Per majority judgment.— Payments are revenue expenditure.
Per Sikri, C.J— The payments are capital expenditure.
Held :
(i) It is not always easy to distinguish whether an agreement is for the payment of price in stipulated instalments or for making annual payments in the nature of income.
There is no single test of universal application for a solution of the question (whether a particular expenditure is revenue expenditure or capital expenditure) and therefore the court has to look not only into the document relating to the transaction, but also the surrounding circumstances, to decide its true nature, the name which the parties give to it being of little consequence.
In distinguishing between a capital and revenue expenditure the courts have applied, in different cases, different tests. Nonetheless, it is recognised that none of them, by itself, is conclusive and the determination, one way or the other, has to be made on the facts and circumstances of each case
(Para 18)
Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 27 ITR 34, 46; CIT v. Coal Shipment (P) Ltd., Civil Appeals Nos. 1494 to 1498 of 1971, decided on October 14, 1971; Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd., 24 TC 453; Strict v. Regent Oil Co. Ltd., 43 TC 1, 38; In re Ramjidas Jaini & Co., 1945 ITR 430; Kuppuswami v. CIT, (1954) 25 ITR 349; Ogden v. Medway Cinemas Ltd., 18 TC 691; Secretary of State for India v. Scoble, 1903 AC 299; Jones v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 7 TC 310; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Ramsay, 20 TC 79; Vithaldas Thakordas of Co. v. CIT, 1946 ITR 822; Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, (1966) 62 ITR 566; Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. 36/49 Holdings Ltd., 25 TC 173, 183; CIT v. Kharwar, (1969) 72 ITR 603; Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. 10 TC 155; Robert Addic and Sons Collieries Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 8 TC 671; Commissioner of Taxes v. Nachanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., (1965) 58 ITR 241; CIT v. Finley Mills, (1951) 20 ITR 475, considered
(ii) The assessing authority is undoubtedly entitled and indeed bound to determine the true legal relationship resulting from transaction.
If the parties have chosen to conceal, by devices, the true legal relationship, it is open for the authority to unravel such device and ascertain the true nature of the transaction.
This does not mean that the legal character of the transaction which is the source of the receipt can be ignored and substituted by what the taxing authority considers the substance of the matter.
If the transaction is embodied in a document the liability to tax depends on the meaning and content of the language used in it in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction
(Para 18)
Per Sikri, CJ.:
(iii) Where a clause of the dissolution deed says what it means to conveys, namely, that there is an agreement to “sell and sale of goodwill” of the partnership which belonged to the vendor, it is difficult to water down the words “As consideration for and in full satisfaction of the purchase price of the goodwill” by any of the subsequent clauses
(Para 2)
Per majority judgment:
Clause (2) of the document, no doubt, uses expressions such as “agreed to sell” and “the purchase price of the goodwill”. These expressions, however, are not to determine time of the exact nature of the transaction or the relationship between the parties arising therefrom. Though clause (2) uses expression which on superficial view might appear to indicate a sale of the goodwill, neither that nor any other clause mentions what its purchase price was. The document was not one of those where the price is expressed in lump sum and is made payable by specific instalments within a specified period. Clause (2) does not fix such a price nor mention a lump sum in respect of which annual payments are to be made
(Para 27)
Pa Sikri, C.J:
(i) The three grounds viz. (1) indefinite period of payment, (2) absence of any expressed lump sum, and (3) payment relating to profits and not being tied up with any fixed sum agreed to as purchase price are not conclusive in a case where there can be no doubt that the capital asset has been sold.
(Para 3)
Travancore Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, (1966) 62 ITR 566, explained
Per majority judgment:
Two things, however, may at once be observed: First, that the duration of payments is indefinite and secondly, the amount is indefinite, depending as it does upon the rise and fall in the profits of business. Obviously, the payment is not related to any lump sum fixed as the purchase price. On the contrary it is directly related to and dependent upon whether at all and what profits are made.
Further the document is silent as to what is to happen to the goodwill, if the vendee or his partner ceases to carry on the business in the agreed name.
The transaction thus contains all the grounds given in the case of Travancore Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. and hence such payments can be treated as Capital disbursement
(Para 28)
Travancore Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, (1966) 62 ITR 566, followed
Appeal allowed