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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 514
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Explanation I appended to Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947
  • Section 2(d) of the Bihar Act
  • Section 13(3)(a) of the Act
  • Section 2, Clause (c) of the Act
  • Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
  • Section 2 of the Act
  • The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 514
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Explanation I appended to Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act
  • Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
  • Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947
  • Section 2(d) of the Bihar Act
  • Section 13(3)(a) of the Act
  • Section 2, Clause (c) of the Act
  • Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
  • Section 2 of the Act
  • The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant has been in possession of Suit Premises No. 2235, 1st Floor, Sector 21-C, Chandigarh, since 1965. The father of the respondent, Bagicha Singh, originally inducted the appellant and collected rent until his death in 1976, after which the appellant paid rent directly to the respondent. Claiming a bona-fide need for personal occupation, the respondent initiated Rent Application No. 231 of 1996 under Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

The learned Rent Controller, by order dated 25-09-1997, held that a landlord–tenant relationship existed and allowed eviction. The Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dismissed the appellant’s challenge on 27-07-1998. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed Civil Revision No. 3791 of 1998 on 06-04-1999. The present appeal before the Supreme Court is by special leave against that High Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope and import of the term “landlord” in Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949?
  2. On that construction, is the respondent entitled to seek eviction under Section 13(3)(a) of the Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent cannot be regarded as “landlord” because he has not produced any document showing derivation of title from the owner; mere receipt of rent is insufficient.
  • Reliance was placed on the observation in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma that for eviction on personal-requirement grounds, the landlord must be a person entitled to exclusive possession, which the respondent allegedly is not.
  • The respondent is, at best, only a rent collector and therefore lacks locus to invoke Section 13(3)(a).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Act draws a clear distinction between “owner” and “landlord”; ownership is not a prerequisite for obtaining eviction under Section 13(3)(a).
  • Under Section 2(c), any person entitled to receive rent is a landlord; therefore, the respondent squarely falls within the definition.
  • The concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, Appellate Authority and High Court correctly identified the respondent as landlord, justifying eviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36 Suggested that for personal-occupation eviction, “landlord” must be the owner entitled to exclusive possession. The Court distinguished this decision, noting it interpreted the Bihar Act, which expressly excludes agents from the definition of landlord, a limitation absent in the East Punjab Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court parsed Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Act and identified four alternative categories of “landlord,” the foremost being “any person for the time being entitled to receive rent.”

2. It emphasised that ownership is not statutorily required; the Act is concerned with the landlord-tenant relationship, not title.

3. The respondent had continuously received rent from the appellant since 1976, bringing him within the primary limb of Section 2(c).

4. The appellant’s reliance on M.M. Quasim was rejected because that case involved the Bihar Act, whose Explanation expressly excludes agents. No such restrictive provision exists in the Punjab enactment, nor in Section 13(3)(a).

5. The Court found no illegality in the concurrent findings of the lower fora that the respondent is the landlord and bona-fide requires the premises.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed with Costs. The appellant is granted time until the end of April 2002 to vacate the premises, subject to filing an undertaking within four weeks.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that, under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, a person entitled to receive rent—irrespective of ownership—qualifies as “landlord” for seeking eviction on personal-requirement grounds. No new legal precedent is set, but the judgment clarifies statutory interpretation and distinguishes contrary dicta under differently worded statutes.

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    K.D Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar .

    Order

    1. This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CR No. 3791 of 1998 dated 6-4-1999.

    2. The appellant is the tenant of Suit Premises No. 2235, 1st Floor, Sector 21-C, Chandigarh (for short “the premises”) of which one Bhakhtawar Singh was said to be the owner. The father of the respondent, Bagicha Singh, inducted the appellant into possession of the premises in 1965. The respondent was paying rent to him till his death in 1976. Thereafter, the appellant has been paying the rent to the respondent. On the ground that he required the premises for his own occupation the respondent filed Rent Application No. 231 of 1996 under Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short “the Act”). The appellant denied that the relationship between him and the respondent was that of tenant and landlord and further denied that the respondent required the premises for his personal occupation.

    3. On considering the evidence produced by both the sides, the learned Rent Controller found that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the respondent and the appellant; it was also found that the respondent satisfied the requirement of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act. Accordingly, the learned Rent Controller ordered eviction of the appellant on 25-9-1997. He unsuccessfully challenged that order before the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, who dismissed the appeal on 27-7-1998. The appellant then carried the matter before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by filing Civil Revision No. 3791 of 1998 which was dismissed on 6-4-1999. It is the validity of that order that is challenged in this appeal.

    4. Mr O.P Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently contended that having regard to the definition of the term “landlord” in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, the respondent cannot be treated as the landlord; he laid emphasis on the words “every person, from time to time, deriving title under a landlord” and argued that no document has been filed and no material was placed before the Court to show that the respondent derived his title from the heir of the owner of the premises after his death. Therefore, he could not be treated as a landlord for purposes of Section 13(3)(a) of the Act.

    5. Mr A. Mariaputham, the learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the Act maintained distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord of the premises; for purposes of Section 13(3)(a), what is required to be seen is whether the person seeking eviction satisfies the requirement of the definition of “landlord” and, therefore, all the courts rightly held that the respondent was the landlord and ordered eviction of the appellant.

    6. The short question that arises for our consideration is, what is the import of the word “landlord” in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act and whether the respondent has rightly been held to be the landlord and entitled to seek eviction of the appellant.

    7. The said provision reads as follows:

    “2. (c) ‘landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and every person, from time to time, deriving title under a landlord;”

    8. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord: (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of “landlord”, Mr Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so, that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.

    9. Having noticed the definition of the term “landlord”, it will be useful to refer to Section 13(3)(a) of the Act which reads as follows:

    “13. (1)-(2) ***
    (3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession—
    (i) in the case of a residential building, if—
    (a) he requires it for his own occupation;”

    10. A plain reading of the provisions extracted above makes it clear that to claim a relief thereunder a person must be a landlord within the meaning of the terms in Section 2(c); his being the owner of the premises is neither a prerequisite nor a relevant factor.

    11. Mr Sharma relied on the following observation of this Court in M.M Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma (1981) 3 SCC 36, AIR 1981 SC 1113:

    “For the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) the expression ‘landlord’ could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation.”

    12. Mr Sharma has submitted that the respondent is only a Rent Collector and he cannot be said to be a person who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else, therefore, he cannot be granted relief under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention of the learned counsel. To understand an observation in a judgment it is necessary to look into the factual context and the provision which has fallen for consideration of the Court. In that case Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (for short “the Bihar Act”) fell for consideration of this Court. Though the definition of the term “landlord” in Section 2(d) of the Bihar Act is much the same, its ambit is cut down by Explanation I appended to Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act which is in the following terms:

    “Explanation I.—In this clause the word ‘landlord’ shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of Section 2”

    13. It is plain that in the context of the Explanation in that case the meaning of the term “landlord” is understood by excluding an agent for purposes of recovery of possession by the landlord for his occupation which is reasonable and which is in good faith.

    14. A similar provision is also to be found in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which specifically excludes an agent from the purview of landlord for purposes of recovery of possession from the tenant on the ground of personal occupation.

    15. From the above discussion it follows that such a truncated meaning of the term “landlord” cannot be imported in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act having regard to the width of the language employed therein and there is no other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for purposes of Section 13(3)(a) thereof to an owner of the premises alone. The appellant has been paying monthly rent of the premises to the respondent from 1976. The respondent is thus the landlord of the premises under the Act and is entitled to seek relief under Section 13(3)(a) of the Act. In this view of the matter, we find no illegality in the order of this High Court under challenge. The appeal is without merit and it is liable to be dismissed.

    16. Mr Sharma, however, pleads that some reasonable time may be granted to the appellant to vacate the premises. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that as the appellant has been in possession of the premises for more than 35 years, in the interest of justice he should be granted reasonable time to search an alternative accommodation. We accordingly grant him time till the end of April 2002, subject to his filing the usual undertaking within four weeks from today.

    17. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    K.D Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar .
    (Oct 16, 2001)