. The second suit was decreed on 21-7-1986. These decrees of the civil court have also attained finality.

    13. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to go into the purely academic question as to whether in case of a minor landlord, “Tillers' day” under Section 32 of the Act gets postponed or not and whether such a minor landlord during his minority, after “Tillers' day” can terminate the tenancy for default in payment of rent or not.

    14. In our considered opinion, the High Court was clearly in error in observing that not all the lands have been found to have been leased for sugarcane cultivation. It also committed a serious error in overlooking the fact that all the proceedings undertaken by the landlord for terminating the tenancy, obtaining possession under Section 29, declaration under Section 43-A and exemption certificate under Section 88-C of the Act had attained finality. The High Court, therefore, grossly erred in quashing all the orders of the authorities under the Act and remanding the matter to the original authority for proceeding afresh under Section 32-G of the Act.

    15. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 17-11-1997 is hereby set aside and the orders of the authorities below under the Act are restored. The respondents are unrepresented and, therefore, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

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    Ramakant Dattatraya Deshpande v. Dadu Bhagoji Patil (Dead) Through Lrs. And Others
    (Dec 12, 2003)