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1998 INSC 175
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1998 INSC 175
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, an officer in the Town and Country Planning Department of the State of Andhra Pradesh, was included in a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) panel dated 16-8-1995 for promotion to the post of Director, Town and Country Planning. Before the DPC met, the State served him with a charge memo dated 31-7-1995 alleging misconduct in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Two additional charge memos were issued on 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996.

The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, by judgment dated 12-12-1996 in OA No. 2239/1996, held that: (i) the 31-7-1995 charge memo was vitiated by inordinate and unexplained delay; (ii) the subsequent charge memos could not be considered for denying promotion recommended by the 16-8-1995 DPC; and (iii) the DPC panel remained valid until 31-12-1996. It therefore directed the State to promote the respondent in the existing vacancy, ignoring the three charge memos if he was otherwise eligible.

The State of Andhra Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the Tribunal’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether unexplained and prolonged delay in disciplinary proceedings vitiates the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 and entitles the respondent to promotion.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in directing promotion by treating the DPC panel of 16-8-1995 as valid until 31-12-1996.
  3. Whether issuance of a second charge memo under the 1991 Rules, without cancelling an earlier memo issued under the 1963 Rules, rendered the disciplinary proceedings illegal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — State of Andhra Pradesh

  • The Tribunal placed undue emphasis on delay; mere delay should not nullify disciplinary action or confer “unwarranted” benefits.
  • The Tribunal quashed the 31-7-1995 charge memo and effectively neutralised the later memos even though they had not been challenged.
  • The DPC panel, according to the State, lapsed on 31-12-1995; hence no right to promotion survived thereafter.

Respondent — N. Radhakishan

  • The 31-7-1995 memo was timed just before the DPC meeting to block his promotion; the incidents were 10–17 years old.
  • Memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996 post-dated the DPC and could not be relied on to deny promotion.
  • For three of the four charges he was not even posted in the relevant office; the State’s own records confirmed this.
  • Repeated changes of Enquiry Officers and failure to supply records showed lack of seriousness and caused prejudice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 Delay in serving charge memo can, in appropriate cases, vitiate disciplinary proceedings; court must balance factors and may still allow enquiry to continue while permitting promotion. Relied on for the balancing test; Court examined length and reasons for delay, prejudice to employee, and seriousness of charges to decide whether to sustain or quash proceedings.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 Right to speedy trial; principles relevant to delay in proceedings. Used indirectly through Chaman Lal Goyal as foundational authority on balancing competing interests when delay is raised as a ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reviewed the chronology of the disciplinary process:

  • Initial memo under the 1963 Rules was issued on 22-12-1987 but no charges were served until 31-7-1995, after several Enquiry Officers were appointed and transferred without progress.
  • The 31-7-1995 memo merely repeated, verbatim, allegations from a 1987 Anti-Corruption Bureau report without linking specific acts to the respondent.
  • For three of the four charges, departmental records confirmed the respondent was not posted in the concerned offices; the disciplinary authority took no action on this revelation.
  • No explanation existed for the eight-year gap or subsequent inaction; the delay was entirely attributable to the State, causing evident prejudice.
  • Applying the principles in Chaman Lal Goyal and Antulay, the Court held that when delay is unexplained and the State shows little seriousness, disciplinary proceedings should not bar promotion.
  • The technical objection that the earlier 1987 memo was not formally cancelled was treated as an irregularity, not illegality; however, the decisive factor remained unexplained delay and lack of particularised charges.

Consequently, the Court found the Tribunal’s order—quashing the 31-7-1995 memo and directing promotion while leaving the later memos intact—was justified.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

The respondent is entitled to promotion to Director, Town and Country Planning, based on the 16-8-1995 DPC recommendation, without reference to the charge memos dated 31-7-1995, 27-10-1995, and 1-6-1996. The latter two memos remain alive for any future action but cannot affect the promotion.

Implications are confined to the parties: the decision reinforces existing jurisprudence that unexplained, prolonged delay can nullify disciplinary proceedings for purposes such as promotion. It does not create a new legal standard but affirms the balancing approach in assessing delay.

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    State Of A.P v. N. Radhakishan .

    D.P Wadhwa, J.— Against the judgment dated 12-12-1996 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in OA No. 2239 of 1996, filed by the respondent, the State of Andhra Pradesh has come up in appeal. By the impugned judgment the Tribunal allowed the petition of the respondent and directed that the respondent be promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning, in the existing vacancy, ignoring the charge memos — (1) Memo No. 2732.FL/87/27/MA, dated 31-7-1995; (2) Memo No. 145.B2/93-19.MA, dated 27-10-1995; and (3) Memo No. 898.B2/94.MA dated 1-6-1996, if the respondent is otherwise eligible. The Tribunal found that the Departmental Promotion Committee met on 16-8-1995 and prepared the panel for the panel year 1994-95, which was approved by the State Government in October 1995. One of the persons included in the panel was promoted to the category of Director of Town and Country Planning by GOMs dated 14-11-1995. The Tribunal observed that the panel itself having been prepared on 16-8-1995 should lapse only on 31-12-1996 and not on 31-12-1995 as was contended by the State. The name of the respondent was included in the panel. The Tribunal, therefore, held that since the panel would lapse only on 31-12-1996 the respondent was entitled for promotion before that date. The Tribunal also noticed that the objection of the State that the panel lapsed on 31-12-1995 was never raised either before it or in the Supreme Court in a special leave petition filed by the State against an interim order earlier made by the Tribunal.

    2. The Tribunal was concerned with the question if promotion of the respondent could be denied to him after his name had been included in the panel prepared by the DPC on the ground that the disciplinary enquiry initiated against him had not yet been terminated. The respondent had submitted before the Tribunal that the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 was served upon him just before the meeting of the DPC only to deprive him of his claim of promotion and further that the charge memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996 being subsequent to the date of meeting of the DPC could not be taken into consideration for promoting him to the post of Director, Town and Country Planning. The Tribunal noticed that the memo dated 31-7-1995 related to the incidents that happened in the years 1978, 1979 and 1984, which were also the subject-matter of Memo No. 1412 dated 22-12-1987. While Memo No. 1412 had been issued under Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1963 (for short “1963 Rules”) that dated 31-7-1995 was issued under Rule 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 (for short “1991 Rules”). Earlier Memo No. 1412 was neither cancelled nor annulled before issuance of memo dated 31-7-1995 and the Tribunal was of the view that because of this circumstance memo dated 31-7-1995 could not have been issued and enquiry should have proceeded under the old Rules after the Enquiry Officer had been appointed.

    3. The State has contended before us that the Tribunal wrongly assumed that the charges communicated to the respondent on 31-7-1995 were belated and not only that it quashed that charge memo but also other charge memos when there was no challenge to that. Merely on the ground of delay the Tribunal should not have conferred unwanted benefits on the respondent. It was submitted that the whole approach of the Tribunal in giving relief to the respondent had been the delay in not concluding the inquiry in furtherance of the charge memo. It may, however, be noticed that the respondent did seek setting aside of the memo dated 31-7-1995 and that dated 27-10-1995. The Tribunal only quashed memo dated 31-7-1995 and as regards memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996, it said that the State might proceed against the respondent for taking action as per law but the only rider which the Tribunal put was that these two memos could not be taken into consideration in implementing the recommendation of the DPC.

    4. Whether the delay did vitiate the disciplinary proceedings and if the Tribunal was justified in giving the directions aforesaid we may refer to the sequence of events.

    5. The respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. He worked in the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”) in 1979. He was posted as City Planner, Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam in 1981. A report dated 7-11-1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi storied complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with municipal authorities.

    6. In this report four multistoried buildings were mentioned, viz., Chandralok Complex, Chenoy Market Commercial Complex, Shahjahan Apartments and Progressive Towers. It was stated that in September 1987 these premises were inspected and irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions were noticed and the relevant files of the Corporation were also perused. Town Planning staff of the Corporation in collusion with the builders permitted them to flout building bye-laws and the staff abused their official position for obtaining pecuniary advantage for themselves and the builders causing loss of revenue to the Corporation in the shape of house taxes. Eleven officers were named including the respondent, who were said to be responsible for the abnormal deviations and unauthorised constructions.

    7. On the basis of the report the State issued two memos both dated 12-12-1987 (1) in respect of three officials, viz., Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner, the respondent, (2) P.V Janaki Raman, the then City Planner and (3) A. Ram Reddy, the then Assistant City Planner. In the second memo seven other officers of the rank of Section Officers and one Assistant City Planner were named. The memo respecting the respondent and two others said that under Rule 19(2) of the 1963 Rules one Shri N. Venugopal Reddy, Director of Town and Country Planning, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct a detailed inquiry against them, who were allegedly involved and found responsible for the irregularities. The Enquiry Officer was directed to complete his inquiry within a period of two months and to submit his report to the Government with specific findings. As we see, this memo is entirely based on the report of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau. In one of the letters dated 7-1-1988 of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, it is mentioned that during the course of the checking of the buildings witnesses were neither examined nor were their statements recorded and as such there was no Part B file. It was suggested that action be taken on the basis of the report already sent to the Government. Rule 19(2) of the 1963 Rules requires that when it is proposed to impose on a member of a service any of the penalties specified therein the authority competent to impose the penalty shall appoint an Enquiry Officer or itself hold an inquiry. In every such case the ground on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of definite charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any of other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders in the case. The charged employee shall be required within a reasonable time to file a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires an oral enquiry or to be heard in person or both. It is not necessary to refer to further steps in the enquiry proceedings as in the present case we find that till 31-7-1995 the articles of charges had not been served on the respondent by which time the 1991 Rules had come into force in supersession of the earlier 1963 Rules. Rule 45 of the 1991 Rules provided that repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the 1963 Rules, or any notification or order made, or anything done, or any action taken thereunder, in any proceeding under those Rules pending at the commencement of the 1991 Rules and shall be continued and disposed of as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Rules. In 1991 Rules procedure for imposing penalties had been changed by Rules 20 and 21. Now, the Enquiry Officer is to be appointed after written statement of the defence of the charged employee has been received. When it is proposed to hold inquiry against a government servant, the disciplinary authority is required to draw up the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct article of charge; a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge containing (a) a statement of all relevant facts, (b) list of documents and (c) list of witnesses. These shall be served upon the government servant, who shall be required to submit written statement in defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If on receipt of the written statement of the defence the disciplinary authority finds that it is necessary to enquire into the charges, it shall appoint an Enquiry Officer for the purpose. Of course, the disciplinary authority can itself enquire into the articles of charges, if it so chooses or thinks to do so. Again, we are not concerned as to how the Enquiry Officer is to proceed further in the matter as per the 1991 Rules as after the articles of charges were served upon the respondent and his statement of defence was received there was no progress and he moved the Tribunal.

    8. Coming back to the stage when Shri N. Venugopal Reddy was appointed as Enquiry Officer we find from the official file produced before us that he sent various communications to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration & Urban Development Department, to send him the relevant files. This he went on writing but without any response from the State Government till Shri N. Venugopal Reddy retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30-9-1991. As to why there was no response to various letters of the Enquiry Officer from the State Government the file does not reveal anything. Meanwhile the respondent was promoted as Joint Director of Town and Country Planning on 10-9-1991. Thereafter, the State Government appointed Shri P.B Chowdhary, OSD (legal cases), Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, as Enquiry Officer by order dated 7-9-1992. Shri Chowdhary did not submit the enquiry report and his term of office as OSD (legal cases) expired on 20-11-1992. Again, orders were issued on 6-3-1993 appointing Shri A. Vidyasagar, IAS, Additional Commissioner of the Corporation as Enquiry Officer. He was transferred from his post on 25-5-1993. Yet again orders were issued on 17-6-1993 appointing Shri Adityanath Dass, IAS, Additional Commissioner (Genl.) of the Corporation, as Enquiry Officer. On 16-8-1994 Shri Dass informed the authorities concerned that connected files and records have been received from the appropriate authority “recently” and promised that he would submit his report as early as possible. No report was submitted and Shri Dass was transferred from the post. Thereafter, orders were issued on 20-3-1995 appointing Shri M. Veerahhadraiah, IAS, OSD of the Corporation, as Enquiry Officer. At this stage it was observed that procedure as contained in the 1991 Rules had not been followed. Therefore, the order dated 20-3-1995 appointing Shri M. Veerahhadraiah as Enquiry Officer was cancelled by order dated 16-6-1995. It was at this stage that articles of charges dated 31-7-1995 were issued to the respondent.

    9. The Tribunal did not go into the culpability of the respondent with respect to the charges as contained in memo dated 31-7-1995 and did not record any finding of guilt or otherwise on those charges. The Tribunal, however, said that the memo dated 31-7-1995 related to incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the enquiry against the respondent. The explanation given by the State that for some reason or the other the Enquiry Officer was being changed from time to time and on that account enquiry could not be conducted, did not find favour by the Tribunal. It said that there was no justification on the part of the State now conducting the enquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. The Tribunal noticed that in the meanwhile the respondent had been promoted as Senior Joint Director of Town and Country Planning notwithstanding the appointment of Enquiry Officer one after the other after Memo No. 1412 dated 22-12-1987 and plea of the State that when the respondent was promoted as Senior Joint Director of Town and Country Planning his file relating to enquiry against him was not brought to the notice of the administrative section in the year 1991 at the time of convening the DPC and which resulted in promoting the respondent, also did not find favour with the Tribunal. The Tribunal said that both the sections were within the Municipal Administration and this explanation, now offered, was without any merit. The Tribunal while quashing memo dated 31-7-1995 did not quash the memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996 and said that the State, if so advised, might proceed against the respondent according to law for taking action against him. What the Tribunal said about the latter two memos was that they should not be taken into consideration while promoting the respondent in pursuance of the recommendations of the DPC which was held on 16-8-1995.

    10. A letter dated 27-3-1995 from the Vigilance Commissioner to the Principal Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department has been brought to our notice. In this letter the Vigilance Commissioner writes that after consideration of the facts it is observed that there was abnormal and avoidable delay in taking disciplinary action against various categories of officers, who are alleged to have committed several irregularities in the matter of permission given for construction of multi storied complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The letter says that the Enquiry Officer has now been appointed without following the procedure under Rule 20 of 1991 Rules. The Department was asked to verify if the earlier Enquiry Officers had served charge memos on the charged officers and if not to take immediate action to frame the charges, first as provided under Rule 20 of the 1991 Rules. The Vigilance Commissioner advised that the draft charges may be shown to him before issuance. A reminder was sent by the Vigilance Commissioner on 26-4-1995. It was thereafter that charges dated 31-7-1995 were framed and served upon the respondent and others.

    11. Four articles of charges have been set out against the respondent, now working as Joint Director, Office of the Director of Town and Country Planning, which are as under:

    “Articles of Charges

    (1) That Shri N. Radhakishan, formerly Assistant Town Planner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, Secunderabad, and presently working as Joint Director, Directorate of Town Planning, Hyderabad, while working as Assistant Town Planner during the year 1978 committed misconduct inasmuch as he has put up misleading note with certain omissions and commissions to the City Planner recommending permission for construction of 4th floor, 5th floor and part of 6th floor subject to certain conditions at Chandralok Complex, Secunderabad in favour of M/s Swastik Builders in File No. 234/241/7/1.B4/78 in violation of Building Bye-laws and Zoning Regulations. He thereby exhibited conduct which is unbecoming on the part of a government servant and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. Thereby the said Shri N. Radhakishan, contravened Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

    (2) Shri N. Radhakishan while working as such has also committed misconduct in allowing the cellar of Chenoy Market Commercial Complex, Secunderabad for using as godowns by various concerns such as Elcom Engineering Company, Hyderabad Pumps Limited, E.T & T. Limited by converting the cellar portion as garage when the cellar was actually meant for parking and he has also allowed the north-east corner of cellar to be converted as strongroom for lockers occupied by Suman Safe Deposit Lockers Private Limited. He has further committed misconduct in allowing to raise the height of the building to 130′ 8″ instead of the permitted average height of the building 92′ wide whereas Permit No. 92/84 dated 11-7-1985 and the sanctioned plan permitted the average height of the building as only 92′ i.e, ground + 7 floors. He thereby exhibited conduct which is unbecoming on the part of a government servant and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. Thereby the said Shri N. Radhakishan contravened Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

    (3) Shri N. Radhakishan has also committed misconduct in allowing the cellar of Shahjahan Apartments bearing Premises No. 6-2-974, Khairatabad for being used as shops and office godowns when it was supposed to be used as car parking as per Permit No. 24/15 of 1979 dated 30-3-1979. He thereby exhibited conduct which is unbecoming on the part of a government servant and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. Thereby the said Shri N. Radhakishan, contravened Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

    (4) Shri N. Radhakishan has also committed misconduct in not insisting to erect railings on the eastern side of Progressive Towers abutting the Rajbhavan Road even though the condition was stipulated that no opening should be provided towards Rajbhavan Road as per Permit No. 145/42 dated 19-3-1981 read with GOMs No. 1065, MA dated 16-9-1981, thus he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and thereby contravened Rule 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

    It is interesting to note that the same articles of charges in verbatim have been served upon Shri A. Sree Rami Reddy also, now working as Joint Director, Office of Director Town and Country Planning and also 8 others named in the report dated 7-11-1987 of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau.

    12. By letter dated 3-8-1995 the respondent informed the disciplinary authority, who issued the articles of charges, that he worked as Assistant City Planner in the Corporation from 6-12-1977 to 16-2-1979 in different circles and that from that it could be seen that only Charge 1 related to his period when he was working as Assistant City Planner in that circle. The respondent wanted copies of the relevant records in respect of charges contained in the memo to facilitate him to submit detailed written statement.

    13. In his written statement dated 25-9-1995 the respondent explained as to how Charges 2, 3 and 4 could not relate to him and subsequently also in his letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh he said that Charges 2 and 4 related to the period when he was working in the Andhra Pradesh State Scheduled Castes and Tribes Cooperative Housing Society Federation from 9-2-1979 to 30-9-1981. During the period Charge 3 related to, the respondent said that he was on deputation at Oxford Polytechnic in United Kingdom from 11-10-1984 to 26-9-1985 for his postgraduation course. On the first charge his statement of defence was as under:

    “I. With reference to Charge 1, I submit that I have perused the file bearing No. 234/241/7/1.B4/78 belonging to M/s Swastik Constructions in the Chambers of Deputy Secretary to Government, MA & UD Department on 20-9-1995. As seen from the file that M/s Swastik Constructions have applied for the construction of 4th, 5th and 6th floors over the existing ground, 1st, 2nd and 3rd floors vide their application dated 18-9-1978. The proposals have been examined in detail in pp. 6 and 7 of note file at paras 1 to 27 giving clear statement of the FSI permissible and also other Rules and Regulations for the proposed construction in the light of the material available in the file. At para 23 the proposals were submitted for consideration to the higher authorities as per corrected plan subject to certain conditions. As it can be seen from the endorsement of the then City Planner Shri P.V Janakiraman on the right-hand side margin ‘This may be restricted to 4th and 5th floors only, let us delete part of 6th floor’. The then City Planner has approved the proposed construction of 4th and 5th floors and part of 6th floor regularising the deviation imposing the compound fee of Rs 1000 on 1-1-1979 and marked the file to the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner in turn approved the proposal on 10-1-1979. It is clear from the above note that I did not put up any misleading note and did not recommend the proposals irregularly against any Rule and Regulation as alleged in the charge. The higher officers have also not pointed out any lapses in the submitted note before approval of the said proposals and also regularised the offence by levy of compounding fee.

    Hence, I submit that since I have not recommended the proposals irregularly, the charge may kindly be dropped.”

    As a matter of fact the disciplinary authority got verified the facts that what the respondent had said about the articles of Charges 2, 3 and 4 was correct and that he could not be concerned with any deviations or unauthorised constructions in respect of the buildings mentioned in those charges. This is by letter dated 10-10-1995 from the Director of Town and Country Planning to the Principal Secretary to the Government, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, and was in answer to a query raised by the disciplinary authority from the Director of Town and Country Planning. On 15-3-1996 Vigilance Commissioner advised the disciplinary authority

    “to process the explanations of the accused officers with reference to the connected files returned by the ACB vide its report dated 7-11-1987 and then refer the file to Vigilance Commissioner for further advice”.

    Nothing happened. Everything was at a standstill.

    14. It was in April 1996 that the respondent moved the Andhra Pradesh Appellate Tribunal for relief.

    15. It would, therefore, appear that charges have been framed against the respondent merely on the basis of the report dated 7-11-1987 from the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, which is of a general nature raising accusing fingers on the various officers of the Corporation, but without any reference to the relevant files and pinpointing if the respondent or any other official charged was at all concerned with the alleged deviations and unauthorised construction in multi-storied complexes.

    16. It would not be necessary for us to refer to the charges issued by the memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996 as that was not the subject-matter for quashing either in the Tribunal or before us.

    17. One of the grounds on which the Tribunal quashed memo dated 31-7-1995, issued under the 1991 Rules, was that without cancelling the earlier Memo No. 1412 dated 22-12-1987 issued under the 1963 Rules, the latter memo could not be issued. We have seen that under Rule 45 of the 1991 Rules the inquiry proceedings initiated under the 1963 Rules could be continued even after coming into force of 1991 Rules. It is correct that inquiry proceedings did progress after issuance of Memo No. 1412 dated 22-12-1987 to the extent that an Enquiry Officer was appointed and should have been concluded under the 1963 Rules. If memo of charge had been served for the first time before 1991 there would have been no difficulty. However, in the present case it could be only an irregularity and not an illegality vitiating the enquiry proceedings inasmuch as after the Enquiry Officer was appointed under Memo No. 1412 dated 22-12-1987, there had not been any progress. If a fresh memo is issued on the same charges against the delinquent officer it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to him. He can always challenge the second memo and, rather, even the first one on the ground of delay which he did.

    18. In State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570, (1995) 29 ATC 546 State of Punjab was aggrieved by the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo of charges against Goyal and also the order appointing Enquiry Officer to inquire into those charges. In this case the incident, which was the subject-matter of charge, happened in December 1986 and in early January 1987, when Goyal was working as Superintendent of Nabha High Security Jail. It was only on 9-7-1992 that memo of charges was issued to Goyal. He submitted his explanation on 4-1-1993 denying the charges. Enquiry Officer was appointed on 20-7-1993 and soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in the High Court on 24-8-1993. The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for which there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the factual position as to how the delay occurred and if Goyal had been prejudiced in any way on account of delay. This Court relied on the principles laid down in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 and said that though that case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. Referring to decision in A.R Antulay case (1992) 1 SCC 225 this Court said:

    “In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that ‘ultimately the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — balancing test or balancing process — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case’. It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.”

    In that case this Court said that it was more appropriate and in the interest of justice as well as in the interest of administration that the enquiry which had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time the Court directed that Goyal should be considered forthwith for promotion without reference to and without taking into consideration the charges or the pendency of the enquiry, if he is found fit for promotion.

    19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.

    20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularising the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any enquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under the 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the enquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Enquiry Officers who had been appointed one after the other had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that the respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the enquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996. The Tribunal rightly did not quash these two latter memos.

    21. Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. It is dismissed with costs.

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    State Of A.P v. N. Radhakishan .
    (Apr 7, 1998)