S.P Bharucha, J.— Leave to appeal granted.
2. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court at Bombay whereby, on a Notice of Motion taken out by the respondent in a writ petition filed by him, the High Court revoked the order of suspension passed by the appellant against the respondent because the appellant had failed and neglected to initiate and complete disciplinary inquiry proceedings against the respondent for two years.
3. The respondent was employed by the appellant, which is a Society registered under the Societies' Registration Act, as a Public Relations Officer. He was suspended, as aforementioned, on September 21, 1990. The order of suspension issued by the Chairperson of the appellant recorded that the Central Bureau of Investigation was investigating a criminal case against the respondent and that he had been arrested in that connection. The respondent was placed under suspension and directed not to leave his headquarters at Bombay without obtaining prior permission. An order regarding subsistence allowance to be paid to the respondent, it was stated, would be issued separately. This order was issued on the same day and the respondent became entitled to draw subsistence allowance equivalent to half his pay plus admissible allowances. The respondent filed the writ petition in the High Court at Bombay on February 22, 1991 and prayed that the suspension order should be quashed and that he should be reinstated. Pending the disposal of the writ petition, the respondent asked that he be allowed to draw his full emoluments without deductions. The writ petition was admitted on April 2, 1991 in these terms:
“Regarding order of suspension in view of B.R Patel v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 800, (1968) 2 LLJ 700, (1968) 2 SCR 577 no interference is called for as the respondents have the power to suspend the petitioner as is done in the present case. On the question of substantive allowance only there will be a rule.
No interim relief order save and except that the respondents shall not make any reduction from the substantive allowance under the order dated September 21, 1990 as is being done at present. The respondents are at liberty to adjust any excess payment made to the petitioners in any manner in accordance with law.
The respondents waive service.”
4. The respondent then took out a Notice of Motion in the writ petition and prayed that the appellant should be directed to withdraw the suspension order so that he could join duties as usual. The order that was passed thereon read thus:
“Respondents state that they will review the question of subsistence allowance. In view of the fact that the petitioner has been suspended since September 21, 1990 and he is getting only 50 per cent as his subsistence allowance, respondents to intimate the decision to the petitioner within 6 weeks from today.”
Pursuant to this order of the High Court the subsistence allowance payable to the respondent was increased on August 20, 1992 and he became entitled to draw it at a rate equivalent to 75 per cent of his pay plus admissible allowances.
5. The respondent then took out another Notice of Motion upon which the order under appeal was made on September 18, 1992. Again, the respondent prayed that the appellant should be directed to withdraw the suspension order. The Division Bench of the High Court noted that although the respondent had been suspended on September 21, 1990, no steps had been taken by the appellant to initiate a departmental enquiry and no charge-sheet had been served upon the respondent. This was, therefore, a fit case where the suspension order should be immediately revoked. The Division Bench noted that although it was urged on behalf of the appellant that this was a case where the respondent was involved in charges of corruption, which the CBI was investigating, no material had been placed before it to indicate what the stage of investigation was. Accordingly, the suspension order was revoked.
6. At an earlier stage before this Court, counsel for the appellant stated that a charge-sheet would be served upon the respondent within two weeks. This has been done.
7. We have heard counsel and, although this is an appeal against an interim order in a pending writ petition, we think it necessary to intervene.
8. It would appear that the attention of the Division Bench of the High Court which passed the impugned order was not drawn to the terms upon which the respondent's writ petition had been admitted. It had been admitted only upon the question of the subsistence allowance, the court having said that no interference with regard to the suspension order was called for. No appeal was preferred against this order by the respondent nor was the scope of the rule expanded subsequently by the High Court. Since the rule was confined to the question of the subsistence allowance payable to the respondent, the question of the validity of the suspension order fell outside the purview of the writ petition and the suspension order ought not, therefore, to have been revoked.
9. Secondly, we have perused the charge-sheets that have been filed against the respondent in the court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is, we think, proper only to say this, without prejudicing the case of either party, that the charges relate to the performance of the respondent's duties and are of a very serious nature. Having regard thereto, it is not desirable that the suspension order should be revoked so that the appellant is compelled to take the respondent back into service pending the disposal of the criminal cases against him.
10. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order under appeal is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.