Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1890 as amended under Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • this Act
  • Section 6(2) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 17(4) of the Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1890 as amended under Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • this Act
  • Section 6(2) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 17(4) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 18 July 1991 a notice under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was served on the petitioner, calling upon him to file written objections to the proposed acquisition of his land within thirty days. The notice expressly stated that the petitioner, his authorised representative, or an advocate could appear personally when filing the objections and would be heard at that time.

The petitioner submitted written objections by post but did not appear personally or through counsel. The Land Acquisition Officer considered the written objections and forwarded a report to the State Government. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was thereafter published on 16 July 1992, following an earlier Section 4(1) notification dated 25 June 1991.

The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging both the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration, primarily on the ground that he had been denied a personal hearing as mandated by Section 5-A(2). The High Court rejected the challenge, holding that the statutory requirement had been complied with.

The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition (SLP).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence of a separately fixed date of personal hearing after the filing of written objections amounted to a violation of the mandatory hearing requirement under Section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  2. Whether the Section 6 declaration was vitiated for having been issued beyond the one-year period prescribed by Section 6(2) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Relying on Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad (1976) 3 SCC 719, the petitioner contended that the landowner has a right not only to file objections but also to be given a specific subsequent date to adduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Failure to issue such a notice, it was argued, violated Section 5-A(2) and the principles of natural justice.
  • The petitioner further asserted that the Section 6 declaration was published more than one year after the Section 4(1) notification, rendering the declaration invalid.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, (1976) 3 SCC 719 Scope of the landowner's right to be heard under Section 5-A, including right to present evidence and cross-examine. The Court distinguished the case, observing that while the right of hearing is mandatory, it must be exercised by the objector; where the objector elects not to appear despite notice, no further date need be fixed.
Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4 SCC 255 Mandatory nature of the personal hearing requirement under Section 5-A(2). The Court accepted the principle but held that the requirement was satisfied in the present case because adequate opportunity had been given and the petitioner chose not to avail it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 5-A(2) imposes a mandatory duty on the Collector to afford an opportunity of personal hearing. However, the statute does not prescribe that an additional notice fixing a separate date must invariably be issued. In the present case the initial notice itself:

  • Invited written objections within thirty days; and
  • Expressly informed the petitioner that he or his representative could appear at the time of filing the objections and would be heard.

By choosing to send objections through post and not appearing personally or through counsel, the petitioner indicated that he did not wish to avail the oral hearing. The Court therefore held that the obligation of the Land Acquisition Officer had been discharged and no fault could be found for not issuing a further notice.

On the second issue, the Court interpreted Section 6(2) to mean that the one-year period is computed from the last of the dates of publication of the Section 4(1) notification, excluding any period during which proceedings were stayed. On that calculation, the declaration dated 16 July 1992 was within time.

Holding and Implications

The Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

The immediate consequence is that the acquisition proceedings, including the Section 6 declaration, stand upheld and will proceed. The decision reiterates that where a Section 5-A notice itself offers a simultaneous opportunity of oral hearing, the objector must appear to exercise that right; failure to do so does not obligate the authority to issue a fresh notice. No new legal precedent was set by this ruling.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt v. State Of Gujarat And Others

    Order

    1. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner at length, we find that it is not a fit case for interference. It is seen that admittedly a notice was issued under Section 5-A to the petitioner on 18-7-1991 calling upon the petitioner to submit his written objections, if any, and it was stated specifically in the notice thus:

    “Therefore, you are hereby informed that if you have any objection in respect of acquisition of this land pursuant to the resolutions under the said Act, you shall, personally or through your authorised person or advocate, make representation in that respect to the office of the Deputy Collector and Land Acquisition Officer, Shri Vyas within 30 days from the date of the publication of this public notice and the time of producing objections, the facts stated by you or your advocate shall also be heard.”

    2. The petitioner was informed that if he had any objection in respect of the acquisition of his land, pursuant to the notification under the said Act, he should, personally or through his authorised representative or advocate, make representation in that behalf to the Deputy Collector and the Land Acquisition Officer, Shri Vyas, within 30 days from the date of the publication of the public notice. At the time of producing objections for the facts stated by him, his authorised representative or himself or his advocate would also be heard. Pursuant thereto, admittedly, the petitioner had sent his objections by post. But he did not personally appear nor appeared through an advocate. The objections had been considered and a report had been submitted to the State Government. Pursuant thereto, after considering the report, the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1890 as amended under Act 68 of 1984 was published on 16-7-1992 as per the procedure prescribed therein.

    3. The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notification published under Section 4(1) on 25-6-1991 and also the declaration. The principal contention raised in the High Court was that since no personal hearing had been given to the petitioner, it is violative of sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act. Sub-section (2) contemplates thus:

    “5-A. (2) Hearing of objections.— (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, [within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification], object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
    (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard [in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf] or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, [either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government]. The decision of the [appropriate Government] on the objections shall be final.
    (3) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act.”

    4. The High Court has considered the matter and recorded its finding thus:

    “The undisputed fact is that after objections had been filed in writing by the petitioner, no formal notice was issued fixing a date for hearing of the said objection. On the facts of this case, the question arising is whether provisions of Section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act should be taken to have been complied with when notice of 18-7-1991 postulated that at the time of producing the objections the objectors or their advocates will be heard.
    Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A requires filing of objections in writing and also casts mandatory duty on the Collector to give the objector an opportunity of being heard. In the instant case, vide a notice dated 18-7-1991 the petitioner was informed of two things —firstly that objections should be filed by the petitioner within 30 days of the date of publication of the notice and secondly, at the time of producing the objections, the objector or his advocate shall be heard. The implication of this is very clear. No specific date for the hearing of the objections was fixed, but what was stated was that the objections should be filed in person either by the objector himself or by the authorised person or through an advocate and then hearing would be granted at that time. The said notice contemplated personal hearing being afforded at the time of production of the objections. The petitioner, however, chose to file his objection in writing and sent the same by post. It is not the case of the petitioner that any attempt was made to personally go to the office of the Collector with a copy of the objections. It is also not in dispute that the objections which were filed in writing were taken into consideration and the report made. In other words, it is not that the written objections were disregarded.
    The observation of the Land Acquisition Collector in the award has to be read in the context of the said notice dated 18-7-1991. Therefore, when in the award it is stated that date was fixed for personal hearing and no one was present on behalf of the objector, the implication clearly is that though 30 days' time was given for the producing of objections and the hearing was to be granted at the time of production of the same, the petitioner was not personally present. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 5-A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act were duly complied with in the present case.”

    5. Shri Anil B. Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad (1976) 3 SCC 719 strenuously contended that the owner of the land has a right to object to the acquisition by placing necessary material and if necessary by adduction of evidence and cross-examination of the witness of the respondent. When he has filed the objections, the Land Acquisition Officer is obliged to give further notice fixing a specified date for adduction of evidence and hearing. Since that was not done, it is violative of sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act. It is unexceptional that when an opportunity of hearing is obliged to be given as enjoined under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to appear and be heard personally or through authorised representative or an advocate, on filing the objection to the acquisition. Sections 4(1) and 6(2) prescribe elaborate procedure as amended by Act 68 of 1984, to take further action, within time-frame for making the award under Section 11. If he fails to make award within two years from the date of last of the dates of publication under Section 6(2), the proceedings for acquisition should lapse unless it is covered by its Explanation. It was notorious that no award was being made for years putting the owner of the land to great hardship. The time-frame for making the award and other procedural steps in Section 4(1) and Section 6(2) were designed to mitigate untold hardship to the person interested in the land and to prevent needless burden on the Exchequer. As its limb, unless power under Section 17(4) was invoked, enquiry under Section 5-A should be conducted and completed within 30 days or within unavoidable minimum period. So, the procedure for inquiry under Section 5-A is not like an elaborate trial. Section 5-A(2) was amended and right of hearing was made mandatory consistent with development of law of natural justice. It would be open to the claimant to avail of the remedy of hearing. But it is mandatory that right of personal hearing should be given to the owner or person interested in the land known to the Land Acquisition Officer or he has reason to believe that such a person has interest in the land under acquisition.

    6. Notice in the present case did indicate that the petitioner was at liberty to file his objections within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notice and in case he wished to and at the time when he filed the objections, he was also asked to appear either in person or through authorised representative or advocate and he would be heard on his objections. Admittedly, the petitioner had not appeared, either in person or through advocate but had chosen to file his objections through post. It would be obvious he did not intend to avail the benefit of hearing while submitting objections. If it were a case that he personally appeared and filed objections and requested for hearing, but for one reason or other he was not heard, then time should be granted and perhaps it may be requested to be adjourned to a next short date to be heard. That would be a different circumstance to consider i.e whether failure to give such a date for hearing violates Section 5-A(2). The petitioner having chosen to send the objections through post and when the notice does indicate that he was to appear either in person or through advocate or authorised representative along with objections but failed, then there would be no need to give any further date of hearing.

    7. Right of hearing is mandatory under Section 5-A(2) and the Land Acquisition Officer is enjoined to give the opportunity of hearing to the owner or person known to be interested in the land. The ratio laid down by this Court in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255 also referred by Shri Divan, is unexceptional and has to be complied with. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Officer has not taken it lightly or casually in issuing the notice but the parties had not chosen to appear either in person or through counsel. No fault could be laid at the door of Land Acquisition Officer for not giving opportunity of hearing.

    8. It is then contended that on the dates mentioned in his writ petition filed in the High Court, the declaration under Section 6 was published beyond one year and that, therefore, the declaration is invalid in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that under clause (2) of Section 6 the declaration shall be published within one year from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). That section clearly adumbrates that one year has to be counted from the date of the publication namely in the Gazette or last of the dates of publication envisaged thereunder excluding the time during which further proceedings were stayed by the High Court. The last date is referred to as the date of the publication of the notification to reckon one year. It would be seen that declaration under Section 6 was published within one year of the last of the dates of local publication under Section 4(1), in view of the closeness of the publication of these in the Gazette.

    9. Though this point was not argued in the High Court, since the learned counsel has raised the point, we have heard and answered accordingly.

    10. The SLP is, therefore, dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt v. State Of Gujarat And Others
    (Apr 10, 1995)