AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1998 INSC 470
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Chapter II-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 38-B of the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 3-A of the Act
  • Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 3-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (1 of 1952)
  • Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act
  • Chapter II-A of the said Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 (Orissa Act 33 of 1970)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1998 INSC 470
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Chapter II-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 38-B of the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 3-A of the Act
  • Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • Section 3-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act
  • The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (1 of 1952)
  • Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act
  • Chapter II-A of the said Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 (Orissa Act 33 of 1970)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is a public deity whose properties are situated in Dhenkanal, formerly a princely State that merged with the State of Orissa in 1948. Under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (1 of 1952), a Government notification dated 27-2-1968 declared that the intermediary interests of Debottar Lakhraj's land in Dhenkanal vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The appellant's case states that a Tribunal declared the deity as a “trust estate.”

Subsequently, on 18-3-1974, exercising powers under Section 3-A(1) of the Act, the State issued another notification declaring that intermediary interests of various categories of intermediaries, including those declared as “trust estates” under Chapter II-A or whose claims/references under that Chapter were then pending, and the intermediary interests of all other estates not already vested, had passed to and vested in the State free from all encumbrances.

Through the Executive Officer, the deity applied under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Act for settlement of the land with the deity. In OEA Case No. 454 of 1974, private respondents filed objections claiming tenancy/occupancy rights. By order dated 23-9-1977, the Estate Abolition Collector rejected the respondents’ tenancy claims and directed that the lands be settled with the deity on fair and equitable rent. Equitable rent was assessed and a patta was issued to the appellant. No appeal was preferred under the Act against this order.

After nearly seven years, the respondents invoked the suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the Member, Board of Revenue, under Section 38-B of the Act. In OEA Revision Case No. 86 of 1984, the Member, Board of Revenue dismissed the revision on 5-5-1987, holding that the respondents’ claim of occupancy rights could not be sustained and that settlement in favour of the deity was proper, inter alia considering an order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments dated 17-1-1953 on the nature of the institution.

The respondents then filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. By judgment dated 13-11-1992 in OJC No. 2030 of 1987, the High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the Collector’s order dated 23-9-1977, and held that the respondents had acquired occupancy rights and were entitled to remain in possession. The present appeal challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, in interfering with the Estate Abolition Collector’s order (affirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue) settling land with the deity and rejecting the respondents’ occupancy claims.
  2. Whether the High Court could embark on a “roving inquiry” into issues not raised before the statutory authorities, particularly concerning vesting under the 1968 notification and the alleged absence of a declaration of “trust estate.”
  3. Whether the High Court could grant occupancy rights to the respondents in the absence of supporting material on record.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 by conducting a roving inquiry and by holding that the lands attached to the deity could not be vested under the 18-3-1974 notification.
  • The respondents had appeared in the estate abolition proceedings, claimed occupancy rights, and were unsuccessful; the Collector’s order became final. They could not, in a writ petition, advance a new stand that was not raised before the Collector.
  • The High Court erred in granting occupancy rights without any material evidence supporting the respondents’ claims.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The question addressed by the High Court was a pure question of law, permitting its consideration even if not previously raised before the authorities.
  • As the appellant did not produce the order declaring the deity as a “trust estate,” the High Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference and concluding that, following the 1968 vesting notification, there had been no declaration in favour of the deity; consequently, the estate had vested and no fresh vesting under the 18-3-1974 notification could arise.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified the central question as whether the High Court rightly interfered under Article 226 with the conclusions of the Estate Abolition Collector (affirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue). The Court reiterated the well-settled parameters for interference in supervisory jurisdiction: the High Court may interfere if the inferior tribunal (i) considered inadmissible evidence, (ii) ignored material evidence, (iii) committed an error of law, (iv) lacked jurisdiction, or (v) based its conclusion on no evidence.

Applying these parameters, the Court concluded that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction:

  • Proceedings before the Collector were initiated after the 18-3-1974 notification. Public notice invited objections; the respondents participated, claimed occupancy rights, and were unsuccessful. They did not contend that vesting had already occurred under the 1968 notification or that there was no declaration of “trust estate.”
  • In the subsequent revision under Section 38-B, the Member, Board of Revenue also proceeded without any party raising the 1968-vesting/no-trust-estate issue, and dismissed the revision, upholding the settlement in favour of the deity and rejecting the respondents’ occupancy claim.
  • Despite this, the High Court undertook an inquiry into the 1968 notification and the alleged absence of a declaration of “trust estate” (including recording a finding based on non-production of records regarding a purported 26-9-1970 declaration), though this issue had not been raised before the statutory authorities. The Court held that such an inquiry was beyond the proper scope of Article 226 in the circumstances.
  • The High Court further concluded that the respondents had acquired occupancy rights without any supporting material. The Court found this conclusion unsustainable as it was not supported by evidence on record.

Given these considerations, the Court held that none of the recognized grounds for supervisory interference were met. The High Court therefore erred in setting aside the Collector’s order and in granting occupancy rights to the respondents.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The High Court’s judgment dated 13-11-1992 in OJC No. 2030 of 1987 is set aside and that writ case stands dismissed. The Estate Abolition Collector’s order dated 23-9-1977, directing settlement of the land with the appellant-deity on fair and equitable rent, is affirmed. There is no order as to costs.

Implications: The immediate effect is that the land remains settled with the appellant-deity; the respondents’ claim to occupancy rights fails. The decision reaffirms the limited scope of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226, restricting interference to instances of jurisdictional error, consideration of inadmissible evidence, ignoring material evidence, errors of law, or conclusions based on no evidence. No broader doctrinal change or new precedent beyond this reaffirmation is indicated in the opinion.

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    Raghunathe Jew At Bhapur v. State Of Orissa And Others

    G.B Pattanaik, J.— The appellant is a public deity and in this appeal the judgment dated 13-11-1992 of the Orissa High Court in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2030 of 1987 is being challenged. The deity and the properties attached to it situate in the district of Dhenkanal, which was earlier a princely State, and it became a part of the State of Orissa after its merger in 1948. Under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (1 of 1952) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) a notification was issued by the Government of Orissa in the Revenue Department on 27-2-1968, declaring that the intermediary interests of Debottar Lakhraj's land in the district of Dhenkanal became vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In accordance with the provisions contained in the Act, it is the case of the appellant that on behalf of the deity an application was made before the Tribunal and the Tribunal declared the deity as a “trust estate”. On 18-3-1974, in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 3-A of the Act, the State Government issued another notification, declaring that (i) the intermediary interests of all intermediaries whose estates have been declared as a trust estate under Chapter II-A of the said Act and (ii) those in respect of which claims and references made under the said Chapter were pending on the date of commencement of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 (Orissa Act 33 of 1970) and (iii) the intermediary interests of all intermediaries in respect of all estates other than those which have already vested in the State have passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The appellant thereafter through the Executive Officer of the deity filed an application under Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act for the settlement of the land with the deity. The private respondents filed their objections pursuant to the notice issued in the aforesaid proceeding, inviting objections from the public and the respondents claimed their tenancy right in respect of the lands belonging to the deity. The said proceeding which was registered as OEA Case No. 454 of 1974 stood disposed of by the order of the Estate Abolition Collector dated 23-9-1977. The said Collector rejected the objection filed on behalf of the private respondents and rejected the claim of tenancy over the land and further directed that the lands in question be settled with the deity on fair and equitable rent. Pursuant to the said order, equitable rent was assessed and “patta” was issued to the appellant. Though appeal is provided under the Act, the respondents did not prefer any appeal. However, after the expiry of seven years, the said respondents invoked the suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the Member, Board of Revenue, under Section 38-B of the Act. The said revision application which was registered as OEA Revision Case No. 86 of 1984 stood disposed of by the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue dated 5-5-1987. The revisional authority came to hold that the claim of the respondents about their occupancy rights cannot be sustained and the institution being a public temple and in view of the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments dated 17-1-1953, deciding the nature of the institution, the Estate Abolition Collector rightly directed the settlement of land in favour of the deity. The said revision case having been dismissed, the respondents approached the High Court invoking the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The High Court by the impugned judgment allowed the said writ petition, having held that the respondents have acquired an occupancy right over the land in question. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the Collector dated 23-9-1977 and held that the respondents have occupancy right in the land and would be entitled to remain in possession of the land in accordance with law.

    2. Mr Misra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by making a roving inquiry and by recording a finding that the lands attached to the deity could not be vested under the notification dated 18-3-1974. Mr Misra further contended that the private respondents having appeared in the estate abolition proceedings pursuant to the notice issued by the Estate Abolition Collector and having claimed a right of occupancy over the land, which claim was rejected and the order of the Estate Abolition Collector became final, is not entitled to approach the High Court in a writ petition taking a new stand which was not there before the Estate Abolition Collector. Consequently, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the said contention and in answering the same by making a roving inquiry. Mr Misra also contended that the High Court committed a serious error in granting occupancy rights over the land in question without an iota of material in support of the said claim of the respondents. Mr J.R Das, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, on the other hand, contended that the question which was urged and answered by the High Court in the impugned judgment was a pure question of law and, therefore, there was no bar for deciding the said question and granting relief to the respondents even if the respondents had not raised those questions either before the Estate Abolition Collector or before the Member, Board of Revenue. Mr Das also further submitted that the appellant having granted the opportunity of producing the relevant order declaring the deity as a “trust estate”, the High Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference and in recording a finding that after the vesting notification issued in the year 1968, there has been no declaration made in favour of the deity and, therefore, the estate stood vested in the State and in that view of the matter, question of fresh vesting under the notification of 18-3-1974 does not arise.

    3. We have carefully considered the rival submissions at the Bar and examined the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. We have also scrutinised the order of the Estate Abolition Collector dated 23-3-1977, rejecting the claims of the private respondents that they have occupancy tenancy over the land in question and settling the land with the deity-intermediary on fair and equitable rent as well as the order of the Member, Board of Revenue dated 5-5-1987, refusing to interfere with the order of the Estate Abolition Collector in exercise of his suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 38-B of the Act. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with such decision of the Estate Abolition Collector and affirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled that in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court would be entitled to interfere with the conclusion of an inferior tribunal, if such tribunal considers any inadmissible pieces of evidence in arriving at its conclusion or ignores material piece of evidence from the purview of consideration or the conclusion is based upon any error of law or the tribunal itself has no jurisdiction at all or that the conclusion is based on no evidence. These being the parameters for exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution and if we examine the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conclusions arrived at by the Estate Abolition Collector and affirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue. It is apparent that after the vesting notification dated 18-3-1974, the appellant filed an application under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, claiming settlement of the land with the deity. In that proceeding, public notice was given inviting objections and the private respondents had filed their objections claiming a right of occupancy over the land and the Estate Abolition Collector decided that proceeding in favour of the appellant and negatived the claim of the respondents. In that proceeding, the respondents never took the stand that the intermediary estate in question did not vest under the notification of 1974 as it had already vested pursuant to the earlier notification of 1968 and it has not been declared as a “trust estate”. No appeal has been preferred against that decision but a suo motu revision had been moved before the Member, Board of Revenue and the Member, Board of Revenue also dismissed the said revision. None of the parties raised the question about the vesting of the estate under the notification of 1968 and the estate was not declared as a “trust estate” pursuant to the aforesaid vesting of 1968. On the other hand, parties approached the Estate Abolition Collector claiming rights on the basis that the intermediary estate stood vested by the notification dated 18-3-1974. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the state of things that happened on the basis of the notification of the year 1968. That apart, the High Court itself recorded a finding in the impugned judgment that under the 1968 notification the Debottar Lakhraj Bahel's land did not vest and there is a definite distinction between the two classes of Debottar property. All the same, the High Court went on examining the question of vesting under the earlier notification and recorded a finding because of non-production of the relevant records that there was no declaration of “trust estate” on 26-9-1970. When the respondents did not raise this question before the Estate Abolition Collector in the present proceedings out of which the impugned order emanates, it was not open for the High Court to go into that question at all. Then again without any material to substantiate a claim of occupancy tenancy over the land in question, the High Court came to the conclusion that the respondents had acquired occupancy right in the land and such a conclusion cannot be sustained in law. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court committed gross error in interfering with the conclusions arrived at by the Estate Abolition Collector and affirmed by the Member, Board of Revenue. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2030 of 1987 and hold that the said case stands dismissed. Necessarily, therefore, the order of the Estate Abolition Collector dated 23-9-1977, directing the settlement of land with the appellant-deity is affirmed. This appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

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    Raghunathe Jew At Bhapur v. State Of Orissa And Others
    (Dec 9, 1998)