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Disposition
Advocates
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (first respondent) purchased several plots of land, including the disputed parcel measuring 2,856 square yards in Himayatnagar, from one Jamsheer Khan under two sale deeds (Exhibits P-2 and P-3) circa 1930 and claims to have remained in possession until about 1945. The second defendant allegedly trespassed on the land and, in 1946, conveyed it to the first defendant (appellant). The plaintiff sued for possession in O.S. No. 210 of 1958 before the First Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding no proven title or possession by the plaintiff. On appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reversed, granting the decree for possession to the plaintiff. The first defendant obtained a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution and appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants established title to the suit property by adverse possession.
  2. Whether the plaintiff proved possession of the suit land from about 1930 to 1945.
  3. Whether, in a suit for recovery of immovable property, a plaintiff who fails to prove paper title can nevertheless succeed on the basis of prior lawful possession as against a trespasser.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff’s failure to establish legal title is fatal to the suit; both title and possession within twelve years must be proved except in proceedings under § 9 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The High Court erred in finding that the plaintiff was in possession between 1930 and 1945.
  • The defendants had perfected title by adverse possession through the second defendant’s long-standing occupation before the 1946 sale.

Plaintiff/Respondent's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was placed in possession by his vendor under Exs. P-2 and P-3 and remained in possession until dispossessed by the second defendant around 1945.
  • Defendants produced no credible evidence of adverse possession; the second defendant did not testify, and Ex. D-1 (purported lease deed) was unreliable and belatedly produced.
  • Prior lawful possession constitutes sufficient title against trespassers, entitling the plaintiff to a decree for possession notwithstanding inability to prove absolute ownership.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ismail Arriff v. Mahomed Ghouse (Privy Council) Prior possession constitutes a good title against all except the true owner. Relied upon to affirm that the plaintiff can recover possession from trespassers despite failing to prove documentary title.
Narayana Row v. Dharmachar (Madras HC) Possession is, under Indian law, valid title against everyone but the lawful owner; § 9 Specific Relief Act is consistent with this rule. Cited to reinforce that prior lawful possession suffices to maintain an ejectment suit against wrong-doers.
Krishnarao Yashvant v. Vasudev Ghotikar (Bombay HC) Same principle of possessory title prevailing over trespassers. Supported the plaintiff’s right to sue.
Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das (Allahabad HC) Prior possession sufficient to eject a trespasser. Used as corroborative authority.
Wali Ahmed Khan v. Ajudhia Kandu (Allahabad HC) Possession alone can ground ejectment against a wrong-doer. Further authority for the rule applied.
Subodh Gopal Bose v. Province of Bihar (Patna HC) Endorsement of the Madras, Bombay and Allahabad view on possessory title. Cited to illustrate consensus among several High Courts.
Debi Churn Boldo; Ertaza Hossein; Purmeshur Chowdhry; Nisa Chand Gaita (Calcutta HC decisions) Contrary view requiring proof of both title and possession. Explicitly disapproved as not stating the law correctly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Plea of adverse possession rejected. The second defendant, the alleged source of the appellant’s title, never deposed despite being available. Ex. D-1, an unregistered lease deed invoked to prove the second defendant’s possession, surfaced only in 1960 without explanation, undermining its authenticity. Other defence evidence was found unreliable. Hence, the defendants failed to prove continuous hostile possession for the statutory period.

2. Plaintiff’s prior possession established. The Court accepted the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborated by: (a) recitals in sale deeds Exs. P-2 and P-3 showing delivery of possession; (b) payment of “Nazul” revenue evidenced by Ex. P-4 (1939 receipt); and (c) Ex. P-5 (1937 letter from the Divisional Engineer) acknowledging acquisition of portions of the plaintiff’s land for a public road and recognising him for compensation. These documents, read with the absence of rebuttal from the second defendant, convinced the Court that the plaintiff possessed the land from 1930 to about 1945.

3. Legal sufficiency of prior possession. Drawing on precedent, the Court held that possessory title is enforceable against trespassers. A plaintiff dispossessed by a wrong-doer need not prove absolute ownership; established prior possession coupled with subsequent unlawful dispossession suffices. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not curtail this broader common-law principle.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed with Costs. CMP No. 3588 of 1968 for additional evidence was also dismissed.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that prior lawful possession alone, absent proved documentary title, entitles a plaintiff to recover property from trespassers. While no new doctrine is created, the Supreme Court’s endorsement clarifies and solidifies existing precedent across Indian jurisdictions.

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    Somnath Burman v. Dr S.P Raju And Another

    K.S Hegde, J.— This appeal has been brought by the first defendant in OS No. 210 of 1958 on the file of the first Additional Judge, City civil court, Hyderabad. That was a suit brought by the first respondent-plaintiff for possession of the suit property. That suit was dismissed by the trial court but in appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reversed the decree of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff's suit for possession. Thereupon this appeal has been brought after obtaining a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.

    2. The subject-matter of the suit is a piece of land in Himayatnager measuring 2,856 Sq. yards. The plaintiff's case is that he purchased this land from one Jamsheer Khan with other plots in the vicinity under two sale deeds marked Exs. P-2 and P-3; thereafter he was in possession of the same. When he was in possession, the second defendant tresspased into the said property and took possession of the same, thereafter he illegally sold the same to the first defendant. The defendants denied the plaint allegations. They denied that the plaintiff had any title to the suit property or that he was in possession of the same at any time. On the other hand they pleaded that the second defendant who had acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession had sold the same to the first defendant in the year 1946.

    3. The trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not established his title to the suit property. It also held that the plaintiff has not satisfactorily proved that he was in possession of the suit property at any time. In view of those findings it thought that it was not necessary to go into the defendants plea of adverse possession. In the result it dismissed the plaintiff's suit. In appeal the High Court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff has not proved his title to the suit property. It rejected the plea of the defendants that they have perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession. But differing from the trial court it came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was put into possession of the suit property by his vendor Jamsheer Khan Sahab in about the year 1930 and he was in possession of the same till about the year 1945, when the second defendant tresspased on the same and took possession of it.

    4. In view of the concurrent finding reached by the trial court and the High Court that the plaintiff has not proved his title, that question was not reopened in this Court. The finding of the High Court that the defendants have not established their plea of title by adverse possession was challenged though feebly. It was contended before us that the plaintiff who based his suit on title and prior possession having failed to establish his title, his suit has to fail. Further the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff was in possession of the said property between 1930 to 1945 was also assailed before us.

    5. The appellant claims that he came into the possession of the suit property on the strength of the sale deed executed by the second defendant in his favour on 1-10-1946. The suit from which this appeal arises was initially instituted on the original side of the High Court of Hyderabad in the year 1949. Therefore to establish his claim of title by adverse possession, the first defendant must primarily depend on the fact that the second defendant was in possession of the suit property for a period of over nine years before he sold the same to him. Though the second defendant filed a written statement supporting the case of the first defendant and though he was present at the time of hearing on several occasions, he was not examined as a witness in this case to support the plea of adverse possession put forward by the defendants. No explanation is forthcoming for his non-examination. This circumstance goes a long way to discredit the defendant's plea of adverse possession. The first defendant's evidence as regards adverse possession is of very little significance as his knowledge of the suit property prior to the date he purchased the same is very little. The only other evidence relied on in support of the plea of adverse possession is that of DW 2, Shambhu Prashad who claims to have taken the suit property on lease from the second defendant. The lease deed said to have been executed by him is marked as Ex. D/1. It is not explained how the first defendant came into possession of Ex. D/1. Though the suit was filed as far back as 1949, Ex. D/1 was produced into Court for the first time in the year 1960. No explanation has been given for this inordinate delay in producing Ex. D/1, (an unregistered document) in Court. According to DW 2, the first defendant knew about this document as far back as 1950. Under these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in rejecting the testimony of DW 2 and not relying on Ex. D/1. The other evidence adduced by the first defendant relating to the plea of adverse possession was not commended for our acceptance. Therefore we need not consider the same. Hence we agree with the High Court that the defendants have failed to establish their plea of adverse possession.

    6. Now coming to the evidence relating to the plaintiff's possession of the suit property from the year 1930 to 1945, we have firstly the oral testimony of the plaintiff. The High Court has accepted the plaintiff's evidence as credit worthy. The plaintiff is a responsible person. He held important offices both under the State Government as well as under the United Nations. Prima facie his evidence is worthy of acceptance. This would be particularly so in view of the non-examination of the second defendant. The question before the trial court and the High Court was whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property between 1930 to 1945 or whether the second defendant was in possession of the same during that period? On this aspect, the evidence is really one sided. The evidence of the plaintiff that he came into possession of the suit property under Exs. P-2 and P-3 is supported by the recitals in those documents. In considering the question whether Jamsheer Khan, the vendor under Exs. P-2 and P-3, had put the plaintiff into possession of the suit property, the fact that Jamsheer Khan had no title to the same is not very material. There is no reason to think that the recitals contained in Exts. P-2 and P-3 as to the delivery of possession are false recitals. There is documentary evidence to show that the plaintiff paid the “Nazul” for the properties purchased by him under Exts. P-2 and P-3 after his purchase. It is true that those documents do not show how much “Nazul” was paid in respect of the suit property but the second defendant has produced no documents to show that he had paid any “Nazul” in respect of the suit property. Ex. P-4 is a stamped revenue receipt on a printed form executed in favour of the plaintiff by the Maqtadar on August 16, 1939 for Rs 331/14/4 pies. It relates to the lands which belonged to Jamsheer Khan and situate at Narayanguda. Evidently that recital refers to the lands covered by Exts. P-2 and P-3. It recites that a sum of Rs 331/14/4 pies was received from the plaintiff as “Nazul” for the period from 15th Aban 1338 Fasli to the end of the Aban 1346 Fasli at the rate of Rs 41/4/5 pies per year. The sale under Exts. P-2 and P-3 was made in 1930. Evidently the “Nazul” in respect of those properties was in arrear till 1939. The “Nazul” due under Exts. P-2 and P-3 comes to Rs 41 and odd per year as seen from Ext. P-6.

    7. Ex. P-5 is a letter, dated December 11, 1937, received by the plaintiff from Mr J.D.M Dean (PW 2), First Divisional Engineer, Hyderabad City. It relates to the construction of a road from Musheerabad to Bashir Bagh. It states that under the Ferman, dated 29th Shaban 56 Hijri, H.E.H The Nizam was pleased to accord sanction to the acquisition of 20 per cent of the land without any compensation for the construction of road, from the owners of the land and that for the excess land required, compensation will be paid. That letter further mentions that total area of the land belonging to the plaintiff was 7,815 sq. yards out of which 2,112 sq. yards were required for the construction of the road; out of that 1,563 sq. yards being the 20 per cent of the entire area was to be taken without any compensation and the value of the remaining 349 sq. yards will be paid to the plaintiff. That letter further informed the plaintiff that the value of the additional area which might finally be determined after the marking may be obtained from the department. It is established that road from Musheerabad to Bashir Bagh was laid not only across the plot covered under Ex. P-3 but also across the site purchased under Ex. P-2 in which the suit land is situate. That was obvious because if the road did not touch any portion of Ex. P-2 the entire area of the land belonging to plaintiff would have been only 5,114 sq. yards and not 7,815 sq. yards as mentioned in Ex. P-5. It also establishes that the plaintiff was recognised by the City Improvement Board as the person entitled to compensation in respect of that land. Evidence further discloses that the plaintiff was paid compensation in respect of the land taken from him in excess of 20 per cent. referred to earlier. The oral evidence adduced in the case coupled with Ex. P-2, P-4 and P-5 satisfactorily establishes the fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property till about 1945.

    8. In addition to the evidence referred to earlier, the High Court has also relied on two other documents namely Exts. D-8 and D-9, but those documents were produced as additional evidence in the High Court. Their connection with the suit property is not satisfactorily established. Therefore we have excluded them from consideration. If we bear in mind the fact that the question for decision is whether the plaintiff or the second defendant was in possession of the suit property between the year 1930 to 1945, there is hardly any doubt that the prepondrance of evidence is in favour of the plaintiffs case. As seen earlier, the defendants have not produced any reliable evidence to support their case. Hence we agree with the High Court that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that he was in possession of the suit property prior to 1945.

    9. It was next contended on behalf of the appellant that in a suit for possession brought on the basis of title, the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves his title to the suit property as well as its possession within twelve years. According to the appellant, except in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff for succeeding in the suit, has to prove both existing title to the such property and its possession within twelve years. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. In our opinion the possession of the plaintiff prior to 1945 is a good title against all but the true owner. The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiff's lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner. In Ismail Arriff v. Mahomed Ghouse the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that a person having possessary title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Therein it was observed that the possession of the plaintiff was a sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant.

    10. In Naryana Row v. Dharmachar a bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ., held that possession is, under the Indian, as under the English law, good title against all but the true owner. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong doer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, is sufficient title, even if the suit be brought more than six months after the act of dispossession complained of and that the wrong-doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person. The same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Krishnara'v Yashvant v. Vasudev Apa'ji Ghotikar (deceased) by 1.rs. That was also the view taken by the Allahabad High Court — see Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das ; Wali Ahmed Khan v. Ajudhia Kandu. In Subodh Gopal Bose v. Province of Bihar AIR (37) 1950 Pat 222 the Patna High Court adhered to the view taken by the Madras, Bombay and Allahabad High Courts. The contrary view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Debi Churn Boldo v. Issur Chander Manjee; Ertaza Hossein and Another v. Bany Mistry; Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brijo Lal Chowdhry. and Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani in our opinion does not lay down the law correctly.

    11. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. We see no reason to accept any additional evidence in this Court. Hence CMP No. 3588 of 1968, is dismissed; but no costs.

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    Somnath Burman v. Dr S.P Raju And Another
    (Oct 16, 1969)