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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 138
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Chapter XX-C of the Act
  • Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 269-UC, Subsection (3) of the Act
  • Hindu Succession Act
  • Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)
  • Income Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 138
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Chapter XX-C of the Act
  • Section 269-UD of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 269-UC, Subsection (3) of the Act
  • Hindu Succession Act
  • Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)
  • Income Tax Act, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 12 August 1995 the second and third respondents agreed to sell immovable property in Ahmedabad to the first respondent for Rs 47 lakhs. The Income-tax Department’s Appropriate Authority concluded that the stated consideration was undervalued by at least 15 % of the market value. A show-cause notice dated 6 November 1995 was issued under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, culminating in an order for pre-emptive purchase by the Central Government.

The respondents challenged that order in a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court. The High Court held that each co-owner’s individual share was valued at less than Rs 25 lakhs (the monetary threshold prescribed for Ahmedabad) and therefore Chapter XX-C was inapplicable; it also found a breach of natural justice because valuation reports had not been supplied. Consequently, the High Court quashed the pre-emptive purchase order. The Revenue obtained special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of applying Chapter XX-C and Rule 48-K, the “apparent consideration” should be assessed per co-owner’s share or with reference to the collective consideration for the entire property.
  2. Whether non-disclosure of valuation reports to the transferor and transferee vitiated the proceedings for breach of natural justice.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue (Appellant)

  • The transaction, as reflected in Form 37-I, involved the sale of the entire property for Rs 47 lakhs; Chapter XX-C is therefore attracted.
  • The High Court erred in disaggregating the consideration into two portions below the threshold.

Respondents

  • Each co-owner was transferring only an undivided one-half share valued below Rs 25 lakhs, taking the case outside Chapter XX-C.
  • All valuation reports had not been supplied, violating the principles of natural justice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.V. Kishore v. Appropriate Authority, (1991) 189 ITR 264 (Mad) Held that each co-owner’s individual share must be considered for the monetary limit under Chapter XX-C. Expressly overruled; Supreme Court found the approach “erroneous”.
N.C. Rangesh v. Inspector General of Registration, (1991) 189 ITR 270 (Mad) Followed K.V. Kishore on the same point. Overruled for the same reasons.
Appropriate Authority v. J.S.A. Raghava Reddy, (1993) 199 ITR 508 (Kant) Adopted the co-owner-centric valuation approach. Overruled.
Surinder Gupta v. Chief CIT, (1996) 221 ITR 375 (Cal) Same principle as above. Overruled.
Webster Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 225 ITR 924 (Del) Same principle as above. Overruled.
Jodhram Daulatram Arora v. M.B. Kodnani, (1996) 221 ITR 368 (Bom) Treated the composite agreement as a single transfer attracting Chapter XX-C. Expressly approved and followed.
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 78 Constitutional validity of Chapter XX-C; necessity of 15 % undervaluation threshold and requirement of reasons. Cited to describe the object of Chapter XX-C and the relevance of a 15 % undervaluation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme and emphasised a realistic, purposive approach. It held that:

  • The “property” under Section 269-UA(d) is the entire land/building contemplated by the agreement, not fractional interests of co-owners.
  • Consequently, the “apparent consideration” under Section 269-UA(b) is the aggregate Rs 47 lakhs, which exceeds the Rs 25 lakhs threshold prescribed for Ahmedabad by Rule 48-K.
  • The High Court’s focus on the individual consideration receivable by each co-owner was a technical, artificial reading that defeats the object of Chapter XX-C—curbing large-scale tax evasion through undervaluation.
  • Even if the agreement had explicitly referred to separate transfers of fractional interests, the substance of the transaction remained a sale of the whole property.
  • The Court aligned with the Bombay High Court’s view in Jodhram Daulatram Arora and rejected contrary decisions of the Madras, Karnataka, Delhi and Calcutta High Courts.
  • However, because the Revenue conceded that it had not disclosed all valuation reports, the principle of natural justice was indeed violated. The appropriate authority must reconsider the matter after complete disclosure.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment and order set aside; matter remanded to the Appropriate Authority for fresh consideration with full disclosure of valuation materials; no order as to costs.

Implications: The Supreme Court clarifies that the monetary threshold in Chapter XX-C is to be applied to the aggregate consideration for the entire property, not to individual shares of co-owners or co-purchasers. This ruling overrides several High Court decisions and aligns the interpretation nationwide, potentially expanding the reach of pre-emptive purchase provisions. The case also reaffirms the necessity of disclosing valuation reports to satisfy natural-justice requirements.

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    Appropriate Authority & Commissioner, Income Tax v. Varshaben Bharatbhai Shah (Smt) And Others

    S.P Bharucha, J.— The Revenue is in appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat. The judgment and order was passed on a writ petition filed by the first respondent in the following circumstances.

    2. On 12-8-1995, the second and third respondents entered into an agreement to sell to the first respondent immovable property situated in Ahmedabad for a sum of Rs 47 lakhs. The appropriate authority of the Revenue came to the conclusion that the apparent consideration in respect of the said immovable property under the said agreement was less than the market value thereof by 15% or more. Accordingly, a notice dated 6-11-1995 was issued to the respondents to show cause why the said immovable property should not be subjected to pre-emptive purchase under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The respondents showed cause, but the order of pre-emptive purchase was made by the appropriate authority. This order was challenged in the writ petition.

    3. Before the High Court, it was contended that what had been transferred by the second and third respondents to the first respondent were their equal half shares in the said immovable property and that they owned such equal half shares was indicated in their income tax returns and in the said agreement, which stated that the earnest money had been paid by two separate cheques to the second and third respondents. The High Court said:

    “There may be one agreement for transfer of property where the transferors may be co-owners or joint owners. It may be that the share of the transferor is not specified. It may happen that there may be one transferee or more than one. The question to be examined is whether the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Act would be attracted or not in a case where co-owners have agreed to transfer their property rights and each co-owner is to be paid an amount of consideration which is less than the amount specified i.e each co-owner transferor will get less than Rs 25 lakhs as per the agreement.”

    The High Court followed the judgment of the Madras High Court in K.V Kishore v. Appropriate Authority (1991) 189 ITR 264 (Mad). It held that it was clear in the case before it that what was agreed to be transferred was the individual undivided share in the said immovable property and the value of each such share was less than Rs 25 lakhs. The transferors were co-owners and each co-owner was getting an apparent consideration that was less than the limit prescribed, that is, less than Rs 25 lakhs. The provisions of Chapter XX-C were not attracted even though the amount that all the co-owners received exceeded Rs 25 lakhs. Before the High Court, it was not disputed on behalf of the Revenue that all the reports obtained by it in regard to the valuation of the said immovable property had not been supplied to the respondents. For that reason, the High Court came to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been followed. The High Court characterised as perverse a finding of the appropriate authority in regard to the case of the first respondent that no unaccounted money had figured in the sale transaction. For all these reasons, the High Court quashed the order of pre-emptive purchase.

    4. In K.V Kishore v. Appropriate Authority (1991) 189 ITR 264 (Mad) a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held, more or less on similar facts, thus: (ITR pp. 268-69)

    “After giving deep consideration to these rival submissions, the following facts would clinchingly establish the case in favour of the petitioners. It is not denied or it is not disputed that the original allottee, A. Srinivasan, died in the year 1962. He being a Hindu, governed by the Hindu Succession Act, on his death, his wife and children acquired a vested right to the definite quantified shares in the property left behind by him. As owners of their respective shares, they were competent to enter into a family arrangement which they did on 8-4-1987, under the terms of which, each one of Respondents 4 to 8 were allotted a definite share in the property. After 8-4-1987, they were individual owners of definite shares in the property. Each one could deal with only his respective share and he cannot deal with the share of another. The property which so fell to the share of each individual will come definitely within the definition of the words ‘immovable property’. Such a sharer was entitled to transfer his immovable property to a third person. Merely because a plurality of such individual owners joined together to enter into one single agreement to transfer their respective shares in favour of one or more persons, that would not make any difference to the main issue that what each transferred is his definite share in the property. Viewed from that perspective, the agreement entered into between the petitioners and Respondents 4 to 8 is to be understood only as an agreement to convey the respective undivided shares of Respondents 4 to 8. It is not in dispute that the value of each such share is less than Rs 10,00,000. The recitals in the agreement in more than one place refer to the fact that what is sold, is the individual undivided share in the property. Consequently, the impugned order made under Chapter XX-C of the Act taking the total consideration, the collective shares, cannot be sustained….”

    The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was followed by that High Court in N.C Rangesh v. Inspector General of Registration (1991) 189 ITR 270 (Mad) and by the Karnataka, Calcutta and Delhi High Courts in the cases of Appropriate Authority v. J.S.A Raghava Reddy (1993) 199 ITR 508 (Kant), Surinder Gupta v. Chief CIT (1996) 221 ITR 375 (Cal) and Webster Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 225 ITR 924 (Del) respectively.

    5. The Bombay High Court has taken the contrary view in Jodhram Daulatram Arora v. M.B Kodnani (1996) 221 ITR 368 (Bom). In this case the vendor was one and there were three purchasers. It was contended that under the agreement in question the vendor had agreed to sell to each of the purchasers an undivided 1/3rd interest in the flat and each of the purchasers individually had agreed to buy an undivided 1/3rd share in the flat from the vendor for a total consideration of Rs 14,06,000; that consideration for the purchase of each such interest in the flat should be valued at Rs 4,68,667, which was less than the limit of Rs 10 lakhs; and that, in the circumstances, the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to proceed under Chapter XX-C. The judgments of the Madras High Court in the cases of K.V Kishore (1991) 189 ITR 264 (Mad) and N.C Rangesh (1991) 189 ITR 270 (Mad) were cited. The Bombay High Court did not accept the contention and it distinguished these judgments. The agreement in question before it, it said, was a composite agreement in respect of the flat. There was nothing in the agreement which indicated that the purchasers had agreed to buy individually an undivided 1/3rd share of the flat from the vendor. All the parties concerned had filed Form 37-I and, therefore, it was not open to them now to contend that Section 269-UD had no application and the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction.

    6. Section 269-UA defines certain terms for the purposes of Chapter XX-C, which deals with the purchase by the Central Government of properties in certain cases of transfer. An “agreement for transfer” is defined by clause (a) thereof to mean an agreement for the transfer of any property. “Property” is defined by clause (d) to mean any land or any building or part of a building and any rights in or with respect to any land or any building or a part of a building. “Transfer” in relation to any property means, by reason of clause (f), the transfer of such property by way of sale or exchange or lease for a term of not less than twelve years. “Apparent consideration” is defined by clause (b) to mean, if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of sale, the consideration for such transfer as specified in the agreement of transfer. Section 269-UC places restrictions on the transfer of immovable property. What is relevant for our purpose are sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 269-UC and they read thus:

    “269-UC. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or in any other law for the time being in force, no transfer of any immovable property in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees, as may be prescribed, shall be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property (hereinafter referred to as the transferor) and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred (hereinafter referred to as the transferee) in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) at least four months before the intended date of transfer.
    (2) The agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.
    (3) Every statement referred to in sub-section (2) shall, —
    (i) be in the prescribed form;
    (ii) set forth such particulars as may be prescribed; and
    (iii) be verified in the prescribed manner,
    and shall be furnished to the appropriate authority in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, by each of the parties to such transaction or by any of the parties to such transaction acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.”

    Section 269-UD, so far as it is relevant, reads thus:

    “269-UD. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1-A) and (1-B), the appropriate authority, after the receipt of the statement under sub-section (3) of Section 269-UC in respect of any immovable property, may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or any instrument or any agreement for the time being in force, make an order for the purchase by the Central Government of such immovable property at an amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration:
    ***
    (1-A) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the appropriate authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation of the property, the transferee and to every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property.
    (1-B) Every order made by the appropriate authority under sub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is made.
    (2) The appropriate authority shall cause a copy of its order under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovable property to be served on the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation thereof, the transferee, and on every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property.”

    Rule 48-K of the Income Tax Rules states that the value of any property for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 269-UC shall be, where the agreement for transfer prescribed under the said sub-section is entered into after 31-7-1995, Rs 25 lakhs for the city of Ahmedabad.

    7. In C.B Gautam v. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 78 a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the constitutionality of the Chapter XX-C. Para 21 of the judgment reads thus:

    “21. The legislative history of Chapter XX-C, the stand taken by the Union of India and the Central Board of Direct Taxes as shown in the main counter-affidavit and the affidavit of H.K Sarangi, which has been filed after obtaining instructions from the Income Tax Department and the Central Board of Direct Taxes make it clear that the powers of compulsory purchase conferred under the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act are being used and intended to be used only in cases where in an agreement to sell an immovable property in an urban area to which the provisions of the said Chapter apply, there is a significant undervaluation of the property concerned, namely, of 15 per cent or more. If the appropriate authority concerned is satisfied that in an agreement to sell immovable property in such areas as set out earlier, the apparent consideration shown in the agreement for sale is less than the fair market value by 15 per cent or more it may draw a presumption that this undervaluation has been done with a view to evade tax. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable and the intended seller or purchaser can lead evidence to rebut such a presumption. Moreover, an order for compulsory purchase of immovable property under the provisions of Section 269-UD require to be supported by reasons in writing and such reasons must be germane to the object for which Chapter XX-C was introduced in the Income Tax Act, namely, to counter attempts to evade tax.”

    8. What, in our opinion, therefore, has to be seen for the purposes of attracting Chapter XX-C is: What is the property which is the subject-matter of transfer and what is the apparent consideration for such transfer? This has to be seen in a real light with due regard to the object of the chapter and not in an artificial or technical manner. If the apparent consideration for the transfer is more than the limit prescribed for the relevant area under Rule 48-K, what has then to be seen is whether the apparent consideration for the property is less than the market value thereof by 15% or more. If so, the notice for pre-emptive purchase can be issued and it is then for the parties to the transaction to satisfy the appropriate authority that the apparent consideration is the real consideration for the transfer.

    9. Now, in the present case, the said agreement is for the sale of the said immovable property. That the equal shares of the second and third respondents therein are to be transferred to the first respondent is a necessary incident of such sale. The parties to the transaction filed Form 37-I with the appropriate authority and, correctly stated that what was being sold was the said immovable property and not the one-half shares of the second and third respondents therein. It also stated, correctly, that the total apparent consideration for the transfer of the said immovable property was Rs 47 lakhs. This leaves us in no doubt at all that what was to be transferred was the said immovable property and that the consideration for such transfer was the sum of Rs 47 lakhs. It is of no consequence that the second and third respondents owned the said immovable property as tenants-in-common or that this is how they had shown their ownership in their income tax returns. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was in error in concluding that what had been sold by the second and third respondents to the first respondent was their equal share in the said immovable property, that the apparent consideration was, therefore, less than Rs 25 lakhs and that, therefore, the provisions of Chapter XX-C would not apply.

    10. We should add that even if the agreement of transfer had been so drawn as to show the transfer of the equal shares of the second and third respondents in the said immovable property, our conclusion would have been the same, for looked at realistically, it was the said immovable property which was the subject of the transfer.

    11. We are of the opinion that the judgments of the Madras, Karnataka, Delhi and Calcutta High Courts referred to above are based on a wrong approach and are erroneous. We approve of the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Jodhram Daulatram Arora case (1996) 221 ITR 368 (Bom).

    12. As we have pointed out, it was conceded before the High Court on behalf of the Revenue that all the relevant reports pertaining to the valuation of the said immovable property had not been disclosed to the respondents. We think, in these circumstances, that the matter should go back to the appropriate authority for hearing the matter afresh. It is not, therefore, necessary to deal with the finding of the High Court about perversity.

    13. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The matter is remanded to the appropriate authority. The Revenue shall make available to the respondents all the materials, including reports, that it relied upon in regard to the valuation of the said immovable property. The appropriate authority shall then hear the parties afresh and pass an appropriate order. It shall do so without taking into account any observation of the High Court in the impugned judgment. In respect of the proceedings upon remand, no objection in regard to limitation may be raised.

    14. No order as to costs.

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    Appropriate Authority & Commissioner, Income Tax v. Varshaben Bharatbhai Shah (Smt) And Others
    (Mar 13, 2001)