AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 769
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982
  • Section of Bihar Housing Board Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 58 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 769
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982
  • Section of Bihar Housing Board Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 58 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bihar State Housing Board (“the Board”) allotted Quarter No. M-11 (Old), Adityapur, near Jamshedpur to the fourth respondent on a hire-purchase basis. Under the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 and its 1983 Regulations, the allottee remains a tenant of the Board until the last instalment is paid, after which ownership is conveyed. Claiming that the first respondent had forcibly and unauthorisedly occupied the first floor of the quarter, the fourth respondent petitioned the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Saraikella (“competent authority”) for eviction. On 16 December 1992 the competent authority issued a show-cause notice (Annexure P-4) to the first respondent under Section 59 of the Act, initiating Eviction Proceedings No. 6 of 1992.

Instead of responding to the notice, the first respondent filed CWJC No. 82 of 1993 before the Patna High Court, challenging both the notice and the eviction proceedings. A Division Bench quashed them on 10 February 1993, holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction. The present appeal, brought by the Executive Engineer on behalf of the Board, seeks reversal of that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Patna High Court erred in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash a show-cause notice issued by the competent authority under Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982.
  2. Whether the competent authority had jurisdiction to initiate eviction proceedings when ownership of the quarter was disputed between the Board and the fourth respondent.

Arguments of the Parties

First Respondent (Writ Petitioner)

  • Contended that the fourth respondent had already purchased the quarter, making him the owner; consequently, the first respondent was a lawful tenant under the fourth respondent.
  • Argued that proceedings for eviction, if any, must be taken under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and not under the Housing Board Act.
  • Asserted that the competent authority lacked jurisdiction to proceed against him, rendering the show-cause notice void.

Appellant Board and Fourth Respondent

  • Maintained that the hire-purchase transaction was still subsisting; ownership had not yet vested in the fourth respondent, who remained a tenant of the Board.
  • Submitted that the first respondent was an unauthorised occupant and that Section 59 empowered the competent authority to undertake summary eviction.
  • Emphasised that disputed questions of fact (notably, ownership) should be examined first by the competent authority, making the writ petition premature.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court underscored the limited scope of writ intervention at the stage of a show-cause notice where no constitutional infirmity or facial lack of jurisdiction is evident. It observed:

  • The show-cause notice was issued by a competent authority designated under the Act; its jurisdiction depended on whether the Board retained ownership—a disputed fact requiring investigation.
  • The first respondent bypassed the statutory process by invoking Article 226 without first presenting objections before the competent authority, thereby short-circuiting the prescribed mechanism for fact-finding.
  • A writ court should ordinarily decline to interfere when alternative remedies exist and contested facts need adjudication, absent a clear allegation of constitutional or jurisdictional illegality.
  • The High Court therefore misapplied its “extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction,” leading to an abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment dated 10-02-1993 set aside with costs.

Consequently, the show-cause notice (Annexure P-4) and Eviction Proceedings No. 6 of 1992 are revived. The first respondent must now raise his objections before the competent authority, which will investigate factual disputes (particularly ownership) and decide jurisdiction. The ruling reiterates that High Courts should refrain from quashing statutory notices at a preliminary stage when adequate alternative remedies and fact-finding fora exist; however, it sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles on writ jurisdiction.

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    Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh And Others

    K.S Paripoornan, J.— Leave granted.

    2. This is a typical case where the extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was improperly invoked, and the High Court was pleased to exercise its jurisdiction resulting in an abuse of process.

    3. The appellant is the Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board and represents the said ‘Board’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Board’). The respondents to this appeal are (1) Shri Ramesh Kumar Singh (Petitioner in the writ petition), (2) State of Bihar, (3) Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Saraikella, District Singhbhum (the “competent authority”) and (4) Shri S.N Pandey, Adityapur, District Singhbhum (East).

    4. The first respondent assailed the show-cause notice — Annexure Ext. P-4 — dated 16-12-1992 issued to him by the third respondent herein under Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 in CWJC No. 82 of 1993 — High Court of Patna. By judgment dated 10-2-1993 a Division Bench of the High Court quashed Annexure Ext. P-4, show-cause notice, and also the Eviction Proceedings No. 6 of 1992 pending before the third respondent. The Board, party-respondent in the writ petition, has filed this appeal against the aforesaid judgment dated 10-2-1993.

    5. The broad facts relevant for the disposal of the appeal are in a narrow compass. The appellant-Board has allotted Quarter No. M-11/(Old) Adityapur, near Jamshedpur, to the fourth respondent on hire-purchase basis. Under the provisions of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 and the Bihar State Housing Board (Management and Disposal of Housing Estates) Regulations of 1983, detailed procedure for allotment, payment of hire-purchase amount, vesting of ownership on payment of the last instalment by the hirer, procedure for summary eviction of unauthorised occupation, etc. are provided. The hirer is a tenant of the Board till the last instalment is paid whereafter the ownership is transferred to the hirer by executing an appropriate conveyance. On this basis the fourth respondent, hirer, is a tenant of the Board. Section 58 of the Act states that the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act are inapplicable to the tenancy created by the Board. Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act enables the Board to evict persons in occupation in cases of sub-tenancy or any other unauthorised occupation, by application to the “competent authority”. By Notification No. 3196.Patna dated 22-11-1973 (Annexure Ext. P-1), the Government of Bihar, in exercise of powers conferred on it by Section 2(10) of the Bihar State Housing Board Ordinance, had authorised all civilian Sub-Divisional Officers and Magistrates, just below the rank of SDOs as competent authorities for the purposes of the Act. The third respondent is the competent authority within whose jurisdiction the instant building — Quarter No. M/11 (Old) Adityapur, near Jamshedpur is situate.

    6. The fourth respondent, the allottee of Quarter No. M/11(Old), Adityapur, near Jamshedpur, complained to the third respondent by communication dated 20-10-1992 (Annexure Ext. P-2) that he has been allotted the said building by the Board, and while he was residing with his family in the said building, the first respondent has forcibly and unauthorisedly occupied the first floor of the building. The third respondent forwarded the aforesaid communication to the appellant. The appellant by Annexure Ext. P-3 dated 15-12-1992 informed the third respondent, SDO that House No. MIG M/11 (Old) Adityapur, near Jamshedpur stands allotted to the fourth respondent and the application of the fourth respondent, which is self-explanatory, praying for eviction of the portion unauthorisedly occupied by the first respondent, is referred for necessary action. In this background, the third respondent issued Annexure Ext. P-4 notice dated 16-12-1992 to the first respondent which is to the following effect:

    “Under Section of Bihar Housing Board Act

    Show-cause Notice

    To,
    Shri R.K Singh,
    Contractor,
    M-11, Adityapur,
    Jamshedpur.
    It appears from the petition of the Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board (Adityapur), Jamshedpur that you are illegally and unauthorisedly living in House No. M-11 (Old) of Housing Board situated at Adityapur Housing Board.
    You are hereby directed through this notice to explain in person or through an advocate on 28-12-1992 at 10 a.m in the court of the undersigned that why not an order of eviction of the house in question be passed.
    sd/-
    Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
    16-12-1992Saraikella”
    (emphasis supplied)

    7. It is seen that the first respondent instead of showing cause against Annexure Ext. P-4, straightaway approached the High Court by filing CWJC No. 82 of 1993 and assailed Annexure Ext. P-4. According to him, fourth respondent is the owner of the building having purchased the same from the Board, that he is a tenant of the first floor under the fourth respondent, that the third respondent is incompetent to initiate proceedings for eviction under the Bihar State Housing Board Act, and that only proceedings under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act will lie for eviction. So, he prayed for quashing Annexure Ext. P-4 show-cause notice and the eviction proceedings.

    8. The High Court heard the parties and took the view that the first respondent is not a tenant of the Board, and so the Board will have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings either on its own motion or at the instance of the fourth respondent and in this view, the proceedings, initiated as per Annexure Ext. P-4, are unjustified and without jurisdiction. The High Court opined that the fourth respondent may seek appropriate remedy by bringing a suit under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. In the result, Annexure Ext. P-4 and also the Eviction Proceedings No. 6 of 1992 were quashed. It is from the aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 10-2-1993, the Board has come up in appeal by special leave.

    9. We heard counsel. It is common ground that Quarter No. M/11 (Old) Adityapur, near Jamshedpur, belongs to the Board. According to the Board and the fourth respondent the hire-purchase transaction is still in force, and the ownership of the building has not been finally transferred to the fourth respondent. The first respondent would say that the fourth respondent is the owner having purchased the building from the Board. The ‘basic’ or fundamental fact is thus in dispute. The third respondent is the competent authority notified by the State Government under the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 to initiate summary proceedings for eviction against sub-letting, unauthorised occupation by any person, of the premises, etc. belonging to the Board. Annexure Ext. P-4, notice, is the one so issued by the third respondent. The appellant and the fourth respondent complained about the forcible or unauthorised occupation by the first respondent of the premises belonging to the Board. The third respondent was competent to initiate the proceedings under the Act if the building still belongs to the Board and the ownership has not vested in the fourth respondent. It may be, that this basic fact is denied by the first respondent when he states that the fourth respondent is the owner having purchased the building from the Board and that he is a tenant under the fourth respondent. The basic facts, on the basis of which the jurisdiction of the third respondent to initiate/continue the proceedings, require investigation and adjudication. If, as pleaded by the appellant and the fourth respondent, the Board is the owner and the fourth respondent is the hirer, it cannot admit of any doubt that the third respondent has jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings as per Annexure Ext. P-4. If that basic fact is denied by the first respondent, that may require investigation of disputed facts and adjudication by the “competent authority” — the third respondent. Without showing cause against Annexure Ext. P-4, notice, the first respondent straightaway filed the writ petition in the High Court and assailed Annexure Ext. P-4 and the eviction proceedings. The averments in this regard, contained in paragraph 13(H) of the special leave petition, are not denied in the detailed counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent in this Court.

    10. We are concerned in this case, with the entertainment of the writ petition against a show-cause notice issued by a competent statutory authority. It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. P-4 notice is ex facie a ‘nullity’ or totally “without jurisdiction” in the traditional sense of that expression — that is to say, that even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the face of it and without anything more, is totally unauthorised. In such a case, for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a show-cause notice, at that stage, it should be shown that the authority has no power or jurisdiction, to enter upon the enquiry in question. In all other cases, it is only appropriate that the party should avail of the alternate remedy and show cause against the same before the authority concerned and take up the objection regarding jurisdiction also, then. In the event of an adverse decision, it will certainly be open to him to assail the same either in appeal or revision, as the case may be, or in appropriate cases, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    11. On the facts of this case, we hold that the first respondent was unjustified in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without first showing cause against Annexure Ext. P-4 before the third respondent. The appropriate procedure for the first respondent would have been to file his objections and place necessary materials before the third respondent and invite a decision as to whether the proceedings initiated by the third respondent under Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982, are justified and appropriate. The adjudication in that behalf necessarily involves disputed questions of fact which require investigation. In such a case, proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution can hardly be an appropriate remedy. The High Court committed a grave error in entertaining the writ petition and in allowing the same by quashing Annexure Ext. P-4 and also the eviction proceedings No. 6 of 1992, without proper and fair investigation of the basic facts. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the judgment of the High Court of Patna in CWJC No. 82 of 1993 dated 10-2-1993. We hereby do so. The appeal is allowed with costs.

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    Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh And Others
    (Nov 22, 1995)