Order
1. In these cases the main challenge is to the constitutional validity of Chapter VIII-A which was inserted in 1986 in the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 which, inter alia, provided for the acquisition of certain properties on payment of hundred times the monthly rent for the premises. By the said amendment, Section 1-A was also inserted in that Act and it contains a declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. In view of Article 31-C of the Constitution, the contention of the State was that the validity of any part of the statute on the ground that it violated Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution, was not permissible.
2. The case was heard by a Bench of three Judges. At that time on behalf of the appellants a contention was sought to be raised, inter alia, to the effect that Article 31-C did not survive because of the events subsequent to the decision in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) 4 SCC 225. It was also submitted before that Bench that the doctrine of revival, as it applied to ordinary statutes, did not apply to the constitutional amendment and when a part of the Forty-second Amendment Act, which amended Article 31-C, had been held to be invalid it did not result in the automatic revival of the unamended Article 31-C.
3. In view of the aforesaid contention which was raised by an order dated 1-5-1996 reported in Property Owners' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 4 SCC 49 the matter was referred to “a larger Bench of not less than five Judges for hearing and deciding these matters”.
4. We heard the counsel at length on various issues which arise in these cases. One of the points which arises for consideration relates to the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471, (1978) 1 SCR 641 validity of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 was challenged and the question which arose was whether the State Government could acquire and then transfer countersigned portions of inter-State permits to Road Transport Corporation. Two judgments were delivered in that case. Krishna Iyer, J. for himself and two other learned Judges, while concurring with the decision of Untwalia, J. (with whom three other Judges agreed), interpreted Article 39(b) of the Constitution and then came to the conclusion that the Act had direct nexus with Article 39(b) and by virtue of Article 31-C its validity could not be challenged on the ground of it being violative of Article 14 or 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Untwalia, J. in his judgment observed that:
“[W]e do not consider it necessary to express any opinion with reference to Article 31-C read with clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. Our learned brother Krishna Iyer, J. has prepared a separate judgment specially dealing with this point. We must not be understood to agree with all that he has said in his judgment in this regard.”
5. The need to interpret Article 39(b) again arose in the case of Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147, (1983) 1 SCR 1000 While upholding the validity of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and the two other connected enactments the Constitution Bench adopted the interpretation of Article 39(b) as enunciated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy case (1977) 4 SCC 471, (1978) 1 SCR 641. This interpretation has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan (1986) 2 SCC 516.
6. The interpretation put on Article 39(b) by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ranganatha Reddy case (1977) 4 SCC 471, (1978) 1 SCR 641 was not specifically assented to in the majority decision but in Sanjeev Coke case (1983) 1 SCC 147, (1983) 1 SCR 1000 it is the observations in the judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. which have been followed.
7. Having heard the counsel at length, we are of the opinion that the views expressed in Sanjeev Coke case (1983) 1 SCC 147, (1983) 1 SCR 1000 require reconsideration. Keeping in view the importance of the point in issue, namely, the interpretation of Article 39(b) it will be appropriate if these cases are heard by a larger Bench of not less than seven Judges.
8. The papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.