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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 243
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Societies Registration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 243
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Societies Registration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti (the “Society”) is a registered body that claims to administer several educational institutions, including Sri Ratnamuni Jain Inter College, Agra. A rival body, RMJ Educational Society, was registered on 10 September 1991 by Respondents 1 and 2, each group electing its own management committee in June–July 1991.

Administrative authorities issued shifting orders of recognition. On 19 March 1994 the Deputy Registrar of Societies cancelled the registration of the RMJ Society, prompting the Deputy Director of Education to recognise the Society’s scheme of administration and to acknowledge Appellant 2, Kamal Kumar Jain, as Manager with authority over the College’s bank accounts. Shortly thereafter, those orders were withdrawn, leading the appellants to institute Civil Suit No. 230 of 1994 in the Court of the III Additional Civil Judge, Agra. On 4 April 1994 the Civil Judge granted interim injunction in favour of the appellants and, on 5 April 1994, dismissed Respondent 2’s application to be impleaded as a party.

Respondents 1 and 2 filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court seeking (i) quashing of the plaint and all proceedings in Suit 230/1994, and (ii) quashing of the two orders dated 4 and 5 April 1994. The High Court refused to quash the plaint but set aside both orders, allowed impleadment of Respondent 2 as defendant, transferred the suit to another court, and directed that Respondent 2 continue as Manager until disposal of the injunction application.

The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could quash interim and miscellaneous orders passed by a civil court despite the existence of statutory remedies of appeal or revision.
  2. Whether, by granting substantive relief and transferring the suit, the High Court exceeded the limits of its supervisory jurisdiction and effectively converted itself into an appellate/revisional court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that although the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is expansive, it is not intended to supplant ordinary civil remedies. It emphasized that:

  • Both the interim injunction dated 4 April 1994 and the order refusing impleadment dated 5 April 1994 were appealable/revisable before the District Judge under the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The High Court acknowledged the availability of these statutory remedies, yet entertained the writ petition, thereby acting as an appellate or revisional court over the civil court’s orders.
  • Such intervention is a “patent error” because writ jurisdiction is reserved for situations where no efficacious alternative remedy exists; here, adequate remedies did exist.
  • The High Court’s broad directions—quashing the orders, allowing impleadment, transferring the suit, and appointing Respondent 2 as interim Manager—constituted an overreach beyond the permissible scope of Article 226.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and that its interference was unwarranted.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition dismissed with costs of Rs 20,000 payable by Respondent 2.

Implications: The interim injunction originally granted by the III Additional Civil Judge and the dismissal of the impleadment application are restored. The decision reinforces the principle that High Courts should refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of civil courts when statutory appellate or revisional remedies are available. No new substantive precedent was created, but the ruling reiterates existing limits on Article 226 supervisory powers.

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    Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti And Another v. Alleged Committee Of Management Sri R.J.I College, Agra And Others

    Kuldip Singh, J.— Special leave granted.

    2. Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti (the Society), Appellant 1 in the appeal herein, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The Society claims that it has established and is administering various educational institutions including Sri Ratnamuni Jain Inter College (the College) Agra. This appeal is sequel to the litigation between two rival management committees, both claiming right to manage the college.

    3. It is not necessary for us to go into the details of the litigation going on between the parties for the last more than ten years. Suffice it to say that Respondents 1 and 2, in the appeal herein, got a rival society, namely, RMJ Educational Society (the RMJ Society) registered under the Societies Registration Act on 10-9-1991. The Society and the RMJ Society have submitted their separate schemes for the administration of the College to the Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools, Agra. The appellants elected their managing committee on 1-7-1991 whereas Respondents 1 and 2 elected a separate management committee on 21-6-1991. Both the committees have been approaching the Deputy Director of Education and District Inspector of Schools for recognition and different orders at different times have been passed by these authorities.

    4. The Deputy Registrar Societies, Respondent 6 in the appeal herein, by the order dated 19-3-1994 cancelled the registration of RMJ Society. As a consequence the Deputy Director of Education by the order dated 23-3-1994 directed the District Inspector of Schools to take immediate action in the matter and grant recognition to the scheme of administration submitted by the appellants. This was done and Appellant 2, Kamal Kumar Jain was recognised as Manager of the College and was permitted to manage and operate the bank accounts. The success of the appellants was, however, short-lived. The Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools withdrew their orders and stopped the appellants from managing the College and operating the bank accounts. The appellants challenged the orders of the Deputy Director of Education and District Inspector of Schools by way of a Civil Suit No. 230 of 1994 in the Court of Civil Judge, Agra. The suit was transferred to the IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Agra who by the order dated 4-4-1994 granted interim injunction as prayed for by the appellants. Moti Lal Jain, Respondent 2 in the appeal herein, filed an application on 5-4-1994 before the Additional Civil Judge for being impleaded as a party in the suit. The application was dismissed by the learned Judge.

    5. Respondents 1 and 2 challenged the order of the learned Additional Civil Judge by which he granted interim relief to the appellants, the order rejecting the application for impleadment and also for quashing of the plaint, before the High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court allowed the writ petition in the following terms:

    “Thus, the petition deserved to be allowed partly. The prayer for quashing the plaint and proceedings in Original Suit No. 230 of 94 supra is rejected mainly on the ground that the petitioners have an alternative remedy under Order 7, Rules 10 and 11 CPC.
    The prayer for quashing the order dated 4-4-1994 (Annexure 20 to the petition) is allowed and so is the case with the order dated 5-4-1994 (Annexure 23 to the petition) rejecting the application for impleadment. Both these orders are quashed totally. The application for impleadment as defendant by Shri Moti Lal Jain is allowed. The proceedings before the learned IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge, Agra in Original Suit No. 230 of 1994, Sri Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti v. Regional Dy. Director of Education stands transferred with immediate effect to the Court of the District Judge, Agra who shall transfer it to any other court of competent jurisdiction, other than Shri Chandra Bhan, IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge, Agra.
    It is made clear that after Shri Moti Lal Jain's impleadment as defendant, he shall be given an opportunity to file objections against the interim injunctions, applications and also the written statement against the plaint. The application for interim injunction would be considered afresh again after hearing the parties by the learned Civil Judge, to whom the case is transferred.
    Till the final disposal of the injunction application, Shri Moti Lal Jain shall continue to function as the Manager of the Committee of Management of Shri Ratan Muni Jain Inter College, Loha Mandi, Agra and nobody shall be allowed to disturb his functioning as such. After any order passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, affected party will have statutory remedy to file appeal/revision as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure.”

    This appeal by the Society and Kamal Kumar Jain, Manager of the College, is against the above-quoted judgment of the High Court.

    6. The High Court in the impugned judgment noticed the prayers of the writ petitioners before the said Court as under:

    “In this writ petition a prayer has been made for an order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the plaint and all proceedings in Original Suit No. 230 of 1994, Sri Swetambar Sthanakwasi Jain Samiti v. Regional Dy. Director of Education. Further a writ, order or direction has been prayed for quashing the orders dated 4-4-1994 and 5-4-1994 passed by the IIIrd Addl. Civil Judge, Agra, Respondent 1 (Annexures 20 and 23 to the writ petition). There is an additional prayer to restrain Respondent 1, i.e, Addl. Civil Judge, Agra from taking any further proceedings in Original Suit No. 230 of 1994 aforesaid.”

    7. It is not disputed that the remedy of appeal before the District Judge was available to the respondents against the order of the Additional Civil Judge by which the learned Judge granted interim injunction against the respondents. The order dated 5-4-1994 rejecting the applications of Respondent 2 for impleadment could also be challenged by way of revision. The High Court also noticed this aspect in the following words:

    “Of course, he could have availed of the jurisdiction of the District Judge, who has an authority to hear appeal as well as revision. But somehow or the other he has been advised to approach this Court.”

    8. We are of the view that the High Court not only fell into patent error but also exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined to issuing the prerogative writs, there is a consensus of opinion that the High Court will not permit this extraordinary jurisdiction to be converted into a civil court under the ordinary law. When a suit is pending between the two parties the interim and miscellaneous orders passed by the trial court — against which the remedy of appeal or revision is available — cannot be challenged by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Where the civil court has the jurisdiction to try a suit, the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate or revisional court and interfere with the interim/miscellaneous orders of the civil court. The writ jurisdiction is meant for doing justice between the parties where it cannot be done in any other forum.

    9. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The writ petition filed by Respondents 1 and 2 before the High Court shall stand dismissed. We quantify the costs at Rs 20,000 to be paid by Respondent 2.

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