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1976 INSC 115
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Neutral Citations
1976 INSC 115
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant applied on 12 September 1958 for a mining lease covering 66.77 acres in Tahsil Ramgarh, Bihar, and paid the prescribed fee. The State Government failed to decide the application within the statutory time, leading the appellant to file a first revision before the Central Government on 22 June 1961. On 24 March 1962 the Central Government directed the State Government to dispose of the application by 30 September 1962, but no decision followed.

A second revision filed on 15 October 1963 resulted in a Central Government order dated 21 November 1964 directing the State Government to grant the lease in a compact block to be chosen by the appellant. Instead of complying, the State Government successively invoked (i) a new policy reserving the area for cement-plant applicants and (ii) pending civil litigation over Tauzi No. 28 as reasons to refuse the lease. It formally rejected the appellant’s request on 17 December 1966.

The appellant’s third revision, filed on 27 January 1967, was dismissed by the Central Government on 17 February 1968. The present appeal by special leave challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Government, acting in revision under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, erred in upholding the State Government’s refusal of the mining lease despite its own prior directive of 21 November 1964 granting the lease to the appellant.
  2. Whether the State Government was legally entitled to disregard the Central Government’s binding order on the grounds of a subsequent policy decision or pending civil litigation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The State Government’s continued inaction and later refusal violated the binding directive issued by the Central Government on 21 November 1964.
  • Both the policy reserving leases for cement-plant proposers and the pending litigation had been considered or were irrelevant when the Central Government earlier granted the lease.
  • The Central Government’s order dated 17 February 1968 therefore failed to follow the law and resulted in grave injustice.

State Government's Stance (as recorded in correspondence)

  • Initially claimed the area should be conserved for applicants willing to establish cement factories; the appellant had not undertaken to do so.
  • Subsequently contended that the land formed part of Tauzi No. 28, already embroiled in title litigation, and that granting a lease would involve the State in “endless litigation.”

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Assam v. Om Prakash Mehta, (1973) 1 SCC 584 The Central Government, in revision under Rule 55 (analogous to Rule 54), may “confirm, modify or set aside” a State order and itself grant or renew a lease. Used to affirm that the Central Government’s 21 November 1964 order effectively granted the lease and left the State with no discretion but to execute the formal document.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found that:

  • The Central Government’s order of 21 November 1964, made in its revisional capacity, amounted to a grant of the mining lease subject only to the appellant selecting a compact block. Under settled law, the State Government was bound to implement that directive.
  • The State Government’s refusal—first on the basis of a cement-plant policy and later on the ground of ongoing litigation—was impermissible. If new circumstances genuinely warranted reconsideration, the State Government could only seek further directions from the Central Government; it could not unilaterally defy the order.
  • When the appellant challenged the State’s defiance in his third revision, the Central Government should have enforced its earlier order instead of re-examining the merits. The litigation over Tauzi No. 28 was not a “fresh” circumstance: it had existed since 1954 and was known when the 1964 order was issued.
  • By sustaining the State Government’s rejection, the Central Government acted contrary to law and undermined judicial discipline.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Supreme Court set aside the Central Government’s order dated 17 February 1968, directed the State Government of Bihar to implement the Central Government’s order of 21 November 1964 forthwith, and awarded costs to the appellant.

Implications: The decision reinforces the binding character of Central Government orders passed in revision under the Mineral Concession Rules and confirms that subordinate authorities cannot disregard such directives on the basis of subsequent policy shifts or existing litigation. No new legal doctrine was created, but the ruling underscores the necessity of administrative compliance with quasi-judicial orders to avoid “subversive” effects on judicial discipline.

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    Dharam Chand Jain v. State Of Bihar .

    S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.— This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Central Government dated February 17, 1968, rejecting the revision application filed by the appellant before the Central Government under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. This appeal reveals a wavering and vacillating attitude of the State Government of Bihar taking inconsistent stands in refusing to implement a quasi-judicial order passed by the Central Government in favour of the appellant on one pretext or another spreading over several years. This has naturally resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice to the appellant who was compelled to toss like a shuttlecock from State Government to Central Government by filing revisions after revisions against the orders of the State Government which shows a somewhat extraordinary and curious conduct of the State Government.

    2. The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass. The appellant applied on September 12, 1958, for grant of a mining licence in an area of 66.77 acres in Tahsil Ramgarh and deposited the prescribed fees of Rs 700. The State Government was unable to make up its mind and passed no order at all on the application filed by the appellant. The appellant thereupon filed a revision application before the Central Government on the basis that his application was deemed to have been rejected by the State Government as it was not disposed of during the statutory period. This revision was filed on June 22, 1961 and gives a detailed history of the case of the appellant. The Central Government in its revisional capacity passed an order dated March 24, 1962 directing the State Government to dispose of the application of the appellant on or before September 30, 1962. In spite of this direction, the State Government failed to pass any order on the application of the appellant. Failing to get any redress from the State Government in spite of the direction of the Central Government, the appellant was compelled to prefer a second revision application before the Central Government on October 15, 1963. Thereafter the Central Government invited the comments of the State Government on the second revision application. The State Government, however, appears to have taken the stand that as the area in question was the subject-matter of a litigation the State Government was legally advised to defer grant of a mining licence particularly in view of certain injunction orders passed by the Alipore Civil Court and the Calcutta High Court. These comments were forwarded to the appellant for his explanation. The appellant informed the Central Government that the injunction orders relating to Ramgarh litigation had since been vacated and the State Government may be directed to dispose of the application filed by the appellant for grant of the mining lease. It appears that by a subsequent correspondence the State Government informed the Central Government that final orders on the application of the appellant could only be made if he decided to select one compact block for the mining lease. On receiving this comment, the Central Government allowed the revision application again and directed the State Government to grant the mining lease to the appellant in respect of a compact block to be selected by him. This order was passed on November 21, 1964. We might mention here that under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the Central Government acts as a revisional tribunal against any order passed by the State Government and has obviously, therefore, the same powers as the State Government. This matter is no longer res integra and is settled by an authority of this Court in State of Assam v. Om Prakash Mehta (1973) 1 SCC 584 where this Court observed as follows: [p. 591, para 15]

    “Under Rule 55 the Central Government can call for the records from the State Government and after considering any comments made on the petition by the State Government or other authority, may confirm, modify or set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as the Central Government may deem just and proper. It also provides for an opportunity to the applicant to make his representation against the comments, if any, received from the State Government or other authority. Thus the fact that the application for renewal is deemed to have been refused as a result of Rule 24(2) does not prohibit the Central Government from passing any order it may deem just and proper including an order granting renewal.”
    In these circumstances, therefore, when the Central Government allowed the revision application and directed the State Government to grant the licence to the appellant, the order must be deemed to be an order passed by the Central Government granting the prayer of the appellant for issue of the mining lease. As, however, the application had been made to the State Government by the appellant, the form of the order of the Central Government was to give a clear direction to the State Government to grant the formal lease. The order of the Central Government dated November 21, 1964, therefore, left no discretion to the State Government to refuse to grant the mining lease to the appellant. It seems to us that the State Government does not appear to have appreciated the real content of the order of the Central Government and was labouring under a misconception that in spite of a clear direction given by the superior tribunal, namely, the Central Government, it was still open to the State Government to reject the application.

    3. It appears that the State Government, after receiving the order of the Central Government, refused to implement it on the ground that the State Government had formulated a policy that the area in dispute should be conserved for building cement factories and licences should be given only to those applicants who are prepared to set up a cement factory. The State Government rejected the application of the appellant on December 17, 1966, as the appellant had not indicated anywhere in the application that he was prepared to set up a cement plant. In fact the appellant on coming to know of the stand taken by the Government did file an application before the Central Government on January 27, 1967 that he could put up a cement plant if it was economical to do so. The appellant consequently filed a third revision application before the Central Government against the order of the State Government dated December 17, 1966 rejecting the application of the appellant for grant of mining lease. This application was filed on January 27, 1967 and in his comments the appellant pointed out that by the time the Central Government was seized of the matter the policy of the State Government of Bihar, due to the change in the ministry, had changed and that it may be asked to re-examine the matter. The Central Government accordingly invited further comments of the State Government in the matter and this time the State Government again took the stand that as the area in dispute which was comprised in Tauzi No. 28 was the subject-matter of title suit in the court of Hazaribagh, the State Government was not willing to grant licence to the appellant and involve itself into an endless litigation. This comment appears to have found favour with the Central Government which rejected the revision application of the appellant by the impugned order dated February 17, 1968 against which the present appeal by special leave has been preferred before us.

    4. The facts mentioned above, are proved from the various annexures filed by the appellant along with the special leave petition and printed in the paper-book and consist of various orders passed by the Central and State Governments, the correspondence between the State Government and the Central Government, the notesheets and summary of facts made by the concerned ministry etc. The learned counsel for the respondent has not at all disputed the correctness of the contents of these documents.

    5. It seems to us that the Central Government has not disposed of the revision application in accordance with law. To begin with, the Central Government had expressly directed the State Government to dispose of the application of the appellant by its order dated March 24, 1962, on the first revision application filed by the appellant. Due to the continued inaction of the State Government, the second revision application was filed before the Central Government which was also allowed on November 21, 1964 and the State Government was given clear directions to grant the lease to the appellant. In view of this order it was not open to the State Government to reject the application of the appellant on any ground whatsoever. If the State Government found itself unable to implement the order of the Central Government a reference could have been made to the Central Government for obtaining necessary directions. Ultimately, the order of the Central Government culminated into the grant of a licence in favour of the appellant after he had selected a compact block. Thereafter the State Government instead of implementing this order took the stand that they had devised a policy to grant leases only to those persons who were prepared to set up a cement plant. Subsequently this policy was also given a go-by and the State Government rejected the application of the appellant on the ground that the land was the subject-matter of a litigation. This led to the last revision filed by the appellant before the Central Government. The Central Government, after calling for the comments of the State Government, appears to have upheld the order of the State Government rejecting the application. In doing so, the Central Government overlooked the fact that it had already directed by its order dated November 21, 1964 that the State Government should grant the mining lease to the appellant in respect of a compact block selected by the appellant. The State Government, being a subordinate authority in the matter of grant of mining lease, was obligated under the law to carry out the orders of the Central Government as indicated above. But the State Government declined to do so on the ground that it had laid down a policy that the mining leases in respect of the area should be given only to those who were prepared to set up a cement factory. It was clearly not open to the State Government to decline to carry out the orders of the Central Government on this ground, particularly because the Central Government was a tribunal superior to the State Government. If a ground came into existence subsequent to the making of the order of the Central Government which warranted a reconsideration of the order of the Central Government as indicated above, the State Government could have brought this ground to the notice of the Central Government. However, one thing is manifestly clear that the State Government could not have refused to implement the order of the Central Government unless the Central Government itself chose to revise it either on a reference by the State Government or suo motu. In fact to take the view that the State Government could decline to carry out the order of the Central Government on some ground which it thinks proper would be subversive of judicial discipline. Therefore, when the appellant preferred a revision application to the Central Government against the refusal of the State Government to carry out the order of the Central Government by rejecting his application, the Central Government should have proceeded to set aside the order of the State Government and directed the State Government to grant the application of the appellant. Instead of doing this, the Central Government again appears to have entered into the merits of the question as if its earlier order was not in existence at all and sustained the rejection of the application of the appellant on the ground that the area in question was the subject-matter of the title suit in the court of Hazaribagh, even though the appellant had pointed out to the Central Government that the injunction issued by the court regarding the premises in dispute had been vacated. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Central Government could revise its earlier order — putting the case of the Central Government at its highest — this could be done only if some fresh ground came into existence which warranted reconsideration of the earlier order. The fact that there was a litigation pending in the Hazaribagh court in respect of the area in question was neither a new nor a fresh fact which came into existence for the first time after the order was made by the Central Government directing the State Government to grant the licence to the appellant. The litigation was pending since 1954 and the Central Government was aware of this fact even when it passed its order dated November 21, 1964. In these circumstances, therefore, there was absolutely no legal justification at all for the Central Government to go back upon its earlier order. The earlier order of the Central Government stood unvaried and unvacated and the State Government was bound to implement it and, therefore, the Central Government was in error in upholding the action of the State Government rejecting the revision application filed by the appellant and thus silently condoned the lapse committed by the State Government.

    6. For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the order impugned passed by the Central Government cannot be allowed to stand and must be set aside. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Central Government dated February 17, 1968 rejecting the revision application of the appellant and direct the State Government to implement the order of the Central Government dated November 21, 1964 for granting the mining lease to the appellant. The appellant will be entitled to his costs throughout.

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    Comments

    Dharam Chand Jain v. State Of Bihar .
    (Apr 14, 1976)