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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 37
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 37
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Food Corporation of India (FCI) instituted a civil suit for recovery of ₹2 lakhs against the present appellant and respondents 2–7 on the basis of a written agreement between the parties. The appellant entered appearance on 10 December 1984.

On 4 January 1985, the appellant filed an application requesting the court to compel FCI to produce the originals of the agreement and other documents because the photostat copies annexed to the plaint were illegible. The application stated that production of the originals was “very essential” before the defendants could prepare a written statement.

Subsequently, on 21 January 1985, the appellant moved an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking a stay of the suit on the ground that the agreement contained an arbitration clause covering the disputes raised in the suit. FCI opposed the stay, contending that the appellant had already taken a “step in the proceedings” by seeking an adjournment for filing a written statement.

The trial court granted the stay, holding that the 4 January 1985 application was not a step in the proceedings within the meaning of Section 34. On appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed that decision and directed the suit to proceed. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, in revision, upheld the appellate order. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant’s application dated 4 January 1985, seeking production of original documents, amounted to “a step in the proceeding” so as to bar the appellant from obtaining a stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The 4 January 1985 application merely sought production of documents and did not constitute a submission to the court’s jurisdiction on the merits.
  • No written statement was filed, and no other procedural act indicated abandonment of the contractual right to arbitration.
  • Under Section 34, only a conscious step indicating election to have the dispute decided by the court—not a request for documents—can bar a stay.

Food Corporation of India's Arguments

  • The appellant’s request implied an adjournment and thus constituted participation in the suit, amounting to a “step in the proceeding.”
  • Having taken that step, the appellant should be precluded from invoking the arbitration clause.
  • The appellate and High Courts correctly treated the application as submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra, (1973) 2 SCC 96; (1974) 1 SCR 31 Definition of “step in the proceeding” under Section 34. Cited as earlier authority explaining that not every procedural act bars recourse to arbitration.
Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor, (1982) 2 SCC 499; (1983) 1 SCR 95 Need for a conscious election to abandon arbitration to constitute a bar. Reinforced the requirement of intentional submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1987) 4 SCC 137; (1987) 3 SCR 858 Comprehensive test: a disqualifying step must aid progress of the suit and manifest unequivocal intention to have the dispute decided by the court. The Supreme Court relied primarily on this case to evaluate whether the appellant’s conduct showed abandonment of the arbitration agreement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated the principles laid down in earlier decisions, particularly the General Electric case, that:

  • A step disentitling a defendant under Section 34 must be taken in aid of the progress of the suit or must clearly evidence submission to the court’s jurisdiction on the merits.
  • The party’s intention—expressly or by necessary implication—must show abandonment of the right to arbitrate.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the appellant’s 4 January 1985 application:

  • Did not ask for an adjournment to file a written statement but only for production of original documents.
  • Did not contain any undertaking or indication that a written statement would in fact be filed.
  • Served merely to obtain clarity of documents and did not advance the suit towards adjudication on merits.

Therefore, the application was not a “step in the proceeding” within the meaning of Section 34. Denying the appellant the contractual right to arbitration on such a technical basis would be contrary to the legislative intent and existing precedent.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the orders of the High Court and the Additional District Judge are set aside, and the trial court’s order staying the suit is restored.

Immediate Effect: The civil suit initiated by FCI remains stayed, and the parties must proceed in accordance with the arbitration clause.

Broader Implication: The judgment underscores that only procedural acts amounting to an unequivocal election to litigate—rather than arbitrate—constitute a “step in the proceeding” under Section 34. Mere requests ancillary to the preparation of a defence, such as seeking production of documents, will not bar a party from invoking arbitration.

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    Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation Of India And Others

    K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.— Special leave granted.

    2. Food Corporation of India filed a suit for recovery of Rs 2 lakhs against the appellant and respondents 2 to 7 on the basis of an agreement between the parties. After service of notice, the appellant entered appearance on December 10, 1984. On January 4, 1985, the appellant filed an application stating as follows:

    “That the photostat copy of the original agreement and other documents which have been produced by the plaintiff in their evidence are not visible and clear, and it is very difficult for the defendants to inspect and give the written statement.
    3. That it is very essential to get the original documents produced in the court which are in possession of the plaintiff so that the defendants may file the written statement.
    4. It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the plaintiff may kindly be ordered to produce the original agreement and other docu∼ments which has been filed with the plaint.”

    3. On January 21, 1985, the appellant moved the court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of the proceeding of the suit on the ground that there exists an arbitration clause in the suit agreement covering the matter in dispute. The Food Corporation of India contended that the appellant had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit since an adjournment was taken for filing written statement. It was however, admitted the existence of the arbitration agreement covering the matter in dispute in the suit. The trial court accepted the request of the appellant and stayed the suit inter alia observing:

    “.... This application did not contain any prayer for adjournment of the case for filing the written statement. The prayer contained in this application was that the plaintiff be directed to produce the original agreement and other documents so that the defendants may file the written statement...
    .... In the present case, the prayer of the defendants that the plaintiff be directed to file the original agreement and other documents in the court before they could file the written statement cannot be said to be a step in the proceedings because it was not a prayer for adjournment of the case for filing written statement.”

    4. But the Additional District Judge, in the appeal preferred by the Food Corporation of India has reversed the order of the trial court. He was of the view that a written request made by the defendants by their application dated January 4, 1985 for an adjournment to enable them to file the written statement was a step in the proceedings and the trial court was not justified in staying the suit. Accordingly, he accepted the appeal and vacated the stay order and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law.

    5. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has dismissed the revision petition of the appellant. The High Court has also observed that the defendants having moved the application dated January 4, 1985 for production of original documents and seeking an adjournment of the suit to enable them to file written statement would certainly be construed as a step taken in the proceedings.

    6. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has received the consideration of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (1973) 2 SCC 96, (1974) 1 SCR 31 (ii) Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer & Contractor (1982) 2 SCC 499, (1983) 1 SCR 95 and more recently in General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1987) 4 SCC 137, (1987) 3 SCR 858 It may be noted that the expression “a step in the proceeding” which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not every step taken by him in the suit. It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed. It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit. The step must have been consciously taken with a view to submit to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on the merits. In General Electric Co. case (1987) 4 SCC 137, (1987) 3 SCR 858 this Court after considering the previous decisions observed:

    “Thus ... a step in the proceeding which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Section 34 of the Arbitration Act should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit or submission to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit. The step must be such as to manifest the intention of the party unequivocally to abandon the right under the arbitration agreement and instead to opt to have the dispute resolved on merits in the suit. The step must be such as to indicate an election or affirmation in favour of the suit in the place of the arbitration. The election or affirmation may be by express choice or by necessary implication by acquiescence. The broad and general right of a person to seek redressal of his grievances in a court of law is subject to the right of the parties to have the disputes settled by a forum of mutual choice. Neither right is insubstantial and neither right can be allowed to be defeated by any manner of technicality. The right to have the dispute adjudicated by a civil court cannot be allowed to be defeated by vague or amorphous miscalled agreements to refer to ‘arbitration’. On the other hand, if the agreement to refer to arbitration is established, the right to have the dispute settled by arbitration cannot be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds.”

    7. In the application filed by the defendants in this case, they only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement. It was not stated that they would file the written statement. They never took any other step submitting to the jurisdiction of the court to decide the case on merits. The right to have the dispute settled by arbitration has been conferred by agreement of parties and that right should not be deprived of by technical pleas. The court must go into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken. The court must examine whether the party has abandoned his right under the agreement. In the light of these principles and looking to the substance of the application dated January 4, 1985, we cannot form an opinion that the defendants have abandoned their right to have the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the written statement.

    8. In the result the appeal is allowed in setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring the order of the trial court.

    9. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

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    Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation Of India And Others
    (Feb 14, 1990)