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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 147, Section 148 read with Section 149 or Section 34 and Section 326 read with Section 149 or Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970
  • Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 147, Section 148 read with Section 149 or Section 34 and Section 326 read with Section 149 or Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970
  • Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Accused 2 and 3, together with Accused 1 and Accused 4–6, were tried before the Sessions Court for offences under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 or 302/34 and 326/149 or 326/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge acquitted all six. The State successfully appealed; the High Court reversed the acquittal, convicting Accused 2 and 3 under Sections 148 and 302 and sentencing each to two years’ rigorous imprisonment (Section 148) and imprisonment for life (Section 302). Because a life sentence was imposed on appeal, Accused 2 and 3 filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.

On the merits, the prosecution alleged that on 16 November 1968 the six accused formed an unlawful assembly. Accused 1 deliberately bumped into the deceased (his own brother) on a lane near their houses, dragged him into Accused 2’s house, assaulted him, and, with Accused 2 and 3, stabbed him. The deceased staggered to a neighbour’s house and died. Prosecution witnesses PW 1–PW 5 were close relatives present at or near the scene and testified to these events.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court correctly reversed the Sessions Court’s acquittal of Accused 2 and 3 and convicted them of murder under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the testimony of prosecution eyewitnesses PW 1–PW 5 was reliable and sufficient to sustain the conviction.
  3. Whether alleged inconsistencies, lack of blood at the scene, and non-examination of a witness (Sunkamma) created reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Accused 2 and 3)

  • Contended that if the stabbing occurred where the prosecution claimed, blood should have been present; its absence undermined the case.
  • Asserted that PW 1–PW 5 were “interested” or inimical witnesses; their minor contradictions and relationship to the deceased undermined credibility.
  • Argued the prosecution failed to examine an allegedly present witness, Sunkamma, creating a fatal gap in evidence.
  • Advanced an alternative factual version: Accused 2 was being forcibly evicted by the deceased and PW 1; during a scuffle in another house the deceased accidentally injured himself and others.

Respondent (State)

  • Relied on consistent eyewitness testimony of PW 1–PW 5, corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of PW 1’s broken bangles from Accused 2’s house.
  • Highlighted the presence of blood traces inside Accused 2’s house, consistent with PW 1’s injuries.
  • Pointed to medical expert PW 8’s explanation that internal bleeding from the stab wounds could account for minimal external blood.
  • Maintained that non-examination of Sunkamma was immaterial because she was not an eyewitness to the stabbing.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court independently reviewed the record and concurred with the High Court’s evaluation of evidence:

  • Credibility of PW 1: Her injuries proved her presence; she lacked motive to falsely implicate all accused. Broken bangles recovered from Accused 2’s house and medical evidence of head injuries corroborated her account.
  • Consistency of PW 2–PW 5: Despite minor discrepancies expected of “ignorant and rustic” witnesses, the testimonies were substantially consistent. Alleged prior enmity was either unproved or irrelevant, particularly regarding PW 2 who had no apparent motive.
  • Defence Version Rejected: The alternative narrative was first raised only in examination under Section 342 CrPC, failed to explain the deceased’s fatal injuries, and was incompatible with blood traces inside Accused 2’s house.
  • Absence of Blood at Lane: Medical expert PW 8 explained that the nature of the chest wound could prevent external bleeding; the Court accepted this scientific explanation.
  • Non-Examination of Sunkamma: She was not an eyewitness to the stabbing; even if examined, her testimony would have concerned only the deceased’s collapse, already established by PW 1. Failure to call her did not create doubt.

Having found the eyewitness evidence “worthy of credence,” the Court held that Accused 2 and 3 each inflicted fatal dagger wounds with intent to kill, satisfying the requirements of Section 302 IPC.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; convictions and life sentences of Accused 2 and 3 affirmed.

The decision leaves the High Court’s reversal of acquittal intact and finalises the conviction for murder. The judgment turns on factual appreciation rather than novel legal principles; therefore, it sets no new precedent but reaffirms standards for evaluating eyewitness credibility and rejecting belated defence theories.

    Boya Ganganna And Another v. State Of Andhra Pradesh .

    P.N Bhagwati, J.— Accused 2 and 3, who are appellants before us, were tried along with Accused 1 and 4 to 6 for various offences under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149 or Section 34 and Section 326 read with Section 149 or Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, who tried the case acquitted all the six accused, including Accused 2 and 3. But on appeal by the State, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. So far as Accused 2 and 3 were concerned, they were convicted under Section 148 and Section 302 and each of them was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years for the former offence and imprisonment for life for the latter. Since the acquittal of Accused 2 and 3 was reversed and they were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, they became entitled to appeal to this Court under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 and they accordingly preferred the present appeal.

    2. The principal charge against all the six accused was that they formed an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of its common object, Accused 2 and 3 stabbed one Chinna Pullanna (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) and intentionally caused his death and Accused 1 caused simple injuries to PW 1. The deceased was a brother of Accused 1. There were three other brothers of their's namely, Pakirappa, Pedda Pullanna and Chinna Peddanna. PW 1 was the wife of the deceased; PW 2 was the wife of Chinna Peddanna and daughter of PW 5. PW 3 was us wife of Pakirappa whose son Nettikallo was married to the granddaughter of PW 5: PW 4 was Pedda Pullanna the brother of the deceased and Accused 1 and PW 5 was the daughter of the elder brother of the father of the deceased and Accused 1. Accused 2 and 3 were the sons of Accused 1 and Accused 4 was the brother-in-law of Accused 2. Accused 2 had no house of his own and, therefore, the deceased had permitted him to occupy his house about three years before the date of the incident. It appears that sometime thereafter Accused 2 got a gift deed of the house executed by the deceased in his favour. When PW 1 came to know about this, she persuaded the deceased to revoke the gift deed which was executed in favour of Accused 2 and to execute a new gift deed in favour of her and her two daughters. This, according to the prosecution, strained the relations between Accused 1 and 2 and 3 on the one hand and the deceased and his wife PW 1 on the other and led to friction between them on various occasions.

    3. The prosecution case has that on November 16, 1968 at about 9.30 a.m all the six accused, including Accused 2 and 3, encountered the deceased as he was going along the lane from his house to the main road which leads from Bellary to Gooty. This lane is about ten feet wide and on the western side of the lane are situate inter alia the houses of the deceased, Accused 2 and one Chennayya. The house of Accused 2 is to the south of the house of the deceased and further south is the house of Chennayya. On seeing the deceased, the first accused deliberately collided against him and Accused 1 to 3 dragged him into the house of Accused 2 which was situate in the lane. Accused 4 to 6 followed them to the house of Accused 2 and kept a vigil outside while Accused 1, 2 forcibly pushed the deceased into the house and started beating him in the cattle manger which occupied a part of the house. PW 1 went to the rescue of her husband, but she was hit by the first accused on the forehead with a brass chembu and when she raised her hands to ward off the blows, her bangles were broken and she sustained bleeding injuries on her hand. Meanwhile the deceased managed to escape from the clutches of Accused 1 to 3 and ran out of the house, but Accused 4 to 6 also were waiting outside, caught hold of him and prevented him from escaping. Accused 1 to 3 also came out of the house and while the first accused held the hair of PW 1, Accused 2 and 3 took out their daggers and Accused 2 stabbed the deceased in the chest and Accused 3 gave two stab injuries, one below the neck and the other on the back. Accused 4 to 6 thereafter ran away, while Accused 1 to 3 went back into the house of Accused 2. The deceased staggered a few steps and entered the house of Chennayya which was a short distance towards south of the house of Accused 2 and fell there and died. It was in respect of this incident that the six accused, including Accused 2 and 3, were prosecuted and though they were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, their acquittal was reversed by the High Court and so far as Accused 2 and 3 were concerned, they were convicted under Section 302 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.

    4. The High Court relied on the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5 and, on the strength of this evidence, held that Accused 2 and 3 had stabbed the deceased with daggers and intentionally caused his death. We have carefully gone through the evidence of these witnesses and we do not see any reason to interfere with the appreciation of their evidence by the High Court. There can be no doubt that PW 1, the wife of the deceased, was present when the incident took place. She admittedly received injuries and that clearly establishes her presence at the scene of the offence. She must then have certainly known as to who were the assailants of her husband and if that be so, it is difficult to conceive of any reason as to why she should have tried to screen the real offenders and falsely implicated all the six accused. She had no reason to be inimical against Accused 2 because she had succeeded in persuading her husband to revoke the gift deed in favour of Accused 2 but, even if it be granted that she bore ill-will against Accused 2 there is no reason why she should have falsely implicated the other accused. Moreover, the recovery of her broken bangles from the house of Accused 2 clearly supports her story that when she went inside the house of Accused 2 to rescue her husband, she was hit by the first accused with a brass chembu and as a result of the blow given by the first accused her bangles were broken. The medical evidence also lends credence to her version that as a result of a blow or two given by the first accused with a brass chembu she sustained injuries on her head. The defence version was that when the deceased and PW 1 tried to evict Accused 2 from the house by force by throwing out his household articles, Accused 2 ran out of the house and the deceased and PW 1 chased him into the house of Chennayya and there they were followed by Accused 1 and 3 and Accused 3, fearing that the deceased would stab Accused 2, caught the deceased by his waist and in the process both fell down and the dagger held by the deceased scratched the nose and left thumb of Accused 3 and caused injuries while Accused 1 was given stab injuries by PW 1. This version was rightly rejected by the High Court as it was put forward for the first time in the examination of Accused 1 and 3 under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it failed to explain the fatal injuries caused to the deceased. Moreover, it did not explain the traces of blood which was found in the house of Accused 2 which were inexplicable only on the basis of the correctness of the prosecution version, namely, that they were the result of the injuries sustained by PW 1 at the hands of Accused 1. There was some criticism levelled by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Accused 2 and 3 that it was surprising that if the deceased was stabbed by Accused 2 and 3 outside the house of Accused 2 near Pakkersab Motu as alleged by the prosecution, no trace of blood should have been found at that place. But this is not a circumstance which militates against the truth of the prosecution version or casts any serious doubt upon it. It has been explained by Dr Vijaya Kumar PW 8 in his evidence where he stated that as the pericardium was held with blood “there need not be any gushing of blood after Injury 1 and there cannot be any blood from Injuries 2 and 3”. This explanation has been accepted by the High Court and we do not see any reason to take a different view. The evidence of PW 1 on the material aspect of the case must, therefore, be held to have been rightly accepted by the High Court.

    5. So far as the evidence of other eyewitnesses, namely PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 is concerned, we do not think that in respect of these witnesses also the High Court has committed any error in appreciating their evidence. Though it was suggested that PW 4 was involved in a criminal case with Accused 2 and 3 about a year before the date of the incident and Nettikallu, son of PW 3 was also involved in the same criminal case on the side of PW 4, nothing whatsoever could be alleged against PW 2 showing either any enmity on her part against the accused or any direct or indirect interest in the deceased. PW 2 was the wife of Chinna Peddanna, who was equally related as a brother both to Accused 1 and the deceased and there is no reason why PW 2 should have falsely implicated Accused 1 or his sons Accused 2 and 3. We have gone through the evidence of PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5, but we have not been able to see any such infirmity in these evidences as to warrant our interference with the assessment of the evidence by the High Court. No doubt, some minor contradictions here and there have been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Accused 2 and 3, but such minor contradictions are bound to appear when ignorant and illiterate women are giving evidence. Even in case of trained and educated persons, memory sometimes plays false and this would be much more so in case of ignorant and rustic women. It must also be remembered that the evidence given by a witness would very much depend upon his power of observation and it is possible that some aspects of an incident may be observed by one witness while they may not be witnessed by another though both are present at the scene of offence. It would not, therefore, be right to reject the testimony of witnesses like PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 merely on the basis of minor contradictions. We think that the High Court was right in accepting the testimony given by them.

    6. Lastly, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Accused 2 and 3 contended that the prosecution has examined only interested witnesses and though one Sunkamma was present at the time when the deceased staggered into the house of Chennayya and fell down dead, and she saw the incident she was not examined, and that introduces a serious infirmity in the prosecution case. We do not think this contention is well founded. In the first place, if the prosecution case were correct, Sunkamma was not an eyewitness to the commission of the offence and there was no point in examining her on behalf of the prosecution. All that she could have deposed to was that the deceased staggered into the house of Chennayya and dropped dead in the presence of PW 1. But that was an inconsequential part of the story and when PW 1 was there to depose to it, it was not necessary to examine Sunkamma for that purpose. Secondly, non-examination of Sunkamma would be immaterial if the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5 is otherwise found worthy of credence. The prosecution case must stand or fall on the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5, irrespective of the fact whether Sunkamma was examined or not. Thirdly, no question was asked on behalf of Accused 2 and 3 as to why Sunkamma was not examined as a witness. We do not think that non-examination of Sunkamma introduces any infirmity in the prosecution case against Accused 2 and 3.

    7. We agree with the appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses by the High Court and concur in the reasoning adopted by the High Court in reaching the conclusion that each of Accused 2 and 3 stabbed the deceased with a dagger and intentionally caused his death and thereby committed the offence of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. We accordingly dismiss the appeal.

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    Boya Ganganna And Another v. State Of Andhra Pradesh .
    (Nov 7, 1975)