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1976 INSC 57
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1976 INSC 57
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The first information report
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 29 June 1967, Amar Singh, his son Ajeet Singh (PW 2) and mason Isar Ram (PW 3) went to a “diggi” in Ganganagar district, Rajasthan, to bathe. Appellant Maina Singh arrived with his three sons (Hardeep, Jeet, Puran) and Narain Singh. Armed with a 12-bore gun, Maina Singh fired twice: the shots injured Ajeet Singh and missed Amar Singh, who fled but was pursued. Ultimately Amar Singh was fatally shot and assaulted with sharp and blunt weapons; the assailants fled.

The police registered a case under Section 307/149 IPC on Ajeet Singh’s report. Post-mortem confirmed multiple firearm, incised and lacerated injuries on Amar Singh and 12 gunshot wounds on Ajeet Singh. All five accused absconded but were later arrested; Maina Singh’s licensed gun was recovered with a broken butt.

The Sessions Judge convicted only Maina Singh under Sections 302/34 and 326 IPC, acquitting the four co-accused for want of certainty as to their participation. The Rajasthan High Court dismissed cross-appeals, maintaining his convictions. Maina Singh appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC can stand when all alleged co-participants have been acquitted and no evidence shows participation of unidentified persons.
  2. If Section 34 (or Section 149) IPC is inapplicable, what individual offence, if any, is established against the appellant on the proven facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC is legally unsustainable once the four co-accused were acquitted; without a proven common intention, only individual liability could be considered.
  • Sessions Court itself found Section 149 or 148 IPC inapplicable; hence the High Court erred in sustaining a Section 34 conviction.

State’s Arguments

  • The trial court’s finding that “one or more” persons acted with Maina Singh suffices to maintain a conviction under Section 34 IPC despite the co-accused being acquitted on benefit of doubt.
  • Physical evidence (multiple weapon injuries) demonstrates more than one assailant, supporting the inference of common intention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
King v. Plummer (1902) 2 KB 339 Conviction of a single accused for a concerted offence is invalid if all alleged co-conspirators are acquitted. Cited to support the proposition that conviction under a joint liability provision fails when sole remaining accused is left.
Harrison v. Errington (referenced in Plummer) Verdict void where only one of several jointly indicted for riot is convicted. Reinforces the same principle of repugnancy in joint offences.
Topandas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33 A lone accused cannot be convicted of conspiracy when all others are acquitted. Approved and applied as Indian authority analogous to the present facts.
Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 Section 149 IPC cannot be invoked when the charge/evidence names only five persons and fewer than five are ultimately found guilty, unless evidence shows unidentified participants. Used to frame the test for applicability of collective liability provisions.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 Earlier authority explaining limits of Section 149 IPC. Referenced while tracing jurisprudential development; supports Mohan Singh ratio.
Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 289 Further clarification on unlawful assembly liability. Cited as part of the line of cases limiting Section 149.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1787 Same theme on unlawful assembly proof requirements. Noted in support of Mohan Singh decision.
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 Court may infer presence of unnamed persons if evidence so indicates, sustaining Section 149 despite some acquittals. Distinguished; held inapplicable because present record lacked evidence of unnamed participants.
Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar (1964) 1 SCR 775 If prosecution case is confined to named persons, Section 149 cannot survive their acquittal. Relied on to negate applicability of Section 149/34 here.
Yashwant v. State of Maharashtra (1972) 3 SCC 639 Section 34 can apply when identity of one participant is doubtful but evidence shows conjoint action. Explained but found factually different; did not alter governing principle.
Sukh Ram v. State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCC 656 Affirms earlier rulings; distinction depends on evidence of unknown assailants. Cited; consistent with approach adopted.
Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. (1975) 2 SCC 596 Could still find minimum five participants on evidence even after some acquittals. Held not contrary to earlier cases; limited to its facts and not helpful to prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the charge, FIR and entire evidence consistently alleged participation only of the five named accused. After the acquittal of the other four, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of any unidentified participant. Therefore, invoking Section 34 or 149 IPC would be impermissible under the line of authorities beginning with Plummer and culminating in Ram Bilas Singh.

The Court further found that while multiple weapon injuries existed, the finding that “someone else might have been with him” was speculative and could not substitute for proof of a common intention.

Turning to individual liability, the High Court’s unchallenged factual finding was that Maina Singh himself caused the firearm and blunt-weapon injuries. Medical evidence showed that, although those injuries collectively contributed to death, none inflicted by the appellant alone was proved to be individually sufficient to cause death. However, one gunshot wound (Injury No. 26) was grievous. Consequently, the ingredients of Section 326 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a firearm) were satisfied.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC is set aside; appellant is instead convicted under Section 326 IPC for injuries to Amar Singh and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. Existing conviction and sentence (three years’ rigorous imprisonment and ₹100 fine) under Section 326 IPC for injuries to Ajeet Singh are affirmed. Sentences to run concurrently.

Implications: The judgment re-affirms that collective liability provisions (Sections 34 and 149 IPC) cannot be applied once alleged co-participants are acquitted, unless independent evidence proves the presence of other offenders. Courts must base application of joint-liability doctrines on concrete evidence, not inference from the nature of injuries alone. The decision narrows prosecutorial reliance on Section 34/149 where participation of others is unproved and does not create new precedent but consolidates existing jurisprudence.

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    Maina Singh v. State Of Rajasthan .

    P.N Shinghal, J.— This appeal of Maina Singh arises out of the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated April 21, 1971 upholding the trial court's judgment convicting him of an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for causing the death of Amar Singh and of an offence under Section 326 IPC for causing grievous injuries to Amar Singh's son Ajeet Singh (PW 2), and sentencing him to imprisonment for life for the offence of murder and to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs 100 for the other offence.

    2. The deceased Amar Singh and accused Maina Singh and his three sons Hardeep Singh, Jeet Singh and Puran Singh used to live in “chak” No. 77 GB, in Ganganagar district of Rajasthan while Narain Singh used to live in another “chak”. It was alleged that the relations between Amar Singh and Maina Singh were strained, as Maina Singh suspected that Amar Singh was giving information about his smuggling activities. Amar Singh was having some construction work done in his house and had engaged Isar Ram (PW 3) as a mason. On June 29, 1967 at about sunset, the deceased Amar Singh, his son Ajeet Singh (PW 2) and Isar Ram (PW 3) went to the “diggi” in “murabba” 35 for bath. Ajeet Singh took his bath, and was changing his clothes and Isar Ram was nearby. Amar Singh was cleaning his “lota” after attending the call of nature. It is alleged that at that time Maina Singh and his three sons Hardeep Singh, Jeet Singh and Puran Singh came to the “diggi” along with Narain Singh. Maina Singh was armed with a 12 bore gun, Puran Singh with a “takua” and the other three with “gandasis”. Maina Singh fired at Amar Singh, but could not hit him. The gunshots however hit Ajeet Singh (PW 2) on his legs and he jumped into a dry watercourse which was nearby to take cover. Maina Singh fired again, but without success. Amar Singh ran towards the sugarcane field crying for help but was chased by the accused. Ajeet Singh thereupon ran towards “chak” No. 78 GB and ultimately went and lodged a report at Police Station Anoopgarh at 10 p.m after covering a distance of about six miles. The five accused however followed Amar Singh. Maina Singh fired his gun at Amar Singh and he fell down. The other accused went near him and gave “gandasi” blows, and Maina Singh gave a blow or two with the butt end of his gun which broke and the broken pieces fell down. Amar Singh succumbed to his injuries on the spot, and the accused ran away.

    3. On the report of Ajeet Singh about the incident which took place by the time he left for the police station, the police registered a case for an offence under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and started investigation. The body of Amar Singh was sent for post-mortem examination. The report Exhibit P-9 of Dr Shanker Lal (PW 5) is on the record. The injuries of Ajeet Singh (PW 2) were also examined by Dr Shanker Lal and his report in that connection is Exhibit P-10. It was found that there were several gunshot injuries, incised wounds and lacerated wounds on the body of the deceased, and there were as many as 12 gunshot wounds on the person of Ajeet Singh (PW 2). All the five accused were found absconding and could be taken into custody after proceedings were started against them under Sections 87 and 88 CrPC. Maina Singh held a licence for gun Exhibit 23 and led to its recovery during the course of the investigation vide memorandum Exhibit P-43. At that time, its butt was found to be missing. Its broken pieces had however been recovered by the investigating officer earlier, along with the empty cartridges.

    4. The prosecution examined Ajeet Singh (PW 2), Isar Ram (PW 3) and Smt Jangir Kaur (PW 7) the wife of the deceased as eyewitnesses of the incident. The accused denied the allegation of the prosecution altogether, but Maina Singh admitted that the gun belonged to him and he held a licence for it. The Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of Smt Jangir Kaur (PW 7) mainly for the reason that her name had not been mentioned in the first information report. He took the view that the statements of Ajeet Singh (PW 2) and Isar Ram (PW 3) were inconsistent regarding the part played by Hardeep Singh, Jeet Singh, Narain Singh and Puran Singh accused, and although he held that one or more of the accused persons, besides Maina Singh, might be responsible for causing injuries to the deceased, along with Maina Singh, he held further that it could not be ascertained which one of the accused was with him. He also took the view that “someone else might have been with him” and he therefore gave the benefit of doubt to accused Hardeep Singh, Jeet Singh, Puran Singh and Narain Singh and acquitted them. As the statements of Ajeet Singh (PW 2) and Isar Ram (PW 3) were found to be consistent against appellant Maina Singh, and as there was circumstantial evidence in the shape of the recovery of empty cartridges near the deadbody. and gun Exhibit 23, as well as the medical evidence, and the fact that the accused had absconded, the learned Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid.

    5. An appeal was preferred by the State against the acquittal of the remaining four accused, and Maina Singh also filed an appeal against his conviction. The High Court dismissed both the appeals and maintained the conviction and sentence of Maina Singh as aforesaid.

    6. Mr Harbans Singh appearing on behalf of appellant Maina Singh has not been able to challenge the evidence on which appellant Maina Singh has been convicted, but he has raised the substantial argument that he could not have been convicted of the offence of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC when the four co-accused had been acquitted and the Sessions Judge had found that it was not possible to record a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC or Section 148 IPC. It has been argued that when the other four accused were given the benefit of doubt and were acquitted, it could not be held, in law, that they formed an unlawful assembly or that any offence was committed by appellant Maina Singh in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. It has been argued further that, a fortiori, it was not permissible for the Court of Sessions or the High Court to take the view that a criminal act was done by appellant Maina Singh in furtherance of the common intention of the “other accused” when those accused had been named to be no other than Hardeep Singh, Puran Singh, Jeet Singh and Narain Singh who had all been acquitted. It has therefore been argued that all that was permissible for the High Court was to convict appellant Maina Singh of any offence which he might have committed in his individual capacity, without reference to the participation of any other person in the crime. On the other hand, it has been argued by Mr S.M Jain that as the learned Sessions Judge had acquitted the remaining four accused by giving them the benefit of doubt, and had recorded the finding that one or more of the accused persons or some other person might have participated in the crime along with Maina Singh, the High Court was quite justified in upholding the conviction of the appellant Maina Singh of an offence under Sections 302/34 IPC.

    7. The relevant portion of the judgment of the trial court, which bears on the controversy and has been extracted with approval in the impugned judgment of the High Court, is as follows:

    “The injuries found on the person of the deceased Amar Singh were with firearm, blunt as well as sharp weapon. The firearm injuries and the blunt weapon injuries have been assigned to Maina Singh and so there must have been other person also along with Maina Singh in causing injuries to the deceased. It can be so inferred from the statements of Isar Ram and Ajeet Singh also. These facts could no doubt create a strong suspicion that one or more of the accused persons might be responsible along with Maina Singh in causing injuries to the deceased. In view of the statement of Isar Ram and Ajeet Singh it cannot however be ascertained which one of the accused was with Maina Singh and it was also possible that someone else might have been with him. In such a case the prosecution version against these four accused persons are not proved beyond doubt. They are therefore not guilty of the offence with which they have been charged.”
    It would thus appear that the view which has found favour with the High Court is that as there were injuries with firearm and with blunt and sharp-edged weapons, and as the firearm and the blunt weapon injuries had been ascribed to Maina Singh, there must have been one other person with him in causing the injuries to the deceased. At the same time, it has been held further that these facts could only create a strong suspicion “that one or more of the accused persons might be responsible along with Maina Singh in causing the injuries to the deceased”, but it could not be ascertained which one of the accused was with him and that it was also possible that “someone else might have been with him”. The finding therefore is that the other person might have been one of the other accused or someone else, and not that the other associate in the crime was a person other than the accused. Thus, the finding is not categorical and does not exclude the possibility of infliction of the injuries in furtherance of the common intention of one of the acquitted accused and the appellant.

    8. Another significant fact which bears on the argument of Mr Harbans Singh is that while in the original charge-sheet the Sessions Judge specifically named appellant Maina Singh and the other accused Hardeep Singh, Puran Singh, Jeet Singh and Narain Singh as forming an unlawful assembly and for causing the death of Amar Singh in furtherance of the common object of that assembly, he altered that charge but retained, at the same time, the charge that Maina Singh formed an unlawful assembly along with the “other accused” with the common object of murdering Amar Singh and intentionally caused injuries to him along with “the other accused” in prosecution of that common object. In this case therefore Maina Singh and the other four accused were alleged, all along, to have participated in the crime and were named in the charge-sheet as the perpetrators of the crime without there being an allegation that some other person (besides the accused) took part in it in any manner whatsoever. It was in fact the case from the very beginning, including the first information report, that the offence was committed by all the five named accused, and even the evidence of the prosecution was confined to them all through and to no other person. The question is whether the High Court was right in upholding the conviction of the appellant with reference to Section 34 IPC in these circumstances?

    9. Such a question came up for consideration in this Court on earlier occasions, and we shall refer to some of those decisions in order to appreciate the argument of Mr Jain that the decision in Dharam Pal v. State of U.P (1975) 2 SCC 596 expresses the latest view of this Court and would justify the appellant's conviction by invoking Section 34 IPC.

    10. We may start by making a reference to King v. PIummer (1902) 2 KB 339, which, as we shall show, has been cited with approval by this Court in some of its decisions. That was a case where there was a trial of an indictment charging three persons jointly with conspiring together. One of them pleaded guilty, and a judgment was passed against him, and the other two were acquitted. It was alleged that the judgment passed against the one who pleaded guilty was bad and could not stand. Lord Justice Wright held that there was much authority to the effect that if there was acquittal of the only alleged co-conspirators, no judgment could have been passed on the appellant, if he had not pleaded guilty, because the verdict must have been regarded as repugnant in finding that there was a criminal agreement between the appellant and the others and none between them and him. In taking that view he made a reference to Harrison v. Errington whereupon an indictment of three for riot two were found not guilty, and one guilty, and upon error brought it was held a “void verdict”. Bruce, J. who was the other Judge in the case made a reference to the following statement in Chitty's Criminal Law while agreeing with the view taken by Wright, J.:

    “And it is holden that if all the defendants mentioned in the indictment, except one, are acquitted, and it is not stated as a conspiracy with certain persons unknown, the conviction of the single defendant will be invalid, and no judgment can be passed upon him.”

    11. This Court approved Plummer case in its decision in Topandas v. State of Bombay AIR 1956 SC 33, (1955) 2 SCR 881, 1956 Cri LJ 138. That was a case where four named individuals were charged with having committed an offence under Section 120-B IPC and three out of those four were acquitted. This Court held that the remaining accused could not be convicted of the offence as his alleged co-participators had been acquitted, for that would be clearly illegal.

    12. A similar point came up for consideration in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 174, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 848, (1963) 1 Cri LJ 100. There two of the five persons who were tried together were acquitted while two were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 147 IPC. In the charge those five accused persons and none others were mentioned as forming the unlawful assembly and the evidence led in the case was confined to them. The proved facts showed that the two appellants and the other convicted person, who inflicted the fatal blow, were actuated by common intention of fatally assaulting the deceased. While examining the question of their liability, it was observed as follows:

    “Cases may also arise where in the charge, the prosecution names five or more persons and alleges that they constituted an unlawful assembly. In such cases, if both the charge and the evidence are confined to the persons named in the charge and out of the persons so named two or more are acquitted leaving before the court less than five persons to be tried, then Section 149 cannot be invoked. Even in such cases, it is possible that though the charge names five or more persons as composing an unlawful assembly, evidence may nevertheless show that the unlawful assembly consisted of some other persons as well who were not identified and so not named. In such cases, either the trial court or even the High Court in appeal may be able to come to the conclusion that the acquittal of some of the persons named in the charge and tried will not necessarily displace the charge under Section 149 because along with the two or three persons convicted were others who composed the unlawful assembly but who have not been identified and so have not been named. In such cases, the acquittal of one or more persons named in the charge does not affect the validity of the charge under Section 149 because on the evidence the court of facts is liable to reach the conclusion that the persons composing the unlawful assembly nevertheless were five or more than five.”
    In taking this view this Court took note of its earlier decisions in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364, 1954 SCR 145, 1953 Cri LJ 1465; Bharwad Mepa Dana v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 289, (1960) 2 SCR 127, 1960 Cri LJ 424; and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1787, (1962) 2 SCR 395, (1961) 2 Cri LJ 853.

    13. The other case to which we may make a reference is Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 1413, (1964) 1 SCR 678, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 351. It noticed and upheld the earlier decision in Mohan Singh case and after referring to the portion which we have extracted, it was held as follows:

    “It may be that the charge discloses only named persons; it may also be that the prosecution witnesses named only the said accused; but there may be other evidence, such as that given by the court witnesses, defence witnesses or circumstantial pieces of evidence, which may disclose the existence of named or unnamed persons, other than those charged or deposed to by the prosecution witnesses, and the court, on the basis of the said evidence, may come to the conclusion that others, named or unnamed, acted conjointly along with one of the accused charged. But such a conclusion is really based on evidence.”

    14. It would thus appear that even if, in a given case, the charge discloses only the named persons as co-accused and the prosecution witnesses confine their testimony to them, even then it would be permissible to come to the conclusion that others named or unnamed, besides those mentioned in the charge or the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, acted conjointly with one of the charged accused if there was other evidence to lead to that conclusion, but not otherwise.

    15. The decision in Krishna Govind Patil case was followed by the decision in Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar (1964) 1 SCR 775. After noticing and approving the view taken in Plummer case and the decisions in Mohan Singh case and Krishna Govind Patil case this Court stated the law once again as follows:

    “The decisions of this Court quoted above thus make it clear that where the prosecution case as set out in the charge and as supported by the evidence is to the effect that the alleged unlawful assembly consists of five or more named persons and no others, and there is no question of any participation by other persons not identified or identifiable it is not open to the court to hold that there was an unlawful assembly unless it comes to the definite conclusion that five or more of the named persons were members thereof. Where, however, the case of the prosecution and the evidence adduced indicates that a number in excess of five persons participated in the incident and some of them could not be identified it would be open to the court to convict less than five of the offence of being members of the unlawful assembly or convict them of the offence committed by the unlawful assembly with the aid of Section 149 IPC provided it comes to the conclusion that five or more persons participated in the incident.”

    16. The other decision to which our attention has been invited is Yashwant v. State of Maharashtra (1972) 3 SCC 639, (1973) 1 SCR 291. The decision in Krishna Govind Patil was cited there on behalf of the appellant and, while referring to the view expressed there, it was observed that in the case before the court there was evidence that the man who used the axe on Sukal was a man who looked like appellant Brahmanand Tiwari, and could be that accused himself. But as the Court was not satisfied that the identity of the person who used the axe on Sukal was satisfactorily established as that of Brahmanand Tiwari, it took the view that the remaining accused could be convicted with the aid of Section 34 for the offences committed by them. This Court did not therefore disagree with the view taken in Krishna Govind Patil case, but purported to follow it in its decision and took the aforesaid view in regard to the identity of Brahmanand Tiwari for the purpose of distinguishing it from the case of Krishna Govind Patil where there was not a single observation in the judgment to indicate that persons other than the named accused participated in the offence and there was no evidence also in that regard.

    17. The matter once again came up for consideration in Sukh Ram v. State of U.P (1974) 3 SCC 656, (1974) 2 SCR 518. The Court referred to its earlier decisions including those in Mohan Singh case and Krishna Govind Patil case and while distinguishing them on facts, it observed that as the prosecution did not put forward a case of the commission of crime by one known person and one or two unknown persons as in Sukh Ram case, and there was no evidence to the effect that the named accused had committed the crime with one or more other persons, the acquittal of the other two accused raised no bar to the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The decision in Sukh Ram case cannot therefore be said to lay down a contrary view for it has upheld the view taken in the earlier decisions of this Court.

    18. That leaves the case of Dharam Pal v. State of U.P for consideration. In that case four accused were tried with fourteen others for rioting. The trial court gave benefit of doubt to eleven of them, and acquitted them. The remaining seven were convicted for the offence under Sections 302/149 IPC and other offences. The High Court gave benefit of doubt to four of them, and held that at least four of the accused participated in the crime because of their admission and the injuries. On appeal this Court found that the attacking party could not conceivably have been of less than five because that was the number of the other party, and it was in that connection that it held that there was no doubt about the number of the participants being not less than five. It was also held that as eighteen accused participated in the crime, and the Court gave the benefit of doubt to be on the side of safety, as a matter of abundant caution, reducing the number to less than five, it may not be difficult to reach the conclusion, having regard to undeniable facts, that the number of the participants could not be less than five. That was therefore a case which was decided on its own facts but, even so, it was observed as follows:

    “It may be that a definite conclusion that the number of participants was at least five may be very difficult to reach where the allegation of participation is confined to five known persons and there is no doubt about the identity of even one.”
    It cannot therefore be said that the decision in Dharam Pal case is any different from the earlier decisions of this Court, or that it goes to support the view which has been taken by the High Court in the case before us. The view which has prevailed with this Court all along will therefore apply to the case before us.

    19. As has been stated, the charge in the present case related to the commission of the offence of unlawful assembly by the appellant along with the other named four co-accused, and with no other person. The trial in fact went on that basis throughout. There was also no direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the offence was committed by the appellant along with any other unnamed person. So when the other four co-accused have been given the benefit of doubt and have been acquitted, it would not be permissible to take the view that there must have been some other person along with the appellant Maina Singh in causing the injuries to the deceased. It was as such not permissible to invoke Section 149 or Section 34 IPC. Maina Singh would accordingly be responsible for the offence, if any, which could be shown to have been committed by him without regard to the participation of others.

    20. The High Court has held that there could be no room for doubt that the firearm and the blunt weapon injuries which were found on the person of Amar Singh were caused by appellant Maina Singh and that finding has not been challenged before us by Mr Harbans Singh. Dr Shanker Lal (PW 5) who performed the post-mortem examination stated that while all those injuries were collectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, he could not say whether any of them was individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It is not therefore possible to hold that the death of Amar Singh was caused by the gunshot or the blunt weapon injuries which were inflicted by appellant Maina Singh. Dr Shanker Lal has stated that the fracture of the frontal bone of the deceased could have been caused by external Injuries Nos. 8, 10 and 12, and that he could die of that injury also but of those three Injuries injury No. 12 was inflicted by a sharp-edged weapon and could not possibly be imputed to the appellant. The evidence on record therefore does not go to show that he was responsible for any such injury as could have resulted in Amar Singh's death. The evidence however proves that he inflicted gunshot injuries on the deceased, and Dr Shanker Lal has stated that one of those injuries (Injury No. 26) was grievous. Maina Singh was therefore guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt to the deceased by means of an instrument for shooting, and was guilty of an offence under Section 326 IPC. In the circumstances of the case, we think it proper to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for that offence. As has been stated, he has been held guilty of a similar offence for the injuries inflicted on Ajeet Singh (PW 2) and his conviction and sentence for that other offence under Section 326 IPC has not been challenged before us.

    21. The appeal is therefore allowed to the extent that the conviction of Maina Singh under Sections 302/34 IPC is altered to one under Section 326 IPC and the sentence is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years thereunder. The conviction under Section 326 for causing injuries to Ajeet Singh, and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs 100 call for no interference and are confirmed. Both the sentences will run concurrently.

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    Comments

    Maina Singh v. State Of Rajasthan .
    (Mar 17, 1976)