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  • Article 136 of the Constitution
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  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees in the cadre of Assistant Conservator of Forests, Maharashtra Forest Service (Class II). Two direct recruits challenged their placement vis-à-vis certain promotees before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur Bench. The Tribunal quashed two State Government decisions and directed that seniority be redetermined strictly in accordance with the 1:1 quota rule prescribed in the service regulations. Aggrieved, the State of Maharashtra and some promotees filed the present appeals before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts, the 1:1 quota rule between direct recruits and promotees had “broken down,” thereby justifying departure from the quota in determining seniority.
  2. Whether the promotees’ ad hoc or excess-quota promotions were “fortuitous” and, if so, whether their seniority should nevertheless be reckoned from the dates of such promotions.
  3. Whether ad hoc service rendered by promotees could be counted for seniority in light of State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey (1993) 3 SCC 371, and whether executive instructions lacking statutory force permitted the State to ignore the quota rule.

Arguments of the Parties

Promotees (represented by Shri Dholakia)

  • Asserted that the State had valid reasons—particularly lack of training facilities and impending Indian Forest Service Recruitment Rules—for not making timely direct recruitment, hence the quota rule had effectively broken down.
  • Invoked paragraph 44(B) of the Constitution Bench decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association to claim seniority from the dates of promotion.
  • Contended that the promotees were not fortuitously promoted.

State of Maharashtra (represented by Shri Bhandare)

  • Relied on State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey to submit that even ad hoc service should be counted for seniority.
  • Argued that the quota ratio flowed from executive instructions lacking statutory force, permitting the State to deviate when circumstances so required.
  • Maintained that the promotees’ service was substantive rather than fortuitous.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Assn.
(1990) 2 SCC 715
Seniority may date from promotion if promotion made in accordance with rules or if quota rule has broken down. Held inapplicable because the promotees were not appointed in accordance with the quota rule; therefore, they could not claim its benefit.
Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India
1992 Supp (1) SCC 272
Promotions made in excess of quota are fortuitous and do not confer seniority from the date of promotion. Cited to reinforce that excess-quota promotions in the present case were fortuitous.
A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran
1992 Supp (1) SCC 304
Same principle as Joshi; excess-quota promotions are fortuitous. Applied to support the finding that the promotees’ seniority could not be reckoned from fortuitous promotions.
State of W.B. v. Aghore Nath Dey
(1993) 3 SCC 371
Ad hoc service may count for seniority if the initial appointment was not in violation of rules. Distinguished; the Court held appointments were rule-violative and thus could not attract the Aghore Nath Dey principle.
Janardhana case
(1983) 3 SCC 601
Concerns seniority but not inter se claims between direct recruits and promotees. Cited to show that its ratio was inapplicable to the present inter se seniority dispute.
Narender Chadha case
(1986) 2 SCC 157
Similar to Janardhana; deals with ad hoc service and seniority questions. Cited only to emphasise its inapplicability to direct recruit vs. promotee seniority conflicts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal’s conclusion that the quota rule had not broken down. It found unpersuasive the State’s two explanations—absence of training facilities and changes introduced by the 1966 Indian Forest Service Rules—for a decade-long failure to recruit direct entrants. Consequently, promotions made in excess of the quota were held contrary to the governing scheme.

Drawing upon Keshav Chandra Joshi and A.N. Sehgal, the Court characterised the excess-quota promotions as “fortuitous.” Because valid appointment is a pre-condition for invoking paragraph 44(B) of Direct Recruit, the promotees could not rely on that judgment to secure seniority from their promotion dates.

The Court dismissed reliance on Aghore Nath Dey, noting that: (a) that case did not involve competition between direct recruits and promotees, and (b) it expressly denies the benefit of ad hoc service where the appointment violates rules—precisely the situation here.

Addressing the State’s contention that the 1:1 quota was embodied only in executive instructions lacking statutory force, the Court observed that even executive instructions, once issued, bind the State; departure from them could not be justified.

Finally, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that there was no material to show the promotions were anything other than fortuitous; neither promotion orders nor relevant records were produced to demonstrate otherwise.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed. The Tribunal’s directions to re-determine seniority strictly according to the 1:1 quota rule remain intact. No order as to costs.

Implications: Direct recruits retain seniority over promotees who were elevated in excess of quota. The decision reinforces the principle that State authorities must adhere to quota rules they themselves frame, even if contained in executive instructions, and that fortuitous or rule-violative promotions do not confer seniority benefits. The ruling applies established jurisprudence and does not introduce a new doctrinal precedent.

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    State Of Maharashtra And Another v. A.W Dhope And Others

    B.L Hansaria, J.— The incessant dispute of inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees needs solution in these appeals relating to the incumbents belonging to the cadre of Assistant Conservator of Forests in the Maharashtra Forests Service, Class II.

    2. Two of the direct recruits approached the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, making a grievance about their seniority qua some promotees. The Tribunal after examining the matter in great detail allowed the petition by quashing two of the State Government's decisions and directing the respondents before it to determine inter se seniority by following the quota rule. Feeling aggrieved, the State as well as some of the promotees have preferred these appeals.

    3. There is no dispute before us that the service rule did lay down quota of 1:1 between the promotees and direct recruits. It is also not in dispute that appointment at the relevant time had not been made as per the quota. The real bone of contention between the parties is whether on the facts it could be said that quota rule had broken down, which stand of the appellants did not find favour with the Tribunal. Secondly, could it be said that promotions in the present case were not fortuitous, because of which in view of what was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Assn. case (1990) 2 SCC 715, (1990) 13 ATC 348, AIR 1990 SC 1607 the seniority has to be reckoned from the date of promotion.

    4. Insofar as the first aspect of the case is concerned, we find that the State had advanced two reasons for not making direct appointments to the posts in question for a long period of 10 years. The Tribunal has dealt with the same in para 22 of the impugned judgment. As to the first reason, which was non-availability of pre-recruitment training facility for the Assistant Conservator of Forests, the Tribunal has observed that this reason is perfunctory, because the State did not bring on record as to how many seats for the training were required and how many were not allotted. The second reason given was the publication of Indian Forests Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966, in 1970, as per which Rules the initial recruitment to the Indian Forests Service was required to be made from the State Forests Service. The Tribunal has observed that even if that was so, that was in the year 1970 and it is not understandable as to why direct recruitments were not made in the succeeding years till 1981.

    5. Shri Dholakia, appearing for some of the promotees, has strenuously urged that the Tribunal was not correct in not giving due weight to the reasons advanced by the State in not having made direct recruitment in time as required by the Rules. Having noted the reasons given by the Tribunal for non-acceptance of the stand taken by the State, we do not think if the examination of the matter by us under Article 136 of the Constitution would permit us to describe the view taken by the Tribunal so unreasonable as to merit interference with the same. We, therefore, hold that the present was not a case about which it could be said that the quota rule had broken down. In this connection it would be apposite to refer to Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272, (1993) 24 ATC 545 and A.N Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran 1992 Supp (1) SCC 304, (1993) 24 ATC 559 which are judgments by three-Judge and two-Judge Benches respectively. Both these cases dealt with the promotions given to the concerned persons in excess of the quota, because of which it was stated that their promotions were not according to rules. The promotions were, therefore, held to be fortuitous; it was also observed that the seniority could not be counted from the dates of fortuitous promotions. These cases voiced the feeling of the Court that the State having made the rules, should implement them in letter and spirit; any justification for dereliction in implementation should not be countenanced; it should really be snubbed.

    6. Insofar as in the second aspect of the case is concerned, Shri Bhandare, appearing for the State, is at pains to urge that in view of what was held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of W.B v. Aghore Nath Dey (1993) 3 SCC 371 the present was pre-eminently a fit case where the service rendered by the promotees, even though ad hoc, was required to be counted for the purpose of seniority. We have two observations to make regarding this submission. The first is that Aghore Nath (1993) 3 SCC 371 was not a case of claim by the promotees for seniority over direct recruits; as was in the cases of Janardhana (1983) 3 SCC 601 and Narender Chadha (1986) 2 SCC 157, ratio of which cases was not applied in Aghore Nath case (1993) 3 SCC 371 for the reason that the cases did not deal with inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees. So the ratio of Aghore Nath case (1993) 3 SCC 371 cannot apply to the facts of the present case as here we are concerned with inter se seniority. This apart, a perusal of Aghore Nath (1993) 3 SCC 371 decision shows that benefit of ad hoc service would not be admissible if appointment be in violation of rules. Now, if the quota rule had not broken down as held by the Tribunal which view we have affirmed, the appointment of promotees has to be regarded as in violation of rules.

    7. The contention of Shri Bhandare that the provisions concerned are executive instructions, having no statutory force, because of which the State could deviate from the ratio, lacks force and deserves to be rejected. Apart from the fact that it was not factually pleaded and contested before the Tribunal, the State having laid down the ratio, even though the same be by way of executive instructions, it does not really lie in the mouth of the State to contend that the instructions having no statutory force could be deviated.

    8. For the aforesaid reason, what was stated by the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Assn. case (1990) 2 SCC 715, (1990) 13 ATC 348, AIR 1990 SC 1607 would not also apply, because to get benefit of what was stated in sub-para (B) of para 44 [(B)], which is strongly pressed into service by Shri Dholakia, the appointment has to be as per the rules, which was not so in the present case so far as the promotees are concerned.

    9. It was also faintly submitted on behalf of the appellants that the promotees in the present cases had not been appointed fortuitously. This submission has to be made to be rejected, because of what has been stated by the Tribunal in para 17 of the judgment which is to the following effect:

    “… we are constrained to mention that neither the petitioners nor any of these respondents have produced the relevant promotion orders on the basis of which it could have been possible to discern whether they were promoted fortuitously to the said posts or not. Thus, we are left in dark.”

    The Tribunal has further mentioned in para 18 that even the State Government was silent as to whether the promotions were fortuitous. So, the material placed on record of the Tribunal would not permit us to accept the contention on behalf of the promotees that their promotions were not fortuitous.

    10. The result is that there is no force in these appeals which stand dismissed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, make no order as to costs.

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    State Of Maharashtra And Another v. A.W Dhope And Others
    (Mar 7, 1995)