Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 135
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Press Council Act
  • The Schedule — The Statutes of the University, para 5(1) of the Delhi University Act, 1922
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6, Subsection (7) of the Act
  • Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Press Council Act, 1978
  • (ii) Section (1) of the Twenty-second Amendment of the U.S Constitution
  • The Act (no specific title or year mentioned)
  • Section 31(5) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972
  • Section 6, Subsection (7) of the Press Council Act, 1978
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
  • sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Act
  • this Act
  • An Act of Parliament
  • The Act, as its preamble shows
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 135
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Press Council Act
  • The Schedule — The Statutes of the University, para 5(1) of the Delhi University Act, 1922
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6, Subsection (7) of the Act
  • Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Press Council Act, 1978
  • (ii) Section (1) of the Twenty-second Amendment of the U.S Constitution
  • The Act (no specific title or year mentioned)
  • Section 31(5) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972
  • Section 6, Subsection (7) of the Press Council Act, 1978
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
  • sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Act
  • this Act
  • An Act of Parliament
  • The Act, as its preamble shows
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Harbhajan Singh, Editor of Indian Observer, had earlier served two consecutive three-year terms (1982-85 and 1985-88) as a member of the Press Council of India. When the Seventh Council was being constituted for the term commencing in 1998, the All-India Small and Medium Newspapers Federation (Respondent 2) nominated him once again. Acting on an opinion dated 30-9-1997 from the Chairman of the Press Council, which read Section 6(7) of the Press Council Act, 1978 as a lifetime bar after two terms, the Council rejected his nomination.

Harbhajan Singh and the Federation challenged that opinion before the Delhi High Court. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on 18-8-2000, holding that Section 6(7) disqualified only a member who was being re-nominated immediately after retirement, not someone whose earlier terms were non-consecutive. The Press Council’s intra-court appeal succeeded before a Division Bench, which reinstated the lifetime bar. Harbhajan Singh obtained special leave, leading to the present Supreme Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 6(7) of the Press Council Act, 1978 disqualifies a person, who has already served two earlier terms, from being nominated again at any time in the future, or whether the disqualification is confined only to an immediate re-nomination for a third consecutive term.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Section 6(7) merely prohibits a third consecutive term; it does not bar a person from serving more than two terms in his lifetime if the terms are non-consecutive.
  • The words “retiring member” and “renomination” are cast in the present tense and relate only to a member whose term is expiring in praesenti.
  • To read the clause as a lifetime bar would require rewriting the statute, contrary to settled principles of literal interpretation.

Respondent Press Council’s Arguments

  • The provision should be construed to impose a total cap of two terms, consecutive or otherwise, because it says a member is “eligible for renomination for not more than one term.”
  • A broader reading is necessary to protect the Council’s independence by preventing entrenched interests.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165 Plain-words interpretation; avoid adding qualifications to statutory text. Cited to reinforce reliance on the strict grammatical meaning of Section 6(7).
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 Statutes should generally receive the construction their plain language imports. Used to support giving Section 6(7) its ordinary meaning.
Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, AIR 1959 SC 198 Effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of statutory words. Relied upon to refuse any departure from the literal wording of Section 6(7).
F.S. Gandhi v. CWT, (1990) 3 SCC 624 Significance of tense (“is”) in statutory language; present tense normally refers to present and future, not past. Supported reading “retiring” in Section 6(7) as present tense, excluding former members whose terms ended earlier.
Maradana Mosque (Board of Trustees) v. Badi-ud-Din Mahmud, (1966) 1 All ER 545 (PC) Present-tense wording confines statutory power to current, not past, situations. Analogous reasoning adopted to show the Press Council’s power relates to immediate re-nomination of a retiring member.
D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner, (1977) 2 SCC 273 Caution against inferring legislative intention based on subjective policy views. Used to criticise the Division Bench for adopting a policy-based, rather than text-based, construction.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., 1897 AC 22 Legislative intention must be gathered from what is enacted, not what might have been enacted. Quoted to underline that Section 6(7) cannot be expanded by implication.
Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, (1976) 3 All ER 611 “Golden rule” – words are given their ordinary meaning unless that leads to absurdity. Cited as theoretical support for adhering to the literal reading, absent demonstrated absurdity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court characterised the language of Section 6(7) as “plain and simple” and applied the literal rule of statutory interpretation:

  • Textual focus: The phrase “a retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one term” is cast in the present tense. “Retiring member” refers only to a member whose term is just expiring, while “renomination” denotes being nominated again.
  • Grammar and syntax: Reading “retiring” as “retired” or treating “renomination” as any future nomination would do “violence to the language employed.” If Parliament intended a lifetime cap, it could have said so expressly (e.g., “No person shall be a member for more than two terms”).
  • Precedent and scholarly commentary: The Court cited authoritative treatises (Cross; G.P. Singh) and several decisions emphasising plain-meaning interpretation and the importance of tense, reinforcing that judges should not rewrite statutes on perceived policy grounds.
  • Rejection of policy-based expansion: The Division Bench’s reliance on presumed legislative intent to protect the Council’s independence was dismissed as unsupported by any intrinsic or extrinsic material.
  • Absence of absurdity: Allowing a non-consecutive third term does not create hardship or undermine statutory objectives; hence there is no justification to deviate from the ordinary meaning.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgment and restored the Single Judge’s decision quashing the Press Council’s rejection of Harbhajan Singh’s nomination. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies that Section 6(7) of the Press Council Act bars only a third consecutive term; former members may be nominated again after a gap. The ruling reinforces the primacy of literal statutory interpretation and sets no new substantive precedent beyond the construction of this specific provision.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council Of India And Others

    R.C Lahoti, J.— The controversy centres around the interpretation of sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Press Council Act, 1978 (hereinafter “the Act” for short) viz. for how many terms of the Council a member can be nominated?

    2. The facts are jejune. Harbhajan Singh, the appellant, is an Editor of the Indian Observer. All-India Small and Medium Newspapers Federation, Respondent 2 is an “association of persons” within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act. The appellant had been a member of the Council for two terms of three years each, namely, 1982-85 and 1985-88. Steps were taken for the constitution of the Seventh Council commencing from the year 1998. A notification in that regard was issued on 21-11-1997. On 5-5-1997 and 9-8-1997 the Federation, Respondent 2 had sought for a clarification-cum-opinion from the Chairman of the Press Council of India as to whether a person who had already been a member of the Council for two terms earlier is eligible for being nominated though such nomination did not amount to renomination, that is to say, at the time of being nominated he was not a retiring member. In response, the Council circulated an opinion of the President dated 30-9-1997, the substance whereof is, that Section 6(7) debars the same person from holding the office as a member of the Council for more than two terms in his life. The appellant and the Federation, Respondent 2 herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi seeking quashing of the opinion of the Chairman of the Press Council. A learned Single Judge of the High Court directed rule nisi to issue and on 9-12-1997 issued an interim direction that the decision of the Press Council would be subject to the decision in the writ petition. The Federation, Respondent 2 nominated the appellant and also his son as a cover candidate. The appellant's nomination was not accepted by the Council on the ground that he having remained a member of the Council for two terms, was ineligible for nomination as per sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Act.

    3. After hearing the petitioners and the Press Council, as also the Union of India, the learned Single Judge vide order dated 18-8-2000 allowed the writ petition and quashed the decision of the Press Council of India rejecting the nomination of the appellant. The learned Single Judge formed an opinion that the language of the statute was plain, admitting of no ambiguity, and therefore, deserves to be assigned the plain meaning which naturally flows from a reading thereof. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge the disqualification spelled out by sub-section (7) of Section 6 attaches to a member “retiring” in praesenti and was sought to be “re-nominated” but did not apply to a person who had “retired” sometime in the past though having held two consecutive terms as member of the Council and was now being only “nominated” and not “re-nominated”. The Press Council of India preferred an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench which allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Tracing out the legislative history of the enactment and giving a liberal interpretation to sub-section (7) of Section 6 in its desire to spell out and read the objective sought to be achieved by the Act, the Division Bench formed an opinion that the legislature intended not to allow a member to hold office for more than two terms in his lifetime, and therefore, the appellant was not eligible for nomination to membership of the Council for the term commencing 1998 in view of his having held membership of the Council for two terms — 1982-85 and 1985-88. The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

    4. Leave granted.

    5. The Act, as its preamble shows, proposed to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. Section 4 provides for incorporation, and Section 5 provides for composition of the Council. The details are irrelevant for our purpose. Section 6, insofar as relevant for our purpose, provides that the Chairman and other members of the Council shall hold office for a period of three years. Sub-section (7) reads as under:

    “6. (7) A retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one term.”

    6. According to the appellant, all that the provision bars is a member holding two terms of office successively. According to the respondent Council the total number of terms for which a member can hold office, whether in succession or otherwise, is two, as the provision makes it permissible for any member to seek renomination for one term only. This is the narrow controversy.

    7. Clearly, the language of sub-section (7) of Section 6 abovesaid, is plain and simple. There are two manners of reading the provision. Read positively, it confers a right on a retiring member to seek renomination. Read in a negative manner, the provision speaks of a retiring member not being eligible for renomination for more than one term. The spell of ineligibility is cast on “renomination” of a member who is “retiring”. The event determinative of eligibility or ineligibility is “renomination”, and the person, by reference to whom it is to be read, is “a retiring member”. “Retiring member” is to be read in contradistinction with a member/person retired sometime in the past, and so, would be called a retired or former member. “Re” means again, and is freely used as a prefix. It gives colour of “again” to the verb with which it is placed. “Renomination” is an act or process of being nominated again. Any person who had held office of member sometime in the past, if being nominated now, cannot be described as being “again nominated”. It is only a member just retiring who can be called “being again nominated” or “re-nominated”. No other meaning can be assigned except by doing violence to the language employed. The legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule — the legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material — intrinsic or external — is available to permit a departure from the rule.

    8. The provision is cast in the present tense. A retiring member is ineligible for renomination. “Not more than one term” qualifies “renomination”. The words “retiring”, used in the present tense, and “renomination” speak aloud of the intention of the legislature. If the word “retiring” was capable of being read as “retired” (sometime in the past) then there would have been no occasion to use “renomination” in the construction of the sentence. If the intention of law-framers would have been not to permit a person to be a member of the Council for more than two terms in his lifetime then a different, better and stronger framing of the provision was expected. It could have been said: “no member shall be eligible for nomination for more than two terms”, or it could have been said: “a retired member shall not be eligible for nomination for more than two terms”.

    9. Cross in Statutory Interpretation (3rd Edn., 1995) states:

    “The governing idea here is that if a statutory provision is intelligible in the context of ordinary language, it ought, without more, to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning an ordinary speaker of the language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is sufficient reason for a different interpretation…. Thus, an ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘grammatical meaning’ does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used. By enabling citizens (and their advisers) to rely on ordinary meanings, unless notice is given to the contrary, the legislature contributes to legal certainty and predictability for citizens and to greater transparency in its own decisions, both of which are important values in a democratic society.” (p. 32, ibid)

    The learned author cites three quotations from speeches of Lord Reid in the House of Lords cases, the gist whereof is: (i) in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, ask for the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute and follow the same unless that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the legislative intent; (ii) rules of construction are our servants and not masters; and (iii) a statutory provision cannot be assigned a meaning which it cannot reasonably bear; if more than one meanings are capable you can choose one but beyond that you must not go. (p. 40, ibid) Justice G.P Singh in his celebrated work — Principles of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn., 2001) states (at p. 54):

    “The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.”

    The learned author states at another place (at p. 74, ibid) that the rule of literal construction whereby the words have to be assigned their natural and grammatical meaning can be departed from but subject to caution. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. A departure is permissible if it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used or the object of the statute in which they occur requires a different meaning. To quote:

    “Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the Judges ‘in the light of their own views as to policy’ although they can ‘adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy’. A modern statement of the rule is to be found in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal (1976) 3 All ER 611, 1977 AC 359, (1976) 3 All ER 725 (HL) (All ER at p. 616) to the effect — ‘Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply “the golden rule” of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further’.”

    10. Sir Dinshaw Mulla, while interpreting Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908 emphasised the need of testing the question of interpretation upon the plain words of the article and opined that there is no warrant for reading into the words quoting any qualification and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide (see Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey AIR 1932 PC 165). Viscount Maugham in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim AIR 1941 PC 6 approved the principle that it may be desirable for an Act to receive such construction as the language in its plain meaning imports. The same principle has been followed by the Supreme Court of India in several decisions. Suffice it to refer to Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf U.P AIR 1959 SC 198, 1959 SCR 1287 wherein P.B Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used. Without multiplying the authorities we would still like to refer to two more decisions, which we think are apposite. In F.S Gandhi v. CWT (1990) 3 SCC 624 the expression “where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee” contained in Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 came up for consideration and the emphasis was on the significance of “is” on the import of the provision. This Court held that the word “is”, normally refers to the present and often to a future meaning. It may also have a past significance as in the sense of “has been”. However, in the setting in which “is” was used followed by the word “available”, it was held:

    “[T]he word ‘is’ must be construed as referring to the present and the future. In that sense it would mean that the interest is presently available and is to be available in future for a period not exceeding six years.”

    The High Court had construed the word “is” to mean “has been”, which construction was discarded by this Court. The tense of the sentence played a predominant role in the interpretation placed on the relevant provision by this Court in F.S Gandhi case AIR 1959 SC 198, 1959 SCR 1287. In Maradana Mosque (Board of Trustees) v. Badi-ud-Din Mahmud (1966) 1 All ER 545, (1967) 1 AC 13, (1966) 2 WLR 921 (PC) under the relevant statute the Minister was empowered to declare that the school should cease to be an unaided school and that the Director should be the Manager of it, if the Minister was satisfied that an unaided school “is being administered” in contravention of any provisions of the Act. Their Lordships opined: (All ER p. 551 B-F)

    “Before the Minister had jurisdiction to make the order he must be satisfied that ‘any school … is being so administered in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act’. The present tense is clear. It would have been easy to say ‘has been administered’ or ‘in the administration of the school any breach of any of the provisions of this Act has been committed’, if such was the intention of the legislature; but for reasons which common sense may easily supply, it was enacted that the Minister should concern himself with the present conduct of the school, not the past, when making the order. This does not mean, of course, that a school may habitually misconduct itself and yet repeatedly save itself from any order of the Minister by correcting its faults as soon as they are called to its attention. Such behaviour might well bring it within the words ‘is being administered’; but in the present case no such situation arose. … There was, therefore, no ground on which the Minister could be ‘satisfied’ at the time of making the order. As appears from the passages of his broadcast statement which are cited above, he failed to consider the right question. He considered only whether a breach had been committed, and not whether the school was at the time of his order being carried on in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. Thus he had no jurisdiction to make the order at the date on which he made it.”

    11. The Division Bench, in its impugned judgment, entered into tracing the legislative history and tried to find out the object of enactment and intention of the legislature. The effort made by the Division Bench can be appreciated but regrettably the deductions drawn by the Bench are based on no material. In fact, the learned Judges of the Division Bench fell into the same error as has been pointed out above, that is, of attributing such intention to the legislature as suited their own view of the policy behind enactment. M.H Beg, J. warned against beginning with a theory as to what the real purpose or need is or could be, for the danger is that we may be injecting a subjective notion or purpose of our own into what is, after all a legal question of construction or interpretation. His Lordship emphasized the need of avoiding the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on our own preconceived notions of an ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted. (See concurring judgment of M.H Beg, J. in D.R Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. (1977) 2 SCC 273) The Division Bench has not culled out and placed material on record, either available intrinsically in the Act or from any external aid to interpretation, so as to lead to the inference drawn by the Division Bench and sustain departure from the golden rule of interpretation.

    12. The learned Single Judge followed the correct track on the path of interpretation of statutes by reading what has been said and comparing with what has not been said. The learned Single Judge gave at least three illustrations of what could have been said but has not been said so as to find out how the legislature would have constructed the provision in question if the intention would have been not to permit a person to be a member of the Council for more than two terms. It would be advantageous to restate briefly the three illustrations from the judgment of the learned Single Judge which are as under:

    (i) In the Schedule appended to the Delhi University Act, 1922 called “The Schedule — The Statutes of the University”, para 5(1) provides for composition of the Executive Council as comprising the various members as specified. Clause (2) provides:
    “No person shall be a member under Item (ix) or (x) of clause (1) for more than two consecutive terms.”
    (ii) Section (1) of the Twenty-second Amendment of the U.S Constitution provides:
    “No person shall be elected to the office of the President for more than twice, and no person who has held the office of the President, or acted as the President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected as the President, shall be elected to the office of the President more than once….”
    (iii) In Section 31(5) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 it is provided:
    “31. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person shall be disqualified for election as, or for being, the president, vice-president, chairman, vice-chairman, managing director, secretary, joint secretary or treasurer of a committee—
    (a) if he has held any such office on that committee during two consecutive terms whether full or part;
    ***”

    13. In all the three illustrations of drafting, the intended bar against holding the given office for more than two terms (as provided) is clearly and categorically spelled out.

    14. Having given the three illustrations, the learned Single Judge held that if the construction suggested by the Council was to be accepted, one would be required to read “retiring member” as “a retired member”. Yet another reason assigned by the learned Single Judge, and rightly so, is that the right to be appointed as a member having been conferred by the law, ineligibility entailing prohibition or bar on being appointed to an office should be clearly stated or positively spelled out, in absence whereof the same cannot be read into the provision on the basis of the assumed intention of fulfilling the object of the statute. The learned Single Judge quoted very apt and appropriate observations of Lord Watson in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 1897 AC 22, (1895-99) All ER Rep 33 AC 38 to the effect: (All ER p. 41 C-D)

    “ ‘Intention of the legislature’ is a common, but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.”

    15. The Division Bench has, during the course of the judgment, noted that the Press Council was intended to be an independent body and if any person was permitted to remain a member of the Council for more than two terms, it will erode independence of the body as the elements of vested interest would creep in and this would also defeat the object of sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Act. We fail to find any justification for such an observation, much less any basis for forming such an opinion. Simply because the Press Council has taken a particular view of the relevant provision it can hardly be a ground for the Court to lean in favour of such a construction.

    16. We are clearly of the opinion that sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the Press Council Act must be assigned its ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning as the language is plain and simple. There is no evidence available, either intrinsic or external, to read the word “retiring” as “retired”. Nor can the word “renomination” be read as nomination for an independent term detached from the previous term of membership or otherwise than in succession. The provision on its plain reading does not disqualify or make ineligible a person from holding the office of a member of the Council for more than two terms in his life. The use of the words “retiring” as qualifying “member” coupled with the use of the word “renomination” clearly suggests that a member is disqualified for being a member for the third term in continuation in view of his having held the office of membership for more than two terms just preceding, one of which terms, the latter one, was held on renomination. Such an interpretation does not lead to any hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly and, therefore, the rule of ordinary and natural meaning being followed cannot be departed from.

    17. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. No order as to the costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council Of India And Others
    (Mar 11, 2002)