AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1), Section 6, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 6 and Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 36, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
  • Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 48(2) and (3) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1), Section 6, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 6 and Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 36, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
  • Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 48(2) and (3) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 23 December 1963, the Deputy Commissioner of Mahasu, at the request of Air Force authorities, took possession of land in Village Calu Chak, including 8-14-0 bighas owned by the respondent. The record did not disclose any statutory authority for this initial occupation. Subsequently:

  • 31 March 1964 – A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, announced that the area was likely to be needed for a public purpose.
  • 16 May 1964 – A composite notification under Sections 6 and 17(1) & (4) declared the land urgently required, dispensed with the Section 5-A enquiry, and stated that possession would be taken fifteen days after publication of notices under Section 9(1).
  • June 1964 – Notices under Section 9 were served.
  • 5 October 1965 – The Government of Himachal Pradesh cancelled the earlier acquisition notifications.

The respondent sought writ relief before the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh, contending that once possession had been taken under Section 17(1), the land vested irrevocably in the State and compensation proceedings had to follow. The Judicial Commissioner accepted this view and granted the writ. The State appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after issuing a notification under Sections 6 and 17(1) & (4) of the Land Acquisition Act and taking possession, the State can cancel the acquisition notifications by invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act or Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  2. Whether land that has statutorily vested in the Government under Section 17(1) can revert to the original owner merely through cancellation of the acquisition notifications.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — State of Himachal Pradesh

  • Invoked Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, asserting an unfettered power to rescind or cancel any earlier notification, including those issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, at any stage.
  • Maintained that Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act does not curtail this general power of cancellation.

Respondent

  • Relied on the statutory scheme of Section 17(1) & (4), contending that once possession is taken pursuant to these provisions, the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.
  • Argued that after such vesting, Section 48 permits withdrawal only when possession has not yet been taken, and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot operate to divest the Government or restore title to the original owner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, (1966) 3 SCR 557 Recognised that Government may cancel notifications under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act before possession is taken, but Section 48(1) bars withdrawal after possession. The Court held that the observations in this case impliedly support the view that cancellation is impermissible once possession is taken; therefore, the precedent did not aid the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice J. C. Shah, delivering the judgment, proceeded as follows:

  1. Reiterated the statutory mechanism: upon a Section 17(1) notification, and after fifteen days from the Section 9(1) notice, possession may be taken even without an award; on such possession, the land vests “exclusively in the Government free from all encumbrances.”
  2. Observed that although the initial entry on 23 December 1963 lacked legal authority, once the Section 17(1) procedure was invoked, the previously taken possession was deemed possession under that provision, effecting statutory vesting.
  3. Dismissed the State’s reliance on Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, holding that a general power to rescind notifications cannot override the specific consequence of vesting mandated by Section 17(1).
  4. Clarified that Section 48(1) expressly permits withdrawal only “of any land of which possession has not been taken.” Since possession had in fact been taken, the statutory bar applied.
  5. Rejected any late attempt by the State to challenge the validity of the Section 17(1) & (4) notification on the ground that the land was not “waste or arable,” noting that this had not been argued before the Judicial Commissioner.
  6. Concluded that no provision exists for divesting the State of title once vesting occurs, and cancellation of the notifications could not restore ownership to the respondent nor relieve the State of its obligation to determine compensation.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Immediate Effect: The order of the Judicial Commissioner stands; the acquisition remains valid, and the State must proceed to determine and pay compensation.

Broader Implications: The decision reinforces that once possession is taken under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the land vests absolutely in the Government and cannot be divested by invoking the general rescission power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act or the withdrawal power under Section 48. The ruling underscores the finality of vesting and safeguards landowners’ entitlement to compensation in urgent acquisitions.

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    Lt. Governor Of Himachal Pradesh And Another v. Sri Avinash Sharma .

    J.C Shah, J.— The Deputy Commissioner, Mahasu, apparently acting on the request of the Air Force Authorities took possession on December 23, 1963, of an area of land in Village Calu Chak. That area included 8-14-0 bighas belonging to the respondent. The record does not disclose the authority under which possession of the land was taken and delivered over to the Air Force. There was correspondence between the Air Force Authorities and the State of Himachal Pradesh in regard to the land occupied by the Air Force and ultimately on March 31, 1964, a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was published notifying that the area of land (including the land of the respondent) was likely to be needed by the State Government for a public purpose. By a composite notification under Section 6 and Section 17(1) and (4) dated May 16, 1964, the State of Himachal Pradesh declared that the land was needed for a public purpose, that since it was required urgently, the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed with, and that possession of the land will be taken under Section 17(1) of the Act after the expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act. The Collector of Mahasu then served notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act in June 1964. On October 5, 1965, the Government of Himachal Pradesh published an order cancelling the notification, dated March 31, 1964 and May 15, 1964, for acquisition of land for a public purpose.

    2. The respondent then presented a petition before the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, for a writ quashing the notification dated October 5, 1965, withdrawing and cancelling the previous notifications and for a writ of mandamus directing the authorities of the State Government to act according to law and discharge the duties cast by law upon them in the matter of determination of compensation for compulsory and urgent acquisition. The petition was granted by the Judicial Commissioner. In the view of the Judicial Commissioner when the notification under Section 17(1) and (4) was issued, and possession was taken by the State Government, the land vested in the Government and it was not competent to the State Government thereafter to withdraw the notifications in exercise of the power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Against the order of the Judicial Commissioner, this appeal has been preferred with special leave.

    3. The Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the State contended that under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act the State has the power to cancel the notifications at any time, and that Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act did not trench upon that power. Under the Land Acquisition Act a notification under Section 4 of the Act may be issued by the appropriate Government that any land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Unless the inquiry under Section 5-A is dispensed with, any person interested in the land notified may object to the acquisition of the land, or of any land in the locality. On the objections made, the Collector holds an inquiry after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard, and makes a report. The appropriate Government may, if satisfied, after considering the report, if any, of the Collector under Section 5-A(2), make a declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose. The declaration is conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Then follows an inquiry as to the amount of compensation payable to the owner of the land and to the other claimants. If the land is waste or arable, the Government may in case of urgency dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A and direct that possession may be taken on the expiration of fifteen days after publication of the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act even though no award of compensation is made by the Collector. When possession is taken the land vests exclusively in the Government free from all encumbrances.

    4. In the present case a notification under Section 17(1) and (4) was issued by the State Government and possession which had previously been taken must, from the date of expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1), be deemed to be in the possession of the Government. We are unable to agree that where the Government has obtained possession illegally or under some unlawful transaction and a notification under Section 17(1) is issued the land does not vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. We are of the view that when a notification under Section 17(1) is issued, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1), the possession previously obtained will be deemed to be the possession of the Government under Section 17(1) of the Act and the land will vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.

    5. It is true that the notification issued by the State of Himachal Pradesh under Section 17(1) and (4) does not recite that the land notified was “waste or arable”. But it was not contended before the Judicial Commissioner that the Government issued the notification under Section 17(1) and (4) without authority. Power under sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 may be only exercised when the land is waste or arable, and the Government having issued the notification, it is not open to them to contend for the first time at this stage that the land of the respondent was not waste or arable and the notifications were unauthorised.

    6. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act by the first sub-section provides:

    “Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.”
    Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is, it is true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government may cancel or rescind the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the State Government.

    7. In State of M.P v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma (1966) 3 SCR 557 on which reliance was placed, the only question which fell to be considered by the Court was whether a notification under Section 4(1) may be followed by successive notifications under Section 6 for small parts of the land comprised in one notification issued under Section 4. The Court rejected the contention that the State was invested with such a power. In considering the argument the Court referred to the power to cancel the notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, apart from the power conferred by Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court observed:

    “Section 48(1) is a special provision for those cases where proceedings for acquisition have gone beyond the stage of the issue of notice under Section 9(1) and it provides for payment of compensation under Section 48(2) read with Section 48(3). We cannot ... accept the argument that without an order under Section 48(1) the notification under Section 4 must remain outstanding. It can be cancelled at any time by Government under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and what Section 48(1) shows is that once Government has taken possession it cannot withdraw from the acquisition. Before that it may cancel the notification under Sections 4 and 6 or it may withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48(1). If no notice has been issued under Section 9(1) all that the Government has to do is to pay for the damage caused as provided in Section 5; if on the other hand a notice has been issued under Section 9(1), damage has also to be paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 48(2) and (3).”

    8. But these observations do not assist the case of the appellant. It is clearly implicit in the observations that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.

    9. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Lt. Governor Of Himachal Pradesh And Another v. Sri Avinash Sharma .
    (Apr 28, 1970)