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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1986 INSC 126
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 549(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (CrPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (Not mentioned in the text, but added as per the format)
  • Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 122(1) of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 13 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952, Section 11
  • Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952
  • Section 52 of the Army Act of 1950
  • Section 13 of the West Bengal Act
  • Section 52 of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 70 of the Army Act of 1950
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952, Section 8(3-A)
  • Sections 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
  • Sections 8(3-A) and 11 quoted hereinabove which were incorporated by Central Act 2 of 1958 as further amended by Central Act 22 of 1966
  • Section 8(3-A) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1938
  • Section 549(1) CrPC and Rule 3 under the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 11, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1986 INSC 126
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 549(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (CrPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (Not mentioned in the text, but added as per the format)
  • Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 122(1) of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 13 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952, Section 11
  • Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952
  • Section 52 of the Army Act of 1950
  • Section 13 of the West Bengal Act
  • Section 52 of the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 70 of the Army Act of 1950
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952, Section 8(3-A)
  • Sections 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
  • Sections 8(3-A) and 11 quoted hereinabove which were incorporated by Central Act 2 of 1958 as further amended by Central Act 22 of 1966
  • Section 8(3-A) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952
  • Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1938
  • Section 549(1) CrPC and Rule 3 under the Army Act, 1950
  • Section 11, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Three Army officers were tried by the Judge presiding over the Fourth Additional Special Court, Calcutta, for offences that fall under Section 52 of the Army Act, 1950—offences over which both an ordinary criminal court and a court-martial have concurrent jurisdiction. The Special Court convicted one officer and acquitted the remaining two. On appeal, the Calcutta High Court quashed the entire trial on the ground that the Special Judge had acted without jurisdiction because he failed to comply with the Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1952 (“the 1952 Rules”) framed under Section 549(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (“CrPC”).

The State of West Bengal obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 1952 Rules, framed under Section 549(1) CrPC, apply to a Special Judge trying Army personnel, thereby making compliance with those Rules mandatory.
  2. Whether the lapse of the three-year limitation period under Section 122 of the Army Act cures the Special Judge’s failure to follow the 1952 Rules and validates the trial.
  3. Whether a letter from a Brigadier requesting police investigation constituted an implied election by the Army authorities to have the case tried by an ordinary criminal court.
  4. Whether the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952—particularly Sections 8(3-A) and 11 making a Special Judge “deemed to be a Magistrate” for purposes of Section 549—applies within the State of West Bengal despite the existence of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — State of West Bengal

  • The 1952 Rules refer only to “Magistrates” and therefore do not bind a Special Judge; the trial was thus within jurisdiction.
  • Because more than three years had passed since the offences, Section 122 of the Army Act barred court-martial proceedings, making the Special Court the only forum left; hence any procedural lapse should be overlooked.
  • The Brigadier’s letter asking police to investigate showed that Army authorities opted for trial by an ordinary criminal court.
  • (New argument before the Supreme Court) Sections 8(3-A) and 11 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 are inapplicable in West Bengal due to the State’s own 1949 Special Courts Act; therefore a Special Judge in West Bengal is not “deemed to be a Magistrate” for Section 549 purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 Held that the 1952 Rules did not originally cover Special Judges because the text mentioned only “Magistrates.” Cited to explain why Parliament later inserted Section 8(3-A) in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, thereby extending the Rules to Special Judges.
Delhi Special Police Establishment v. Lt. Col. S.K. Loraiya, (1972) 2 SCC 692 Section 549 CrPC and the 1952 Rules are mandatory; without compliance, an ordinary criminal court lacks initial jurisdiction despite limitation issues under the Army Act. Relied upon to reject the State’s limitation argument and affirm that non-compliance with the Rules vitiates the entire trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Applicability of the 1952 Rules to a Special Judge. Parliament addressed the Barsay loophole by enacting Section 8(3-A) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, which expressly deems a Special Judge to be a “Magistrate” for purposes of Sections 350 and 549 CrPC. Consequently, the mandatory procedure in Rules 3 and 4 of the 1952 Rules applies equally to Special Judges.

2. Effect of the Army Act’s three-year limitation. Following Loraiya, the Court held that Section 122’s limitation period concerns only the jurisdiction of a court-martial after a charge is tabled; it does not retroactively confer jurisdiction on an ordinary criminal court that never complied with the 1952 Rules. Initial jurisdiction is lacking, and the trial is void ab initio.

3. Alleged implied election by Army authorities. The Brigadier’s letter merely sought police assistance in investigation and asked for a detailed report. An election between court-martial and criminal court occurs only after investigation, through the mechanism set out in Rules 3 and 4. Because those Rules were not invoked, no valid election occurred.

4. Territorial applicability in West Bengal. Section 13 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1949 expressly excludes only Sections 6–10 of the Central 1952 Act; Sections 8(3-A) and 11 remain operative. The State statute contains no provisions dealing with Army personnel or Section 549 procedures, so no repugnancy arises. Therefore, Sections 8(3-A) and 11 apply in West Bengal, making the 1952 Rules mandatory before any Special Court there as well.

5. Resulting conclusion. Because the Special Judge failed to follow a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite, the entire trial—including conviction and acquittals—is null and void.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order quashing the Special Court proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

Implications: The judgment reinforces that, nationwide—including in West Bengal—Special Judges must comply with the 1952 Rules before trying service personnel for offences triable by both court-martial and criminal courts. Failure to do so nullifies the proceedings, regardless of perceived practical difficulties such as statutory limitation under military law. No new precedent is created, but the decision re-affirms and applies existing Supreme Court authority, ensuring uniform procedural safeguards for members of the Armed Forces.

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    Superintendent And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Usha Ranjan Roy Choudhury And Another

    M.P Thakkar, J.— The validity of the trial of three Army officers is in question.

    2. The High Court has taken the view that the learned Judge presiding over the Special Court had acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case and proceeding with the trial of three Army officers resulting in the conviction of one of them, and the acquittal of the remaining two and has quashed the proceedings. The question which calls for determination in these two allied appeals by special leave preferred by the State of West Bengal is whether the High Court was right in doing so.

    3. The following facts are not in dispute:

    (1) Three accused persons who were tried by the Judge presiding over the Fourth Additional Special Court, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the learned trial Judge for the sake of brevity) were Army officers. They were charged with offences in respect of which the ordinary criminal court and the court-martial both had concurrent jurisdiction.
    (2) The learned trial Judge had failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Courts and Court Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1952 (referred to as Rules hereinafter) framed under Section 549(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (CrPC).

    4. The following contentions were urged before the High Court on behalf of the State with a view to substantiate the contention that the learned trial Judge had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and that the trial was not null and void notwithstanding the fact that the procedure prescribed by the Rules had not been followed.

    (1) The rules framed under Section 549(1) of CrPC were not attracted inasmuch as the rules applied to Magistrates and not to a Judge presiding over a Special Court.
    (2) Having regard to the provision contained in Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950, which prescribes a period of limitation of three years, which period had already elapsed during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, the court-martial would have no jurisdiction to try the accused and that the trial held by the learned trial Judge could not be said to have been vitiated in view of this circumstance.
    (3) In view of a letter addressed by the Brigadier of the Division concerned to the police officer for investigating the offences, it can be said by necessary implication that the Army authorities had opted for the trial of the case by the ordinary civil (sic criminal) court.

    5. The High Court repelled all the three contentions, allowed the appeal of the officer who was convicted, and dismissed the appeal of the State calling into question the acquittal of the remaining two.

    6. Besides reiterating the same three contentions before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant has raised a new point which was not urged before the High Court. We propose to deal with the submissions which were urged in the High Court before coming to grips with the new point sought to be raised by ths learned counsel for the appellant State.

    7. For a proper appreciation of the first point, a quick look at the statutory provisions and the position emerging therefrom is called for. In regard to the offences which fall within the purview of Section 70 of the Army Act of 1950, an offender can be tried only by court-martial whereas in regard to offences falling within the purview of Section 52 of the said Act, the offences can be tried both by the ordinary criminal court as also by the court-martial both of which have concurrent jurisdiction. The offences with which the concerned accused were charged before the learned trial Judge were offences which fell within the scope of Section 52 of the Army Act of 1950 and accordingly the ordinary criminal court as also the court material had concurrent jurisdiction. In order to avoid any conflict of jurisdiction between the criminal court and the court-martial in regard to offenders who are charged with having committed offences which fall under the purview of Section 52 of the Army Act, 1950, Section 549(i) of CrPC provides that Central Government may make Rules consistent with CrPC and the Army Act. In pursuance of this provision contained in Section 549(1) CrPC the Central Government has framed rules known as Criminal Courts and Court Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1952. Rule 3 of the said Rules requires that when a person subject to Military, Naval or Air Force law is brought before a Magistrate on accusation of an offence for which he is liable to be tried by court-martial also the Magistrate shall not proceed with the case unless he is requested to do so by the appropriate military authority. On a combined reading of Rules 3 and 4 1898 (5 of 1898), it is evident that in case the Magistrate is of the opinion that he should proceed with the case without there being any such request from the appropriate military authority, the concerned Magistrate is enioined to give notice to the commanding officer in this behalf. Till the expiry of seven days from the service of such notice on the commanding officer, the Magistrate is prohibited from taking any order of conviction or acquittal or framing any charges or committing the accused. It is in the background of these provisions that the High Court has taken the view that compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Rules is a mandatory requirement and that any proceedings undertaken by the learned trial Judge without compliance with the aforesaid mandatory procedure would vitiate the trial before the ordinary criminal court and the entire proceedings would be rendered null and void. Faced with this situation, counsel for the State contended before the High Court that the procedure embodied in Section 549(1) of the CrPC and Rules framed thereunder was applicable only to the court presided over by a Magistrate and not to a Judge presiding over a Special Court. This contention was negatived by the High Court. And it has now been reiterated before us, it being an admitted position that the prescribed procedure has not been followed by the learned trial Judge in the case giving rise lo the present appeals. This argument was possibly inspired by a point debated in Major E.G Barsay v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1762, (1962) 2 SCR 195, 1961 (2) Cri LJ 828. The view was taken therein that inasmuch as the aforesaid Rules refer to a Magistrate the Rules were not attracted with regard to a trial before a Special Judge. It was presumably on account of this decision that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 was amended by incorporating Sections 8(3-A) and 11, reading as under:

    “8. (3-A) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the provisions of Sections 350 and 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge, and for the purposes of the said provisions a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate.
    11. Military, naval and air force lawf not to be affected.— (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction exercisable by, or the procedure applicable to, any court or other authority under any military, naval or air force law.”
    This amendment was effected by virtue of Central Act 22 of 1966. Having regard to the provision contained in Section 8(3-A) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 as it now stands it is clear that a Special Judge is deemed to be a Magistrate for the purposes of the Rules framed under Section 549(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the end in view to eschew the conflict between court-martial on the one hand and the ordinary criminal courts on the other. The High Court was therefore perfectly justified in repelling this contention urged on behalf of the appellant State, albeit on a reasoning which is somewhat obscure. Confronted by this situation counsel for the appellant State has raised a new point to which a reference was made in the earlier part of the judgment. The new point which has been so raised is that Sections 8(3-A) and 11 quoted hereinabove which were incorporated by Central Act 2 of 1958 as further amended by Central Act 22 of 1966 were not applicable to the State of West Bengal from where the matter giving rise to the present appeals stems. Since no such arguments was advanced before the High Court, initially, we were reluctant to permit counsel to raise this new point. But having regard to the fact that it goes to the root of the matter we have permitted counsel to urge this contention. We will however deal with it after exhausting all the points which were urged before the High Court.

    8. The next point which was unsuccessfully urged before the High Court was in the context of Section 122 of the Army Act of 1950 which prescribes a period of limitation of three years. The High Court did not accede to the submission, in this behalf having regard to the law enunciated by this Court in Delhi Special Police Establishment v. Lt. Col. S.K Loraiya (1972) 2 SCC 692, AIR 1972 SC 2548, (1973) 1 SCR 1010. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right. This Court in the aforesaid case has taken the view to the effect that the question being essentially one of the initial jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal court on the one hand and the court-martial on the other, unless the procedure prescribed by the rules is complied with the ordinary criminal court would not have initial jurisdiction in regard to the matter, as is evident from the following passage: [, SCC (Cri) p. 1103, paras 6 to 9]

    “It is an admitted fact in this case that the procedure specified in Rule 3 was not followed by the Special Judge, Gauhati before framing of charges against the respondent. Section 549(1) CrPC and Rule 3 under which charges were framed are mandatory. Accordingly the charges framed by the Special Judge against the respondent cannot survive. But counsel for the appellant has urged before us that in the particular circumstances of this case the respondent is not ‘liable to be tried’ by a court-martial.
    Section 122(1) of the Army Act, 1950, provides that no trial by court-martial of any person subject to the Army Act for any offence shall be commenced after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of the offence. The offences are alleged to have been committed by the respondent in November-December, 1962. So more than three years have expired from the alleged commission of the offence. It is claimed that having regard to Section 122(1), the respondent is not liable to be tried by court-martial.
    This argument is built on the phrase ‘is liable to be tried either by the court to which this Code applies or by a court-martial in Section 549(1). According to counsel for the appellant this phrase connotes that the ordinary criminal court as well as the court-martial should not only have concurrent initial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case but should also retain jurisdiction to try him up to the last stage of conviction or acquittal. We are unable to accept this construction of the phrase.
    As regards the trial of offences committed by army men. the Army Act draws a threefold scheme. Certain offences enumerated in the Army Act are exclusively triable by a court-martial; certain other offences are exclusively triable by the ordinary criminal courts; and certain other offences are triable both by the ordinary criminal court and the court-martial. In respect of the last category both the courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Section 549(1) CrPC is designed to avoid the conflict of jurisdiction in respect of the last category of offences. The clause ‘for which he is liable to be tried either by the court to which this Code applies or by a court-martial’ in our view, qualifies the preceding clause ‘when any person is charged with an offence’ in Section 549(1). Accordingly the phrase ‘is liable to be tried either by a court to which this Code applies or a court-martial’ imports that the offence for which the accused is to be tried should be an offence of which cognizance can be taken by an ordinary criminal court as well as a court-martial. In our opinion, the phrase is intended to refer to the initial jurisdiction of the two courts to take cognizance of the case and not to their jurisdiction to decide it on merits. It is admitted that both the ordinary criminal court and the court-martial have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to the offences for which the respondent has been charged by the Special Judge. So, Section 549 and the rules made thereunder are attracted to the case at hand”.

    9. Having regard to the enunciation of law to this effect it is evident that the ordinary criminal court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and to try the accused in a matter where the procedure prescribed by the Rules has not been complied with. The initial lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the case would of logical necessity vitiate the trial and the order of conviction and sentence would be liable to be quashed as a result thereof. We are therefore unable to accede to the submission urged on behalf of the appellant State that even if the Rules are applicable, having regard to the fact that more than three years have expired from the date of the commission of the alleged offence, the trial is not vitiated.

    10. The last contention raised before the High Court was that having regard to the fact that the investigation which preceded the lodging of the complaint before the learned trial Judge was commenced in pursuance of a letter written by the Brigadier of the Division, which contained a request for investigation by the police into alleged offences, it can be said that the Army authorities had opted for the trial of the accused person by the ordinary criminal court. The argument was that by necessary implication this would follow as a logical corollary. The High Court brushed aside this contention as untenable, taking into account the contents of the letter in question. The said letter was in the following terms:

    “Dear Sir,

    (1) Please refer to Memo No. 8940 dated August 28, 1963 from Shri R.K Bhattacharyya, Superintendent of Police, DEB, Darjeeling.

    (2) At Appendix ‘A’ please find a copy of the investigation that had been carried by us. We request you to take over the case and submit your detailed report to us at your earliest convenience.”

    The High Court relied on the fact that the Army had called for a detailed report by the police which would show that the Army authorities had not taken any such decision either expressly or by necessary implication. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to press this point with any vigour for the obvious reason that it relates to the stage of investigation preceding the complaint. The question regarding exercise of jurisdiction by the court-martial would arise only after the investigation was completed and the police report was available. What is more, it is only after the prescribed procedure under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules is resorted to by the ordinary criminal court that the question of exercising an option can arise. In the present matter, admittedly the procedure prescribed by the Rules was not followed. Under the circumstances it is futile to contend that the Army authorities had voluntarily abandoned their option to try the accused person in the court-martial. There is no substance in the plea and it has been rightly repelled by the High Court.

    11. At long last, we come to the last point, the point which was not urged before the High Court but which we have permitted the learned counsel for the State to raise before us. It is argued that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 was not applicable to the State of West Bengal inasmuch as the State of West Bengal had enacted an Act of its own known as West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 which was in operation throughout the whole of West Bengal. No doubt it is true that criminal law is a subject which falls within the scope of Entry 1 of List III (Concurrent List) embodied in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Union Government as well as the State Government both can therefore legislate in regard to criminal law. The contention that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 enacted by the Parliament of India is not applicable to the State of West Bengal is altogether misconceived. It is necessary to advert to the legislative history for a proper appreciation of the point at issue. In 1938 the Government of India had enacted the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1938. In 1949 the State of West Bengal introduced the State legislation being the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 (West Bengal Act). This Act was further amended after the enforcement of the Constitution of India by incorporating Section 13 in 1953. The said Section 13 has great significance from the standpoint of the present argument:

    “13. Certain sections of Act 46 of 1952, not to apply to West Bengal—Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to West Bengal.”
    It will thus be seen that Section 13 of the West Bengal Act in terms accords recognition to the applicability of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 except and save some of the sections, namely, Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 thereof which as provided in Section 13 shall not apply and shall be never deemed to have applied to West Bengal. It is implicit in Section 13 of the West Bengal Act that the Central Act, namely, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 is applicable to the State of West Bengal except and save the aforesaid five sections. There can be no doubt or debate about this position having regard to the fact that criminal law is a subject which falls under the Concurrent List and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 enacted by the Parliament is applicable subject to inconsistency, if any, between the said Act and the West Bengal Act. So far as the coverage of the present point is concerned, there is no such inconsistency. The West Bengal Act does not contain any provision pertaining to personnel governed by the Army Act. It is altogether silent in regard to the matter pertaining to the procedure to be followed in regard to Army personnel from the perspective of Section 549 CrPC and the rules framed under the authority thereof. There is thus no conflict between the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 and the West Bengal Act insofar as this matter is concerned. Such being the position the provision contained in Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 with a special eye on the procedure to be followed in Section 8(3-A) and Section 11 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 will operate in this sphere without any let or hindrance. And inasmuch as Section 8(3-A) in terms provides that the provision of Section 549 CrPC shall so far as may be applied to the proceeding before the Special Judge and that for the purposes of that provision a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate, the said provisions remain fully alive and unaffected by the West Bengal Act. In view of this provision the procedure prescribed by Section 549 CrPC read with the rules framed thereunder which have been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment will be applicable to a proceeding before a Special Judge in West Bengal as well. Insofar as the Army personnel are concerned therefore the law governing them and the procedure required to be followed in their case would be the same in West Bengal as elsewhere in India as it should be. It may incidentally be mentioned that in the West Bengal Act also the Judge presiding over the Special Court is called a Special Judge (vide Schedule to the West Bengal Act). He would therefore be deemed to be a Magistrate for the purposes of the Rules in view of Section 8(3-A) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952. The mandatory procedure prescribed by the Rules is accordingly obligatory even in respect of proceedings before a Special Court under the West Bengal Act. There is thus no substance in this point. We are of the opinion that this feeble and faint-hearted attempt is born out of desperation and deserves no more consideration. We have therefore no hesitation in negativing this plea. No other point has been urged. The appeal must therefore fail. But before we write “finis” it may be made clear that the acquittal rendered by the High Court is on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Special Judge who tried the case in the Special Court and not on merits. The expression “acquitted” has been employed by the High Court though it was sufficient to say no more than this, that the order of conviction and sentence was without jurisdiction and was therefore being quashed. In the eye of law, it is not an acquittal since it is not on merits. It is therefore for the competent authority to decide whether or not to subject the accused to a fresh trial after following the procedure prescribed by the Rules. With these observations, we dismiss the appeal.

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