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2000 INSC 588
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  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 588
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants are technically-qualified direct recruits working as Operators/Overseers/Meter Readers/Assistant Storekeepers under the Karnataka Electricity Board. By an amendment dated 3 February 1982 to the Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations, 1969, the Board fixed a 1:1 promotion ratio between (i) technically-qualified direct recruits and (ii) technically-unqualified promotees for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical). The appellants challenged this amendment in writ petitions before the Karnataka High Court, alleging that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions on 12 January 1994. On appeal, a Division Bench reversed that decision, relying mainly on the Supreme Court judgment in P. Murugesan v. State of Tamil Nadu. The present appeals were filed against the Division Bench decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 1982 amendment providing a 1:1 promotion ratio between technically-qualified direct recruits and technically-unqualified promotees to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the classification created by the amendment is based on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved—namely, balancing qualifications with experience and avoiding stagnation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The ratio is hostile discrimination against technically-qualified employees, lacks any rational basis, and therefore offends Article 14.
  • Unqualified employees, who would not ordinarily be eligible for promotion to Junior Engineer, are given an unwarranted advantage, diminishing the promotion prospects of qualified staff.
  • The Division Bench erred in applying P. Murugesan, as that case dealt with classification based directly on educational qualifications, unlike the present situation.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Avoiding stagnation is a legitimate administrative objective; unqualified employees reach a promotional ceiling at Junior Engineer, while qualified recruits can rise higher.
  • The rule-making authority considered relevant factors such as experience and administrative efficiency; unless mala fides or clear discrimination is shown, the regulation should stand.
  • The principle in P. Murugesan squarely covers the issue and validates the ratio.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Murugesan v. State of T.N. (1993) 2 SCC 340 Upheld a 3:1 promotion ratio between graduates and diploma-holders; clarified permissible classification under Article 14. Main precedent relied on to sustain the 1:1 ratio; Court held its reasoning applies “with full force” to the present case.
Shamkant Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 194 Distinguished earlier cases in light of Triloki Nath Khosa; endorsed qualification-based classification. Cited by Division Bench and Supreme Court to reinforce the validity of the impugned ratio.
Triloki Nath Khosa v. State of J&K (1974) 1 SCC 19 Approved classification between degree-holder and diploma-holder engineers; laid down dual test for Article 14. Formed the conceptual basis for accepting the differentiation between qualified and unqualified employees.
Mervyn Continho v. Collector of Customs AIR 1967 SC 52 Earlier view relied on to challenge ratio-based promotions. Single Judge had followed it; Supreme Court noted it was “not followed” after Murugesan.
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889 Earlier authority questioning promotional distinctions. Distinguished and not followed in view of later jurisprudence.
Punjab SEB v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma (1986) 4 SCC 617 Held certain promotion ratios invalid. Overruled by Murugesan; therefore not accepted as governing law.
Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCC 76 Considered equality in public employment. Explained away in Murugesan; did not alter the result here.
N. Abdul Basheer v. K.K. Karunakaran 1989 Supp (2) SCC 344 Earlier case on promotional differentiation. Distinguished in Murugesan; hence not decisive.
G.M., S.C. Railway v. A.V.R. Siddhantti (1974) 4 SCC 335 Referenced regarding equality principles. Only cited by Single Judge; not treated as controlling after later precedents.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated that Article 14 permits reasonable classification if two conditions are met: (1) the classification is based on an intelligible differentia, and (2) the differentia has a rational nexus with the legislative objective. Applying this dual test, the Court found:

  • The feeder cadre comprises both technically-qualified direct recruits and technically-unqualified promotees, but their career prospects differ: unqualified employees reach a ceiling at Junior Engineer, while qualified recruits may advance further.
  • The Board introduced the ratio to alleviate prolonged stagnation of unqualified employees—some had to wait over 15 years for consideration—while still recognising the superior educational qualifications of direct recruits.
  • The Board balanced “qualification” against “experience” and the need for efficient administration; these are germane considerations.
  • Precedents such as Triloki Nath Khosa and, especially, P. Murugesan validate such ratio-based classifications. Earlier cases relied on by the Single Judge were either distinguished or overruled.
  • Consequently, the impugned amendment is a rational classification, does not single out the appellants for hostile treatment, and therefore withstands scrutiny under Article 14.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench’s decision, upholding the 1:1 promotion ratio. The immediate consequence is that the amended Regulation remains operative, and the appellants are subject to the same promotional terms. The judgment applies settled principles of equality rather than establishing a new doctrinal rule.

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    K.R Lakshman And Others v. Karnataka Electricity Board And Others

    G.B Pattanaik, J.— The judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge is the subject-matter of challenge in these appeals. The appellants are technically-qualified direct recruits to the post of Operator/Overseer/Meter Reader/Assistant Storekeeper. The Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations, 1969 were amended on 3-2-1982, providing a ratio of 1:1 for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Electrical) between technically-qualified (direct recruit) and technically not qualified (promotees). The present appellants, assailed the aforesaid amendment by filing writ petitions, inter alia, on the ground that it is highly discriminatory and arbitrary and that there is no rational basis for providing a ratio between technically-qualified and technically-unqualified people for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the appellants and allowed the writ petitions by judgment dated 12-1-1994. In arriving at its conclusion that providing ratio for promotion is discriminatory, the learned Single Judge relied upon the decisions of this Court in Mervyn Continho AIR 1967 SC 52, (1966) 3 SCR 600, Roshan Lal Tandon AIR 1967 SC 1889, (1968) 1 SCR 185, Punjab SEB (1986) 4 SCC 617, Mohd. Shujat Ali (1975) 3 SCC 76, G.M, S.C Rly. v. A.V.R Siddhantti (1974) 4 SCC 335 and N. Abdul Basheer 1989 Supp (2) SCC 344, (1991) 17 ATC 160. The Board assailed the judgment of the learned Single Judge by preferring an appeal. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and allowed the appeal, preferred by the Board, relying upon the decisions of this Court in P. Murugesan v. State of T.N (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 and Shamkant Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 194, (1993) 24 ATC 416 It is this judgment of the Division Bench, which is the subject-matter of these appeals.

    2. Mr M. Rama Jois, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, contended that providing a ratio for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer for the unqualified promotees, would not tantamount to a classification based on qualification, as in the case of Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 and as such the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court committed serious error in interfering with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. According to Mr Rama Jois, the amendment to the regulation is nothing but an act of hostile discrimination against the qualified direct recruits inasmuch as there is no rationale behind providing such a ratio, which jeopardises the chances of promotion of the qualified people and consequently, the Regulation is liable to be struck down, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr Rama Jois, further urged that the unqualified people, who are not ordinarily entitled to promotion to the post of Junior Engineer, were being shown favouritism by providing a channel of promotion to them. But without any rational basis for providing a ratio and putting the unqualified people at a more advantageous position, must be held to be discriminatory and the Division Bench of the High Court committed error in holding that it does not work out any discrimination.

    3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand contended that stagnation in any public service, not being in the interest of administration and taking into account the experience of the unqualified promotees, when the rule-making authority, provided for a ratio for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer, the same cannot be struck down, as being violative of Article 14, unless it is positively shown that either it is mala fide or that it really works out any hostile discrimination between the two categories of employees. According to the learned counsel, no doubt in the feeder category, the appellants had entered by direct recruitment, while the respondents had entered by way of promotion, but the further promotion to the post of Junior Engineer is the maximum rank to which the unqualified promotee could ever aspire to, whereas qualified direct recruits can go still higher up in the ladder and that being the provision to avoid harassment of stagnation, the authorities having provided for a ratio between the qualified direct recruits and unqualified promotees, on consideration of germane and relevant materials, the same should not be interfered with by this Court. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 squarely applies and, therefore, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge.

    4. The recruitment and other service conditions including promotion in the Karnataka Electricity Board is governed by a set of regulations called the Karnataka Electricity Board Recruitment and Promotion Regulations (hereinafter referred to as “the Recruitment Regulations”). The recruitment to the post of Operator, Meter Reader and Assistant Storekeeper, which constitute a combined cadre, is made both by direct recruitment as well as by promotion, on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The Regulation provides that 50% of the combined cadre would be filled up by direct recruitment and 40% of the cadre by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and equivalent post and 10% by direct recruitment from among the in-service personnel. The minimum qualification for direct recruitment is ITI Certificate in Electrical or Telecommunication or Electronic Trade or certificate in Lineman Trade of the Karnataka Electricity Board Training Institute, after passing of the 10th standard, whereas for promotees from Mechanic Grade II, the minimum educational qualification is up to 10th standard. The next higher rank is Junior Engineer (Electrical) and the cadre of Junior Engineer is required to be filled up by direct recruitment of persons possessing diploma in Electrical or Computer Engineering to the extent of 40%. Against this 40% quota, appointment could be made by transfer of in-service personnel, possessing Engineering Degree qualification. 10% of the cadre of Junior Engineer could be filled up by direct recruitment of in-service personnel possessing diploma qualification. 10% of the post could be filled up by promotion of Operators, Meter Readers, Overseers, Assistant Storekeepers, having diploma qualification. 35% of the posts of Junior Engineer could be filled up by promotion from the common cadre of Operators, Overseers, Meter Readers and Assistant Storekeepers and 5% by promotion of Mechanics with five years of service. By the amendment of the Regulation in February 1982 a ratio was provided in respect of the 35% quota, which was to be filled up by promotion for the common cadre, the same ratio as 1:1 between the technically-qualified direct recruits and technically-unqualified promotees. It is this amendment which had been assailed by the present appellants by filing writ petitions in the Karnataka High Court. The question for consideration, therefore is whether the amended Regulation, providing a ratio of 1:1 between the technically-qualified direct recruits and technically-unqualified promotees, as against 35% quota available to them in the cadre of Junior Engineer, could be held to be violative of Article 14 or such a classification is permissible in law and the rule-making authority had considered all relevant and germane material in providing for the aforesaid ratio? The concept of equality before law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. All that Article 14 guarantees is a similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. The guarantee of equal protection of law and equality before the law does not prohibit reasonable classification. Equality before law does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as though they were the same. The principle of equality does not absolutely prevent the State from making differentiation between persons and things. The State has always the power to have a classification on the basis of rational distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with but such permissible classification must satisfy two conditions namely the classification to be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from others who are left out of the group and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. In other words, there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the legislation. So long as the classification is based on a rational basis and so long as all persons falling in the same class are treated alike, there can be no question of violating the equality clause. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law cannot be condemned as discriminatory, though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation, some included in the class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. When a provision is challenged as violative of Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it and having ascertained the policy and object of the Act, the court has to apply a dual test namely whether the classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from others that are left out of the group and whether the basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and objects. The power to make classification can be exercised not only by the legislature but also by the administrative bodies acting under an Act.

    5. When the validity of the amended Regulation, providing ratio for promotion between the technically-qualified and technically-unqualified persons in 1:1 is examined from the aforesaid standpoint, we are unable to hold that the direct recruit technically-qualified personnel had been treated with hostile discrimination. The feeder category for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer is the combined cadre of Operator-Overseer-Meter Reader-Assistant Storekeeper. To the aforesaid combined cadre, direct recruitment is possible and those with ITI Certificate in Electrical or Telecommunication or Electronic Trade, after passing of 10th standard could be recruited. Whereas in case of promotees, the qualification required is only study up to 10th standard and for them the entry point is Mechanic Grade II from where they get promoted to the combined cadre, as noted above. For the technical post of Junior Engineer, which is the next higher post, the Regulation itself provided that 35% of the said posts could be filled up by promotion from the common cadre and the aforesaid provision for promotion from the common cadre had been made, after prescribing different quotas for direct recruitment of in-service personnel having diploma qualification, promotion from the combined cadre who have diploma qualification and promotion of Mechanics with five years' service. According to the Board, though the Regulation initially provided for promotion to the extent of 35% in the cadre of Junior Engineer from the common cadre but it used to work out gross injustice to the technically-unqualified promotees inasmuch as such technically-unqualified operators could be considered for promotion to the post of Junior Engineer only after they have rendered more than 15 years of service. That apart, the only promotional avenue available to such technically-unqualified promotees is the 35% quota in the cadre of Junior Engineer and they could not aspire to any further promotion, whereas the qualified direct recruits could be promoted still further. The Board claimed that while fixing the ratio as 1:1, it took into account the qualification, the experience and smooth functioning of the Board and for striking a balance between the qualification on the one hand and the experience on the other. In Triloki Nath (1974) 1 SCC 19 this Court has affirmed the principle of classification but has held that it should be founded on a reasonable differentia which distinguishes the persons grouped together from those who are left out of the group and in that case the classification was between the degree-holder Assistant Engineers and diploma-holder Assistant Engineers. The Court upheld such classification as it was intended to achieve administrative experience in the Engineering Service. In Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 a three-Judge Bench of this Court upheld the ratio of 3:1 between graduate Assistant Engineers and diploma-holder Junior Engineers for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, as such a distinction had been maintained throughout between the two categories. It is no doubt true that in that case, it is the diploma-holders who had approached the Court, challenging the introduction of ratio of 3:1 between such diploma-holders and graduate Assistant Engineers and the Court upheld the provisions, whereas in the case in hand, it is the qualified direct recruits who have approached the Court. But in deciding the question whether such a provision can be held to be violative of Article 14, the principle in Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 would apply with full force to the case in hand. It may be noticed that the learned Single Judge relied upon the two earlier decisions of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon AIR 1967 SC 1889, (1968) 1 SCR 185 and Mervyn Continho AIR 1967 SC 52, (1966) 3 SCR 600 and both the decisions have been noticed and distinguished in Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 and the other decision on which the learned Single Judge has relied upon namely Shujat Ali (1975) 3 SCC 76 has also been explained away in the aforesaid three-Judge judgment in Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149. It is no doubt true that in Triloki Nath (1974) 1 SCC 19 Chandrachud, J. had observed that the classification should not be carried too far lest it may subvert, perhaps submerge the precious guarantee of equality, but such word of caution will have no application to the facts of the present case, where under the Regulation itself, both the technically-qualified direct recruits and non-technical promotees were entitled to 35% quota in the cadre of Junior Engineer and the amendment of the year 1982 merely provided a ratio between them namely 1:1 and this amendment was brought about in the Regulation itself to ameliorate the stagnation of the unqualified promotees in the cadre. That apart, it is not correct to hold that there has been a complete fusion in the combined cadre inasmuch as the Regulation did provide for promotion at different percentage for in-service personnel, possessing diploma qualification, then diploma-holders from amongst the combined cadre namely Operators, Meter Readers, Overseers and Assistant Storekeepers and 5% by promotion of Mechanics with five years' service. Thus, 60% of the posts in the cadre of Junior Engineers were meant to be filled up by different ratio from amongst the persons in the so-called combined cadre and 35% quota, which was available for promotion for such common cadre people was further bifurcated between qualified direct recruits, who are the appellants and technically-unqualified promotees, who are the private respondents in the ratio 1:1. Such a classification, in our considered opinion, cannot be held to be discriminatory, if the object sought to be achieved, as indicated by the Board in its counter-affidavit is looked into. The decision of this Court in the case of Punjab SEB v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma (1986) 4 SCC 617 on which the learned Single Judge had relied upon and Mr Rama Jois appearing for the appellants had strongly relied upon, was overruled by the three-Judge Bench judgment in P. Murugesan v. State of T.N (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 The decision of this Court in N. Abdul Basheer v. K.K Karunakaran 1989 Supp (2) SCC 344, (1991) 17 ATC 160 on which also, the learned Single Judge had relied upon and Mr Rama Jois, also strongly relied upon, has been distinguished in the aforesaid case of Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149. The decision of this Court in Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCC 76 which was followed in Punjab SEB case (1986) 4 SCC 617 has been explained in the aforesaid three-Judge Bench judgment. The decision of Mervyn Continho AIR 1967 SC 52, (1966) 3 SCR 600 as well as Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889, (1968) 1 SCR 185 has also been noticed in Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 and not followed, but in the later case of Shamkant Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corpn. 1993 Supp (2) SCC 194, (1993) 24 ATC 416 both these decisions have been distinguished, in view of the law laid down in Triloki Nath Khosa case (1974) 1 SCC 19. In the aforesaid premises and in view of the judgment of this Court in Triloki Nath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19, in P. Murugesan (1993) 2 SCC 340, (1993) 24 ATC 149 and in Shamkant Narayan Deshpande 1993 Supp (2) SCC 194, (1993) 24 ATC 416 the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion that by providing a ratio of 1:1 in the matter of promotion to the post of Junior Engineer between directly recruited technically-qualified people and promotee technically not qualified people, there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and we see no infirmity with the aforesaid conclusion of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. Accordingly, these appeals fail and are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.

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    K.R Lakshman And Others v. Karnataka Electricity Board And Others
    (Dec 12, 2000)