AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 273-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 i.e Act 41 of 1975
  • Section 18-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 18-B of the Act
  • Section 18-B of the Wealth Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 273-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 i.e Act 41 of 1975
  • Section 18-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 18-B of the Act
  • Section 18-B of the Wealth Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants failed to file wealth-tax returns for Assessment Years 1970-71 through 1975-76 and became liable to penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. After Parliament inserted Section 18-B by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, the appellants submitted the overdue returns and sought a full waiver of penalty. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax accepted that the statutory conditions were met but, exercising his discretion, reduced the penalty to 5 per cent instead of waiving it entirely. Writ petitions challenging the partial relief were dismissed by the High Court in limine. The present appeals were therefore brought before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon satisfaction of the conditions in Section 18-B of the Wealth-tax Act, the Commissioner is bound to waive the entire penalty or possesses discretion to grant only a partial reduction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Once the statutory conditions under Section 18-B are fulfilled, the Commissioner has no option but to waive the penalty in full; a partial waiver amounts to an impermissible truncation of the statutory benefit.
  • Reliance was placed on several High Court decisions that, according to counsel, mandated complete waiver whenever the provision applies.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 Discretionary powers must be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Used to affirm that the Commissioner’s discretion under Section 18-B must be exercised on relevant grounds and not arbitrarily.
Shakuntla Mehra v. CWT, (1976) 102 ITR 301 (Del) Commissioner must indicate reasons when granting or refusing full waiver. Cited to show that the need for recorded reasons does not translate into an obligation to grant complete waiver.
Shankara Apaya Swami v. WTO, (1976) 103 ITR 649 (Kant) Same principle as above—reasoned exercise of discretion. Relied upon to negate the appellants’ claim that full waiver is automatic.
B. Anjanappa v. CWT, (1980) 124 ITR 433 (Kant) Commissioner’s discretion must be reasoned. Reinforced that discretion may lead to reduction rather than total waiver.
Rasiklal Ranchhodbhai Patel v. CWT, (1980) 121 ITR 219 (Guj) Need for recorded reasons in penalty waiver orders. Distinguished; the Supreme Court noted it did not mandate full waiver.
Sardar Kartar Singh v. CWT, (1982) 135 ITR 379 (Gau) Commissioner must apply mind and give reasons. Cited for the same limited proposition on recorded reasons.
Purshottam Thackersey v. K.N. Anantarama Ayyar, CIT, (1985) 154 ITR 438 (Bom) Commissioner’s refusal of waiver without reasons is unsustainable. Used to support the requirement of reasoned orders; does not compel full waiver.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the wording of Section 18-B, emphasising the concurrent use of “may” and “in his discretion,” which unequivocally vests the Commissioner with choice either to waive or to reduce penalty once statutory conditions are satisfied. Drawing on S.G. Jaisinghani, the Court held that such discretion must be exercised fairly, justly, and on relevant considerations. However, fairness does not equate to a mandatory full waiver.

The Court rejected the appellants’ reliance on various High Court decisions, clarifying that those authorities only required the Commissioner to provide reasons; none held that complete waiver is the sole permissible outcome. It noted that the Commissioner in the present matter had expressly recorded reasons for limiting relief to a 5 per cent penalty, and those reasons were neither arbitrary nor irrelevant. Consequently, no interference was warranted.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed.

Direct Effect: The Commissioner’s orders reducing penalty to 5 per cent stand affirmed, and the appellants receive no additional relief.

Broader Implications: The decision clarifies that satisfaction of Section 18-B’s conditions does not automatically compel total waiver; the Commissioner retains discretionary authority provided it is exercised on relevant and recorded reasons. This interpretation aligns Section 18-B of the Wealth-tax Act with the analogous Section 273-A of the Income-tax Act, reinforcing administrative discretion while insisting on reasoned decision-making.

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    Harbans Kaur (Smt) v. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, Jullundur .

    K.T Thomas, J.— The appellants in these appeals were liable to penalty under Section 18 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, (for short “the Act”), for failure to file the returns in respect of the Assessment Years 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. When Parliament amended the Act and incorporated Section 18-B by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 i.e Act 41 of 1975, the appellants in these cases submitted wealth tax returns and made a request for full waiver of the penalty as envisaged in the new provision. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax (“the Commissioner” for short) found that as the appellants have complied with the conditions stipulated in Section 18-B of the Act they are entitled to the benefit of the new provision. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner, instead of granting waiver for the full penalty had only reduced it to 5% for the relevant assessment years. The appellants submitted that once a person is found to be entitled to the benefits of the new provision of Section 18-B of the Act, the Commissioner should have waived the entire amount of penalty payable by that person concerned. So saying they approached the High Court by filing writ petitions but those writ petitions were dismissed in limine. Hence, these appeals.

    2. The learned counsel contended that once a person is found entitled to the benefit under Section 18-B, the Commissioner cannot withdraw part of the benefit by imposing a penalty of 5 per cent. According to him, once the failure is condoned, power to waive cannot be exercised in a truncated manner as was done in this case but only in a full measure.

    3. Section 18(1) empowers the officer under the Act to impose penalty on a person in certain contingencies. As per the sub-section if the Wealth Tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner or Appellate Tribunal in the course of any proceedings under the Act is satisfied that any person has, without reasonable cause, failed to furnish the returns which he is required to furnish or has without reasonable cause failed to furnish within the time allowed or without reasonable cause failed to comply with a notice under Section 16(2) or (4), or has concealed the particulars of any assets or furnished inaccurate particulars of any assets or debts such officer may direct that such person shall pay, by way of penalty, the amount specified respectively in the three clauses set out therein.

    4. Section 18-B confers power on the Commissioner to reduce or waive such penalty in certain contingencies, if he is satisfied that such person has made full and true disclosure of his net wealth and has also cooperated in any enquiry relating to the assessment of his net wealth and has either paid or made satisfactory arrangement for the payment of any tax or interest payable in consequence of an order passed under the Act.

    5. If the conditions stipulated in the section are satisfied, the Commissioner has a discretion in the matter. In exercise of that discretion, the Commissioner can either reduce the amount of penalty or he may even waive the entire penalty. It is for the Commissioner to decide on the facts of a particular case whether a waiver in entirety or a reduction alone is warranted.

    6. The words “the Commissioner may in his discretion … reduce or waive the amount of penalty” in Section 18-B of the Act are clear enough to show that the power conferred on the Commissioner is to be exercised by him in such manner as he deems just and proper. When a discretion is conferred on an authority the same must be exercised fairly and not arbitrarily, justly and not fancifully. Vide S.G Jaisinghani v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1427.

    7. Even if the legislature has not used the words “in his discretion” in Section 18-B(1) the Commissioner could have exercised only a discretionary power in view of the employment of the word “may”. Now when Parliament used both expressions “may” and “in his discretion” together, the position is placed beyond the pale of any doubt that the legislature wanted an officer of the rank of the Commissioner to be reposed with the discretionary power to choose between entire waiver or reduction in any proportion.

    8. Of course when the Commissioner, instead of giving a complete waiver, chooses to give only a reduction for the penalty amount he must indicate in his order that he has applied his mind in that regard. In this view, there is no warrant for the proposition that the Commissioner, if satisfied of the compliance of conditions, has only one choice i.e to waive the penalty in entirety. Otherwise, it may mean that the Commissioner can in a case where conditions are not satisfied, reduce the penalty amount. When the conditions are not satisfied the Commissioner cannot do either. Only when the said conditions are satisfied that the occasion arises for the Commissioner to exercise his discretion — not before.

    9. The learned counsel has cited the following decisions of various High Courts in support of the contention that waiver in full has to be ordered when all the required conditions have been complied with: Shakuntla Mehra v. CWT (1976) 102 ITR 301 (Del) of the Delhi High Court; Shankara Apaya Swami v. WTO (1976) 103 ITR 649, 1976 Tax LR 248 (Kant) of the Karnataka High Court; B. Anjanappa v. CWT (1980) 124 ITR 433, 1980 Tax LR 558 (Kant) of the Karnataka High Court; Rasiklal Ranchhodbhai Patel v. CWT (1980) 121 ITR 219, 1979 Tax LR 653 (Guj) of the Gujarat High Court; Sardar Kartar Singh v. CWT (1982) 135 ITR 379 (Gau) of the Gauhati High Court. In all those decisions the learned Judges have pointed out that without indicating any reason whatsoever the Commissioner cannot dispense with his discretion in granting waiver of the penalty. Those decisions have not laid down a proposition that the only course which a Commissioner can adopt on fulfilment of the conditions is to waive the penalty in entirety.

    10. Section 18-B is analogous to Section 273-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 whereunder also a similar discretion has been conferred on the Commissioner of Income Tax for either reducing the penalty or granting waiver of the entire penalty. It is understood in clear terms that the said discretion in Income Tax Act is to be exercised in a reasonable and fair manner. The decision of the Bombay High Court (Purshottam Thackersey v. K.N Anantarama Ayyar, CIT (1985) 154 ITR 438, 1984 Tax LR 1369 (Bom)) cited before us only shows that the order of the Commissioner declining to waive the penalty without advancing any reason whatsoever cannot be supported and the matter was remitted to the Commissioner for passing an order afresh.

    11. In the cases on hand, the Commissioner has indicated his own reasons for resorting to the power of reduction of penalty in preference to granting full waiver of the penalty. We cannot say that the reasons indicated in the orders are in any manner unjust or irrelevant. We, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the impugned orders and the judgments of the High Court. The appeals are dismissed.

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    Comments

    Harbans Kaur (Smt) v. Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, Jullundur .
    (Jan 13, 1997)