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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1981 INSC 173
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Act
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Article 22(5) of the Constitution
  • Sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution
  • Section 12 of the Act (sub-section (1))
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980
  • Article 19 of the Constitution
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1981 INSC 173
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Act
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
  • Article 22(5) of the Constitution
  • Sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution
  • Section 12 of the Act (sub-section (1))
  • Section 13 of the Act
  • Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980
  • Article 19 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 by an order of the District Magistrate, Dhanbad dated 30 April 1981. The three grounds of detention were served on 1 May 1981 and the State Government approved the detention on 7 May 1981. Pursuant to Section 10 of the Act the matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 19 May 1981.

The petitioner submitted a representation against his detention on 31 May 1981 through the Jail Superintendent. The Home (Special) Department received it on 5 June 1981, sought comments from the District Magistrate on 10 June 1981, and received those comments on 24 June 1981. The Advisory Board considered the matter on 29 June 1981, opined that the detention was justified, and the State Government confirmed the order and fixed a period of one year.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government’s failure to consider the petitioner’s representation promptly and independently, and its decision to wait for the Advisory Board’s report, amounted to a violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, thereby rendering the detention order invalid.
  2. Whether the first two grounds of detention were “stale” and lacked continuity, and whether non-supply of relied-upon documents vitiated the detention (issues raised but not adjudicated due to the court’s decision on Issue 1).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The State Government did not itself consider the representation, violating the mandate of Article 22(5).
  • The first two grounds of detention related to past events and did not show a continuing threat.
  • The documents relied upon in the grounds of detention were not furnished to him, undermining his right to make an effective representation.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The representation was received only on 5 June 1981, not on 13 May 1981 as alleged, and procedural steps—including obtaining the District Magistrate’s comments—were necessary before consideration.
  • The representation, the District Magistrate’s comments and the Advisory Board’s report were all examined on 30 June 1981, and the Chief Minister approved detention on 1 July 1981, indicating that the representation was indeed considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B.B. Gujral, (1979) 2 SCC 637; (1979) 2 SCR 315 The Government has a two-fold obligation: (i) independent and prompt consideration of the detenu's representation, and (ii) forwarding of the representation to the Advisory Board. Relied on to hold that these two obligations are distinct and must both be fulfilled separately and expeditiously.
Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty v. State of W.B., (1969) 3 SCC 400; (1970) 1 SCR 543 Same two-fold obligation under Article 22(5); delay or non-consideration infringes the constitutional right. Cited to reinforce that failure to meet the first obligation vitiates the detention order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated that Article 22(5) imposes a dual duty on the appropriate government: (i) to afford and promptly consider the detenu’s representation, and (ii) to place that representation before the Advisory Board. These duties are independent of each other.

Examining the chronology, the Court found three unexplained periods of official inactivity—5 days (5–10 June), 14 days (10–24 June) and 5 days (24–29 June)—totalling 24 days. This demonstrated that the State Government awaited the Advisory Board’s opinion before itself applying its mind, thereby abdicating its independent obligation.

Such deferment constituted “clear non-compliance” with Article 22(5). As non-consideration or unreasonable delay in considering a representation invalidates preventive detention, the detention order could not stand. In light of this finding, the Court declined to examine the additional grounds regarding staleness of allegations and non-supply of documents.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: The writ petition is allowed; the detention order is quashed and the detenu is to be released forthwith.

Implications: The decision reinforces the constitutional mandate that a detenu’s representation must be considered promptly and independently of Advisory Board proceedings. While it does not create new precedent, it underscores administrative diligence as a prerequisite for valid preventive detention and reaffirms the two-fold obligation articulated in earlier Supreme Court rulings.

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    Rahamatullah v. State Of Bihar And Another

    Baharul Islam, J.— This is a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by the petitioner who has been detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter “the Act”). The facts material for the purpose of disposal of this petition and not disputed before us may be stated thus.

    2. The order of detention was passed by the District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar, on April 30, 1981. The grounds of detention which were three in number were served on the petitioner on May 1, 1981 and the State Government approved the order of detention on May 7, 1981. In pursuance of Section 10 of the Act, the State Government referred the matter to the Advisory Board constituted under the Act on May 19, 1981. The petitioner submitted his representation against this detention on May 31, 1981. A copy of the representation was sent to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board by its report dated June 29, 1981 gave its opinion that there was sufficient ground for the detention of the petitioner and on receipt of the report, the State Government, in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act confirmed the detention of the petitioner and under Section 13 of the Act directed the detention of the petitioner for a period of one year.

    3. The first contention of Mr R.K Garg, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that the State Government did not consider the representation submitted by the petitioner and thereby violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution. In the counter-affidavit, the respondents have stated, “since the Advisory Board was going to consider this case on June 29, 1981, the comments of the District Magistrate were kept handy for use during the sitting of the Board. The report of the Board was received by the Government after office hours on June 29, 1981. The next morning i.e on June 30, 1981, the report of the Advisory Board as well as the representation of the petitioner was examined by the office and the file was endorsed to the Chief Minister on July 1, 1981 by the Special Secretary of the Home (Special) Department suggesting that “in view of the report of the Advisory Board, the detention of Shri Rahamatullah may be confirmed and be directed to be detained for a period of twelve months”.

    4. Before we consider the first submission of learned Counsel, a few more facts need be stated. In the writ petition, the petitioner alleged that he had submitted the representation on May 13, 1981 which fact was denied by the respondents in their counter-affidavit; they asserted that the representation was submitted not on May 13, but on May 31. This has not been controverted before us by Mr Garg. It has further been stated in the counter-affidavit — and not denied by the petitioner — that the petitioner submitted the representation to the Superintendent of the District Jail, Dhanbad, where he was detained; the Superintendent, District Jail, sent it by registered post on the following day, namely, June 1, and the Home (Special) Department of the Government received it on June 5. It has been stated further in the counter-affidavit that “the representation contained certain points which needed a report” from the District Magistrate. A copy of the representation was sent on June 10, to the District Magistrate, Dhanbad, through a special messenger, for comments, which were received on June 24. The respondents explained that since the Advisory Board was going to sit for consideration of the petitioner's case on June 29, they sent the representation of the petitioner to the Advisory Board for consideration and placed the comments of the District Magistrate before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board's report was received on June 29 and the following day, the Home Department “examined” the representation as well as the opinion of the Advisory Board on June 30, and endorsed the file on July 1 to the Chief Minister who approved the detention. But the respondents have not explained their inaction during (i) the period of five days from June 5 to June 10 taken by the Home Department to send the representation to the District Magistrate for his comments; (ii) the period of fourteen days from June 10 to June 24 taken by the District Magistrate to send his comments and (iii) the period of five days from June 24 to June 29 taken by the Home Department in placing the District Magistrate's comments before the Advisory Board and placing the matter before the Chief Minister. Thus the total period of inaction of the respondents is twenty-four days.

    5. The normal rule of law is that when a person commits an offence or a number of offences, he should be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the normal appropriate criminal law; but if he is sought to be detained under any of the preventive detention laws as may often be necessary to prevent further commission of such offences, then the provisions of Article 22(5) must be complied with. Sub-article (5) of Article 22 reads:

    “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.”

    6. This sub-article provides, inter alia, that the detaining authority shall as soon as may be communicate the grounds of detention and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The opportunity of making a representation is not for nothing. The representation, if any, submitted by the detenu is meant for consideration by the appropriate authority without any unreasonable delay, as it involves the liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. The non-consideration or an unreasonably belated consideration of the representation tantamounts to non-compliance of sub-article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution.

    7. The law is well-settled that in case of preventive detention of a citizen, the obligation of the appropriate government is two-fold: (i) to afford the detenu the opportunity to make a representation and to consider the representation which may result in the release of the detenu, and (ii) to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation of the detenu along with other materials to the Board to enable it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. The former is distinct from the latter. As there is a two-fold obligation of the appropriate government, so there is a two-fold right in favour of the detenu to have his representation considered by the appropriate government and to have the representation once again considered by the Government in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board for the purpose of giving its opinion. (See Narendra Purshotam Umrao v.B.B Gujral (1979) 2 SCC 637, (1979) 2 SCR 315 and Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. (1969) 3 SCC 400, (1970) 1 SCR 543)

    8. In the instant case, the State Government did not discharge the first of the two-fold obligation and waited till the receipt of the Advisory Board's opinion. There was, as pointed out above, an unexplained period of twenty-four days of non-consideration of the representation. This shows there was no independent consideration of the representation by the State Government; on the contrary they deferred its consideration till they received the report of the Advisory Board. This is clear non-compliance of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground alone.

    9. Mr Garg raised two other contentions before us; namely (i) that the first two of the three grounds of detention were stale and the grounds showed no continuity of the alleged activities of the detenu; and (ii) that the documents relied on by the detaining authority in the grounds were not furnished to the detenu. In view of the fact that we are quashing the order of detention on the first ground, we need not examine these two contentions.

    10. The petition is allowed. The order of detention is quashed. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith.

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    Comments

    Rahamatullah v. State Of Bihar And Another
    (Sep 28, 1981)