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Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 340
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Penal Code
  • IPC (Indian Penal Code)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 340
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Penal Code
  • IPC (Indian Penal Code)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In Sessions Trial No. 391 of 1977, the Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh convicted Jhinkoo Nai and Tahir under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for the fatal stabbing of Chandratara and the attempted murder of her parents, Mani Ram and Nageshari. A third accused, Imtiyaz @ Chitharu, was acquitted. Jhinkoo and Tahir appealed to the Allahabad High Court. During the pendency of that appeal Tahir died, abating his appeal. On 28-5-1999 the High Court:

  • Set aside Jhinkoo Nai’s convictions under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 IPC,
  • Convicted him instead under Section 324 IPC, and
  • Imposed a sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment.

The State of Uttar Pradesh filed Criminal Appeal No. 1077 of 1999 in the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s reduction of liability. Jhinkoo Nai filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against his conviction under Section 324 IPC, delayed by 454 days.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in overturning the trial court’s finding of common intention under Section 34 IPC and consequently acquitting Jhinkoo Nai of offences under Sections 302/34 and 307/34.
  2. Whether the facts proved by the prosecution permit only a conviction under Section 324 IPC or sustain the graver offences of murder and attempted murder in furtherance of common intention.

Arguments of the Parties

State’s Arguments

  • The High Court’s decision to acquit the respondent of offences under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 IPC is manifestly illegal and unsupported by the record.
  • The collective conduct of the accused, armed with knives and entering the victims’ home at midnight, demonstrates a shared intention to commit murder if resistance was offered.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The incident was primarily an attempt to commit rape; there was no common intention to kill.
  • Knife attacks on Mani Ram and Nageshari were individual acts, not done in furtherance of a common intention, justifying conviction only under Section 324 IPC.
  • Relied on Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 4 SCC 193 to contend that mere presence with weapons does not automatically establish common intention to murder.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 4 SCC 193 Common intention cannot be inferred merely from joint presence with weapons; the record must disclose shared intent to kill. Distinguished: Supreme Court held the facts here, unlike Mithu Singh, clearly demonstrated a shared intent that encompassed murder upon resistance.
Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 640 Where several persons launch a murderous assault, it is impermissible to separate fatal from non-fatal blows; Section 34 fixes constructive liability. Relied upon to reject the High Court’s view that only Tahir’s blow was fatal; the group’s collective liability was reinstated.
Amir Hussain v. State of U.P., (1975) 4 SCC 247 Affirms constructive liability under Section 34 for participants in a common intention. Cited in support of the proposition that community of intent triggers collective guilt.
Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 2 SCC 827 Reinforces the doctrine of common intention and participatory presence. Quoted to bolster the conclusion that all assailants share liability for murder when acting in furtherance of a common design.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated that common intention is ordinarily inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances rather than direct evidence. Applying this to the facts proved at trial, the Court reasoned as follows:

  1. The accused, armed with knives, entered the victims’ home at midnight, evidencing a concerted plan.
  2. They forcibly removed 18-year-old Chandratara to the verandah to satisfy their sexual lust and were met with resistance from her and her parents.
  3. Upon resistance, Tahir fatally stabbed Chandratara while Jhinkoo and Deep Chand inflicted knife wounds on her parents; the acts were simultaneous and mutually reinforcing.
  4. Such conduct permits only one reasonable inference: the group shared a common intention to commit rape and, if thwarted, to kill—bringing the case squarely within Section 34 IPC.
  5. The High Court erred in isolating individual acts and ignoring the cumulative criminality condemned in Harshadsingh and allied precedents.

Consequently, the Court restored the trial court’s findings that the respondent is guilty of murder and attempted murder in furtherance of common intention.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The State’s appeal is allowed; the Allahabad High Court’s judgment is quashed. The conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 IPC are restored. Respondent Jhinkoo Nai is to be taken into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. The respondent’s delayed SLP is dismissed.

Implications: The decision re-affirms the breadth of Section 34 IPC, underscoring that courts should not dissect fatal from non-fatal blows where a common intention is apparent. No new legal doctrine is created, but the judgment reinforces existing precedent on constructive liability for group offences.

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    State Of U.P v. Jhinkoo Nai .

    M.B Shah, J.— In Sessions Trial No. 391 of 1977, Jhinkoo Nai and Tahir were convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. Third accused Imtiyaz alias Chitharu was acquitted. Against that judgment and order, Jhinkoo Nai along with Tahir filed Criminal Appeal No. 2478 of 1980 before the High Court of Allahabad. Pending appeal, Tahir expired and his appeal proved abated. By judgment and order dated 28-5-1999, the High Court set aside the conviction of Jhinkoo Nai for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC but convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and sentenced him to suffer RI for two years.

    2. Against that judgment and order, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1077 of 1999. Accused Jhinkoo Nai has also filed special leave petition against the said order which is delayed by 454 days.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that the judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. As against this, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused supported the reasons recorded by the High Court acquitting the respondent for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC.

    4. For appreciating the contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we would refer to the facts as proved by the prosecution. It is the prosecution story that on 14-2-1975, as it was alleged that there was illicit relationship of accused Chitharu and Tahir with Subhawati, D/o Sanichari, there was a quarrel between Sanichari Devi and Nageshari (PW 5), wife of Mani Ram (PW 4). At the time of this quarrel, deceased Chandratara and Mantara, daughters of Nageshari were present. The accused Tahir and Chitharu were also sitting nearby. It is the say of the prosecution that during this quarrel Sanichari had given a threat to Nageshari that she would teach her a lesson in the near future for the allegation made against her daughter. On the same day, at midnight, while Mani Ram and his wife Nageshari were sleeping in the verandah of the house and their two daughters were sleeping inside the room, four persons, namely, Deep Chand, who died during the pendency of the trial, Tahir who died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, Jhinkoo Nai and Imtiyaz alias Chitharu entered into the house of Mani Ram. Tahir, Jhinkoo and Deep Chand entered into the room where Chandratara and Mantara were sleeping. All of them lifted Chandratara who was merely 18 years old and brought her in the osara (verandah). It is the say of the prosecution witnesses that deceased Chandratara was resisting and was not prepared to satisfy the lust of the accused. At that time, Tahir stabbed her on the left side of the chest and she died instantaneously. Nageshari started shouting. Thereafter, Mani Ram and his other daughter Mantara also started raising alarm. At that time, Jhinkoo gave a knife-blow to Nageshari on her chest, Deep Chand gave three knife-blows to Mani Ram. It is also alleged that Chitharu who was standing with a lathi in his hand gave a lathi-blow to Mani Ram. Thereafter, they ran away from the scene of occurrence. The aforesaid prosecution story is proved and is accepted by the Sessions Court as well as the High Court on the basis of the evidence of PW 3 Mantara, D/o Mani Ram, who was sleeping along with her sister on the fateful night, PW 4 Mani Ram and PW 5 Nageshari. The Sessions Court rejected the defence version that on the night in question a dacoity was committed at the house of Mani Ram as absolutely false by observing that it looks quite improbable that a poor Harijan who earns his livelihood by doing halwahi or mazdoori should have been made victim of a dacoity.

    5. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted that in view of the evidence led by the prosecution, it is apparent that there was no intention of the accused to commit murder of the deceased, but it was at the most to commit rape. Therefore, the High Court rightly held that assault by knife on Mantara and Nageshari were individual acts of Jhinkoo (respondent) and Deep Chand (deceased) and the High Court rightly altered the conviction of the respondent from Section 302 to Section 324 IPC. Learned counsel also referred to the decision rendered by this Court in Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab (2001) 4 SCC 193 and submitted that even though both the accused were armed with pistol, the Court has not drawn the inference of common intention as the one shot was fired by the other accused.

    6. In our view, contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-accused is without any substance. In the case of Mithu Singh (2001) 4 SCC 193 the Court arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing available on record to draw an inference that the co-accused had gone to the house of the deceased with the intention of causing her death and such intention was known to the accused, much less shared by him. Hence, the Court set aside the conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC. We reiterate that for common intention, there could rarely be direct evidence. The ultimate decision, at any rate, would invariably depend upon the inferences deducible from the circumstances of each case. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of the individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties.

    7. Further, when several persons simultaneously attack with common intent, no distinction between causing the fatal and non-fatal wounds could be drawn while allocating the guilt. Negativing a similar contention this Court in Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore v. State of Gujarat (1976) 4 SCC 640 succinctly observed:

    “[W]hen a murderous assault by many hands with many knives has ended fatally, it is legally impermissible to dissect the serious ones from the others and seek to salvage those whose stabs have not proved fatal. When people play with knives and lives, the circumstances that one man's stab falls on a less or more vulnerable part of the person of the victim is of no consequence to fix the guilt for murder. Conjoint complicity is the inevitable inference when a gory group animated by lethal intent accomplish their purpose cumulatively. Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P (1975) 4 SCC 247; Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 2 SCC 827.) Lord Sumner's classic legal shorthand for constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse ‘They also serve who only stand and wait’ a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting hostile heads, some spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties can be pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of the Penal Code.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    8. Now let us apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case and find out what reasonable inference could be drawn by a prudent man. Proved facts are : the accused were armed with knives; they entered the house of the complainant in the dead of night; maybe to take revenge for the quarrel which had taken place in the daytime or because they are rich headstrong persons; on a refusal to submit and satisfy their sexual lust, the accused including the appellant, despite resistance by the girl lifted her and brought her in the osara. At that stage when the deceased was crying and resisting, her father PW 4 Mani Ram and her mother Nageshari, PW 5 got up and started raising alarm. Tahir, one of the accused gave a knife-blow to the deceased and two others gave knife-blows to PW 4 and PW 5. From these facts, the only reasonable inference which could be drawn is that the common intention of the accused was to ravish the young girl of the poor Harijan and in case of resistance, to commit murder by inflicting knife-blows. Their adventure in criminality cannot be watered down or nullified by contending that injuries caused by them have not resulted in the death of PW 4 and PW 5. In this view of the matter, the High Court materially erred in altering the sentence of the accused from the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC to Section 324 IPC by observing that assault by knife on Mani Ram and Nageshari were individual acts of Jhinkoo (appellant) and Deep Chand and the act of Tahir in inflicting the knife injury on the chest of the deceased appears to be his individual act and, therefore, the appellant Jhinkoo cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Hence, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained.

    9. In the result, the appeal filed by the State is allowed, the impugned order passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh convicting the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC is restored. Respondent Jhinkoo Nai be taken into custody for undergoing the remaining part of his sentence.

    10. So far as the appeal filed by Jhinkoo is concerned, which is delayed by 454 days, even if we condoned the delay, the same would not survive because of his conviction under Section 302 IPC as stated hereinbefore. Hence, the delay is condoned and the special leave petition is dismissed.

    11. Ordered accordingly.

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    Comments

    State Of U.P v. Jhinkoo Nai .
    (Aug 3, 2001)