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1998 INSC 38
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Army Act
  • muddamal Article 20
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1998 INSC 38
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Army Act
  • muddamal Article 20
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a sepoy in the 14th Maratha Light Infantry, married Vimal in 1980. Because of tuberculosis, Vimal was advised prolonged rest and sexual abstinence. On 10 February 1983 Vimal disappeared from the home of the appellant’s parents in Village Tisangi. Three days later a headless, decomposed female torso was discovered in a well at Pusegaon village, but remained unidentified and was cremated after public notification.

On 17 February 1983 the appellant voluntarily approached four superior military officers, produced a detailed written confession in Marathi admitting that he strangled Vimal, dismembered her body and disposed of it in two separate wells, and signed the document. Military authorities informed the civil police, leading to the appellant’s arrest on 5 March 1983. Acting on information supplied by him, the police recovered Vimal’s severed head from a different well and seized other incriminating articles.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Sangli, accepted many prosecution facts—including the voluntariness of the confession—but acquitted the appellant on the ground that other evidence conflicted with the confession. The High Court of Bombay (Appellate Side) reversed, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and imposed a death sentence. The appellant sought relief before the Supreme Court of India, which initially stayed execution and ultimately decided the present criminal appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant’s extra-judicial confession, standing alone or with supporting circumstances, could form the legal basis for conviction under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s order of acquittal.
  3. Whether the facts of the case satisfied the “rarest of rare” threshold necessary to affirm the death penalty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court erred in reversing an acquittal without independently analysing every reason given by the trial court.
  • Medical and circumstantial evidence allegedly contradicted the contents of the confession (e.g., the post-mortem indicated death from decapitation, not strangulation).
  • The High Court impermissibly accepted parts of the confession while discarding other details.
  • Discovery of a steel box and kukhari undermined the confession because the appellant had stated he had discarded them before returning to duty, and the box was allegedly too small to contain an adult body.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, AIR 1985 SC 48 An unambiguous, voluntary extra-judicial confession can by itself sustain a conviction; minor discrepancies are immaterial and no corroboration is mandatory. Relied upon to hold that the appellant’s confession, proved through disinterested military officers, required no further corroboration.
Manguli Dei v. State of Orissa 1989 Supp (1) SCC 161, AIR 1989 SC 483 Confession not invalid merely because medical evidence on a highly decomposed body shows fewer injuries than described. Used to rebut the appellant’s reliance on post-mortem discrepancies; upheld validity of confession despite decomposition.
Piara Singh v. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 452, AIR 1977 SC 2274 Extra-judicial confession to an independent, unbiased witness can be acted upon without corroboration. Cited to reinforce that the military officers were neutral witnesses and their testimony was credible.
Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347 Cited by the appellant to question reliability of extra-judicial confession. Court held the facts distinguishable and found the precedent unhelpful to the appellant.
Harchand Singh v. State of Haryana (1974) 3 SCC 397 Referenced by appellant regarding appellate interference with acquittal. Court distinguished, stating circumstances were different and thus inapplicable.
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab 1988 Supp SCC 526 Cited by appellant on confession law. Court found it factually dissimilar and of no assistance.
Chhittar v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Supp (4) SCC 519 Also cited by appellant on confession and circumstantial evidence. Court held it did not alter the analysis because the present facts were unique.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Voluntariness and Credibility of Confession: Both lower courts found the confession voluntary; Supreme Court saw no evidence of inducement or bias by military officers (PW 32 proved authorship). Therefore, it constituted substantive evidence requiring no corroboration.

2. Recovery of the Head: The appellant alone knew the location of the severed head; its discovery from a different well corroborated the confession and provided a powerful incriminating circumstance within the exclusive knowledge test of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

3. Medical Evidence: The body was badly decomposed; absence of strangulation marks did not negate strangulation because the neck had been severed. The doctor’s opinion that death was due to haemorrhage from decapitation lacked supporting details and was made without knowledge of the confession. Consequently, the Court attached limited weight to the post-mortem.

4. Other Physical Objects: Size of the recovered steel trunk and presence of the kukhari were not inconsistent with the confession; minor variances in how or where articles were discarded were treated as inconsequential.

5. Letter to Co-accused (Muddamal Article 20): The appellant’s letter to his friend suggested a shared nefarious plan and further strengthened the prosecution case.

6. Appellate Interference with Acquittal: The trial court’s acquittal rested mainly on perceived conflicts between the confession and other evidence. The High Court rightly focused on the confession’s core truth rather than peripheral details. The Supreme Court endorsed this approach, finding the High Court correctly applied settled law on extra-judicial confessions.

7. Sentencing: While affirming guilt, the Court concluded that the crime did not meet the “gravest of the grave” standard; hence, death penalty was disproportionate.

Holding and Implications

Conviction Upheld; Death Sentence Set Aside. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 IPC but commuted the sentence from death to imprisonment for life.

Implications: The judgment reiterates that a clear, voluntary extra-judicial confession, proved through trustworthy witnesses, can independently ground a conviction, and that minor inconsistencies or decomposed remains do not undermine its probative value. It also underscores the stringent scrutiny required before classifying a murder as “rarest of rare” for purposes of capital punishment.

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    Vinayak Shivajirao Pol v. State Of Maharashtra .

    M. Srinivasan, J.— The pivotal question in this appeal is whether the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant could form the basis of conviction under Section 302 IPC. The question was answered in the negative by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangli but the High Court gave a contrary answer and reversed the judgment of the Court of Session. Thus the appellant stood convicted and sentenced to death as the High Court opined that “this case falls in the category of the gravest of the grave and rarest of the rare cases”. After hearing the appeal for some time, we decided that the death sentence awarded to the appellant may not be sustainable whether we accept or reject the appeal ultimately and passed an order on 6-1-1998 that the appellant be taken out from the Death Cell and be put in the cell meant for life convicts till further orders. Thereafter we completed the hearing of the appeal.

    2. The appellant was a sepoy in the Army at 14th Maratha Light Infantry, Aundh Camp, Pune. He married one Vimal of Hingangaon village in 1980 and had a female child about a year later. Vimal was not keeping good health and was found to be suffering from tuberculosis. She was advised complete bedrest for 6 to 7 months and avoid sexual intercourse at least for one year. The parents of the appellant were living in Village Tisangi. Vimal was sent back to her parents but some time later she was brought back by the appellant and left with his parents.

    3. The appellant was allotted the duty of a guard at the residence of Commanding Officer at Ghorpadi, Pune for 24 hours in rotation in February 1983. He was absent from his duty on 9th and 10th February and reported for duty on the 11th at 1.00 p.m He gave an explanation for his absence to the authorities concerned that he had gone to his sister's house at Akurdi, Pune. As it was found to be unsatisfactory, he was punished under the Army Act.

    4. In the meanwhile on 10-2-1983, Vimal's father went to Tisangi in response to her letter requesting him to come immediately. She was not available and the parents of the appellant could not give an explanation for her absence to his satisfaction. He went back to his village in a disgusted mood.

    5. On 13-2-1983 a headless dead body was found in a well in Pusegaon village. The body was in a highly decomposed state. It was found that there was only a blouse on the trunk and both the legs were tied with a green cloth piece. Some injuries were found in the neck and the thumbs of the hands were found cut. Certain other fingers were also found half cut. After autopsy, search was made for the head but it could not be found. The fact was proclaimed by beat of drums in the nearby villages so that the trunk of the body could be identified. But nobody could identify the same and the same was cremated.

    6. On 17-2-1983 the appellant approached some of the superior officers and confessed before them that he had killed his wife Vimal. He was told by them to put in writing whatever he wanted to say. He wrote out a confessional statement in Marathi language and signed below it. The writing was attested by four military officers. He was kept under watch by the higher authorities in the guardroom. The military authorities informed the Superintendent of Police at Sangli about the confessional statement and sent a copy of the same to him. They were requested to contact the Superintendent of Police, Satara as the offence was alleged to have been committed at Pusegaon in District Satara. The military authorities communicated to the Superintendent of Police the information on 22-2-1983. The police commenced the investigation and obtained on 2-3-1983 a warrant from the Judicial Magistrate, Kavathe-Mahankal for the arrest of the appellant. Pursuant to the same, he was arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 5-3-1983. During the interrogation the appellant mentioned the name of his friend Baban Shankar Suryavanshi as his accomplice. The latter was also questioned and he offered to make discovery of certain articles namely a kukhari and a steel box like a military box. The appellant himself offered to make discovery of the head of his wife Vimal and as per his statement the head was recovered from another well in the same Village Pusegaon. Thereafter the investigation was completed and charges were framed against the appellant and his friend.

    7. The Court of Session recorded the following findings:

    I. The dead body was that of Vimal, the wife of the appellant whose death was homicidal.
    II. The appellant had sufficient motive for killing his wife.
    III. The extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to the military authorities was voluntary.
    IV. The head of the deceased was discovered at the instance of the appellant.
    V. The letter muddamal Article 20 was written by the appellant to his friend.

    However, the Court of Session took the view that the evidence led by the prosecution ran counter to the contents of the extra-judicial confession and the same could not therefore be relied upon to convict the appellant. In that view, the Court of Session acquitted the accused.

    8. On appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court and convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He was sentenced to death. The High Court however confirmed the acquittal of the other accused.

    9. Before proceeding further it is necessary to set out the statement of extra-judicial confession made by the appellant to the military authorities. It has been extracted in full in the judgment of the High Court as translated and placed before it. It reads as follows:

    “I, Shipai No. 277/892, am giving in writing as to how I killed my wife as her behaviour was not good and I myself had caught her with another man.
    On 9th February in the afternoon at 4.00 p.m I was on duty at Brigadier Saheb's Bungalow at Ghorpadi, Pune. From there I straightway came to the bus-stand and went to Satara by bus. While going I was carrying one steel box, one kukhari and one rug. With this luggage I reached home at 2.00 a.m on 10th. After reaching home, I went to the place where my mother, father and wife were sleeping. I woke up my wife. At that time my mother also woke up. I did not allow anybody to talk. My wife said, ‘Come, I will prepare tea for you.’ I told my mother that I am taking my wife and she should stay there only. Then, I came with my wife to the other home. After coming to the other home, I closed the outer door and also closed the inner door of the room. Then I pretended to sleep with my wife and pressed her neck. I pressed the neck till she died. After she was dead. I put her in the tin box which I had taken with me and covered with rug. Then at 2.30 a.m I came to the bus-stop at the plateau of Ghat Nagre which is 2-1/2 miles away from our village. Thus, in the morning at 5.30 a.m I came to Nagare Fata by Bombay-to-Jat bus. At that spot within two minutes one truck came. I got into the truck and came to Miraj. I came to Miraj Railway Station at 10.00 a.m on 10th. Again at 10.25 a.m I boarded a train and got down at Koregaon. I went to Koregaon bus-station in bullock cart. Then in the afternoon at 1.00 p.m I went to Aundh Fata bus-stop, which is 2 miles west of Village Puregaon by bus. It was 3.30 in the afternoon. At that time I waited there till night 8 p.m and after the vehicular and human traffic stopped, I started my work. Earlier I had inspected the wells in the area. Then I carried the box to a gulch (nala). After reaching the nala, I took out the dead body from the box and severed the head and both the thumbs. Then I put the body only in a gunny bag and went to a well. At the well I put two big stones in the gunny bag and tied the mouth of the gunny bag and threw it in the well.
    Then again I came back near the box. I wrapped the head in a cloth and with that head went near the other well. Then I tied two stones with that head and threw it in the well. Then I tied the thumbs in a cloth and put them in pocket. I washed the box and kukhari in the well. At that time some truck came from Puregaon. I came to Satara S.T station at 10.30 p.m at night in that truck. Then I removed the kukhari from the box and kept it in the cloth bag which was with me. I left the box there only and came to W.C at the station. In the W.C I threw the thumbs and kukhari and flushed it. At Aundh Fata I burnt her clothes and mixed it in the soil. And then at 11.00 p.m I sat in the bus and got down at Pune on 11th at 1.00 a.m Then I went for Guard. Then there was report. I told the Guard Commander that I had gone to my sister at Akurdi. Then on 14th at 12.00 noon I came to the Main Line. I had given the same statement to Company Commander on 16th.
    This entire statement is absolutely true.
    Shipai Vinayak Shivaji Pal
    No. 277/892
    sd/-
    17/2/1983”

    10. There is no ambiguity in the above statement. It shows that the appellant killed his wife. Both the courts have found that the statement was made voluntarily by the appellant. The sequence of events shows that at the time when the appellant made the confession, neither he nor the military authorities had any knowledge of the recovery of the headless trunk of the appellant's wife. The military authorities were in no way biased or inimical to the appellant. Nothing is brought out in the evidence in respect of the military officers which may indicate that they had a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the appellant. The statement has been proved by one of the officers to whom it was made. The said officer has been examined as PW 32. A perusal of the evidence shows that the vague plea raised by the appellant that the statement was obtained from him on inducement and promise is not true. In such circumstances it is open to the Court to rest its conclusion on the basis of such statement and no corroboration is necessary.

    11. In State of U.P v. M.K Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, AIR 1985 SC 48 an extra-judicial confession was made by the accused to his friend. The Court found that the statement was unambiguous and unmistakably conveyed that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime. The Court also found that the testimony of the friend was truthful, reliable and trustworthy. It was therefore held by this Court that the conviction of the accused on such extra-judicial confession was proper and no corroboration was necessary. It was also held that much importance should not be given to minor discrepancies and technical errors.

    12. In the present case apart from the statement of recovery there is a clinching circumstance against the appellant. That is, the head of the deceased wife was recovered from another well situated in the land of another person and the said recovery was made at the instance of the appellant. The said fact of the head being in another well was within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant and if he had not committed the murder he could not have shown the well in which the head was found. The High Court was therefore perfectly justified in relying upon the statement of confession and the recovery of the head at the instance of the appellant for holding that the appellant was guilty of murder.

    13. The High Court is also right in placing reliance on muddamal Article 20, a letter written by the appellant to his friend who was the second accused which indicated that there was some evil plan between the two.

    14. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the High Court is not justified in upsetting the order of acquittal passed by the trial court when the same was based on several reasons set out therein. It is also argued that none of the reasons given by the trial court has been independently considered by the High Court. According to the learned counsel each and every reason found in the judgment of the trial court must be dealt with by the High Court before it reverses the conclusion of the trial court. It is also argued that the medical evidence as well as the other circumstantial evidence are contrary to the contents of the statement of confession made by the appellant and in the face of such contradictions the Court ought not to have relied on the extra-judicial confession. It is further contended that the High Court has in fact accepted one part of the statement of confession finding it to be true. According to the learned counsel such a course is not open to the High Court.

    15. We have carefully gone through the judgment of both the courts below and also the evidence on record. The trial court has given various reasons for not accepting the extra-judicial confession but all are on the premise that the other evidence on record is contrary thereto. The High Court has relied upon the crux of the statement of confession and proceeded on the footing that the other details mentioned in the statement are not of much relevance and even if there is a variation between such details and the other evidence on record, it would be of no consequence. We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

    16. The main contention of the appellant is that in the post-mortem examination the opinion expressed by the doctor is that the death occurred due to haemorrhage by cutting off the head and that there is no evidence of strangling of the deceased by the appellant. There is no merit in this contention. Even if there had been any mark of strangling, the same would not be visible as the neck was cut. The body was found in such highly decomposed condition that it would not have been possible at all for the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem, to have found anything relating to the strangling of the deceased by the appellant. Further, one important factor should be kept in mind when we consider the evidence afforded by the post-mortem report. When the post-mortem was carried out, the appellant had not made the confession. On seeing the headless trunk, normally and naturally, the doctor would have proceeded to conduct the post-mortem on the footing that the death occurred on account of the chopping off of the head. In such a situation, the doctor expressed an opinion that death was due to haemorrhage but it is seen that in the post-mortem report there is no reference to the symptoms which indicated such haemorrhage. The same reasoning would apply to the opinion of the doctor that the injuries found on the body were ante-mortem.

    17. Our attention has been drawn to some of the passages in Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, edited by C.A Franklin, Twenty-first Edition and also Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology edited by Dr C.K Parikh. None of the passages is of any help in the present case in view of the facts mentioned above and in particular the circumstance that the body was highly decomposed when it was discovered. Reference has also been made to the following passage in the Textbook on Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by John Glaister:

    “Ante-mortem and post-mortem bruises.—The signs which are indicative of ante-mortem production of bruises are swelling of the tissues, discolouration of the skin, extravasation of blood into the true skin and subcutaneous tissues, with infiltration. When a bruise is well developed, an examiner is justified in assuming the view that it was produced during life. Nevertheless for medico-legal purposes, a microscopical examination should be made to verify the presence of infiltrated blood. Since infiltration is possible only while the heart is beating, this sign is conclusive that the injury was produced during life. While molecular life remains in the tissues, considerable violence applied to a dead body with a blunt instrument will produce a slight degree of extravasation, but never to the same extent as during life, and infiltration of the tissues will be absent.
    Suspected areas of bruising should always be incised to differentiate them from colour marks due to hypostasis, since both conditions may coexist in the same region of the body. In bruising, extravasated blood is present, but in hypostasis the severed small vessels are filled with blood and extravasation is absent.”

    18. There is nothing on record to show that the post-mortem examination was of the type mentioned in the above passage. In such circumstances we are unable to place any reliance on the opinion of the doctor who conducted the post-mortem.

    19. In Manguli Dei v. State of Orissa 1989 Supp (1) SCC 161, AIR 1989 SC 483 the wife killed her husband and buried the dead body in the house. According to her confessional statement she gave four axe blows on the head of the deceased. The dead body was recovered according to her statement but the injuries on the dead body were not visible as it was highly decomposed. The Court held that the confession could not be rejected merely on the ground that only one simple injury was stated in the post-mortem report. The facts in the present case are similar and the same principle will apply.

    20. There is no substance in the contention that the steel box discovered on the statement of the second accused would not be sufficient to place the dead body inside and carry it. Comments are also made that the discovery of the steel box and kukhari belies the statement of the appellant that he had discarded the same before returning to his place of duty. A cardboard model of the steel trunk was produced before us. In our view the size of the trunk is quite sufficient to place the body of the deceased inside by folding it which could be possible immediately after the death. In any event the variation between the minor details contained in the statement of confession and the circumstances brought out in the evidence will not in any way affect the acceptability of the confession of the appellant that he killed his wife.

    21. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the decisions in Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347, Harchand Singh v. State of Haryana (1974) 3 SCC 397, Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab 1988 Supp SCC 526, Chhittar v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Supp (4) SCC 519. None of the rulings is of any help to the appellant as the facts therein are entirely different. The principles on which extra-judicial confession could form the basis of a conviction are well settled. We have already referred to the judgment in State of U.P v. M.K Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, AIR 1985 SC 48 and Manguli Dei v. State of Orissa 1989 Supp (1) SCC 161, AIR 1989 SC 483. We may usefully add the decision in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 452, AIR 1977 SC 2274. In that case it was held that law does not require that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated and where such confession was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus against the accused, there was hardly any justification to disbelieve the same.

    22. In the result we have no hesitation in upholding the judgment of the High Court insofar as it finds the appellant to be guilty of committing the murder of his wife. The conviction is therefore upheld.

    23. However, we are not satisfied that this is a rarest of rare cases in order to warrant award of death sentence to the appellant. The ends of justice would be met by reducing the sentence to one of imprisonment for life. The appeal is allowed to that extent and the sentence awarded to the appellant is altered into one of imprisonment for life.

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    Vinayak Shivajirao Pol v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Jan 22, 1998)