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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976
  • Article 12 of the Constitution
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976
  • Article 12 of the Constitution
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was selected by Gurgaon Gramin Bank as a Trainee Branch Manager and, after training, appointed on probation as Branch Manager of the Mohna Branch effective 16 October 1978. The probation was for one year, extendable by six months. The outer limit of 18 months expired in April 1980, yet the Bank neither discharged the petitioner nor issued an express confirmation, and he continued in service.

Allegations of serious misconduct—such as withholding sanctioned loan amounts from gramin borrowers and refusing to accept custody of cash-chest keys—surfaced during his tenure. In April 1981 the Superintendent of Police, Faridabad reportedly found the allegations substantiated and recommended disciplinary action. Instead of commencing disciplinary proceedings, the Bank invoked Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Gurgaon Gramin Bank (Staff) Services Regulations, 1980 to terminate his services on 17 August 1982. The Board of Directors dismissed his appeal on 28 August 1982.

The petitioner challenged the dismissal in C.W.P. 5003 of 1982 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which rejected the petition on 1 February 1983. He thereafter filed a special leave petition and a writ petition under Article 32 before the Supreme Court. Special leave was granted, and both matters were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner became a confirmed employee upon expiry of the maximum probationary period.
  2. Whether Regulation 10(2)(a), permitting termination simpliciter on notice or pay in lieu, is unconstitutional as conferring arbitrary and unguided power in violation of Article 14.
  3. If the regulation is invalid and the petitioner stood confirmed, whether he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages or only monetary compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner stood automatically confirmed after 18 months because the Bank neither extended probation beyond the permissible limit nor discharged him.
  • Regulation 10(2)(a) violates Article 14 as it authorises arbitrary termination without guidelines.
  • Given his age (32 years) and career prospects, reinstatement—rather than mere compensation—is the appropriate remedy.

Bank's Arguments

  • The petitioner, occupying a managerial post crucial to rural banking, has irretrievably lost the administration’s trust owing to serious integrity concerns.
  • Even if the termination is held invalid, reinstatement should be denied; monetary compensation would suffice, avoiding disruptive disciplinary proceedings.
  • The petitioner delayed pursuit of the case (from April 1983 to February 1987), allegedly to allow evidence of misconduct to fade.
  • Reliance was placed on O.P. Bhandari v. ITDC, where the Supreme Court granted compensation instead of reinstatement for a managerial employee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 Confirmation by implication when probation is not terminated within the maximum prescribed period. Relied on to hold that the petitioner was deemed confirmed after 18 months.
Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, 1986 Supp SCC 95; AIR 1986 SC 1844 Same principle of implied confirmation. Cited alongside Dharam Singh to reinforce the conclusion of automatic confirmation.
W.B. State Electricity Board v. D.B. Ghosh, (1985) 3 SCC 116 Striking down provisions enabling arbitrary termination as violative of Article 14. Used to assess the constitutionality of Regulation 10(2)(a) and find it arbitrary.
Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath, (1986) 3 SCC 156 Article 14 prohibits arbitrary, unguided termination powers in employment. Supported the finding that Regulation 10(2)(a) is unconstitutional.
O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corp. Ltd., (1986) 4 SCC 337 Court’s discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement for high-level managerial staff. Considered while determining whether to reinstate the petitioner or grant monetary compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Implied Confirmation: The Court noted that the probation period could extend only to 18 months. Citing Dharam Singh and Om Prakash Maurya, it held that failure to discharge the petitioner within that limit resulted in automatic confirmation.

2. Constitutionality of Regulation 10(2)(a): Given the Bank’s status as “State” under Article 12, the Court examined Regulation 10(2)(a) against Article 14. Relying on D.B. Ghosh and Brojo Nath, the provision was deemed to confer an arbitrary, unguided power to terminate employment and was therefore unconstitutional.

3. Consequence for the Termination Order: Because the termination order of 17 August 1982 was founded solely on the invalid regulation, the Court quashed it as void.

4. Relief: The Court weighed the Bank’s plea for compensation (invoking O.P. Bhandari) against the petitioner’s request for reinstatement. Considering the petitioner’s age and prospect of a long service career, the Court found reinstatement appropriate but moderated back wages to 50 percent. It preserved the Bank’s right to initiate disciplinary proceedings, if still considered necessary.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED IN PART. The Supreme Court:

  • Declared Regulation 10(2)(a) unconstitutional.
  • Set aside the High Court’s judgment and quashed the Bank’s termination order dated 17 August 1982.
  • Directed the Bank to reinstate the petitioner with 50 percent of past salary and liberty to conduct disciplinary proceedings, if desired.

Implications: The decision directly restores the petitioner’s employment and partial back wages. While it reiterates existing jurisprudence against arbitrary termination clauses, it does not announce a new doctrinal rule but reinforces the necessity for public sector employers to structure dismissal powers within constitutional constraints.

    M.K Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank And Others

    M.N Venkatachaliah, J.— The special leave petition, directed against the order dated February 1, 1983 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in C.W.P 5003 of 1982 and the writ petition invoking Article 32 of the Constitution, pertain to the same subject-matter and raise the question as to the constitutional validity of Regulation 10(2)(a) of the Gurgaon Gramin Bank (Staff) Services Regulations, 1980 (“Regulations” for short) enabling a termination —simpliciter and consequently, of the validity of the order dated, August 17, 1982 of Gurgaon Gramin Bank (“Bank” for short) terminating the petitioner's services as Branch Manager in exertion of the said Regulation.

    2. Petitioner was selected by the Gurgaon Gramin Bank as a Trainee Branch Manager and after training, appointed as Branch Manager on probation at its Mohna Branch with effect from October 16, 1978. The period of probation was one year in the first instance, with power to the Bank to extend the probation for a further period of six months at the end of which the probationer would either be confirmed if he was found suitable or if, otherwise, discharged from service. The 18 months' period representing the outermost limit of the permissible period of probation expired some time in April 1980. Petitioner was not discharged; nor an express order of confirmation made. Petitioner continued in service.

    3. Apparently, the course of petitioner's service did not run smooth. There were allegations against him—some of them quite serious—of acts of bad faith including that he was not disbursing the loans granted to the gramin borrowers the full sanctioned amounts, but was helping himself to some portions of it. The Bank asked the Superintendent of Police, Faridabad to look into these allegations. In April 1981, the Superintendent of Police, it would appear, reported that the allegations according to him were substantiated and recommended disciplinary action against the petitioner. There was also an allegation that petitioner had refused to accept the second set of keys of the cash chest from another official who was in custody of the keys and who was not attending the Bank that day, as a result of which the “cash” could not be opened on a working day.

    4. However, the Bank did not initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner; but on August 17, 1982 the Bank terminated his services invoking and relying upon the said Regulation 10(2)(a) which enabled a termination simpliciter. Petitioner's appeal to the Board of Directors of the Bank was turned down on August 28, 1982. Thereafter, petitioner moved the High Court in CWP No. 5003 of 1982. The High Court, dismissed the writ petition by its order dated February 1, 1983, now under appeal.

    5. Special leave is granted and both the appeal and the writ petition are taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this judgment. We have heard Dr Chitale, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Shri K.N Bhat learned Senior Counsel for the Bank.

    6. On the contentions urged at the hearing, the questions that fall for consideration are, first, whether petitioner became a full member of the service upon the expiry of the period of probation; secondly, whether the impugned Regulation 10(2)(a) is unconstitutional as granting an arbitrary and unregulated power and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that, consequently, the purported termination of the services of the petitioner must be held to be void and nonest; and thirdly, if the first two questions are held in his favour, whether petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service with full back salary.

    7. The point last-mentioned, arises in the context of the submissions of Shri Bhat that, at all events, even if the termination is held to be invalid, the petitioner who works in a managerial cadre should not be thrust on, the administration as the petitioner had forfeited its confidence and that the award of such monetary compensation as this Court might deem fit would be appropriate relief, in lieu of reinstatement.

    8. The first point need not detain us. The period of the probation was one year, in the first instance. The employer could extend it only for a further period of six more months. The limitation on the power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the services of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged render the inference inescapable that if the probationer was not discharged at or before the expiry of the maximum period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. In cases where, as here, these conditions coalesce, it has been held, there would be confirmation by implication. (See: State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh AIR 1968 SC 1210, 1968 Lab IC 1409; Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow 1986 Supp SCC 95, AIR 1986 SC 1844.)

    9. Now to the second point. The Bank is constituted under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. Having regard to its constitution and nature of its legal entity and the measure of state control, it is an instrumentality of the State and is made of latter's own “flesh and bones” and is, accordingly, “State” within the meaning, and for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution.

    10. The said Regulation 10(2)(a) provides:

    “10. Termination of service by notice.—(2)(a) The Bank may terminate the service of an—
    (i) officer after giving him three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof;
    (ii) employee after giving him one months' notice or pay in lieu thereof:
    (b) The power to terminate the service of an officer or employee shall be exercised by the Chairman.”

    11. This Court dealing with the constitutionality of similar provisions which enabled governmental authorities such terminations simpliciter has held that the constitutional pledge of equality and the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary action contained in Article 14, frown upon conferment on the State or its instrumentalities such arbitrary power. (See W.B State Electricity Board v. D.B Ghosh (1985) 3 SCC 116, (1985) 2 SCR 1014; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath (1986) 3 SCC 156, AIR 1986 SC 1571, 1986 ATC 103; O.P Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. (1986) 4 SCC 337, AIR 1987 SC 111)

    12. It requires, therefore, to be held that impugned Regulation 10(2)(a) conferring as it does, on the Bank an arbitrary and unguided power is unconstitutional. Consequently, the order dated, August 17, 1982 of purported termination (Annexure 10) of petitioner's services, which has for its foundation a provision which is unconstitutional would require to be and is hereby quashed.

    13. We now come to the third question, pertaining to the relief to be granted to the petitioner.

    14. Shri Bhat strenuously urged that petitioner is not some ordinary workman but holds a managerial post, pivotal to the successful implementation of the policies of rural banking undertaken to be achieved by the Bank, that for a satisfactory discharge of his offices and duties the trust and confidence of the administration are essential and that as petitioner had a broken image in view of the serious and legitimate suspicions as to his integrity, shaking the very foundations of that trust and confidence, it is only appropriate that in the interest of both the parties and in the larger interests of the cause of rural banking, this Court should, in exercise of its discretion, decline reinstatement and grant compensation in lieu thereof. This would, it is said, avoid the otherwise unavoidable and unpleasant prospects of the Bank having to consider the initiation of appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.

    15. Shri Bhat drew our attention to one other circumstance. He pointed out that though the special leave petition and the writ petition, along with applications containing interlocutory prayers, were lodged as far back as April 1983, the petitioner did not bestir himself to move this Court to have those matters brought up for consideration expeditiously and that consequently it was only February 1987 that the Bank was notified of these proceedings for the first time. The suggestion is that petitioner deliberately bided his time till the evidences of his past misconduct were lost with the passage of time.

    16. Learned counsel also commended to us the considerations that weighed with this court in Bhandari case (1986) 4 SCC 337, AIR 1987 SC 111, where in respect of a person holding a managerial post, this Court declined reinstatement and granted monetary compensation instead. The learned counsel relied upon the following observations of Thakkar, J.:(, 6 and 8)

    “Public sector undertakings may under the circumstances be exposed to irreversible damage at the hands of a ‘gold collar’ employee (belonging to a high managerial cadre) on account of the faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such an employee. The very existence of the undertaking may be endangered beyond recall...”
    Time is now ripe to turn to the next question as to whether it is obligatory to direct reinstatement when the concerned regulation ... be void.... Insofar as the high level managerial cadre is concerned, the matter deserves to be viewed from an altogether different perspective — a larger perspective which must take into account the demands of National Interest and the resultant compulsion to ensure the success of the public sector in its competitive coexistence with the private sector. The public sector can never fulfil its life aim or successfully vie with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the ‘policy-makers’ of such undertakings....
    So far as the facts of this case are concerned, we are satisfied that this is a fit case for granting compensation in lieu of reinstatement, instead of granting ‘reinstatement’.”

    17. Dr Chitale submitted that the analogy of Bhandari case (1986) 4 SCC 337, AIR 1987 SC 111 is not apposite in the present context and said that to refuse reinstatement in the case of the petitioner who was just 32 years old and has a long career of service ahead of him would be unfair.

    18. The principle is well settled that this Court can in appropriate case, decline reinstatement. The principle is in no doubt. But its application in a given case would require the balancing of diverse and conflicting interests and claims.

    19. However, in the present case, on a consideration of the entire matter, we think we should not refuse reinstatment. But we think we should restrict the back salary to 50 per cent of what would otherwise be payable. It will also be open to the Bank, if it still thinks it necessary and worthwhile, to hold such disciplinary enquiry as it may deem fit in regard to the acts of misconduct alleged against the petitioner.

    20. In the result, both the appeal and the writ petition are allowed in part; the order of the High Court under appeal set aside; the impugned order of the Bank dated August 17, 1982 terminating the services of the petitioner quashed and the respondent Bank directed to reinstate petitioner in service together with the monetary benefits of past salary limited to 50 per cent as aforesaid. The appeal and the writ petition are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to the costs.

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    M.K Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank And Others
    (Nov 20, 1987)