Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 2(1) of the Factory Act
  • Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952
  • Halbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 25, p. 448, Article 872
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6(1) of the Factories Act, 1948
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 2(1) of the Factory Act
  • Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952
  • Halbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 25, p. 448, Article 872
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 6(1) of the Factories Act, 1948
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Messrs Golden Tobacco Co. (P) Ltd. maintains its main cigarette-manufacturing factory in Bombay and a satellite establishment at Eluru, Andhra Pradesh, where sun-cured country tobacco is procured, processed, stored and dispatched to Bombay. The State asserted that the Eluru premises qualified as a “factory” under Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948. On that footing the appellant—occupier-cum-manager of the Eluru unit—was prosecuted for operating without (i) a licence under Section 6(1) of the Act and (ii) prior approval of building plans under Rules 3 and 5(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Factory Rules, 1950.

The II Additional Munsif-Magistrate, Eluru acquitted the appellant, holding that no “factory” or “manufacturing process” and no “workers” were proved. The State’s appeal was allowed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which convicted the appellant under Section 92 of the Act and imposed fines of ₹50 on each count. Special leave was granted, leading to the present Supreme Court appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the activities conducted in the Eluru premises constitute a “manufacturing process” within Section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948.
  2. Whether twenty or more persons working there were “workers” within Section 2(l) (formerly 2(1)) of the Act, i.e., persons employed under a contract of service with the company rather than independent contractors.
  3. Consequently, whether the premises fell within the statutory definition of “factory” in Section 2(m), attracting the licensing and plan-approval requirements of Section 6(1) and the Andhra Pradesh Factory Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The Eluru premises did not constitute a “factory” because no “manufacturing process” was carried on; moistening, stripping and packing of tobacco leaves were merely preparatory or agricultural in nature.
  • Even if a process existed, the persons working there were hired by independent contractors; hence they were not “workers” as defined in Section 2(l), and the numerical threshold of twenty workers was not satisfied.
  • Documents issued earlier by the Chief Inspector of Factories, Madras, and the Superintendent of Central Excise suggested the premises were not a factory.

Respondent-State’s Arguments

  • Moistening, stripping stalks, grading and packing tobacco clearly fall within the wide wording of Section 2(k)(i) (“making, altering, finishing, packing… or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport …”) and therefore amount to a “manufacturing process”.
  • More than twenty persons worked on the premises every day; supervision, wage-related provident-fund deductions and work-sheets maintained by the company demonstrated an employer-employee relationship, making them “workers”.
  • Because both statutory elements—manufacturing process and twenty or more workers—were satisfied, the Eluru unit was a “factory”, and the appellant’s operation without licence or approved plans violated Section 6(1) and the Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Kerala v. V.M. Patel, (1961) 1 LLJ 549 Processes such as winnowing, cleaning, washing and drying agricultural produce constitute a “manufacturing process”. Used illustratively to support the view that similar operations on tobacco leaves are manufacturing processes.
Col. Sardar C.S. Angre v. The State, ILR 1965 (15) Raj 117 Sorting, drying and repacking potatoes for cold storage held not a manufacturing process because done solely for preservation. Distinguished: tobacco processing was aimed at use and transport to the Bombay factory, bringing it within Section 2(k)(i).
Sri Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1958 SCR 1340 “Worker” requires a contract of service; sattedars and their coolies rolling bidis independently are not workers. Cited; Court accepted the test but found on facts that the Eluru labourers were under the company’s control and thus workers.
Short v. J.W. Henderson Ltd., 1946 SC (HL) 24 Four classic indicia of a contract of service: selection, payment, control of method, power of dismissal. Relied on to analyse employer–employee relationship between company and labourers.
Gould v. Minister of National Insurance, [1951] 1 KB 731 Further authority on the indicia of a contract of service. Cited as supporting material in discussing the control test.
Pauley v. Kenaldo Ltd., (1953) 1 All ER 226 (CA) Reinforces the same indicia of service contract. Cited alongside Short to buttress the legal test.
Dharangadhara Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra, 1957 SCR 152 Master’s “right to control” is the critical test; bidi rollers engaged by contractors were not workers. Distinguished; Court held a higher degree of control existed in the present case.
Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) 1 Lab LJ 119 Illustrates varied outcomes on whether bidi workers are “workers”. Referenced to show that results depend on factual control; not decisive of present facts.
Bridhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge, Nagpur, (1961) 2 Lab LJ 86 Even minimal end-of-day rejection control may suffice for employment relationship. Supports prosecution’s view that physical presence in factory implies supervisory control.
D.C. Dewan Mohinder Sahab & Sons v. United Bidi Workers Union, (1964) 2 Lab LJ 638 Bidi workers held “workmen” under Industrial Disputes Act; relevance to worker status tests. Referenced in survey of authorities; underlines flexible control standard.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Manufacturing Process: The Court construed Section 2(k)(i) broadly. Moistening, stripping stalks, grading and packing tobacco leaves adapted the product for its ultimate use (cigarette manufacture) and for transport to Bombay. Each activity—“breaking up”, “finishing”, “packing”, or “otherwise treating” the leaves—squarely fell within the statutory language.

Existence of Workers: Although the appellant contended that more than twenty labourers were hired by independent contractors, the Court emphasised:

  • Inspector PW-1’s uncontroverted observation of 120 persons working under the supervision of the company’s clerk, who issued work-sheets and collected output.
  • Provident-fund returns (Exs. P-7 to P-12) showing regular wage deductions and company contributions for roughly 200 employees.
  • Absence of any rebutting evidence from the appellant to substantiate the “independent contractor” claim.

Applying the Short v. Henderson indicia—especially the company’s effective control over the method and quality of work—the Court held that the labourers were employed “directly or through any agency” but nonetheless under a contract of service, satisfying the definition of “worker”.

Factory Status: Because (i) a manufacturing process was being carried on and (ii) more than twenty workers were employed during the relevant period, the premises constituted a “factory” under Section 2(m). Consequently, operation without a licence and approved plans breached Section 6(1) and Rules 3 and 5(3).

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed – Conviction Affirmed.

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment convicting the occupier-cum-manager and maintained the fines imposed. The decision clarifies that seemingly simple preparatory processes applied to raw tobacco can constitute “manufacturing processes”, and that labourers working under on-site supervision may qualify as “workers” notwithstanding references to them as “contract employees”. While the ruling does not create a new legal test, it reinforces the expansive scope of Sections 2(k) and 2(m) and signals strict compliance expectations for satellite processing units feeding larger factories.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    V. P. Gopala Rao v. Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh .

    R.S Bachawat, J.— Messrs Golden Tobacco Co., Private Ltd., have their head office and main factory at Bombay where they manufacture cigarettes. The appellant is the occupier-cum-manager of the company's premises at Eluru in Andhra Pradesh where sun-cured country tobacco purchased from the local producers is collected, processed and stored and then transported to the company's factory at Bombay. The prosecution case is that the aforesaid premises are a factory. The appellant was prosecuted and tried for contravention of Section 6(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 and Rules 3 and 5(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Factory Rules, 1950, for operating the factory without obtaining a licence from the Chief Inspector of Factories and his previous permission approving the plans of the building. The appellant's defence was that the premises did not constitute a factory and it was not necessary for him to obtain the licence or permission. The 2nd Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Eluru, accepted the defence contention and acquitted the appellant. According to the Magistrate the prosecution failed to establish that the premises were a factory or that any manufacturing process was carried on or that any worker was working therein. The Public Prosecutor filed an appeal against the order. The Andhra Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal, convicted the appellant under Section 92 for contravention of Section 6(1) and Rules 3 and 5(3) and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs 50 under each count. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant after obtaining special leave.

    2. The question in this appeal is whether the company's premises at Eluru constitute a factory. Section 2(m) defines factory. Under Section 2(m) factory means any premises including the precincts thereof “whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on”. It is not disputed that more than 20 persons were working on the premises. The points in issue are (1) whether those persons were “workers”; and (2) whether any manufacturing process was being carried on therein.

    3. For the purpose of proving the prosecution case, the respondent relied upon the following materials: (1) the testimony of PW 1-A. Subbarao, the Assistant Inspector of Factories; (2) his report of inspection of the premises on December 20, 1965; (Ext. P-1); (3) the show-cause notice Ex. P-3, and the appellant's reply, dated January 15, 1966; (Ext. P-5); (4) the testimony of PW 2, B.P Chandrareddi, the Provident Fund Inspector; and (5) six returns (Exs. P-7 to P-12) submitted by the Eluru establishment, to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.

    4. The materials on the record show that in the company's Eluru premises, sun-cured tobacco leaves bought from the growers were subjected to the processes of moistening, stripping and packing. The tobacco leaves were moistened so that they may be handled without breakage. The moistening was done for 10 to 14 days by sprinkling water on stacks of tobacco and shifting the top and bottom layers. The stalks were stripped from the leaves. The Thukku (wholly spoilt) and Pagu (partly spoilt) leaves were separated. The leaves were tied up in bundles and stored in the premises. From time to time they were packed in gunny bags and exported to the company's factory at Bombay where they were used for manufacturing cigarettes. All these processes are carried on in the tabacco industry . In Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1965 Edn., Vol. 22, p. 265 under the heading “tobacco industry” it is stated: “After curing, only during humid periods or in special moistening cellars can the leaf be handled without breakage. It is removed from the stalks or sticks and graded according to colour, size, soundness and other recognizable elements of quality. It is tied into bands, or bundles, of 15 to 30 leaves by means of a tobacco leaf wrapped securely around the stem end of the leaves. After grading the leaf is ready for the market.”

    5. In our opinion, manufacturing processes as defined in Section 2(k)(i) were carried on in the premises. Under Section 2(k)(i) manufacturing process means any process for “making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article, or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal”. The definition is widely worded. The moistening was an adaptation of the tobacco leaves. The stalks were stripped by breaking them up. The leaves were packed by bundling them up and putting them into gunny bags. The breaking up, the adaptation and the packing of the tobacco leaves were done with a view to their use and transport. All these processes are manufacturing processes within Section 2(k)(i).

    6. The reported cases are of little help in deciding whether a particular process is a manufacturing process as defined in Section 2(k)(i). In State of Kerala v. V.M Pateli (1961) 1 LLJ 549 the court held that the work of garbling pepper by winnowing, cleaning, washing and drying it on concrete floor and a similar process of curing ginger dipped in lime and laid out to dry in a warehouse were manufacturing processes. With regard to the decision in Col. Sardar C.S Angre v. State ILR 1965 (15) Raj 117 it is sufficient to say that the work of sorting and drying potatoes and packing and re-packing them into bags was held not to be a manufacturing process as the work was done for the purpose of cold storage only and not for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 2(k)(i).

    7. The next question is whether 20 or more persons worked on the premises. On behalf of the appellant it is admitted that more than 20 persons work there, but his contention is that they are employed by independent contractors and are not workers as defined in Section 2(1). Section 2(1) reads: “‘worker’ means a person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinary or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process”.

    8. In Sri Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1958 SCR 1340 the court gave a restricted meaning to the words “directly or through an agency” in Section 2(1) and held that a worker was a person employed by the management and that there must be a contract of service and a relationship of master and servant between them. On the facts of that case the court held that certain sattedars were independent contractors and that they and the coolies engaged by them for rolling bidis were not “workers”.

    9. It is a question of fact in each case whether the relationship of master and servant exists between the management and the workmen. The relationship is characterised by contract of service between them. In Short v. J.W Henderson Limited 1946 SC HL 24 Lord Thankerton recapitulated four indicia of a contract of service. As stated in Halbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 25, p. 448, Article 872:

    “The following have been stated to be the indicia of a contract of service, namely: (1) the master's power of selection of his servant; (2) the payment of wages or other remuneration, (3) the master's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the master's right of suspension or dismissal [Short v. J.W Henderson Ltd., (1946) SC (HL) 24, at pp. 33, 34; Gould v. Minister of National Insurance, [1951] 1 KB 731 at p. 734. [1951 All ER 368 at p. 371; Pauley v. Kenaldo Ltd., (1953) 1 All ER 226, CA at p. 228]; but modern industrial conditions have so affected the freedom of the master that it may be necessary at some future time to restate the indicia; e.g, heads (1), (2) and (4) and probably also head(3), are affected by statutory provisions Short v. J.W Henderson Ltd., at p. 34.”

    10. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra, 1957 SCR 152 the Court held that the critical test of the relationship of master and servant is the master's right of superintendence and control of the method of doing the work. Applying this test workmen rolling bidis were found to be employees of independent contractors and not workers within Section 2(1). In State of Kerala v. Patel, V.M Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra (1962) 1 Lab LJ 119 while they were found to be workers within Section 2(1) in Bridhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge, Nagpur (1961) 2 Lab LJ 86 and workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act in D.C Dewan Mohinder Sahab and Sons v. United Bidi Workers Union (1964) 2 Lab LJ 638.

    11. There is no abstract a priori test of the work control required for establishing a contract of service. In Short v. J.W Henderson Ltd., Lord Thankerton quoting Lord Justice Clerk's dicta in an earlier case said that the principal requirement of a contract of service was the right of the master “in some reasonable sense” to control the method of doing the work. As pointed out in Bridhichand case the fact that the workmen have to work in the factory imply a certain amount of supervision by the management. The court held that the nature and extent of control varied in different industries and that when the operation was of a simple nature, the control could be exercised at the end of the day by the method of rejecting the bidis which did not come up to the proper standard.

    12. In the present case, the prosecution relied on (1) Exts. P-7 to P-12, (2) the testimony of PW 1 and (3) Exts. P-1 and P-6 to prove that the persons working at the company's premises at Eluru were employed by the management. Exhibits P-7 to P-12 are monthly returns for July to December, 1966, submitted by the company's Eluru establishment to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, under para 38(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The returns disclosed the number and names of about 200 persons employed every month and the recoveries from the wages and the company's contributions on account of the provident fund of each employee. At the top of each return it was stated that the employees were contract employees. Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952, defines “employee” as including any person employed by or through a contractor. paras 29 and 30 of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, shows that the employer is required to pay contributions in respect of all such employees. Para 26 of the Scheme shows that employees who have actually worked for not less than 12 months or less in the factory or establishment is entitled and required to become a member of the fund. In view of the fact that the returns are in respect of all persons employed in the establishment either by the management or by or through a contractor they are not of much help in determining whether the employee were employed by the management or were employed by the contractors. They only show that in the months of July to December, 1966, 200 workers had been working in the establishment for not less than 240 days.

    13. The testimony of PW 1-A, Subbarao, the Assistant Inspector of Factories shows that on December 20, 1965, he found 120 workmen working in the premises. He is corroborated by his inspection report Ext. P-1. In his reply Ext. P-5 the appellant did not dispute the fact that 120 persons were working there. PW 1 found workmen doing the work of stripping stalks from the tobacco leaves. The work of stripping was being done under the supervision of the management's clerk J. Satyanarain Rao. At the end of the day the clerk collected the stripped tobacco and noted the quantity of work done in the work sheet allotted to the worker. PW 1 found some workmen doing other work.

    14. The onus of proving that the workmen were employed by the management was on the prosecution. We think that the prosecution has discharged this onus. It is not disputed that more than twenty persons worked in the premises regularly every day. There is the positive evidence of PW-1 that the work of stripping stalks from the tobacco leaves was done under the supervision of the management. There is no evidence to show that the other work in the premises was not done under the like supervision. The prosecution adduced prima facie evidence showing that the relationship of master and servant existed between the workmen and the management. The appellant did not produce any rebutting evidence. In the cross-examination of PW 1, it was suggested that the workmen were employed by independent contractors, but the suggestion is not borne out by the materials on the record. We hold that the persons employed are workers as defined in Section 2(1). The High Court rightly held that the company's premises at Eluru were a factory.

    15. In the courts below the appellant produced (1) an order of the Chief Inspector of Factories, Madras, and (2) a letter of Superintendent of Central Excise, I.D.O, Vijaywada. Mr Setalvad conceded, and in our opinion rightly, that these documents throw no light on the question whether in 1966 the premises were a factory within the meaning of Section 2(m). We therefore say nothing more with regard to these documents.

    16. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    V. P. Gopala Rao v. Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh .
    (Mar 7, 1969)