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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 109
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965)
  • Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution
  • the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule
  • Section 40 of the Act
  • Entry 33 of Concurrent List, Entry 52 of List I of Seventh Schedule, Entry 28 of List II, Article 246 of the Constitution, Article 254(2)
  • Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 109
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965)
  • Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution
  • the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule
  • Section 40 of the Act
  • Entry 33 of Concurrent List, Entry 52 of List I of Seventh Schedule, Entry 28 of List II, Article 246 of the Constitution, Article 254(2)
  • Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Dealers engaged in the trade of agricultural commodities filed writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 (“the Act”). The challenge focused on the levy of a market fee on the sale and purchase of agricultural produce within notified market yards. Comparable statutes in other States (Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, etc.) had been attacked on similar grounds and many of those challenges had already failed in earlier Supreme Court decisions. In the present proceedings the petitioners sought to reopen the issue, concentrating particularly on the inclusion of “sugar” in the Act’s Schedule of agricultural produce.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Legislature had legislative competence to include sugar—a “declared commodity” under Entry 52, List I of the Seventh Schedule—in the Schedule to the Act.
  2. Whether the inclusion of sugar, khandsari, shakkar and gur in the Schedule was arbitrary or ultra-vires because such items are manufactured in mills or factories rather than directly “produced from the soil.”
  3. Whether the Act, by imposing a market fee, violated Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution, inter alia for want of quid pro quo.
  4. Whether the delegated power conferred by Section 40 of the Act to add or amend items in the Schedule amounted to excessive delegation.
  5. Whether the field relating to sugar was “occupied” by Central legislation, rendering the State enactment repugnant under Article 254.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The State Legislature lacked competence to legislate on sugar because it is a commodity declared of public importance under Entry 52, List I; therefore, its inclusion in the Schedule was unconstitutional.
  • Sugar is a factory or mill product and cannot be categorised as “agricultural produce,” which, according to the petitioners, should be confined to items directly produced from soil.
  • The fee imposed lacks quid pro quo, infringing Articles 14 and 19.
  • The Act restricts the freedom of trade guaranteed under Articles 301 and 304.
  • Section 40 confers excessive and unguided delegated power on the State Government to alter the Schedule.

State's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab (1980) 1 SCC 416 Laid down basic principles for judging validity of marketing legislation and levy of market fees. Cited as earlier authority upholding marketing statutes; petitions in other States had been dismissed on its basis.
Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P. 1980 Supp SCC 27 Held rice/dal produced in mills to be “agricultural produce.” Relied upon to show that method of production (mill processing) does not remove a commodity from the category of agricultural produce.
Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P. (1985) 2 SCC 485 Recognised khandsari sugar as agricultural produce irrespective of production process. Used by the Court to rebut the argument that sugar, being factory-made, could not be agricultural produce.
Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 353 Upheld validity of marketing legislation and levy structures. Noted as part of a consistent line of precedent rejecting identical challenges.
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Ganga Dal Mill (1984) 4 SCC 516 Affirmed that processed products like rice/dal remain agricultural produce. Strengthened the reasoning that processing method is irrelevant to the statutory definition.
Choudhary Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. 1956 SCR 393 Held sugar legislation falls under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List; Central and State legislatures both competent. Applied to dismiss the “occupied field” and legislative-competence arguments; any potential repugnancy is cured by presidential assent under Article 254(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first observed that sugar had been included in the Schedule from the inception of the Act and that Section 40 expressly empowers the State Government to amend the Schedule; such delegation is common and valid, defeating the charge of excessive delegation.

Addressing the definition of “agricultural produce,” the Court noted it is inclusive, encompassing products “agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified.” Nothing in the language confines it to goods directly produced from soil or excludes factory-processed commodities. Judicial precedent—particularly Rathi Khandsari Udyog and Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar—confirms that the mode of production does not alter a commodity’s character as agricultural produce. Hence, the argument that sugar, being mill-produced, is outside the legislative scope was rejected.

On legislative competence, the Court relied on Choudhary Tika Ramji to emphasise that sugar falls under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List. Consequently both Parliament and State Legislatures can enact laws on sugar. There was no demonstrated repugnancy with existing Central legislation; in any event, the Act had presidential assent, giving it protection under Article 254(2).

Finally, previous decisions such as Kewal Krishan Puri and Sreenivasa General Traders had already upheld similar marketing fee structures, negating the petitioners’ constitutional objections under Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304. The Court therefore found no merit in any of the contentions raised.

Holding and Implications

Petitions Dismissed with Costs.

The immediate effect is that the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961—including the levy of market fee on sugar—remains fully operative. The Court did not alter existing jurisprudence but reaffirmed a settled line of authority sustaining the validity of agricultural marketing legislation across several States.

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    Kishan Lal v. State Of Rajasthan And Others

    R.M Sahai, J.— Validity of Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 (for brevity ‘the Act’) levying market fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce in market yard or sub-market yard was challenged by dealers for lack of legislative competence, violation of Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of the Constitution, absence of any quid pro quo in the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and arbitrary inclusion of manufactured articles such as khandsari, shakkar, gur and sugar as agricultural produce in the Schedule etc.

    2. Acts of other States, for instance, Punjab and Haryana and U.P were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions, which appear to be identical, are reproduction of any of those petitions, which were pending in this Court from before is not relevant but various group of petitions of Punjab and Haryana dealers challenging constitutionality and legality of Act and its provisions including gur, khandsari and shakkar as agricultural produce in the schedule of Punjab Act have been dismissed by different benches presumably because of decisions in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab (1980) 1 SCC 416, (1979) 3 SCR 1217, Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P 1980 Supp SCC 27, (1980) 3 SCR 104, Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P (1985) 2 SCC 485, (1985) 2 SCR 966 and Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P (1983) 4 SCC 353, AIR 1983 SC 1264.

    3. Despite these decisions spelling out basic principles for determining validity of marketing legislations dealing with agricultural produce the petitioners were not willing to take it lying down probably because none of these decisions dealt with sugar. It was urged that inclusion of sugar in the Schedule of the Act was arbitrary, primarily because it being a declared commodity of public importance under Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule the State legislature was precluded from legislating on it. Its inclusion in the Schedule was also assailed as it being a mill or factory produce it could not be deemed to be agricultural produce which is basically confined to produce of or from soil.

    4. Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the Act, statutorily, right from its inception. Such inclusion is found in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was immaterial as Section 40 of the Act empowered State Government to amend or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge, therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power was misconceived.

    5. Inclusion of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it was not produced out of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural produce. Fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disregard of definition of the word “agricultural produce” in the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the expression “or otherwise as specified in the Schedule”. Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character. Khandsari sugar, which is produced by open pan process and is not different from sugar produced by vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and conductivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog (1985) 2 SCC 485, (1985) 2 SCR 966 was held to be agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on method of production, namely, by modern plant and machinery. To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States. Rice or dal produced in mills have been held to be agricultural produce in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P 1980 Supp SCC 27, (1980) 3 SCR 104 and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Ganga Dal Mill and Co. (1984) 4 SCC 516 Even in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. vol. 1, para 1414, the word agricultural produce for purposes of agricultural marketing schemes is understood as, including “any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals”. In the same volume products covered by the provisions of EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965) are mentioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them.

    6. Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to legislate on sugar or oft-repeated argument of occupied field was more attractive than of any substance. Reliance on Article 246 of the Constitution was academic only. As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of this Court in Choudhary Tika Ramji v. State of U.P 1956 SCR 393, AIR 1956 SC 676 examined the matter in detail and held sugar legislations to be within the scope of Entry 33 of Concurrent List. It was observed that all ‘Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction’. Effect of it was described thus, ‘The Provincial legislature as well as the Central legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise’. Any further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of Seventh Schedule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is unnecessary. As regards the submission of occupied field suffice it to say that there is no repugnancy in the Central and State legislation. At least none was made out. Even if there would have been any the Act having received assent of the President it is fully protected by Article 254(2).

    7. For these reasons these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Kishan Lal v. State Of Rajasthan And Others
    (Mar 23, 1990)