Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bihar Legal Support Society, a registered organization dedicated to providing legal aid to economically and socially disadvantaged persons, filed the present writ petition under public-interest litigation. The immediate trigger was an incident on 5 September 1986 when a bench of the Supreme Court convened late at night to hear the bail applications of two prominent industrialists, Shri Lalit Mohan Thapar and Shri Shyam Sunder Lal. The petitioner contended that similar urgency is seldom shown for bail matters involving “small men” and requested that all special-leave petitions (SLPs) challenging denial of bail or anticipatory bail be listed and heard with equal immediacy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court should direct that SLPs against orders refusing bail or anticipatory bail be listed for immediate hearing with the same urgency displayed in high-profile cases.
  2. Whether, as a matter of judicial policy, the Supreme Court ought to entertain and interfere in SLPs arising from High Court orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Bihar Legal Support Society)

  • The Supreme Court demonstrated exceptional urgency for the bail applications of two wealthy industrialists; the same consideration should extend to “small men” whose liberty is equally at stake.
  • Differential treatment undermines the constitutional guarantee of equality and the Court’s own commitment to protect the liberty of all citizens, irrespective of status.

No detailed counter-arguments from any opposing party were recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Order dated 30 October 1985 in SLP (Criminal) No. 2938 of 1985 (Supreme Court of India) The Supreme Court should not ordinarily interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail; such matters should normally be final in the High Courts. The present bench reiterates and adopts this policy principle, stating that interference will be reserved for exceptional cases involving a substantial question of law or grave miscarriage of justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court begins by reaffirming its historic commitment to the poor and disadvantaged, noting that public-interest litigation was fashioned precisely to expand their access to justice. It rejects the suggestion that “small men” receive less favorable treatment than affluent litigants.

Addressing the requested relief, the Court states that listing SLPs for urgent hearing lies within the administrative discretion of the Chief Justice of India, and therefore no judicial direction can be issued on that point. Instead, any petitioner may seek administrative relief by mentioning the matter before the Chief Justice for expedited listing.

In a broader policy discussion, the Court explains that Article 136 confers an extraordinary, discretionary jurisdiction intended primarily for:

  • Laying down the correct law for the nation, and
  • Correcting grave miscarriages of justice, which are inherently exceptional.

If the Supreme Court were to function as a routine appellate forum for every perceived error, it would become overburdened and unable to perform its constitutionally intended role. Consequently, the bench reiterates the 1985 policy norm that the Supreme Court “should not ordinarily, save in exceptional cases, interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail,” leaving such matters to be finally decided by the High Courts. The Court even moots the establishment of a National Court of Appeal for general appellate oversight, reserving the present Apex Court for constitutional and public-law questions.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF – The writ petition is dismissed without issuing directions, though the Court appreciates the petitioner’s concern for the disadvantaged.

Implications: The decision reaffirms and publicizes an internal policy limiting Supreme Court intervention in bail-related SLPs, thereby signaling to litigants that the High Courts are ordinarily the final forum in such matters. No new legal right was created, but the reiteration aims to curb the inflow of routine bail appeals to the Supreme Court and to channel urgent listing requests through administrative, rather than judicial, mechanisms.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Bihar Legal Support Society, Through Its President, C-761, Laxmi Bai Nagar, New Delhi v. Chief Justice Of India And Another

    P.N Bhagwati, C.J— This writ petition has been filed by the Bihar Legal Support Society which is a registered society having as its main aim and objective provision of legal support to the poor and disadvantaged sections of the community with a view to assisting them to fight for their constitutional and legal rights through the process of law. The occasion for filing the writ petition is set out in paragraph 2 where it has been stated that a bench of this Court sat late at night on September 5, 1986 for considering the bail application of Shri Lalit Mohan Thapar and Shri Shyam Sunder Lal and that the same anxiety which was shown by this Court in taking up the bail application of these two gentlemen must “permeate the attitude and inclination of this Hon'ble Court in all matters where questions relating to the liberty of citizens, high or low, arise” and that the bail applications of “small men” must receive the same importance as the bail applications of “big industrialists”. The petitioner, therefore, prays that special leave petitions against orders refusing bail or anticipatory bail should be taken up by this Court immediately in the same manner in which the special leave petition of these two “big industrialists” was taken up by the Court.

    2. Now, we may point out that so far as this Court is concerned, the special leave petitions of “small men” are as much entitled to consideration as special leave petitions of “big industrialists”. In fact, this Court has always regarded the poor and the disadvantaged as entitled to preferential consideration than the rich and the affluent, the businessmen and the industrialists. The reason is that the weaker sections of Indian humanity have been deprived of justice for long, long years: they have had no access to justice on account of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. They are not aware of the rights and benefits conferred upon them by the Constitution and the law. On account of their socially and economically disadvantaged position they lack the capacity to assert their rights and they do not have the material resources with which to enforce their social and economic entitlements and combat exploitation and injustice. The majority of the people of our country are subjected to this denial of access of justice and, overtaken by despair and helplessness, they continue to remain victims of an exploitative society where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few and it is used for perpetuation of domination over large masses of human beings. This Court has always, therefore, regarded it as its duty to come to the rescue of these deprived and vulnerable sections of Indian humanity in order to help them realise their economic and social entitlements and to bring to an end their oppression and exploitation. The strategy of public interest litigation has been evolved by this Court with a view to bringing justice within the easy reach of the poor and the disadvantaged sections of the community. This Court has always shown the greatest concern and anxiety for the welfare of the large masses of people in the country who are living a life of want and destitution, misery and suffering and has become a symbol of the hopes and aspirations of millions of people in the country. It is, therefore, not correct to say that this Court is not giving to the “small men” the same treatment as it is giving to the “big industrialists”. In fact, the concern shown to the poor and the disadvantaged is much greater than that shown to the rich and the well-to-do because the latter can on account of their dominant social and economic position and large material resources, resist aggression on their rights where the poor and the deprived just do not have the capacity or the will to resist and fight.

    3. The question whether special leave petitions against refusal of bail or anticipatory bail should be listed immediately or not is a question within the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief Justice and we cannot give any direction in that behalf. But, we may point out that every petitioner who files a special leave petition against (sic refusal) of bail or anticipatory bail has an opportunity of mentioning his case before the learned Chief Justice in his administrative capacity for urgent listing and wherever a case deserves urgent listing, the Chief Justice makes an appropriate order for urgent listing. It may, however, be pointed out that this Court was never intended to be a regular court of appeal against orders made by the High Court or the sessions court or the Magistrates. It was created as an Apex Court for the purpose of laying down the law for the entire country and extraordinary jurisdiction for granting special leave was conferred upon it under Article 136 of the Constitution so that it could interfere whenever it found that law was not correctly enunciated by the lower courts or tribunals and it was necessary to pronounce the correct law on the subject. This extraordinary jurisdiction could also be availed by the Apex Court for the purpose of correcting grave miscarriage of justice, but such cases would be exceptional by their very nature. It is not every case where the Apex Court finds that some injustice has been done that it would grant special leave and interfere. That would be convening the Apex Court into a regular court of appeal and moreover, by so doing, the Apex Court would soon be reduced to a position where it will find itself unable to remedy any injustice at all, on account of the tremendous backlog of cases which is bound to accumulate. We must realise that in the vast majority of cases the High Courts must become final even if they are wrong. The Apex Court can also be wrong on occasions but since there is no further appeal, what the Apex Court says is final. That is why one American Judge said of the Supreme Court of the United States: “We are right because we are final: we are not final because we are right”. We must, therefore, reconcile ourselves to the idea that like the Apex Court which may be wrong on occasions, the High Courts may also be wrong and it is not every error of the High Court which the Apex Court can possibly correct. We think it would be desirable to set up a National Court of Appeal which would be in a position to entertain appeals by special leave from the decisions of the High Courts and the Tribunals in the country in civil, criminal, revenue and labour cases and so far as the present Apex Court is concerned, it should concern itself only with entertaining cases, involving questions of constitutional law and public law. But until any such policy decision is endorsed by the Government, the Apex Court must interfere only in the limited class of cases where there is a substantial question of law involved which needs to be finally laid at rest by the Apex Court for the entire country or where there is grave, blatant and atrocious miscarriage of justice. Sometimes, we Judges feel that when a case comes before us and we find that injustice has been done, how can we shut our eyes to it. But the answer to this anguished query is that the judges of the Apex Court may not shut their eyes to injustice but they must equally not keep their eyes too wide open, otherwise the Apex Court would not be able to perform the high and noble role which it was intended to perform according to the faith of the Constitution-makers. It is for this reason that the Apex Court has evolved, as a matter of self-discipline, certain norms to guide it in the exercise of its discretion in cases where special leave petition are filed against orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail. These norms have to be articulated in order that the people may know as to what is the judicial policy of the Apex Court in entertaining such special leave petitions. That would go a long way towards introducing a measure of certainty in judicial response to such special leave petitions and would also tend to reduce the inflow of such special leave petitions. This was the reason why a bench of this Court consisting of two of us viz. the Chief Justice and Justice Ranganath Misra, clearly enunciated in an order made on October 30, 1985 in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 2938 of 1985 that this Court should not “interfere with the orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail” and that “these are matters in which the High Court should normally become the final authority”. We reiterate this policy principle laid down by the bench of this Court and hold that this Court should not ordinarily, save in exceptional cases, interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail, because these are matters in which the High Court should normally be the final arbiter.

    4. The writ petition will stand disposed of in these terms. We appreciate the anxiety and concern shown by the petitioner for the poor and the disadvantaged in bringing this public interest litigation.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bihar Legal Support ... v. Chief Justice Of Ind...
    (Nov 19, 1986)