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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27 of the Arms Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The order disposes of, or gives directions in, several matters—primarily Criminal Appeals Nos. 146, 257, 601 of 1987 and allied proceedings—all arising from long-pending criminal prosecutions in the State of Bihar. Each prosecution had remained stagnant for years, prompting the High Court of Patna to quash the proceedings on the ground that the accused persons' fundamental right to a speedy trial had been violated. The State did not challenge those High-Court decisions; instead, complainants or private parties invoked the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, one appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1987) became infructuous because the accused had already been acquitted by the trial court, while certain civil matters were merely adjourned or dismissed for default.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether prolonged and unexplained delay in investigation and trial infringes the accused persons’ fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby justifying quashing of the criminal proceedings.
  2. Whether an appeal becomes infructuous when, pending the appeal, the accused has been acquitted by the trial court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • In Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 1987, Shri A.K. Srivastava (for the complainant) contended that the offences involved murder and dacoity, the accused had been in custody for only two years, and therefore the High Court should not have quashed the charges; instead, the Sessions trial should proceed expeditiously.
  • In the other appeals filed by private complainants, it was generally urged that the seriousness of the offences warranted continuation of the prosecutions despite delays.

Respondents' Arguments

  • For Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 1987, counsel for the respondent (Director of Mines) asserted that from 1978 to the date of hearing no witness had been examined, the alleged disproportionate assets were only about ₹2,00,000, and the delay was entirely attributable to the prosecution’s lapses, not to the accused.
  • Across the matters, respondents emphasised that years—sometimes more than a decade—had passed without meaningful progress, violating their right to a speedy trial.
  • In Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1987, Shri Sumant Bhardwaj informed the Court that the respondent had already been acquitted, rendering that appeal infructuous.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 Articulates the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the parameters for assessing delay. The Court applied the Antulay guidelines to conclude that the unexplained, prosecution-induced delays in each case infringed the respondents’ Article 21 rights, thereby justifying quashing or dismissal of the State/complainant appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court scrutinised the chronology of each prosecution. It noted that in Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 1987, the case had languished since 1978, no witness had been examined, and the prosecution itself had failed to secure timely sanction. In Criminal Appeals Nos. 257 and 601 of 1987, there were eight-year and seven-year delays, respectively, before the trials even began in earnest, followed by minimal progress. The appellants could not offer any explanation; the State was either absent or equally unable to justify the inaction.

Invoking the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay, the Court distinguished between systemic or unavoidable delays and delays wholly attributable to the prosecution. Finding the latter, it held that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial had been violated. Consequently, there was “no occasion for interference” with the High Court’s orders quashing the prosecutions. In Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1987 the Court simply recorded the respondent’s acquittal and dismissed the appeal as infructuous.

Holding and Implications

All substantive criminal appeals filed by complainants or the State against the Patna High Court’s quashing orders were DISMISSED; the appeal rendered infructuous by the respondent’s acquittal was also DISMISSED; certain other matters were adjourned or dismissed for default.

Implications: The decision reinforces the authority of Abdul Rehman Antulay by applying its speedy-trial doctrine to multiple fact scenarios, thereby underscoring that unexplained prosecutorial delay—even in serious offences—can result in termination of proceedings. The order sets no new precedent but exemplifies strict enforcement of existing constitutional protections.

    Santosh De v. Archna Guha And Others

    Order

    Civil Appeal No. 3811 of 1990

    1. Adjourned to 1-9-1993.

    Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1987

    2. It is stated by Shri Sumant Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent, Dilip Kumar Dey has since been acquitted by the trial court. The statement is recorded. In view of this statement, this appeal must be deemed to have become infructuous and is dismissed as such.

    Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 1987

    3. No one appears for the State of Bihar, the appellant. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Crl. WJC No. 164 of 1986. The respondent had approached the High Court by way of a writ petition complaining that his right to speedy trial was infringed by the inordinate delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution launched against him. The writ petition was allowed by the Patna High Court and the proceedings quashed.

    4. A few relevant facts may be stated. The respondent was the Director of Mines, Government of Bihar. A raid was conducted on his premises and certain amount of cash and jewellery recovered. On 27-3-1978, a preliminary charge-sheet was filed under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The substance of the charge was that the respondent was in possession of assets beyond the known sources of his income. On 15-12-1982, the Government of Bihar refused to grant sanction for prosecuting the respondent, which was required under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For that reason — or any other, as the case may be — no final charge-sheet was filed. Yet the proceedings were kept pending. It is in these circumstances that the respondent approached the High Court by way of a writ petition which was allowed. We are also told that in the criminal appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, this Court made an order on 23-11-1987 permitting the parties to lead evidence with the restriction that no further proceedings shall be taken in the matter. Taking advantage of the said interim order, it appears, sanction for prosecution was accorded by the State Government on 29-3-1990 but it is stated by the learned counsel for the respondent, no statements of witnesses were recorded in the case. Meanwhile, the respondent retired from service on 30-11-1991.

    5. It would be evident from the above narrative that the prosecution launched in 1978 is pending even today and yet the examination of the witnesses has not begun, though the final charge-sheet is said to have been filed in April 1990. Learned counsel for the respondent states that the disproportionate assets alleged to have been possessed by the respondent is in the region of Rs 2,00,000.

    6. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the delay in conduct of the case has been caused by the accused-respondent. From 1978 to 1986 and again from November 1987 till this day, there has been no progress in the case. Not a single witness has been examined so far. In these circumstances, following the principles enunciated in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and the criminal appeal is dismissed.

    SLP (C) No. 15131 of 1990

    7. SLP is taken on board.

    8. This SLP is directed against an order of the Patna High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent (accused in Crl. A. No. 146 of 1987) against the order of sanction dated 29-3-1990. In view of our orders in Crl. A. No. 146 of 1987, this SLP has become infructuous and is dismissed accordingly.

    Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 1987

    9. This appeal is preferred by the complainant against the order of the Patna High Court quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that the inordinate delay in proceeding with and concluding the prosecution case against the accused has defeated his fundamental right to speedy trial. A few facts may be noticed.

    10. In the occurrence that took place in the village concerned herein, on 9-4-1973, one Nand Kumar Singh received gunshot injuries. First Information Report was lodged on the same day. Nand Kumar Singh succumbed to his injuries later whereupon the FIR was converted to one under Section 302 in the place of Section 307. On 25-5-1974, charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to sessions court on 15-7-1974. No trial took place for a period of six years when on 3-6-1980 the case was transferred to the file of IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan. Even here, it took about two years for charges to be framed by the court. The cross-examination of witnesses began in 1982 and only four witnesses were examined over a period of two years. Thereafter, the prosecution obtained as many as ninety adjournments for producing other witnesses including the Inquiry Officer.

    11. The writ petition was filed by the accused persons in the High Court of Patna on 29-8-1986 and it was allowed on 2-3-1987.

    12. The State has not chosen to question the judgment of the High Court. It is only the complainant who has come to this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant, Shri A.K Srivastava says that because the offence is of a serious nature involving murder and dacoity and further because the accused was in jail only for a period of two years, this was not a fit case for quashing the charges. He prays that the judgment of the High Court be set aside and the sessions trial be directed to be proceeded with expeditiously.

    13. We are not satisfied that there are any valid grounds for interference with the order of the High Court. The most glaring circumstance in the case is the delay in commencing the trial. The case was committed to sessions court on 15-7-1974 and the charges came to be framed by the sessions court only on 13-4-1983 i.e after a lapse of about eight years. The appellant is not in a position to explain the reasons for this delay. In the order under appeal, the High Court has stated that this delay is entirely on account of the default of the prosecution. This is not a case of what is called “systemic delays” — as explained in Abdul Rehman Antulay (1992) 1 SCC 225. In our opinion, this unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial, by itself, infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In the absence of any material to the contrary, we accept the finding of the High Court that this delay of eight years is entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution. Once that is so there is no occasion for interference in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

    Criminal Appeal No. 601 of 1987

    14. This is an appeal by special leave granted against the judgment and order of the High Court at Patna dated 19-12-1986 whereby it quashed the criminal proceedings in twenty-six matters including the matter out of which this appeal arises, on the ground that there had been such delay as violated the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

    15. The incident in question took place on 10-7-1976 in a village in the State of Bihar when Respondents 1 to 9 are alleged to have entered into the house of one Rajinder Singh along with one Ram Lakhan Singh, the son of the deceased. They were armed with pistols and fired at Rajinder Singh who was badly injured. The FIR was recorded on the same day after some hours and the police came to the scene. On 20-12-1976 Respondents 1 to 9 were charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 27 of the Arms Act. It was only in 1980 that the case was committed to the court of sessions and the trial commenced. By 1986, only two witnesses had been examined when Respondents 1 to 9 filed a criminal writ petition in the Patna High Court for quashing of the trial on account of delay and the pendency of the trial for a period of more than seven years. The writ petition came to be allowed on 19-12-1986 and the criminal case against Respondents 1 to 9 was quashed.

    16. Special leave petition against the judgment and order of the Patna High Court insofar as it concerned Respondents 1 to 9 was filed by the appellant who is the son of the injured Rajinder Singh who, subsequently, died. When leave to appeal was granted on 23-11-1987 this Court granted stay of the operation of the High Court judgment.

    17. The appeal has been filed not by the State of Bihar but by the complainant. Not surprisingly, the complainant is unable to explain why, when Respondents 1 to 9 were charge-sheeted in December 1976, the committal order was made only in 1980; why only two witnesses had been examined between 1980, when the trial commenced and in 1986 when the criminal writ petition in the Patna High Court was filed; and why, despite the stay of the judgment granted by this Court in November 1987, the criminal case has not been proceeded with up to date. Learned counsel for the State of Bihar which is impleaded as a respondent has also no explanation.

    18. While we appreciate that a serious criminal offence might have taken place at the hands of Respondents 1 to 9, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that almost 17 years have elapsed since the date of that occurrence and there are these several delays pointed out earlier which remain unexplained. We think that in the circumstances the rights of Respondents 1 to 9 to a speedy trial have been breached and no interference with the judgment under appeal is called for. The appeal is dismissed.

    Criminal Appeal No. 665 of 1989

    19. No one appears for the appellant. List on 1-9-1993.

    SLP (Crl.) No. 983 of 1990

    20. Adjourned to 1-9-1993.

    Writ Petition (C) No. 1128 of 1986

    21. Party-in-person not present. None else appears for the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed in default. No costs.

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    Santosh De v. Archna Guha And Others
    (Aug 26, 1993)