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1977 INSC 135
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Penal Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1977 INSC 135
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Penal Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Court tried multiple accused for murder. It convicted the appellant and two other accused, awarding life imprisonment to the two co-accused and a sentence of death to the appellant.

The High Court confirmed both the conviction and the death sentence imposed on the appellant. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 1976 by special leave. The challenge before the Supreme Court, as confined by Shri A.K. Sen for the appellant and by the terms of the limited leave granted, related only to the question of sentence, not to the conviction itself.

In parallel, Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 1976 was also before the Court, but it was ultimately dismissed as not pressed, with no further factual details provided in the text.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 (failure to give the convicted person an opportunity to be heard on the question of sentence), affects the validity of the conviction or only bears on the question of sentence in a murder case.
  2. In light of Section 235(2) CrPC and the facts of the case, whether the appellant should suffer the death penalty or have the sentence reduced to life imprisonment, given that two co-accused received life imprisonment and considering the surrounding circumstances of the offence.
  3. Whether, in a case of non-compliance with Section 235(2) CrPC by the trial court, it is necessary to remit the matter to the Sessions Court for a fresh hearing on sentence, or whether the appellate court can itself provide an opportunity consistent with Section 235(2) and determine the appropriate sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Through Shri A.K. Sen, the appellant confined the challenge to the question of sentence, accepting that the conviction for murder stood proved.
  • Shri Sen submitted that the death sentence had been inflicted nearly two years earlier and that the prolonged agony of living under a sentence of death had been an excruciating experience for the appellant, which ought to be treated as a mitigating factor when considering whether to maintain the death penalty or substitute life imprisonment.

Respondent's / Prosecution's Position

  • Counsel for the parties, including the prosecution, agreed before the Supreme Court that they would rely upon the materials already available on the record and that they had nothing further to place before the Court on the question of sentence.
  • No further detailed arguments from the prosecution side are recorded in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190 The hearing contemplated by Section 235(2) CrPC:
  • Is not confined merely to oral submissions.
  • Extends to giving both the prosecution and the accused an opportunity to place before the court facts and materials relating to various factors bearing on the question of sentence.
  • If such facts or materials are contested, the parties must be allowed to produce evidence to establish them.
  • In that case, the matter was remitted to the Sessions Court for compliance with Section 235(2).
The Court relied on this precedent to explain the scope and purpose of Section 235(2) CrPC and to underscore that a real and substantive opportunity on sentence must be provided. It then considered whether, in the present case, remitting the matter to the Sessions Court was necessary or whether the appellate court itself could, in appropriate circumstances, effectively comply with the spirit of Section 235(2) by allowing the parties to rely on the existing record and any further materials they wished to adduce. The Court concluded that, to avoid expense, delay, and prejudice to justice, it was appropriate in this case for the appellate court itself to deal with the question of sentence rather than remanding the matter.
E. Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 443 Cited as part of the line of decisions establishing that:
  • The death sentence is to be awarded where there are aggravating factors justifying the extreme penalty.
The Court invoked this decision to reiterate that the death penalty should be reserved for cases marked by aggravating features—such as acts that are particularly brutal or depraved, or otherwise merit the highest penalty. It then measured the facts of the present case against this standard and, considering the absence of clear aggravating circumstances and the disparity between the sentences of the appellant and his co-accused, concluded that life imprisonment, not death, was appropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that the appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 1976, was confined exclusively to the question of sentence. The conviction for murder had been concurrently found by the Sessions Court and the High Court, and this aspect was not in issue before the Supreme Court.

The Court examined Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974, which it described as a departure from the previous Code, introduced on humanist considerations to personalise the sentence to be awarded. The object of Section 235(2), as articulated by the Court, is to provide a fresh opportunity to the convicted person to bring to the court's notice circumstances that may assist in determining an appropriate sentence, having regard to personal, social, and other relevant factors.

The Court added that where a person is convicted under Section 302 IPC and only the statutory minimum sentence is imposed, the question of affording an opportunity under Section 235(2) CrPC would not arise. This indicates that the obligation to hear the accused on sentence under Section 235(2) is functionally significant only where the court is considering a sentence above the minimum, such as the death penalty in a murder case.

The Court then recorded that in the present case it was admitted that no opportunity had been given to the appellant under Section 235(2) CrPC to show cause why the lesser sentence of life imprisonment should not be imposed instead of death. The Court made it “absolutely clear” that such a failure would not affect the conviction “under any circumstances”; it was relevant only to the question of sentence. Even as to sentence, in a murder case where the charge of murder is made out, the issue is confined to choosing between the two sentences prescribed by the Penal Code—death or life imprisonment.

In this context, the Court referred to Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, which had explained that the hearing under Section 235(2) is not limited to oral argument but includes an opportunity for both sides to place materials and, if contested, adduce evidence on sentencing factors. The Supreme Court noted that in Santa Singh it had remitted the matter to the Sessions Court for compliance with Section 235(2). However, the Court observed that in many cases such remittal could lead to additional expense, delay, and potential prejudice to the cause of justice.

The Court therefore reasoned that, in appropriate cases, an appellate court may itself provide the opportunity contemplated by Section 235(2) CrPC by allowing the parties before it to place whatever materials they wish on the question of sentence, instead of sending the matter back to the trial court. This approach, the Court noted, may save time and help produce prompt justice.

Applying this reasoning to the present case, the Court stated that it proposed to adopt the appellate-level course. Counsel for the parties agreed that they would rely upon the materials already on record and that they had nothing further to offer on sentencing. In such circumstances, the Court held that it would be an “idle formality” to remit the case to the Sessions Court merely to reconsider sentence.

Turning to the merits of the appropriate sentence, the Court considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the factual circumstances reflected in the record:

  • The Court was impressed by the submission of Shri A.K. Sen that the death sentence had been imposed nearly two years earlier and that the appellant had suffered the excruciating agony of living under a death sentence for a long period. The Court acknowledged this as a relevant factor, though it cautioned that this circumstance alone might not justify reduction of the death sentence if the act was otherwise too brutal, depraved, or merited the highest penalty.
  • The Court recalled that its earlier decisions, including E. Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, had established that the death penalty should be imposed where there are aggravating factors warranting such extreme punishment.
  • Examining the record, the Court noted that the appellant had two other assailants with him at the time of the incident, and they had been sentenced only to life imprisonment. This raised a question of sentencing parity and whether there was a sufficient basis to single out the appellant for the harsher penalty.
  • The Court further observed that there had been an exchange of abuse between Shiv Singh and the accused party, suggesting an altercation context rather than a cold-blooded or premeditated attack.
  • It was “apparent” from the record that the appellant had no motive to kill the innocent child who died, though this circumstance had influenced the courts below in awarding the capital sentence. The Supreme Court’s analysis implied that, while the death of the child was a grave outcome, the absence of motive to target the child weighed against treating the case as one meriting the death penalty.
  • The Court concluded that the other circumstances present in the record did not disclose any particular reason why the appellant, as opposed to his co-accused, should receive the severer sentence of death.

On this cumulative assessment, the Court was satisfied that the ends of justice would be adequately served by substituting a sentence of life imprisonment for the appellant in place of the death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court.

As for Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 1976, the Court simply recorded that it was dismissed as not pressed, without further analysis.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • In Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 1976, the Supreme Court:
    • Maintained the appellant’s conviction for murder; the validity of the conviction was expressly held to be unaffected by the failure to comply with Section 235(2) CrPC.
    • Set aside the sentence of death imposed by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court.
    • Substituted a sentence of life imprisonment in place of the death sentence.
    • Allowed the appeal to this extent, i.e., limited to the modification of the sentence.
  • Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 1976 was dismissed as not pressed.

Implications:

The decision clarifies that non-compliance with Section 235(2) CrPC does not vitiate the conviction but is relevant only to sentencing, especially in cases like murder where the court must choose between life imprisonment and death. It also recognizes that appellate courts, in suitable cases and with the parties’ consent, can themselves afford an opportunity consistent with Section 235(2) and proceed to determine sentence without remanding the matter to the trial court, thereby avoiding unnecessary delay and expense.

On the substantive question of sentence, the Court’s ruling underscores that the death penalty should be reserved for cases with clear aggravating factors and that sentencing must consider parity with co-accused, the presence or absence of motive, the context of the incident, and the suffering already endured under a death sentence. The decision primarily affects the parties before the Court by commuting the appellant’s sentence to life imprisonment and does not purport to lay down any new general legal rule beyond applying and reiterating existing principles.

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    Tarlok Singh v. State Of Punjab .

    V.R Krishna Iyer, J.— In Criminal Appeal 337 of 1976 by special leave Shri A.K Sen has confined his challenge — indeed leave itself was limited — to the question of sentence. The case of murder was proved and the conviction by the Sessions Court was confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions Judge awarded life imprisonment to two accused and death sentence to the appellant. The High Court confirmed the death sentence and hence this appeal.

    2. Section 235 CrPC 1974 makes a departure from the previous Code on account of humanist considerations to personalise the sentence to be awarded. The object of the provision is to give a fresh opportunity to the convicted person to bring to the notice of the Court such circumstances as may help the Court in awarding an appropriate sentence having regard to the personal, social and other circumstances of the case. Of course, when it is a case of conviction under Section 302 IPC if the minimum sentence is imposed the question of providing an opportunity under Section 235 would not arise.

    3. In this case it is admitted that no opportunity was given under Section 235(2) CrPC to the appellant to show cause as to why the lesser sentence of life imprisonment should not be inflicted. We may make it absolutely clear that such a failure will not affect the conviction under any circumstances. The only point is relevant to sentence. Even there, in a murder case where the charge of murder is made out, the limited question is as between the two sentences prescribed under the Penal Code.

    4. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 this Court considering Section 235(2) CrPC held that the hearing contemplated by that sub-section is not confined merely to hearing oral submissions but extends to giving an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused to place before the Court facts and materials relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence and, if they are contested by either sofe, then to produce evidence for the purpose of establishing the same. Of course, in that particular case this Court sent the case back to the Sessions Court for complying with Section 235(2) CrPC. It may well be that in many cases sending the case back to the Sessions Court may lead to more expense, delay and prejudice to the cause of justice. In such cases it may be more appropriate for the appellate court to give an opportunity to the parties in terms of Section 235(2) to produce the materials they wish to adduce instead of going through the exercise of sending the case back to the trial court. This may, in many cases, save time and help produce prompt justice.

    5. In the present case we propose to adopt that course and Counsel for the parties agree that they will rely upon the materials available on record and they have nothing more to offer to the Court bearing on the question ot sentence. It will be an idle formality in a situation like that to remit the case to reconsider the question of sentence to the Sessions Court.

    6. Coming to the facts of the present case, having heard both sides we are impressed by Shri Sen's submission that the death sentence has been inflicted nearly two years ago and the agony of such a sentence has been an excruciating experience suffered by the convict for a long period. This, by itself, may not be a circumstance to bring down the death sentence, if otherwise the act is too brutal, depraved or meriting the highest penalty. It has been now established in many decisions of this Court that death sentence must be awarded where there are aggravating factors (vide E. Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC 443). The appellant had two other assailants with him who have been awarded life imprisonment. Moreover, it is evident from the records that there was an exchange of abuse between the parties viz. Shiv Singh and the accused party. It is also apparent that there was no motive for the appellant to kill the innocent child who died, a circumstance which has influenced the courts below in awarding the capital sentence. The other circumstances present also indicate that there is no particular reason why the appellant should have been given the severer sentence and we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by awarding life imprisonment. We accordingly direct that the sentence of life imprisonment should be substituted in place of death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. We allow the appeal to this extent.

    7. Criminal Appeal 367 of 1976 is dismissed as not pressed.

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    Comments

    Tarlok Singh v. State Of Punjab .
    (Apr 28, 1977)