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Disposition
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  • Section 3 of the Essential articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 3 of the Essential articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, acting under Section 3 of the Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, issued G.O. No. 187 dated 30 January 1955 enhancing electricity tariffs beyond the rates fixed in existing supply agreements with consumers. A group of high- and low-tension consumers, including the present appellants, challenged the order by filing writ petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

  • 22 February 1957 – A learned Single Judge (Satyanarayana Raju, J.) allowed the writ petitions and struck down G.O. No. 187.
  • 19 December 1958 – On appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, a Division Bench reversed the Single Judge and upheld the Government Order.
  • 1 April 1959 – The State’s electricity undertakings were transferred to the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB).
  • After the High Court’s appellate decision, APSEB issued bills that separated: (a) total liability at enhanced rates, (b) the amount payable immediately under a prospective Supreme Court injunction, and (c) arrears subject to a possible surcharge of 1 % per month.
  • 10 August 1959 – The Supreme Court granted the consumers an injunction restraining the Government from realising “arrears occasioned by the enhancement of rates,” conditional on security being furnished by the consumers. No restraint was placed on collection of current charges at the higher rate.
  • 25 March 1964 – The Supreme Court dismissed the consumers’ substantive appeals challenging G.O. No. 187.
  • Following dismissal, APSEB demanded surcharge at 12 % per annum on the arrears accumulated during the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings.
  • The consumers again approached the High Court. A Single Judge allowed their writ petitions, holding that no surcharge was leviable during the period covered by the Supreme Court’s injunction. A Division Bench reversed, holding the surcharge payable. The present two appeals challenge that Division Bench judgment.
  • In Civil Appeal No. 292 of 1970, the respondent Board was initially set ex parte for non-payment of court-fee; that order was later recalled.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the consumers committed “default” attracting surcharge under clause 9 of their supply agreements during the period in which the Supreme Court injunction restrained APSEB from realising arrears.
  2. Whether the contractual surcharge of 1 % per month (12 % per annum) is penal in nature and therefore unenforceable.
  3. Whether the post-injunction bills issued by APSEB constituted a valid demand for arrears so as to trigger liability for surcharge.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The Supreme Court’s injunction prevented any “default”; hence surcharge cannot be levied for the covered period.
  • The surcharge clause is penal; courts should not enforce a penalty.
  • APSEB’s bills issued after the High Court judgment did not call upon consumers to pay arrears, so no liability for surcharge arose.

Respondent Electricity Board’s Arguments

  • Clause 9 prescribes surcharge as compensated interest, not as a penalty.
  • The injunction merely barred coercive recovery; it did not suspend the consumers’ primary obligation to pay enhanced rates.
  • Surcharge was demanded only for the Supreme Court period because, unlike the earlier High Court stay, G.O. No. 187 remained operational; APSEB specifically notified consumers of potential surcharge in its bills.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Nature of the surcharge — interest, not penalty: Clause 9 of the agreement imposes “an additional charge of one per cent … for every month of delay.” The Court held that the stipulated rate (12 % p.a.) evidences compensation for delayed payment, not punishment. Therefore, the appellants cannot seek equitable relief against a penalty.

2. Effect of the Supreme Court injunction: The injunction restrained APSEB from realising arrears by coercive means; it did not stay G.O. No. 187 or the consumers’ contractual obligation to pay enhanced charges. Consumers were free to pay arrears voluntarily; had they done so, no surcharge would have accrued.

3. Selective surcharge claim: APSEB did not seek surcharge for the earlier High Court stay period because, at that time, operation of the Government Order itself was suspended. By contrast, during the Supreme Court proceedings G.O. No. 187 was operative; hence surcharge for that period is contractually due.

4. Validity of demand notices: Each bill issued after the injunction itemised (i) total liability including arrears, (ii) amount payable immediately, and (iii) arrears with a warning that, if the appeal failed, surcharge would be payable. Therefore, the contention that arrears were never demanded was rejected as factually untenable.

5. Conclusion: In the absence of payment within thirty days of receipt of bills, the consumers were in default under clause 9 and are liable to pay surcharge for the relevant period.

Holding and Implications

Appeals DISMISSED with costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench decision, obliging the consumers to pay surcharge at 12 % per annum on arrears accumulated during the pendency of their earlier Supreme Court appeals. The judgment settles the parties’ contractual liabilities but does not establish a new legal precedent beyond the specific interpretation of clause 9 of the supply agreement.

    Adoni Ginning Factory And Others v. Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad And Others

    O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.— These two appeals arise out of a batch of writ petitions which were allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, but, which, on appeal, were dismissed by a Division Bench of that court. The appellants were consumers of high and low tension electrical energy which was being supplied to them under agreements with the Government of Andhra Pradesh. By GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955 the Government of Andhra Pradesh, purporting to act in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the Essential articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, enhanced the rates of supply of electrical energy over and above the contracted rates. Several persons, including the appellants in the two appeals, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955. Pending disposal of the writ petitions they obtained stay of collection of enhanced charges. The writ petitions were finally allowed by Satyanarayana Raju, J., on February 22, 1957, and GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955 was struck down. The Government of Andhra Pradesh preferred appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeals were allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court on December 19, 1958, and GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955 was upheld. After the appeals were allowed by the Division Bench, the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, to whom the Government had transferred the Electricity Undertakings with effect from April 1, 1959, issued bills to the several consumers calling upon them to pay the arrears of enhanced charges. At this stage the consumers were not called upon to pay any surcharge on the arrears. Some of the consumers including the present appellants filed appeals in the Supreme Court and on August 10, 1959, obtained orders of injunction restraining the Government from realising from them the “amount of arrears occasioned by the enhancement of rates”. The injunction was subject to the condition that they offered security for such amount of arrears, intimation of which was directed to be given to them by the Government. There was no injunction restraining the Government from collecting future charges at the enhanced rates. The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board to whom (as we mentioned earlier) the Government had transferred its Electricity Undertakings duly issued bills to the consumers specifying separately the total amount (including arrears) which had to be paid at the enhanced rates, the amount which the consumer had necessarily to pay in view of the orders of the Supreme Court and the amount of arrears. Each consumer was expressly told that if his contentions were eventually rejected by the Supreme Court he would have to pay the amount of arrears with surcharge thereon calculated at two per cent per rupee per month. Two per cent was mistakenly mentioned for one per cent Though the appellants and others were thus expressly put on notice of the claim of the Electricity Board for payment of surcharge in the event of the appellants failing in their appeals in the Supreme Court, the appellants did not seek to get any clarification from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed all the appeals on March 25, 1964. Thereafter, the Electricity Board called upon the appellants and other consumers to pay surcharge at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on the arrears in regard to which they had obtained orders of injunction during the pendency of the appeals in the Supreme Court. Once again, the appellants and others filed writ petitions in the High Court questioning the demand of the Electricity Board for payment of surcharge. The writ petitions were allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on the ground that no surcharge was leviable for the period during which the order of injunction passed by the Supreme Court was in operation. The Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board preferred appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. They were allowed by a Division Bench first on the ground that the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board was not bound by the injunction granted against the Government of Andhra Pradesh, and, second, on the ground that in any case, the injunction did not prevent the consumers from paying enhanced charges and that if they failed to pay enhanced charges they were under an obligation to pay surcharge under the terms of the agreement. A few of the consumers have preferred these two appeals to this Court.

    2. Shri S.T Desai and Shri Naunitlal, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the appellants could not be penalized for non-payment of enhanced charges in the face of the order of injunction obtained by them. They argued that in view of the injunction no default had been committed by them. It was also said that the levy of surcharge was penal in nature and could not be enforced. It was further argued that the bills issued to them after the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court did not call upon them to pay the arrears and, therefore, there was no question of their becoming liable to pay any surcharge.

    3. We do not see any substance in any of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants. The provision for payment of surcharge is contained in clause 9 of the agreement. The relevant para of clause 9 is as follows:

    “ Every consumer shall pay the bill amount within thirty days of the date of receipt of the bill. In default of such payment, he shall pay an additional charge of one per cent on the amount of the bill for every month of delay or part thereof.”

    4. The very rate of levy of surcharge stipulated in the agreement, namely, one per cent per mensem i.e twelve per cent per annum, is a clear indication that the levy is not meant to be a penalty but is a provision for interest by way of compensation for delayed payment. There is, therefore, no question of relieving the appellants against any penalty.

    5. The primary submission of the learned counsel was that there was no default on the part of the appellants in view of the injunction granted by the Supreme Court. We are unable to agree. The injunction granted by this Court restrained the Government from realising the arrears of enhanced charges. For the purposes of these appeals we may proceed on the assumption that the order of injunction bound the Electricity Board also. All that the injunction did was to restrain the Board from realising the arrears which meant that the Board was restrained from taking any coercive action such as disconnection of supply of electricity etc. for the realisation of the arrears. The operation of GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955, as such, was not stayed. Thus the obligation of the consumers to pay charges at the enhanced rates was not suspended though the Electricity Board was prevented from realising the arrears. It was up to the consumers to pay or not to pay the arrears. If they paid the arrears they relieved themselves against the liability to pay surcharge. If they did not pay the arrears they were bound to pay the surcharge if they failed in the appeals before the Supreme Court. This was precisely what was pointed out by the Electricity Board in the bills issued to the consumers after the Supreme Court granted the injunction. We may mention here that the Electricity Board is not demanding any surcharge on the arrears for the period during which the Andhra Pradesh High Court had granted stay. It was explained by the learned counsel for the Electricity Board that no surcharge was claimed for that period as the operation of GO No. 187 dated January 30, 1955 had itself been stayed at that time. Surcharge was claimed for the period during which the appeals were pending in the Supreme Court since the Supreme Court did not stay the operation of GO No. 187 but only restrained the Board from collecting the arrears. That no stay of GO No. 187 was ever intended to be granted by the Supreme Court is also clear from the circumstance that there was no injunction restraining the Electricity Board from collecting future charges at the enhanced rates. The Electricity Board was, therefore, right in claiming surcharge for the period during which the appeals were pending in the Supreme Court and not claiming surcharge for the period during which the writ petitions and writ appeals were pending in the High Court.

    6. The submission that the bills issued by the Electricity Board did not call upon the appellants and others to pay the arrears is entirely without substance. Each of the bills mentions the total amount payable, including the arrears. The bill separately mentions the amount which the consumer may pay in view of the orders of the Supreme Court. The bill also mentions the amount of arrears which would have to be paid if the appeals were to be eventually rejected by the Supreme Court. The bill also informs the consumers that in the event of the rejection of the appeals by the Supreme Court surcharge will have to be paid. It is impossible to hold that the consumers were not called upon to pay the arrears. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs.

    7. It was brought to our notice that in Civil Appeal No. 292 of 1970, the respondent Electricity Board was set ex parte for failure to pay the requisite court-fee on the statement of case. The order of the Registrar is recalled and the respondent is permitted to pay the requisite court-fee on the statement of the case.

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    Adoni Ginning Factor... v. Secretary, Andhra Pr...
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