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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted by the trial court for murder punishable under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to death. The High Court confirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. A co-accused, Doran Dass, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment; the High Court confirmed his conviction and sentence as well. Both accused filed special leave petitions before the Supreme Court; Doran Dass’s special leave petition was dismissed. The appellant was granted leave to appeal only on the question of sentence. Accordingly, the appeal concerned only whether the death sentence imposed on the appellant was proper.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the material on record, the sentence of death imposed on the appellant was proper.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470, AIR 1983 SC 957 Guidelines for identifying “rarest of rare” cases warranting the death penalty. The High Court relied on these guidelines to justify that the case fell within the “rarest of rare” category; the Supreme Court, however, held that the key aggravating circumstance underpinning this conclusion (that the appellant was a professional killer with a prior history of murders) was not supported by admissible evidence, and therefore the case did not qualify as “rarest of rare” on the remaining circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The trial court imposed the death sentence principally on three stated reasons: (i) the appellant committed the murder of Kusum Devi at the instance of Doran Dass for payment of Rs 10,000; (ii) the appellant was a “professional killer”; and (iii) the appellant committed the murder in broad daylight on a public street, coupled with the view that such a professional killer did not deserve to remain in the world. The High Court also emphasized the cruel manner of the killing in a public place, and additionally stated that it had been proved that the appellant had a previous history of committing murder; on that basis, applying the “rarest of rare” guidelines in Machhi Singh, it upheld the death penalty.

The Supreme Court identified that the main factor driving both courts to impose the extreme penalty was the asserted circumstance that the appellant was a professional killer with a prior history of murders. It then examined the evidence supporting that assertion. PW 5 (Arjun Das) stated that, while trying to find out who committed the murder, he came to know it was committed by Doran Dass through a professional killer on payment of money, but he did not disclose the source of this information and had no personal knowledge that the appellant was a professional killer. PW 19 (Sukumari Devi) was declared hostile; in cross-examination it was elicited as a contradiction that she had earlier told police that people in the locality knew the appellant commits murder for money. The Court held that such a statement, introduced as a contradiction, was not substantive evidence.

The Court also addressed the appellant’s alleged confessional statement (Ex. 5), which was recorded by PW 21 (Rakesh Kumar Brahamchari) after the FIR was registered and after the investigation had begun, when the appellant had been arrested and brought before him. The Court noted that no defence objection had been raised to its admission, and that neither the trial court nor the High Court examined its admissibility. The Supreme Court held that the confessional statement was “clearly inadmissible” because it was made by an accused before a police officer after the investigation had started.

Having found that there was no admissible evidence to support the key aggravating circumstance that the appellant was a professional killer with a previous history of killing for money, the Court held that once that circumstance was discarded, the remaining circumstances did not make the case a “rarest of rare” case warranting the death penalty.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED; SENTENCE MODIFIED. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on sentence and substituted the sentence of imprisonment for life in place of the death sentence imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.

The direct consequence was that the appellant’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The decision turned on the absence of admissible evidence for the asserted aggravating factor (professional killer/previous murder history) and did not indicate that any new precedent was set beyond applying the “rarest of rare” framework and excluding inadmissible material from sentencing consideration.

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    Bullu Das v. State Of Bihar .

    G.T Nanavati, J.— The appellant was convicted by the trial court for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to death. The High Court confirmed the conviction and also the death sentence. Co-accused, Doran Dass was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. His conviction and sentence were also confirmed by the High Court. Both the accused then filed special leave petitions in this Court for obtaining leave to appeal against the judgment and order passed by the High Court. The special leave petition filed by Doran Dass was dismissed. Leave was granted to the appellant on the question of sentence only. Therefore, the only point that we are required to consider in this appeal is whether the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant is proper.

    2. For awarding the death sentence, the trial court gave the following reasons:

    (1) that the appellant committed murder of Kusum Devi at the instance of Doran Dass and on payment of Rs 10,000,

    (2) that the appellant is a professional killer, and

    (3) that the appellant is such a daredevil that he committed the murder of Kusum Devi in broad daylight on a public street.

    3. It was of the view that such a professional killer does not deserve to remain in the world.

    4. On the question of sentence, the High Court has observed as under:

    “From the materials brought on record, I have already indicated the cruel manner in which this appellant had committed the murder of a young and helpless lady in broad daylight at a public place. It has also been proved that this appellant had a previous history of committing murder. Therefore, having regard to the guidelines enumerated by the Apex Court in the case of Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470, AIR 1983 SC 957 there appears no difficulty in concluding that this case falls in the category of one of the ‘rarest of rare cases’ where death penalty can be fully justified.”

    5. Thus, the main reason which induced the trial court and the High Court to impose the extreme penalty of death was that the appellant is a professional killer with a previous history of committing murders.

    6. The only evidence on that point consists of the depositions of PW 5, Arjun Das and PW 19, Sukumari Devi and the confessional statement of the appellant, Ex. 5, recorded by Rakesh Kumar Brahamchari, PW 21. Arjun Das has deposed that when he had tried to find out who had committed the murder of Kusum Devi, he had come to know that it was committed by Doran Dass through a professional killer on payment of money. He did not say through whom he came to know it. He had no personal knowledge that Bullu Das, the appellant, is a professional killer. PW 19, Sukumari Devi was declared hostile as she did not support the prosecution. She was cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor and during that cross-examination, it was brought out that she had stated before the police that people of the locality know that Bullu Das commits murder on payment of money. This was brought on record by way of a contradiction. Thus, the statement made by her that Bullu Das commits murder by taking money was not substantive evidence.

    7. The confessional statement, Ex. 5, stated to have been made by the appellant was before the police officer in charge of the Godda Town Police Station where the offence was registered in respect of the murder of Kusum Devi. The FIR was registered at the police station on 8-8-1995 at about 12.30 p.m On 9-8-1995, it was after the appellant was arrested and brought before Rakesh Kumar that he recorded the confessional statement of the appellant. Surprisingly, no objection was taken by the defence for admitting it in evidence. The trial court also did not consider whether such a confessional statement is admissible in evidence or not. The High Court has also not considered this aspect. The confessional statement was clearly inadmissible as it was made by an accused before a police officer after the investigation had started.

    8. Really, there was no evidence on record on the basis of which it could have been held that the appellant is a professional killer having a previous history of killing others on payment of money. If this circumstance is discarded from consideration, then the rest of the circumstances do not make it a rarest of rare case.

    9. We, therefore, allow this appeal and modify the order of sentence passed by the High Court by substituting the sentence of imprisonment for life for the sentence of death imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.

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    Comments

    Bullu Das v. State Of Bihar .
    (Nov 3, 1998)