AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
  • Section 3(1) of the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Section 3(6) of the Act
  • Article 303(1)
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955)
  • Article 303 of the Constitution
  • Article 301 in Part XIII of the Constitution
  • Section 3 of the Act, Article 302
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Act
  • Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
  • Section 3(1) of the Act
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Section 3(6) of the Act
  • Article 303(1)
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955)
  • Article 303 of the Constitution
  • Article 301 in Part XIII of the Constitution
  • Section 3 of the Act, Article 302
  • Section 3(2)(d) of the Act
  • Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners/appellants were dealers in rice and rice products (such as “Powa”, “Murmura” and “Idlirava”) operating from the State of Andhra Pradesh. They had applied for permits to export these commodities to other States or to move them within Andhra Pradesh. The competent authorities either rejected the applications or failed to decide them. Challenging the refusals, the dealers filed writ petitions under Article 226 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, attacking the constitutionality of three Control Orders issued under Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (“the Act”) and questioning the validity of Section 3(2)(d) itself. The High Court upheld both the Act and the Orders. The dealers then approached the Supreme Court through appeals by special leave, and a separate writ petition was also filed directly in the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and the three Control Orders issued thereunder violate Article 303 of the Constitution by giving preference to, or discriminating between, States.
  2. Whether the Control Orders constitute mere executive instructions rather than subordinate legislation enacted “by law” under Article 302.
  3. If the Orders are subordinate legislation, whether they are void for lack of the specific parliamentary declaration required by Article 303(2).
  4. Whether the Control Orders are invalid because the requisite “opinion” of the Central Government contemplated by Section 3(1) of the Act is not expressly recorded in the text of the Orders.
  5. Whether the Orders impose unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners’ right to trade—particularly because (a) permits may be refused arbitrarily and (b) no appeal or revision lies against such refusal.
  6. Whether Section 3(2)(d) of the Act is unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners/Appellants' Arguments

  • The three Control Orders offend Article 303 by preferring or discriminating between States.
  • The Orders are mere executive directions, not “law” within the meaning of Article 302.
  • Even if they are law, they are not protected by Article 303(2) because Parliament has issued no express declaration of necessity due to scarcity.
  • The Orders are vitiated for failure to record the Central Government’s “opinion” under Section 3(1).
  • The permit system confers arbitrary power, offers no appeal or revision, and thus imposes unreasonable restrictions on trade.
  • Section 3(2)(d) itself involves excessive delegation and is therefore unconstitutional.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 224; (1954) SCR 803 A licensing scheme that vests uncontrolled and arbitrary power in any delegate is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Distinguished: In the present case permits are issued by high-ranking officers (District Collectors/Deputy Commissioners of Civil Supplies), not by any delegate, and therefore the vice of arbitrariness found in Dwarka Prasad does not arise.
K.L. Gupta v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1968 SC 303; (1968) 1 SCR 274 Absence of an appellate remedy is not fatal when the initial power is vested in a high authority. Relied upon to hold that lack of a statutory appeal or revision against permit refusal does not render the Control Orders unreasonable.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397; (1957) SCR 233 Discretionary power vested in top-ranking authorities is presumed to be exercised lawfully; abuse cannot be readily assumed. Cited to reinforce the view that discretionary power in the hands of senior officers does not automatically amount to unreasonable restriction.
Union of India v. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal, AIR 1960 SC 475; (1960) 2 SCR 627 Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946—a provision analogous to Section 3 of the 1955 Act—does not involve excessive delegation. Used to reject the challenge that Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, suffers from excessive delegation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Character of the Control Orders: The Court noted that the Orders were issued under Section 3 of the Act, laid before Parliament as required by Section 3(6), and therefore constitute valid subordinate legislation. No basis was shown for treating them as mere executive instructions.

2. Article 303 Objections: The pleadings contained no factual foundation to establish State preference or discrimination. Consequently, the Court refused to entertain the Article 303 argument.

3. Omission of Central Government “opinion”: The Court held that the recital stating the Orders were made under Section 3 implicitly incorporated the Central Government’s requisite opinion; an express statement was unnecessary.

4. Reasonableness of Restrictions: The permit-granting authority is the State Government or senior officers (District Collectors/Deputy Commissioners). Relying on Dwarka Prasad (distinguished), K.L. Gupta and Pannalal Binjraj, the Court found no arbitrariness. Even without a formal appellate provision, aggrieved parties may approach the State Government for reconsideration, and the high status of the decision-makers suffices to ensure fairness.

5. Challenge to Section 3(2)(d): Following Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal, the Court reaffirmed that the provision does not amount to excessive delegation; the statute furnishes adequate policy guidance.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED – The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition and the connected appeals with costs (one consolidated hearing fee).

Implications: The validity of Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and of all three Control Orders regulating rice movement in Southern States stands affirmed. Dealers must continue to obtain permits for inter-State or intra-State movement of rice and its products. The decision reinforces the principle that discretionary powers vested in senior administrative officers, even without a statutory appeal, are not inherently unreasonable. No new constitutional doctrine was created, but existing jurisprudence on legislative delegation and reasonableness of trade restrictions was reaffirmed.

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    Chinta Lingam And Others v. Government Of India And Others

    A.N Grover, J.— The points involved in the writ petition and the appeals by special leave relate to the constitutionality and validity of the provisions of three Control Orders issued under Section 3(2)(d) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (Act 10 of 1955), hereinafter called the “Act”. The validity of Section 3(2) (d) of the Act itself has also been assailed.

    The Control Orders which were promulgated under Section 3(2)(d) of the Act were the following:

    “(i) The Rice (Southern Zone) Movement Control Order, 1957;

    (ii) The Southern States (Regulation of Exports of Rice) Order, 1964; and

    (iii) The Andhra Pradesh Rice and Paddy (Restriction of Movement) Order, 1965.”

    In the appeals the appellants had moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Article 226 of the Constitution. There the petitioners were dealers in rice and rice products such as puffed, parched and beaten rice (beaten rice is known as “Powa” while, parched and puffed rice is known as “Murmura”). Some of the petitioners had applied for permits to export Powa, Murmura and Idlirava from the State of Andhra Pradesh to other States while others had applied for permits to transport one or other of the rice products to some places within Andhra Pradesh. The applications for permits were either rejected or were not disposed of by the authorities concerned. In the writ petitions the High Court examined all the contentions raised exhaustively and repelled the attack on the constitutionality of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act as also the relevant clauses of the Control Orders.

    Section 3 of the Act provides:

    “(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.
    (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1) an order made thereunder may provide—
    * * *
    (a)(c)
    (d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity;”
    The 1957 Control Order extends to the States of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras, Mysore and Pondicherry which has been called the Southern Zone. According to clause 3(1) no person can export or attempt to export or abet the export of rice from any place within the Southern Zone except under and in accordance with a permit issued by the State Government concerned or any officer authorised in this behalf by that Government subject to the condition that such export shall be regulated in accordance with the export quotas fixed by the Central Government. Now this Control Order made a division into Southern Zone or regions in the matter of export of rice. By the Control Order of 1964 the Southern Zone or regions were further divided into four specified areas i.e States of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras and Mysore. Clause 3 of this Order prohibited the export by any person of rice from any place within a specified area to a place outside that area except under and in accordance with the permit issued by the State Government or an officer authorised by that Government in that behalf. The rice was defined by clause 2(b) to include broken rice and paddy as also broken rice and paddy products other than bran and husk. The Control Order of 1965 imposed further restrictions on the movement of rice and paddy. By Clause 3 restrictions were placed on the movement of these commodities from any place in any block to any place outside that block even within the State of Andhra Pradesh.

    2. Mrs Shyamala Pappu on behalf of the writ petitioners and the appellants before us made an attempt to raise the following contentions in respect of the Control Orders:

    “(1) All the three Control Orders offended Article 303 of the Constitution. They suffered from the vice of discrimination between one State and another and of preference to one State over another.

    (2) These orders were in the nature of executive instructions and did not fall within the meaning of subordinate legislation.

    (3) Even if the Control Orders could be regarded as subordinate legislation they were not saved by Article 303(2) in the absence of the declaration contemplated thereby.

    (4) The requisite opinion of the Central Government within Section 3 (1) of the Act was not to be found in any of the Orders.

    (5) The Control Orders imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on trade as arbitrary powers had been conferred in the matter of issuing or withholding permits and there were no provisions for appeal or revision against refusal to grant a permit.”

    Article 301 in Part XIII of the Constitution declares that subject to the other provisions of this Part trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. Under Article 302 Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. Article 303 reads:

    “(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 302, neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State shall have power to make any law giving or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorise the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule.
    (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent Parliament from making any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference or making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination if it is declared by such law that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India.”

    3. Now the Control Orders were made under Section 3 of the Act. The object essentially was to regulate the export and movement of rice and of rice and paddy products from the Southern States. These Control Orders were laid before both Houses of Parliament as required by sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Act. It has not been shown how this form of legislation would be mere executive instruction and would not constitute law made by Parliament within the meaning of Article 302. No foundation was laid in the pleadings either before the High Court or in the writ petition before us as to how the restrictions which were imposed by the Control Orders were not in the public interest. It is significant that even on the point of preference to one State over another or discrimination between one State and another State there is complete absence of pleading in the writ petition filed before us. The High Court adverted to the matter but we have not been shown that any proper or firm foundation was laid in the writ petitions before the High Court on the question of preference or discrimination within Article 303(1). No argument, therefore, can be entertained on these matters. We are unable to see the necessity of reciting the requisite opinion within Section 3(1) of the Act in the Control Orders. It is implicit in the recital in the Control Orders that they were being made under Section 3 of the Act that the Central Government had formed the requisite opinion within sub-section (1) of that section. This disposes of the first four contentions.

    4. As regards the 5th point it is noteworthy that the permit is to be issued by the State Government concerned or any officer authorised in this behalf by that Government. It is common ground that the officers authorised by the State Government are the District Collector and the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies. These officers cannot but be regarded as fairly high in rank who are expected to discharge their duties in a responsible and reasonable manner. In Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 224, (1954) SCR 803 in which the provisions of clause 14(3) of the U.P Coal Control Order, 1953, which gave the licensing authority absolute power to grant or refuse to grant any licence were struck down on the ground that a law which confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities must be held to be unreasonable. There the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller might choose to delegate the same. The matter which has been stressed before us relates generally to the absence of any provision relating to appeal or revision in the Control Orders if the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies refuses to grant a permit under Clause 3 of the Order. [In Dwarka Prasad case the delegation could be made to any one which was certainly a relevant factor in judging the reasonableness of the impugned provision. But in the cases before us the permit is to be granted either by the State Government or by responsible officers of the rank of the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies. Indeed, Mrs Pappu quite properly agreed that if the State Government alone had the power to issue the permits the challenge on the ground of unreasonableness of the restrictions would not be available. We consider that there is no bar to any of the aggrieved parties approaching the State Government by means of a representation for a final decision even if the matter has been dealt with by the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies in the first instance and the permit has been refused or wrongly withheld by those officers. In these circumstances the absence of a provision for appeal or revision can be of no consequence. At any rate it has been pointed out in more than one decision of this Court that when the power has to be exercised by one of the highest officers the fact that no appeal has been provided for is a matter of no moment; (See K.L Gupta v. Bombay Municipal Corporation). AIR 1968 SC 303, (1968) 1 SCR 274 at p. 297 It may also be remembered that emphasis was laid in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397, (1957) SCR 233 at 257 on the power being vested not in any minor official but in top-ranking authority. It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law.

    5. Lastly an effort was made to agitate the point that Section 3(2)(d) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. This question is no longer at largo. In Union of India v. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal, AIR 1960 SC 475, (1960) 2 SCR 627 the attack on Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 which was similar in terms to Section 3 of the Act on the ground of excessive delegation was repelled. It was held that the Central Government had been given sufficient and proper guidance for exercising its powers in effectuating the policy of the statute.

    6. In the result the writ petition and the appeals fail and they are dismissal with costs. One set of hearing fee.

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    Chinta Lingam And Others v. Government Of India And Others
    (Nov 30, 1970)