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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 23-A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Articles of Association (no specific year mentioned)
  • Article 33 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association
  • Section 23-A of the Act, Article 37 of the Articles of Association
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 23-A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Articles of Association (no specific year mentioned)
  • Article 33 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association
  • Section 23-A of the Act, Article 37 of the Articles of Association
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee-appellant, a limited company, declared no dividend for Assessment Years 1952-53 and 1953-54. The Income-tax Officer invoked Section 23-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, on the footing that:

  • Its total assessed income for 1952-53 was Rs 22,65,227.
  • Two shareholders—Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and Punjab Produce & Investment Co. Ltd.—held 3,21,594 of the 3,70,000 shares, leaving less than 25 % in the hands of the public.
  • Article 33 of the company’s Articles of Association empowered directors to refuse registration of share transfers without assigning reasons, which the officer treated as a restriction on free transferability.
  • After deducting tax of Rs 8,40,524, undistributed profits of Rs 14,23,703 were deemed to have been distributed.

The assessee’s appeals progressed as follows:

  1. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the Income-tax Officer’s order.
  2. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reversed that decision, holding that the assessee was a public company in which the public was substantially interested and that its shares were freely transferable.
  3. On reference, the Calcutta High Court, relying on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd. (1963) 48 ITR 902, answered the question in favour of the revenue.
  4. The assessee obtained a certificate and appealed to the Supreme Court, which delivered the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, Section 23-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was rightly invoked against the assessee-company for the relevant assessment years.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Both Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and Punjab Produce & Investment Co. Ltd. are public companies in which the public is substantially interested; therefore, their shareholding should be treated as “public” for the purposes of Section 23-A.
  • The High Court’s reliance on Tona Jute Co. is misplaced because that decision has been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in Shree Krishna Agency Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 3 SCC 377.
  • The mere existence of an article allowing directors to refuse registration of transfers does not, without proof of its restrictive use, negate free transferability of shares.
  • No evidence exists that any group acted in concert to control the company.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Supported the High Court’s application of Tona Jute Co. to treat the shares as not freely transferable.
  • Requested a remand to tax authorities to ascertain whether a concerted group controlled the assessee-company.
  • Invoked CIT v. Jubilee Mills Ltd. (1963) 48 ITR 9 to argue that concentrated voting control removes a company from the ambit of “publicly interested” companies.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd. (1963) 48 ITR 902 Shares of a company are not “freely transferable” if directors can refuse transfers without reasons; such company falls within Section 23-A. Relied on by the High Court, but the Supreme Court held it had been impliedly overruled and declined to follow it.
Shree Krishna Agency Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 3 SCC 377 Mere existence of a discretionary refusal clause does not affect free transferability absent evidence of restrictive use. Approved and applied by the Supreme Court to uphold the assessee’s position.
East India Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (1966) 61 ITR 16 Same principle as Shree Krishna Agency; article of association does not per se restrict free transferability. Cited as an authority whose view was approved in Shree Krishna Agency.
Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. CIT, Bombay (1969) 74 ITR 823 Supports the view that discretionary refusal clauses do not automatically negate free transferability. Also approved in Shree Krishna Agency; reinforces the Supreme Court’s approach.
CIT v. Jubilee Mills Ltd. (1963) 48 ITR 9 Where a single group holds more than 75 % of voting power, the company is not one in which the public is substantially interested. Distinguished; Supreme Court held it inapplicable because the 75 % holding was by two public companies, not by a concerted group.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook the following analytical steps:

  1. Noted that Tona Jute Co., the sole authority supporting the High Court’s view, stood impliedly overruled by the Court’s own later decision in Shree Krishna Agency Ltd.
  2. Applied the principle from Shree Krishna Agency Ltd. that the mere presence of an article empowering directors to refuse transfers does not, without evidence of its restrictive use, negate free transferability of shares.
  3. Found no evidence that the directors had used Article 33 to impede transfers, nor any proof of a group acting in concert to control the company.
  4. Rejected the revenue’s request for a remand; despite an adjournment, the department could not produce “cogent material” to show group control.
  5. Distinguished Jubilee Mills on the ground that the 75 % shareholding in the present case was held by two public companies, not by partners acting as a concerted group.
  6. Concluded that Section 23-A was wrongly invoked because the assessee is a public company in which the public is substantially interested and whose shares are freely transferable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeals allowed; the question is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee, and the High Court’s judgment is set aside.

Implications: The deemed-dividend order under Section 23-A for the relevant assessment years stands quashed, relieving the assessee of the associated tax liability. The decision turns on established Supreme Court authority and does not set out a new legal principle, but reaffirms that discretionary transfer clauses alone do not negate free transferability of shares.

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    Pilani Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central) .

    H.R Khanna, J.— These two appeals on certificate are directed against the judgment of Calcutta High Court whereby it answered the following question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue:

    “Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of Section 23-A were rightly invoked.”

    2. The matter relates to Assessment Years 1952-53 and 1953-54. It would, however, be convenient to set out the facts, relating to the year 1952-53 because the decision in regard to the assessment for that year would also govern the assessment for the following year. The assessee-appellant is a limited company. Proceedings under Section 23-A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) were started against the appellant-company as it had not declared any dividend during the year. The Income Tax Officer found that the income of the assessee-company had been determined in regular assessment to be Rs 22,65,227 and despite that it had not declared any dividend. The Income Tax Officer observed that there were only two big shareholders of the assessee company, namely, Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd., Birlanagar (Gwalior) (hereinafter referred to as “J.C Mills”) and Punjab Produce and Investment Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as P.P.I Co.). J.C Mills, in the opinion of the Income Tax Officer, could not be regarded as a member of the public as it was being represented on the Board of Directors through its General Manager, D.P Mandalia. P.P.I Co. was found to be a company to which the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act were applicable. These two companies between themselves held 3,21,594 shares out of the total shareholding of 3,70,000 shares. As the shares held by the public, in the opinion of the Income Tax Officer, came to less than 25 per cent of the total shareholding, the assessee-company was held to fall within the purview of Section 23-A of the Act. The Income Tax Officer also referred to Article 33 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the assessee-company, according to which the directors could without assigning any reason decline to register a transfer to a transferee of whom they did not approve. This fact was held to be a definite restriction on the transfer of shares. It was further observed that the shares of the assessee-company were not quoted in stock exchange. After deducting Rs 8,40,524 on account of tax payable on Rs 22,65,227, the balance of Rs 14,23,703 was deemed by the Income Tax Officer to have been distributed amongst the share-holders.

    3. On appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was urged on behalf of the assessee-company that J.C Mills and P.P.I Co. were companies in which the public was substantially interested and, as such, the share-holding of these public companies should be considered to be shares held by the members of the public. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not go into the question as to whether or not the above mentioned two companies were such in which the public was substantially interested. He observed that groups of the two companies were controlling the affairs of the assessee-company and, as such, the shares held by them could not be considered to be shares held by the members of the public. The appeal filed by the assessee was accordingly dismissed.

    4. The matter was then taken up by the assessee in appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. It was urged before the Tribunal that J.C Mills was a public limited company to which the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act were not applicable. It was also pointed out that the P.P.I Co. was a company to which the provisions of Section 23-A did not apply. A copy of the order of Appellate Assistant Commissioner made in appeal filed by P.P.I Co was produced before the Tribunal. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had by that order set aside the order of Income Tax Officer and had held that Section 23-A of the Act did not apply to P.P.I Co. The Tribunal observed that both J.C Mills and P.P.I Co. were public companies in which the public were substantially interested and, therefore, it was not correct to say that the shares held by the two companies were controlled by a group of persons as distinguished from members of the public. The Tribunal further observed that the usual clause in the Memorandum and Articles of Association empowering the directors to decline to register a transfer of shares without assigning any reason did not mean any restriction on the transferability of shares by one holder to another. The Tribunal also found that there was nothing to show that the shares were not in fact freely transferable. The Tribunal consequently upheld the assessee's contention that it was a public limited company in which the public was substantially interested and its share were freely transferable. The provisions of Section 23-A of the Act were held to have been wrongly invoked. The order of the Income Tax Officer in this respect was consequently set aside. The question reproduced above was thereafter referred to the High Court. The High Court by a short order answered the question in the affirmative and in this connection relied upon an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd (1963) 48 ITR 902.

    5. In appeal before us, Mr Sen on behalf of the appellant has contended that the decision of Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Tona Jute Co. Ltd. has been impliedly overruled by a decision of this Court in the case of Shree Krishna Agency Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 3 SCC 377. This contention, in our opinion, is well founded. In the case of Tona Jute Co. the Calcutta High Court had expressed the view that a public limited company whose directors had absolute discretion to refuse to register transfer of a share to any person whom it would, in their opinion, be undesirable in the interest of the company to admit to membership and were not obliged to give any reason for refusal to register, was not a company the shares of which were freely transferable to other members of the public within the meaning of Section 23-A of the Act. A view contrary to that of Calcutta High Court was taken by the Madras High Court in East India Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (1966) 61 ITR 16 and the Bombay High Court in Raghuvanshi Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1969) 74 ITR 823. This Court in the case of Shree Krishna Agency Ltd. approved the view taken by the Madras and Bombay High Courts. This Court in that case dealt with Article 37 of the Articles of Association of the assessee-company which was a public company and which provided that the directors might at any time in their absolute and uncontrollable discretion and without assigning any reason decline to register any proposed transfer of shares. It was held that in the absence of evidence to show that the directors had been exercising their power under Article 37 freely and had virtually eliminated the element of free transferability of the shares in the company, the mere existence of an article like Article 37 could not be said to affect the free transferability of the shares as contemplated by the explanation to Section 23-A of the Act.

    6. There is in the present case also no evidence to show that the directors had eliminated the element of transferability of shares. As such, we find that the decision of the High Court in answering the question against the assessee cannot be sustained.

    7. On an earlier date of hearing Mr Ahuja, on behalf of the revenue, prayed for adjournment to ascertain whether there was any cogent material on the record to show that there was any group acting in concert which was in control of the assessee-company. The adjournment was granted. When the hearing of the case was resumed thereafter, Mr Ahuja on behalf of the department frankly stated that he had not been able to find any cogent material to show that there was any group acting in concert which was in control of the assessee-company. He, however, prayed that the case be remanded to the authorities concerned for going into this question. As the matter relates to Assessment Year 1952-53 and as Mr Ahuja in spite of adjournment has not been able to find any cogent material to warrant the plea that a group acting in concert was in control of the assessee-company, we are of the opinion that we should not accede to the prayer of Mr Ahuja in this respect. The fact that two public limited companies were holding between themselves more than 75 per cent of the shares of the assessee-company was not sufficient to attract Section 23-A of the Act.

    8. The case of CIT v. Jubilee Mills Ltd. (1963) 48 ITR 9, (1963) 1 SCJ 133 referred to by Mr Ahuja cannot be of much assistance to him. In the said case the Managing Agents of a company were partners of a firm who held between themselves more than 75 per cent of the voting power. It was held that as more than 75 per cent of voting power was held by a group, the company was not a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23-A. In the present case as appears from the resume of facts, more than 75 per cent of shares of the assessee-company are held not by a group of partners, but by two public companies in which public are substantially interested. There is also no material to show that any group acting in concert is in control of the assessee-company. As such, the case of Jubilee Mills cannot be said to have any material bearing.

    9. We accordingly accept the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and discharge the answer given by it to the question referred to it. We answer the said question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee-appellant shall also be entitled to the costs of this Court and in the High Court. One set of hearing fee.

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    Pilani Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central) .
    (Jan 9, 1973)