Ashoke Bhan, J.— The appellant Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “the Authority”) formulated a scheme known as “Registration Scheme on New Pattern — 1979” (for short “the Scheme”) to build and sell MIG/LIG and Janta flats so as to be within the reach of the common man.
2. Registration for the Scheme opened on 1-9-1979. In the Scheme the illustrated price of various categories of flats were mentioned. The likely cost of MIG flats with which we are concerned in these appeals was indicated to be Rs 42,000. On 30-9-1979, registration was closed. About 1,70,000 persons registered themselves in the Scheme. In 1981, allotment started taking place by draw of lots based on randomised allotment. The cost of flats was worked out after taking into account the prevailing rate of land by the Lt. Governor. The cost of construction was worked out by dividing the cost incurred in construction of a pocket of flats by a number of flats in that pocket. Clauses 13 and 14 of the brochure are as follows:
“13. The plinth area of the flats to be constructed under new pattern is likely to be as under:
MIG between 60 to 65 sq m
LIG about 38 sq m
Janta up to 24 sq m
The accommodation in the flats under different categories will be as under:
MIG — one living room, 2 bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and WC and open courtyard.
LIG — two rooms, kitchen, bathroom and WC.
Janta — one room, kitchen, bathroom and WC.
The likely cost of flats constructed under this Scheme will be as under:
MIG Rs 42,000
LIG Rs 18,000
Janta Rs 8000
The prices are indicative and do not represent the final cost.
14. It may please be noted that the plinth area of the flats indicated and the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending upon the exigencies or layout, cost of construction etc.”
(emphasis supplied)
3. Due to certain reasons with which we are not concerned at the moment, the allotments could not be made. On 6-12-1990, fresh rates of land to be taken into account for costing of flats were approved by the Lt. Governor. Whereas in 1979 the prevailing land rate was fixed at Rs 62 per sq metre, the same was revised in 1990 to Rs 870 per sq metre for MIG flats, Rs 660 per sq metre for LIG flats and Rs 500 per sq metre for EWS (Janta flats). The increased rate was approved after taking into consideration all the relevant factors involved.
4. The respondent writ petitioners (hereinafter referred to as “the respondents”) whose turn for allotment came in 1991 were allotted flats in Jahangirpuri. The demand letters were sent to them. The respondents filed Writ Petition No. 3267 of 1991 along with Civil Writs Nos. 3198, 3456, 3645, 3795 and 3796 of 1991 respectively in the Delhi High Court challenging the rate at which the flats were being allotted. The case put up by them was that the amount being charged for the flats was much higher than what was indicated in the Scheme itself.
5. Writ Petition No. 3876 of 1992 titled Prem Chand v. Union of India, CWP No. 2787 of 1990 J.K Dhingra v. DDA, CWP No. 728 of 1991 Vinod Kumar Gupta v. DDA and CWP No. 1327 of 1991 Maha Nand Sharma v. DDA also filed on the same grounds and for the same were dismissed on 24-5-1993, 16-5-1991, 22-10-1991 and 15-1-1992, respectively.
6. Writ petitions filed by the respondents were allowed by the High Court despite the fact that several similar writ petitions had already been dismissed on merits. By the impugned judgment the High Court struck down the revision in the rate of land. The Authority was directed to make allotment of flats at a tentative price of four-and-a-half times of the price offered in the year 1979. Further the Authority was directed to constitute an Expert Committee to go into the costing of the flats taking the land rate at Rs 62 per sq metre. The Expert Committee was to work out the price after taking into account the actual cost of construction made by it for the construction of the flats. If the Expert Committee after working out the cost on the basis of the aforesaid works out cost to be more than the price that was provisionally fixed then the Authority was put at liberty to revise the cost and intimate to the respondents requiring them to make the payment within a month of such intimation.
7. Another set of Writ Petitions Nos. 1121 of 1991, 1102 of 1993, 1059, 874, 1008, 1019, 1451 and 1628 of 1994 which were for similar relief came up for hearing before another Division Bench. Arguments were heard and orders were reserved. A miscellaneous application being CM No. 6491 of 1993 was filed in Writ Petition No. 1121 of 1991 to report that another Division Bench had pronounced judgment in Writ Petition No. 3267 of 1991 (writ petition filed by the respondents) on 25-8-1993 which had a direct bearing on the controversy involved, in which similar issues had been considered and decided. The relief similar to the one claimed in petition had been granted. A prayer was made that the writ petitions be disposed of in terms of the said judgment. On notice, the Authority resisted the application saying that important decisions vital to the issue raised had escaped the attention of the Court in CWP No. 3267 of 1991 and as such the same was not binding. Keeping in mind the divergent views expressed by different Benches of equal strength, the Division Bench felt it appropriate that the matter be decided by a larger Bench and in particular the following questions:
“1. Whether under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can interfere in the matter of pricing/costing of flats including escalation in cost of land particularly in view of clauses 13 and 14 of the brochure regarding the Registration Scheme on New Pattern — 1979 under which the petitioners are registrants for allotment of flats?
2. Is the impugned revision of cost of land by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi illegal and arbitrary?”
8. Thus, on their recommendation, a Full Bench was constituted to decide the aforesaid questions.
9. The fact that the matter had been referred to a larger Bench doubting the correctness of the view expressed in the impugned judgment was brought to the notice of this Court in the present appeals. This Court on 7-2-1994 adjourned the case sine die to await the decision of the Full Bench and passed the following order:
“We are told at the Bar that the instant decision under appeal has been doubted by another Division Bench of the High Court. Apparently there exists a conflict of opinion raging in the High Court on the question raised herein. It appears that CWP No. 1121 of 1991 Sheela Wanti v. Delhi Development Authority and other batch of cases stands referred to a Full Bench by an order of a Division Bench dated 22-9-1993. We feel that in this situation it would be appropriate that the High Court itself puts to order its own views. We, therefore, send a request to the Chief Justice of the High Court to constitute a Full Bench, if possible, within 3 weeks and have the matter listed and heard as expeditiously as possible. We on our part hold over this matter awaiting the decision of the Full Bench.
The matter is adjourned sine die with the liberty to mention.”
10. The Authority filed a detailed affidavit before the Full Bench along with the documents explaining as to how the likely cost of the flats mentioned in 1979 was arrived at, the component of land price in the said cost, the basis thereof and increase in the land price, if any, between 1979 and 1990. The basis on which the price was enhanced was also indicated which ultimately resulted in the issuance of the notification by the Lt. Governor of Delhi dated 6-12-1990 fixing the revised rates which was impugned in the writ petitions filed in the High Court.
11. The points which were referred to the Full Bench were answered in the negative i.e in favour of the Authority and against the allottees. It was held that the scope of judicial review in the cases involving costing and fixation of prices was very much limited.
12. In the concluding portions, the two points referred to the Full Bench were answered in the following terms:
“We may now advert to the questions referred to the Full Bench. In keeping with our observations and findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that in view of clauses 13 and 14 of the brochure and the transaction being contractual, this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of pricing/costing of flats, including escalation of cost of land, etc. The answer to the first question has to be in the negative.
As regards the second question referred to the Full Bench, as noticed above, we are of the view that the impugned revision by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is neither illegal nor arbitrary.”
13. The decision of the Full Bench was challenged in this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (C) No. 13508 of 1995 and the same was dismissed on 14-7-1995.
14. Special leave petitions in the present appeals were listed before the Bench on 20-10-1995. Counsel for the respondents raised an argument that since the special leave petitions against the Full Bench judgment were dismissed in limine, he would like to challenge the correctness of the Full Bench judgment. Keeping in view this submission, this Court granted leave to file the appeals. The order passed by the Court is in the following terms:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned judgment by a Division Bench of the High Court is contrary to the subsequent Full Bench decision of the same High Court against which special leave petition has been dismissed by this Court. Learned counsel further submits that other similar SLPs were also dismissed by this Court which amounts to affirmance of the Full Bench decision dated 3-2-1995 (at pp. 143-79 of the paper-book). On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the dismissal of the SLPs being in limine, he would like to challenge the correctness of the Full Bench judgment and therefore the hearing will take some time.
For the above reason, we grant special leave in all the special leave petitions. In the meantime operation of the impugned judgment shall remain stayed.”
15. From the facts narrated above, it is evident that there was a difference of opinion between coequal Benches of the High Court regarding fixation of the price of MIG flats in the same Scheme. Since there was a divergence of opinion, the matter was referred to a Full Bench to resolve the conflict in the views expressed. The conclusions arrived at by the Full Bench run contrary to the view expressed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgments.
16. Shri Hardev Singh, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents strenuously contended that the view expressed in the impugned judgment before us was not overruled by the Full Bench, rather the same was approved. Relying upon the following observations:
“The consistent view of this Court, thus, was that escalation in prices of the flats constructed by DDA under different schemes, including the present scheme, could not be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution till the decision in Ashok Kumar Behal v. UOI (1993) 52 DLT 153 in which the Court went into the question of pricing and quashed the escalated price of the flats allotted under the Scheme. It appears that the Court did so apparently for the reason that despite specific directions in that behalf DDA had failed to place the relevant material before the Court to explain how the price fixation had been done and on what basis. Court queries in this behalf were not answered, which led to the belief that DDA was suppressing something and had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the writ petitioners. These significant factors put the case out of the ambit of the ratio of Bareilly Development Authority case (1989) 2 SCC 116, (1989) 1 SCR 743.”
it was stressed that since DDA had failed to produce the relevant material before the Court to explain how the price fixation had been done the ratio of this Court's judgment in Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh (1989) 2 SCC 116, (1989) 1 SCR 743 was not applicable. That the Division Bench in the impugned judgment decided the case on the peculiar facts of the case and therefore the same would not be governed by the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench judgment.
17. The contention put forth by the counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted either on facts or in law. Keeping in mind the divergence of views expressed by the coequal Benches the matter was referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench expressed the view that revision of price by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi in the year 1991 was neither arbitrary nor illegal, in other words, the price fixed by the Lieutenant Governor in the year 1991 was upheld whereas the Division Bench in the impugned judgment has taken a diametrically opposite view. In the impugned judgment it has been held that the price fixed by the Lt. Governor in the year 1991 was arbitrary and illegal. The Court after fixing a tentative price directed to constitute an Expert Committee to go into the question of pricing and determine the same after taking the land rate at Rs 62 per sq metre and actual cost of construction made by it for the construction of the flats. The Full Bench did not approve the view expressed by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment, it simply stated that the Division Bench may have come to this conclusion because the Authority failed to place the relevant material before the Court to explain how the price fixation had been done and on what basis. Court queries in this behalf were not answered, which led to the belief that DDA was suppressing something and had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the writ petitioners. The relevant material had been placed before the larger Bench and the Bench after taking into consideration the material placed before it came to the conclusion that the price fixed by the Lt. Governor of Delhi was neither arbitrary nor illegal. The inconsistency of the views expressed in the impugned judgment and the larger Bench of the Delhi High Court is self-evident. The Delhi High Court has resolved the conflict of views expressed by the Division Benches of coequal strength by constituting a larger Bench and the special leave filed against the judgment of the larger Bench has already been dismissed.
18. Inconsistency and contradiction in the orders passed by the same Court on the same point regarding the same scheme cannot be allowed to be continued or perpetuated. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted then an anomalous situation would arise by which the price fixed for a few of the MIG flats in the Scheme would be much less than the price fixed for the remaining flats allotted in the same year which cannot be permitted. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India and the law laid down by a High Court is binding on all courts within its jurisdiction. It is a cardinal principle of rule of law that inconsistency and contradiction in the orders has to be avoided at all costs to bring about a certainty in the mind of the subordinate courts and the litigant public. This principle would stand violated in case two binding principles on the same point of the same court are allowed to operate simultaneously.
19. We put an end to the controversy by setting aside the impugned judgment and dispose of the writ petitions filed by the respondents in terms of the order passed by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sheela Wanti decided on 3-2-1995. We agree with the view expressed by the larger Bench in Sheela Wanti case (supra).
20. The appeals, accordingly, stand disposed of with no order as to costs.