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  • Article 311(1) of the Constitution
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Disposition
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  • Article 311(1) of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Krishna Kumar (the appellant) joined the Indian Railways on 30 May 1966 as an Apprentice Mechanic (Electrical) after selection by the Railway Service Commission. Upon completion of training he became a Train Examiner (Electrical) and, on 11 July 1974, was promoted to Train Lighting Inspector at Nagpur by the Chief Electrical Engineer (CEE), a designated Head of Department. On 31 August 1976 the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer (Respondent 1) removed him from service.

The appellant challenged the removal in Writ Petition No. 4260 of 1976 before the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), which summarily dismissed the petition on 21 October 1976. He then sought special leave before the Supreme Court. After directing the Union of India to clarify who appointed and who removed the appellant, the Court granted special leave on 3 April 1978, leading to the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant was removed by an authority “subordinate to that by which he was appointed” in contravention of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether a subsequent delegation of appointing power to the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer could retrospectively legitimise that officer’s power to remove the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • His appointment as Train Lighting Inspector was made by the Chief Electrical Engineer, a higher authority.
  • The removal order was passed by the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, who is indisputably lower in the official hierarchy, rendering the removal void under Article 311(1).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Paragraph 2 of Respondent 1’s affidavit stated that the power to appoint Train Lighting Inspectors had been delegated to several officers, including the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer.
  • Because the delegated authority could now make appointments, it was contended that the same officer possessed correlative power to remove incumbents from the post.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court anchored its analysis on Article 311(1), which guards civil servants against dismissal or removal by an authority lower than that which appointed them. It identified two incontrovertible facts: (i) the appellant was appointed by the Chief Electrical Engineer, and (ii) he was removed by the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer. The Court found no evidence that these two posts were equivalent; on the contrary, the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer was manifestly subordinate to the CEE.

Respondents’ reliance on delegated appointing power was rejected on two grounds:

  1. The relevant comparison for Article 311(1) is the organisational hierarchy at the moment of appointment, not subsequent administrative delegations.
  2. Delegation of certain powers to a subordinate does not elevate that subordinate’s rank; hierarchical status is distinct from functional authorisations.

Consequently, the removal order was held to breach the constitutional safeguard, rendering it void ab initio.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; removal order dated 31 August 1976 declared unconstitutional and set aside. The appellant is deemed to continue in service, subject to any lawful future action the Government may take. Respondents are directed to pay costs.

Implications: The decision reinforces the protective scope of Article 311(1), clarifying that subsequent delegations of appointing authority neither alter the hierarchical status of officers nor validate removals already effected by subordinate authorities. While creating no new precedent, it underscores that security of tenure for civil servants depends on the rank of the appointing authority at the time of appointment.

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    Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer And Others

    Y.V Chandrachud, C.J— The appellant, Krishna Kumar, was appointed on May 30, 1966 as .an Apprentice Mechanic (Electrical) after selection by the Railway Service Commission and on the completion of his training period, he was appointed as a Train Examiner (Electrical). On July 11, 1974 he was appointed as a Train Lighting Inspector, Nagpur under an order passed by the Chief Electrical Engineer. That the order of appointment was made by the C.E.E is undisputed and indeed there can be no controversy over it. The list of officers declared to be heads of departments shows that Chief Electrical Engineers are heads of their departments. By an order dated August 31, 1976, the appellant was removed from service by Respondent 1, the Divisional Assistant Engineer, Central Railway, Nagpur.

    2. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition (No. 4260 of 1976) in the Bombay High Court to challenge the order of removal. A Division Bench of the Nagpur Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petition summarily on October 21, 1976. Being aggrieved by that order the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

    3. The special leave petition came up before this Court on February 22, 1978 when a Bench consisting of Justice V.R Krishna Iyer and Justice Jaswant Singh adjourned the petition for four weeks in order to enable the respondents to file an affidavit stating as to (i) who appointed the petitioner, with special reference to the designation of the Officer who made the order of appointment, and (ii) who removed the petitioner from service, with special reference to the designation of that Officer. Pursuant to that direction, two affidavits were filed by Shri S.P Sarathy, Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway, Nagpur. The petitioner filed his rejoinder affidavit on February 20, 1978. On a consideration of these affidavits the court on April 3, 1978 granted special leave to the appellant to file this appeal.

    4. Article 311(1) of the Constitution provides that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The simple question for determination is whether, as alleged by the appellant, he was removed from service by an authority subordinate to that which had appointed him. The relevant facts are but these and these only: The appellant was appointed as a Train Lighting Inspector under an order issued by the Chief Electrical Engineer and was removed from service under an order passed by the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway, Nagpur. The narrow question, therefore, for consideration is whether the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer is subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer. None of the affidavits filed by Shri Sarathy, who passed the order of removal says that the post of Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer is equivalent to that of the Chief Electrical Engineer in the official hierarchy. That the former is not higher in rank than the latter is self-evident. In the circumstances, it seems clear that the appellant was removed from service by an authority which is subordinate in rank to that by which he was appointed.

    5. In defence of the legality of the order of removal, counsel for the respondents relies on para 2 of Respondent 1's affidavit, dated January 7, 1978, wherein he has stated that the power to make Appointments to the post of the Train Lighting Inspector was delegated to certain other officers including the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer. It is urged that since the Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer has been given the power to make appointments to the post of the Train Lighting Inspector, he would have the power to remove any person from that post. We cannot accept this contention. Whether or not an authority is subordinate in rank to another has to be determined with reference to the state of affairs existing on the date of appointment. It is at that point of time that the constitutional guarantee under Article 311(1) becomes available to the person holding, for example, a civil post under the Union Government that he shall not be removed or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him. The subsequent authorisation made in favour of Respondent 1 in regard to making appointments to the post held by the appellant cannot confer upon Respondent 1 the power to remove him. On the date of the appellant's appointment as a Train Lighting Inspector, Respondent 1 had no power to make that appointment. He cannot have, therefore, the power to remove him.

    6. Besides, delegation of the power to make a particular appointment does not enhance or improve the hierarchical status of the delegate. An Officer subordinate to another will not become his equal in rank by reason of his coming to possess some of the powers of that another. The Divisional Engineer, in other words, does not cease to be subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer merely because the latter's power to make appointments to certain posts has been delegated to him.

    7. Since the appellant was appointed by the Chief Electrical Engineer and has been removed from service by an order passed by Respondent 1 who, at any rate, was subordinate in rank to the Chief Electrical Engineer on the date of appellant's appointment, it must be held that Respondent 1 had no power to remove the appellant from service. The order of removal is in patent violation of the provisions of Article 311(1) of the Constitution.

    8. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and hold that the order dated August 31, 1976 passed by Respondent 1 removing the appellant from service is unconstitutional and, therefore, of no effect. The appellant must accordingly be deemed to continue in service until, if so advised, the government takes appropriate steps to bring his service to an end.

    9. Respondents will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellant.

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    Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer And Others
    (Jul 17, 1979)