Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 147, 447 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
  • Section 447 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 147 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 304 (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 147, 447 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
  • Section 447 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 147 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 304 (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 31 August 1968. The High Court had: (i) affirmed the conviction of appellant Gangu under Section 304 Part I IPC, sentencing him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment, and (ii) reversed the trial court’s acquittal of co-appellants — Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram — convicting each under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentencing them to five years’ rigorous imprisonment.

The underlying incident occurred on 26 October 1964 over possession of agricultural Plot No. 559 in village Simra. The prosecution alleged that Damru (PW-1) held a patta for the land, had cultivated a tilli (sesame) crop, and that the accused group attempted to harvest it forcibly. In the ensuing confrontation Kashiram (Damru’s brother) was fatally speared by Gangu after preliminary lathi blows were exchanged.

Before the Additional Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh, the trial court found that the accused were in possession of the field and that Gangu had a right of private defence, though exceeded; it convicted only Gangu (Section 304 I) and acquitted the others. The State appealed and the High Court reversed the acquittal, giving rise to the present appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the trial court’s acquittal of Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram and in convicting them under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC.
  2. Whether the High Court correctly evaluated evidence on possession of Plot No. 559 and, consequently, the availability and extent of the right of private defence to the accused.
  3. Whether appellant Gangu’s conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC was sustainable and whether he was entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The High Court set aside the acquittal of Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram without adequate evidence and without addressing the trial court’s reasons.
  • The High Court misread both documentary and oral evidence, thereby wrongly rejecting the defence of private defence.
  • Application of Section 34 IPC to impose vicarious liability on the three co-appellants was legally unsustainable because no common intention was proved.
  • In Gangu’s case, his right of private defence was not appreciated; given his age (19 years), Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been invoked.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Possession of the disputed land. After a detailed examination of revenue records, orders of the Naib Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer and Collector (Exts. D-1, D-2, D-14, D-15, D-16 and others), the Court concluded that the documentary evidence consistently showed possession with appellant Parichhat, and that the patta in Damru’s favour had been declared a nullity on 1 February 1964. The High Court’s reliance on a 28 October 1964 khasra entry favouring Damru was criticised as “precarious and unworthy,” having been made two days after the occurrence by an interested Patwari.

2. Right of private defence. Because the accused were in possession, they were not aggressors; a right of private defence of property (and of person, vis-à-vis Kashiram’s imminent second lathi blow on Parichhat) arose. However, Gangu exceeded that right when he delivered a fatal spear thrust despite facing only lathis, leading to liability under Section 304 Part I, not a full justification.

3. Applicability of Section 34 IPC to co-appellants. The Court reiterated that Section 34 requires proof of (i) a pre-arranged plan/common intention, and (ii) participation in furtherance of that intention. Evidence showed: (a) only Gangu delivered the fatal spear blow; (b) Sunnu and Sitaram merely exhorted; (c) there was no prior meeting of minds to kill Kashiram. Hence Section 34 could not fasten vicarious liability for the grievous hurt or homicide on them.

4. Evaluation of prosecution witness credibility. The Patwari (PW-11) was found unreliable as his oral testimony conflicted with official records. Investigation was tainted by a prior dispute: Sub-Inspector Ram Lakhan Sharma and village president Dharam Ballabh were allegedly hostile to the appellants and involved as panch witnesses, casting doubt on the prosecution case.

5. Probation argument for Gangu. Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act was held inapplicable because Section 304 Part I IPC is punishable with imprisonment for life; the statute excludes such offences.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The convictions of appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram are set aside and they are acquitted. The conviction of Gangu under Section 304 Part I IPC is affirmed; he remains sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Implications: The decision restores the trial court’s view on co-appellants and clarifies that mere presence or verbal exhortation, absent a pre-arranged plan, is insufficient for conviction under Section 34 IPC. It re-emphasises rigorous scrutiny of documentary evidence in determining possession and the scope of private defence. No new legal precedent was expressly created, but the ruling reinforces standards for appellate interference with acquittals and application of Section 34 IPC.

    Parichhat And Others v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .

    A.N Ray, J.— This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated August 31, 1968 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant Gangu and accepted the appeal of the State against the judgment dated March 31, 1965 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh. The High Court maintained the conviction of the appellant Gangu and the sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment passed against him under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court set aside the acquittal of the appellants, Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram under Sections 147 and 302 read with Section 149 and under Section 447 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

    2. Each of the appellants, Parichhat, Ram Sahai, Sunnu and two other accused Sitaram and Durji was charged on three counts. First that each was member of an unlawful assembly on October 26, 1964 and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly viz. in forcibly cutting the tilli crop of Damrulal standing in the field Plot No. 559 and in taking possession of that plot, committed the offence of rioting punishable under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code. Secondly, each on the said date committed criminal trespass by entering into the field Plot No. 559 of Damrulal with intent to cut the tilli crop standing in the field and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. Thirdly, each was member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of which viz. in forcibly cutting the tilli crop of Damrulal standing in the field Plot No. 559, and in taking possession of that plot, one of the members Gangu committed murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Kashiram and each was charged under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code of causing the murder of Kashiram, an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    3. The appellant Gangu was charged on three counts. The first two counts were similar to those of the other appellants. The third count was that Gangu on October 26, 1964 did commit murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Kashiram, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    4. The prosecution case was this. The relationship between Damru and his brother Kashiram the deceased and the appellant Parichhat was strained for some time with regard to possession of Khasra 559 of Village Simra. The patta of the Khasra was given to Damru (PW 1) on October 8, 1963. Parichhat made efforts to have this patta cancelled. Parichhat was unsuccessful in obtaining cancellation of the patta granted to Damru. Parichhat decided to cut forcibly the standing crop of tilli sown by Damru over the land, of Plot No. 559. Parichhat went with labourers on the field on October 26, 1964. Damru requested the labourers not to cut the crop. The labourers went away. Parichhat opened the attack by a lathi blow on Kashiram. Kashiram warded off on his lathi and returned the blow to Parichhat with lathi. Sitaram and Ram Sahai thereupon exhorted Gangu. Gangu thrust his ballam in the chest of Kashiram who after giving lathi blows on Sunnu and Sitaram, fell on the ground. Damru beat Sunnu and Sitaram with lathi. All the accused thereafter ran away. Kashiram died when he was taken to the police station. Damru made the first information report.

    5. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The defence of Parichhat was that he was in possession of the field and had sown tilli thereon. His further defence was that he was assaulted by lathi by Damru, Kashiram and others. Gangu, Ram Sahai and Mst Durji pleaded that they were not present at the place of occurrence. The rest of the accused pleaded that they were falsely implicated.

    6. The Sessions Judge held that the land in dispute was in the possession of the appellants and Gangu had a right of private defence of property as well as of person of his father Parichhat on whose head deceased Kashiram had lifted and aimed his stick second time to strike but Gangu had exceeded his right of private defence and therefore Gangu was convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code. The other 5 accused including the three appellants, Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram were acquitted by the Sessions Judge.

    7. The High Court held that the possession of the land in dispute was with Damru who had sown and grown the crop. Even if Damru's title over the field was not established by the prosecution because the patta was not validly granted Damru stood in a better position than Parichhat by virtue of his cultivation over the field. The High Court held that the cultivation would establish Damru's possession and on that reasoning Damru would resist Parichhat and his party. Therefore, the High Court held that the accused being aggressors, they had no right of private defence.

    8. The High Court therefore maintained the conviction of the appellant Gangu to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code and set aside the acquittal of the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram and convicted them under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years.

    9. Counsel on behalf of the appellants raised these contentions. The High Court was wrong in setting aside the acquittal of the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram without evidence and without giving consideration to reasons for acquittal given by the Sessions Judge. The High Court misread the documentary and the oral evidence and thereby failed to appreciate the plea of private defence. The High Court acted illegally in applying Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code to the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram. Gangu was convicted without considering his right of private defence and since Gangu was 19 years in age Section 6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been applied.

    10. The Sessions Judge held that there was no reliable evidence on record to hold that Damru, PW 1 was in possession on the date of occurrence and Parichhat and others had rightfully entered the field in question and thus committed no offence punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge also held that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly. The High Court on the contrary arrived at these findings. The possession of field 559 was handed over to Damru in 1963 and the patta in favour of Damru was not cancelled. The land belonged to Government and Parichhat was a trespasser. There were orders for evicting Parichhat. Parichhat was evicted from the land. Ext. D-14 would show that Parichhat was evicted and fined. Ext. P-10 dated October 28, 1964 would show possession of Damru on the land in dispute and that tilli crop was sown by him on the land.

    11. The most important question is therefore to find out what the evidence was as to who was in possession of Plot No. 559 on the date of occurrence viz. October 26, 1964. It will appear from Ext. D-15 dated September 8, 1962 that Parichhat and Shyam Sunder, son of Sitaram, were in possession of the disputed land. The khasra entry dated September 8, 1962, also showed that the Naib Tahsildar had on August 17, 1962 ordered the dispossession of Parichhat and Shyam Sunder and fined them Rs 100 each. On January 23, 1963 there was an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in Appeal 14 of 1962-63 setting aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated August 17, 1962 of the imposition of fine of Rs 100 each and dispossession of Shyam Sunder and Parichhat. On May 9, 1963 Babu Lal Patwari, PW 11 reported to the Sub-Divisional Officer as will appear from Ext. D-14 that Parichhat and Shyam Sunder were still in possession and they had not obeyed the order of the Naib Tahsildar for dispossession. On September 22, 1963 there was a receipt Ext. D-16 given by Babu Lal Patwari, PW 11 for Rs 54.58 as land revenue for the disputed land received from Shyam Sunder and Parichhat. On October 8, 1963 the Naib Tahsildar in Ext. P-1 made an order granting patta of the disputed land in favour of Damru (PW 1) on the basis of a note of the Collector dated August 24, 1963 treating the same as an order by the Collector under Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. On February 1, 1964 the Collector in Ext. D-1 held that his note dated August 24, 1963 was only a comment in an administrative matter and was not an order under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and the Naib Tahsildar had no authority to grant patta on the basis thereof and only the Tahsildar was empowered to grant patta and the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated October 8, 1963 in Ext. P-1 was declared a nullity. On February 22, 1964 the Sub-Divisional Officer in Ext. P-2 in ignorance of the order of the Collector dated February 1, 1964, held in appeal, that the Naib Tahsildar had passed orders on the basis of the Collector's note dated August 24, 1963 and the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to hear appeal from and set aside the order of the Collector dated August 24, 1963. On July 4, 1964 there was an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in Ext. D-2 that the order of the Collector dated February 1, 1964 in Ext. D-1 declaring that the patta Ext. P-1 was a nullity had not been brought to his notice and in view of the order of the Collector, the Naib Tahsildar had no power to grant patta and therefore his own previous order dated February 22, 1964 became invalid in view of the Collector's order dated February 1, 1964.

    12. The documentary evidence points to one conclusion that the appellant Parichhat was in possession of the land and the grant of patta in favour of Damru was declared by the Collector to be a nullity. The High Court completely ignored these documents. The incident occurred on October 26, 1964. There is a significant piece of documentary evidence dated October 28, 1964. The High Court relied on that document. That is Khasra entry drawn by Babu Lal Patwari, PW 11 after the incident showing Damru complainant as pattadar tenant. This is directly opposed to the Collector's order dated February 1, 1964. Khasra entry dated October 28, 1964 further shows that Damru had sown tilli crop on the land. Babu Lal Patwari, PW 11, in his oral evidence said that the order of Naib Tahsildar dated August 17, 1962 ordering dispossession of Parichhat and Shyam Sunder, son of Sitaram, from the property in question amounted to dispossession of Parichhat. Babu Lal Patwari's evidence is contrary to the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated January 23, 1963 setting aside the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated August 17, 1962 and also the order of the Naib Tahsildar himself dated October 8, 1963 granting a patta of the land to Damru which order was declared unauthorised and nullity by the Collector's order dated February 1, 1964. The High Court did not notice these pieces of documentary evidence.

    13. The other documents which the High Court did not notice are Ext. D-14, dated May 9, 1963 which was a report by Babu Lal Patwari, PW 11 that Parichhat and others had taken unlawful possession and had not vacated possession Ext. D-16 dated September 22, 1963 being receipt of revenue paid by Parichhat. Ext. D-3 dated April 26, 1964 was also not noticed by the High Court. That exhibit relates to information of non-cognizable offence by the police. The date of information is April 26, 1964. Parichhat was the complainant. Damru and his son Mukundi were the alleged co-accused. The information given by Parichhat was that Damru and his son Mukundi arrived on the field with lathis. Parichhat was grazing buffaloes on the field. Parichhat prevented Damru and his son who broke the fence of the hut. This was the gist of the information. These documents indicate that Parichhat was in possession.

    14. Babu Lal Patwari in his oral evidence said that Parichhat had possession over the land till Samvat 2017-18 and that the possession was unauthorised. Babu Lal Patwari further said that Parichhat and Shyam Sunder were dispossessed from the land in Samvat 2018 and Samvat 2019 and the land was then lying vacant. In Samvat 2020 the land was allotted to Damru. The High Court relied on the oral evidence of Babu Lal Patwari which was contrary to all documentary evidence. The order of the Naib Tehsilder dated August 17, 1962 ordering dispossession of Parichhat which was relied on by the High Court to support the finding of possession of land by Damru was set aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer on January 23, 1963 as will appear from Ext. D-26. Again, the order of the Naib Tahsildar dated September 8, 1962 granting patta of the land to Damru was also declared a nullity by the Collector's order dated February 1, 1964. Entry dated October 28, 1964 which was relied on by the High Court showing possession of land by Damru came into existence two days after the date of occurrence. It was written by Babu Lal Patwari who supported Damru. Therefore the entry dated October 28, 1964 is precarious and unworthy in character.

    15. The High Court relied on Exts. D-14, D-15 and D-16 and the evidence of Babu Lal Patwari to show dispossession of Parichhat and Shyam Sunder. Ext. D-14 is the report dated May 9, 1963 by Babu Lal Patwari to the effect that in spite of the order of the Naib Tahsildar for dispossession Shyam Sunder and Parichhat were still in possession in Samvat 2017 and 2018. The report itself contains the remarks “still they have not given over possession”. Ext. D-15 dated September 8, 1962 is a copy of Khasra. Five plots including Plot No. 559 were mentioned there. Sitaram, Brindavan, father of Sitaram, Pyarelal, father of Parichhat, Parichhat, Shyam Sunder, son of Parichhat are shown to be in possession. There is a note to Ext. D-15 by Babu Lal Patwari dated September 8, 1962 to the effect that the Tahsildar has dispossessed Sitaram and Parichhat by order dated July 17, 1962 (sic) meaning August 17, 1962 by imposing a fine and ordering payment of double land revenue. Ext. D-16 is the receipt dated September 22, 1963 of revenue from Shyam Sunder and Parichhat. These Exs. D-14, D-15 and D-16 show that land was in possession of Parichhat and not of Damru and the High Court totally misread the documents.

    16. The High Court did not notice the order of the Collector dated February 1, 1964 declaring the patta in favour of Damru a nullity and the order dated July 4, 1964 of the Sub-Divisional Officer that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated February 22, 1964 stood vacated in view of the order of the Collector dated February 1, 1964. These documents totally repel the erroneous reading of the evidence by the High Court that the patta in favour of Damru had not been cancelled. The documents establish that Parichhat was in possession of the disputed land.

    17. Ext. P. 10 dated October 28, 1964 on which the High Court relied in support of the finding that tilli crop had been sown and grown by Damru does not support the finding. The prosecution case was that tilli crop had not been cut on the date of the occurrence October 26, 1964. The High Court said that if the crop had been sown and grown by Parichhat he would never have made any efforts to cut the same in green and unripe condition. The evidence of Mukundi, son of Damru, was that when Parichhat and the labourers arrived for cutting the crop on the date of the occurrence Kashiram said that the tilli crop could not be cut and Damru said that the tilli was grown and it should not be cut. It was never put to Parichhat in the statement under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code whether Parichhat had cut the tilli crop in green and unripe condition. The High Court was therefore wrong in holding that Parichhat would not have cut the tilli in green and unripe condition if tilli crop had been sown by him. No such question was put to Babu Lal Patwari or to any other witness whether the tilli crop was unripe. It was never alleged in the first information report nor in evidence that the tilli crop on the land was unripe and that it was not mature for cutting. Therefore, as the prosecution case was that tilli crop was not cut on October 26, 1964 the date of occurrence the entry of Babu Lal Patwari on October 28, 1964 that Damru had sown and grown tilli crop had become totally unworthy. The entry made by Babu Lal Patwari on October 28, 1964 appears to be brought into existence to bolster the plea of possession of land by Damru.

    18. The real importance of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that there is a duty cast upon the courts to question the accused properly and fairly so that it is brought home to the accused in clear words the exact case that the accused will have to meet, and thereby an opportunity is given to the accused to explain any such point. The High Court being under the impression that the tilli was in green and unripe condition held that if Parichhat had sown and grown the crop he would have preserved and protected the crop and not cut the same. This finding is totally inconsistent with the other finding of the High Court that Damru was in possession of the land. If Damru had been in possession Parichhat would not have sown tilli crop. If, on the other hand, Parichhat had been in possession and had sown and grown the crop it should have been clearly put to Parichhat that tilli crop was green and unripe. If Parichhat had sown and grown the crop, the entire prosecution case fails.

    19. The High Court convicted the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution was required to prove first the common intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of Kashiram which presupposed a pre-arranged plan and prior meeting of the minds to achieve that intention and secondly, participation in action by each of the appellants for the achievement of that intention i.e committing the murder of Kashiram. The prosecution case was this. Gangu gave a blow with the spear to Kashiram on his chest as a result of which he died. Parichhat opened the attack by wielding his lathi on Kashiram. Kashiram warded it off by taking the same on his lathi. Kashiram did not strike any blow after that. Sunnu and Sitaram instigated Gangu to use his spear on Kashiram and did nothing else. Damru said that only Parichhat gave a lathi blow. Lalnaju (PW 2) a cultivator said that before the ballam injury Kashiram had struck Parichhat alone and none of the accused had given lathi blow before the ballam injury nor had any accused beaten the Sunars after the ballam injury. By Sunars Lalnaju meant Kashiram Sunar and Damru Sunar. PW 3 Ajudhi also said that out of the accused Gangu alone gave a spear blow.

    20. The Sessions Court disbelieved that the appellants Sunnu and Sitaram had instigated the appellant Gangu to give a ballam blow to Kashiram. The appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram did not beat or strike anyone. Common intention within the meaning of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code implies pre-arranged plan. There being no evidence of a prior meeting of minds and any pre-arranged plan or of participation of Sunnu and Sitaram in the fight they could not be convicted with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Parichhat could not be said to have common intention with Gangu to cause the death of Kashiram and Parichhat could not be convicted with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. If they wanted to dispossess Damru and if they went there to dispossess Damru and if Gangu killed Kashiram the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram could not be brought within the common intention of killing Kashiram. No such pre-arranged plan has been proved. It has also not been proved that any criminal act has been done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely, the intention to kill and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required by Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of murder.

    21. Dharam Ballabh was the President of the Gram Sabha. Ram Lakhan Sharma (PW 15) was the Sub-Inspector and Officer in-Charge of Police Station Prithvipur. Damru and Ram Lakhan Sharma were friends. Accused Durji was occupying a room in the house of accused as a tenant. Durji on July 21, 1964 sent a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police that when she had gone to collect gold and silver ornaments deposited by her with Dharam Ballabh the latter assaulted her and the head constable at Simra refused to record her report. Ram Lakhan Sharma was deputed by the Superintendent of Police to enquire into that matter. Ram Lakhan Sharma went to Village Simra on July 30, 1964. The appellants Sitaram, Parichhat and accused sent a letter to the Superintendent of Police on August 3, 1964 narrating that Ram Lakhan Sharma the investigating officer had accepted money from Dharam Ballabh the Sabhapati of village Simra. It also transpired from the evidence that Damru and Ajudhi and Jaggutwo prosecution witnesses were all tenants of Dharam Ballabh in respect of agricultural lands. Sitaram and Sunnu were agriculturists having adjoining lands. Parichhat and his son Gangu were in possession of Plot No. 559. Dharam Ballabh recommended grant of patta in favour of Damru. It is in this context that the Sessions Court had found that the Sub-Inspector of Police with the aid of Dharam Ballabh implicated Parichhat, Sitaram and Durji so that Durji might abandon the case against Dharam Ballabh. The High Court did not consider these aspects at all. It is also in evidence that investigation was made by Ram Lakhan Sharma the Station Officer and Dharam Ballabh against whom allegations had been made by the appellants and against whom the case instituted by Durji was pending and against whom allegations were made by Parichhat and Sunnu and Sitaram was brought as a panch witness in the investigation. Apart from the inimical relations between Dharam Ballabh and Parichhat, the investigation with the aid of Dharam Ballabh as the panch witness became tainted and controversial. In a criminal trial courts have to be cautious and chary of such course of action.

    22. Section 34 will not be attracted unless first it is established that a criminal act was done by several persons, second, that there was a common intention and a pre-arranged plan to commit an offence and third that there was participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance of that common intention. The High Court was wrong in convicting the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Their convictions are set aside. The High Court in setting aside the acquittal of Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram should have considered the enmity between Dharam Ballabh and Parichhat, the case instituted by Durji against Dharam Ballabh, the allegations made by Parichhat against Dharam Ballabh, the hostile and unsympathetic attitude of Ram Lakhan Sharma in investigating the complaint of Durji against Dharam Ballabh. If the appellants could not be convicted under Sections 147, 447 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and they were acquitted the acquittal could not be set aside by the High Court unless the Sessions Court in acquitting the accused was palpably wrong or took an erroneous view or committed grave injustice. The setting aside of the acquittal by the High Court was itself erroneous and wrong. The High Court was also wrong in convicting the appellants under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Merely remaining with Gangu at the time of cutting the crop will not justify any application of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code with regard to the murder of Kashiram.

    23. As to Gangu it was said that he defended his father Parichhat's person against the immediately impending second lathi blow by Kashiram on the head of Parichhat and that was sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt and even of the death of Parichhat. It is true that if the threat to the person or property which the accused was entitled to defend was real and immediate he was not required to weigh in golden scales the kind of instrument and the force which he used at the spur of the moment. The High Court held that no right of private defence was available to Gangu. The High Court was wrong in holding that the right of private defence was not available to Gangu. Gangu however exceeded the right of private defence. There would be no apprehension in his mind of grievous hurt because no sharp weapon was used. Secondly, there could be no reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt or death. Parichhat had only one simple injury on his head. The medical evidence was that the injury on the head of Parichhat was on the back. That would indicate that Parichhat was beaten when he had his back to Kashiram. Gangu exceeded the right of private defence and caused the death of Kashiram without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of defence. The conviction of Gangu under Section 304 (Part I) of the Indian Penal Code by the High Court is upheld.

    24. It was contended on behalf of the appellant Gangu that he was under 21 years of age and therefore he should have the benefit of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act is applicable where a person under 21 years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment but not with imprisonment for life. In the present case Gangu has been found guilty under Section 304 (Part I) of the Indian Penal Code and the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life. Therefore, Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act is not attracted. It was then submitted that the punishment of Gangu should be under Section 304 (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code in order to attract the provisions of Sections 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. That is impermissible now. The Sessions Court passed the sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment in the case of Gangu. The High Court upheld the conviction and confirmed the sentence. Gangu will serve out the sentence.

    25. For these reasons, the appellants Parichhat, Sunnu and Sitaram are acquitted and the conviction of Gangu is maintained.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Parichhat And Others v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .
    (Oct 14, 1971)