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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1968 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 36(2) of the Act
  • Art. 173 of the Constitution
  • Section 33, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Part II of this Act
  • Article 173 of the Constitution
  • Section 36(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 4, Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
  • Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 32 of the Act
  • Section 30 to s. 36, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Section 35, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Section 14, Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
  • Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191
  • s. 36 (2) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1968 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 36(2) of the Act
  • Art. 173 of the Constitution
  • Section 33, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Part II of this Act
  • Article 173 of the Constitution
  • Section 36(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 4, Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
  • Section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 32 of the Act
  • Section 30 to s. 36, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Section 35, Constitution of India as by law established
  • Section 14, Government of Union Territories Act, 1963
  • Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191
  • s. 36 (2) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Pashupati Nath Singh, filed his nomination on 16 January 1967 to contest the election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Dumraon constituency. Eight other candidates, including the respondent Harihar Prasad Singh, also filed nominations between 13 January and 20 January 1967. On 21 January 1967—the date fixed for scrutiny under section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951—the Returning Officer rejected the appellant’s nomination because he had not made and subscribed the oath or affirmation required by Article 173(a) of the Constitution. Polling was held on 17 February 1967, and the respondent was declared elected with 14,539 votes. The appellant challenged this result in Election Petition No. 8 of 1967 before the Patna High Court, alleging improper rejection of his nomination. The High Court dismissed the petition. The present civil appeal (No. 1692 of 1967) under section 116-A of the Act was heard by the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a candidate who has not made or subscribed the constitutional oath/affirmation before the scrutiny of nominations can validly do so during the scrutiny proceedings and thereby cure the defect.
  2. What is the correct interpretation of the phrase “on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations” in section 36(2)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Under section 36(2) a candidate may take the oath or affirmation immediately before the Returning Officer considers objections; once the oath is taken, the candidate becomes qualified under Article 173, and that qualification exists “on the date fixed for scrutiny” because the day has not yet expired.
  • The absence of a space in Form 2B (Conduct of Election Rules, 1961) for indicating that the oath has been taken suggests it can be completed later, i.e., during scrutiny.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Section 32 indicates that a candidate must be qualified on the last date for filing nominations; therefore the oath must be taken before that date or, at the latest, before scrutiny begins.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Paynter v. James (1866-67) L.R. 2 C.P. 348 Interpretative approach to the words “on” or “upon” indicating they may mean before, simultaneous with, or after an act, depending on context. Approved to support reading that “on the date fixed for scrutiny” requires possession of qualifications from the very start of that day.
Reg v. Humphery, 10 Ad. & E. 335 Same interpretative principle regarding temporal expressions. Cited through Paynter v. James; reinforced the Court’s view that the statutory phrase must be interpreted in a way that avoids uncertainty.
Shiva Shankar Kanodia v. Kapildeo Narain Singh, Election Appeal No. 4 of 1965 (Patna High Court, 22 Sept 1965) Held that a person is “nominated” only after scrutiny and acceptance by the Returning Officer. Expressly disapproved; Supreme Court held that the oath requirement attaches once a person is nominated, not necessarily “validly” nominated after scrutiny.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined sections 30–36 of the Representation of the People Act alongside Article 173(a) and the Third Schedule oath form. It noted:

  • The oath form uses the words “having been nominated,” implying that the oath cannot precede nomination but need not wait until validation after scrutiny.
  • No statutory provision requires the oath to accompany the nomination paper, yet section 36(2)(a) empowers the Returning Officer to reject a nomination if on the date fixed for scrutiny the candidate lacks the constitutional qualification.
  • Interpreting “on the date fixed for scrutiny” to include any moment during that day would cause practical confusion, permitting last-minute compliance (even at 11:55 p.m.). To avoid such uncertainty, the qualification must exist “from the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny.”
  • The statutory scheme envisages that other candidates should be able to raise all objections at the start of scrutiny; permitting oath-taking mid-scrutiny would frustrate this purpose.
  • The absence of a declaration about oath-taking in Form 2B does not imply that the oath may be deferred to scrutiny day; it simply reflects that the oath follows nomination.
  • The Court relied on the interpretative guidance from Paynter v. James and Reg v. Humphery to conclude that “on” can mean “throughout” a day when context demands certainty.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Returning Officer’s rejection of the appellant’s nomination and upheld the respondent’s election. The decision clarifies that a candidate’s constitutional qualification—including the prescribed oath or affirmation—must subsist from the very beginning of the day fixed for scrutiny of nominations. The ruling tightens election procedure by foreclosing attempts to cure such defects during scrutiny itself and disapproves contrary reasoning adopted by the Patna High Court in an earlier case. No new statutory amendment was directed, but election officials and candidates must ensure compliance with Article 173(a) before scrutiny commences.

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    Pashupati Nath Singh v. Harihar Prasad Singh .

    http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6

    PETITIONER:

    PASHUPATI NATH SINGH

    Vs.

    RESPONDENT:

    HARIHAR PRASAD SINGH

    DATE OF JUDGMENT:

    22/01/1968

    BENCH:

    SIKRI, S.M.

    BENCH:

    SIKRI, S.M.

    HIDAYATULLAH, M.

    HEGDE, K.S.

    CITATION:

    1968 AIR 1064 1968 SCR (2) 812

    CITATOR INFO :

    R 1969 SC1034 (4,6)

    R 1969 SC1111 (24)

    ACT:

    Representation of the People Act, 1951, ss. 30 to 35, and 36-Candidate not having made or subscribed oath or affirmation under Art. 173(a) -Whether entitled to do so on date fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers.-"On the date fixed for scrutiny"-"meaning of.

    Constitution of India Art. 173(a) and third Schedule-When oath or affirmation to be made or subscribed by candidate.

    HEADNOTE:

    The appellant challenged the election of the respondent to the Bihar Legislative Assembly by an election petition on the ground that his own nomination paper had been improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. On January 21, 1967 the date fixed for scrutiny of nomination papers under s. 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. the Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper of the appellant on the ground that he was not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the State Legislature requisite since he had not made and subscribed the oath or affirmation as enjoined by clause (a) of Art.173 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the appellant's election petition. It was contended for the appellant that s. 36(2) that the petitioner had not made and subscribed an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the Third Schedule of the Constitution, he was entitled to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation immediately before the objection was considered by the Returning officer. As soon as a candidate makes or subscribes the oath or affirmation, he would become qualified under Art. 173 of the Constitution, and this qualification would exist "on the date fixed for the scrutiny" within the meaning of s. 36(2) because the date of scrutiny of nomination papers-in this case January 21, 1967-would not have passed away by ,the time the oath or affirmation is taken or subscribed. HELD : dismissing the appeal.

    The expression "on the date fixed for scrutiny" in s. 36(2)

    (a) means "on the whole of the day on which the scrutiny of

    1

    nomination has to take place". In other words, the qualification must exist from the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny. On this date the Returning Officer has to decide the objections and the objections have to be made by the other candidates after examining the nomination papers and in the light of s. 36(2) of the Act and other provisions. On the date of the scrutiny the other candidates should be in a position to, raise all possible objections before the scrutiny of a particular nomination paper starts. [817 F-H]

    Paynter v. James, (1866-67) L.R. 2 C.P. 348 and Reg v. Humphery, 10 Ad. & E. 335; referred to.

    The fact that there was no place in form. 2B prescribed under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 where it can be stated by the candidates that he had taken the requisite oath or -affirmation does not mean that the oath or affirmation can be taken and subscribed on the date fixed for -scrutiny. The nomination 'paper does not provide for the statement about

    813

    the oath because the oath or affirmation has to be taken after a candidate has been nominated. It cannot be said that a person can be regarded its nominated only when, after scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer finds him to be validly nominated. The form of oath does not say "having been validly nominated" but only "having been nominated". [818 E]

    Shiva Shankar Kanodia v. Kapildeo Narain Singh, Election Appeal No. 4 of 1965; judgment dated September 22, 1965 of the Patna High Court; disapproved.

    The words "having been nominated" in the form of the oath or affirmation in the third Schedule to the Constitution clearly show that the oath or affirmation cannot be taken or made by a candidate before he has been nominated as a candidate. Further, it is clear that none of the sections from s. 30 to s. 36 require that this oath should accompany the ,nomination paper. No reference has been made to, the form of oath in s. 33 or s. 35, although in s. 33 it is provided that in certain cases the nomination paper should be accompanied by a declaration or by a certificate issued by the Election Commission. [817 B, C]

    JUDGMENT:

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1692 of 1967. Appeal under S. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated September 26, 1967 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 8 of

    1967.

    H. R. Gokhale, J. P. Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant.

    S. V. Gupte, S. N. Prasad and B. P. Singh, for the respon- dent.

    R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This is an appeal under s. 116A of the Represen- tation of the People Act, 1951-hereinafter referred to as the Act-from the judgment of the High Court of Judicature. at Patna dismissing Election Petition ' No. 8 of 1967 filed by the appellant Pashupan Nath Singh hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. In order to appreciate the point arising before us it is necessary to state the relevant facts. The petitioner stood as a candidate for election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly. The election to that Assembly

    2

    from the Dumraon Assembly Constituency was held during the last general elections as per the following schedule :

    "(a) Date of filing nomination papers-13-1-1967 to 20-1-1967.

    L3 Sup Cl/68-8

    814

    (b) Date of scrutiny of' nomination papers--21-1-1967.

    (c) Last date of withdrawal of candidatures-23-1-1967.

    (d) Date of poll-17-2-1967.

    (e) Date of counting of votes-23-2-1967.

    (f) Date of declaration of result of the election 23-2-1.967".

    The petitioner filed his nomination paper before the Returning Officer at Buxar on January 16, 1967. Eight other candidates, including the, respondent Harihar Prasad Singh, filed their nomination papers before the Returning Officer on different dates between January 13, 1967, and January 20, 1967. On January 21, 1967, the nomination papers were taken up for scrutiny, when the Returning officer rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner and accepted the nomination papers of the remaining eight candidates. On February 17, 1967, the poll was held and the respondent, Shri Harihar Prasad Singh, secured the largest number of votes, namely, 14,539, and was accordingly declared elected. Thereupon the petitioner presented election petition in the Patna High Court for a declaration that the election of the respondent is void on the ground that the nomination paper of the petitioner was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer.

    The High Court held that the nomination of the petitioner was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer on the; ground that he was not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the State Legislature since he had not made and subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined by cl. (a) of Art. 173 of the Constitution. either before the scrutiny of nominations or even subsequently on the date of scrutiny. The short question which arises in this appeal is whether it is necessary for a candidate to make and subscribe the requisite oath or affirmation as enjoined by cl. (a) of Art. 173 of the Constitution before the date fixed for scrutiny of nomination paper. In other words, is a candidate entitled to make and subscribe the requisite oath when objection is taken before the Returning Officer or must he have made and subscribed the requisite oath or affirmation before the scrutiny of nomination commenced ? The answer to this question mainly depends on the interpretation of s. 36(2) of the Act. It will, however, be necessary to refer to some other sections of the Act in order to fully appreciate the effect of the words used in that section. Section 32 of the Act provides for nomination of candidates for election thus :

    815

    "Any person may be nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat if lie is qualified to be chosen to fill that seat under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act or under the provisions of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, as the case may be.,,

    It was suggested by the learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Gupte, that this section means that a candidate must also be qualified to be chosen on the last date for film,, nominations. We need not consider this question because we have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not qualified for being chosen to fill the seat on the date

    3

    fixed for scrutiny of nominations within the meaning of s. 36(2)(a).

    Section 33 provides for presentation of nomination paper and certain requirements for a valid nomination. Sub-s. (2), for instance, provides that in the case of a constituency where any seat is reserved, the nomination paper must contain declaration by the candidate specifying the particular case or tribe of which he is a member and the area in relation to which that case or tribe is a Scheduled Caste or. as the case may be, a Scheduled Tribe of the State. Sub-s. (3) provides that where a candidate is a person who, having held any office referred to in cl. (f) of s. 7, has been dismissed and a period of five years has not elapsed since the dismissal, lie must with the nomination paper give a certificate issued in the prescribed manner by the Election Commission to the effect that he has not been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State. Section 35 deals with the notice of nominations and the time and place for their scrutiny. The Returning Officer has to inform the person or persons delivering the nomination paper of the date, time and place fixed for the scrutiny of' nominations. He is also required to sign a certificate stating the date on which and the hour at which the nomination paper has been delivered to him, and also to cause to be fixed in some conspicuous place in his office a notice of the nomination containing descriptions similar to those contained in the nomination paper. both of the candidate and of the proposer.

    Then comes s. 36, relevant portion of which reads follows:

    " 36. Scrutiny of nominations.-( I ) On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly authorized in writing by each candidate, but no other person, may attend at such time and place as the returning officer

    816

    may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidates which have been delivered within the time and in the manner laid down in sec- tion 33.

    (2) The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the following grounds :-

    (a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following provisions that may be applicable, namely : - Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191.

    Part II of this Act, and sections 4 and 14 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 or

    (b) that there has been a failure to comply with

    any of the provisions of section 33 or section 34;

    or

    4

    (c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. . ."

    It will be noticed that under s. 36(2) of the Act, one of the grounds on which a nomination can be rejected is that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate is not qualified for being chosen to fill the seat under Art. 173 of the Constitution. The relevant part of Art. 173 provides :

    "173. A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he-

    (a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorized in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule."

    The form referred to reads as under

    "Form of oath or affirmation to be made by a candidate for election to the Legislature of a State :-

    " "I, A.B., having been nominated as a candidate to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly (or Legislative

    817

    Council), do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true, faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India......... The words "having been nominated" in this form clearly show that the oath or affirmation cannot be taken or made by a candidate before he has been nominated as a candidate. Fur- ther, it is clear that none of the sections from s. 30 to s. 36 require that this oath should accompany the nomination paper. No reference has been made, to the form of oath in s. 33 or s. 35, although in s. 33 it is provided that in certain cases the nomination paper should be accompanied by a declaration or by a certificate issued by the Election Commission. In this case it is common ground that no oath or affirmation was attached to the nomination paper or was filed before the date fixed for the scrutiny. Mr. Gokhale, who appears for the petitioner, contends that on objection being taken under s. 36(2) that the petitioner had not made and subscribed an oath or affirmation according to the form set out above, he was entitled to make and subscribe the oath or affirmation immediately before the objection was considered by the Returning Officer. He says that as soon as a candidate takes the oath or makes and subscribes the oath or affirmation he would become qualified within the terms of Art. 173 of the Constitution, and this qualification would exist "on the date fixed for the scrutiny" because the date of scrutiny of nomination paper- in this case January 21, 1967-would not have passed away by the time; the oath or affirmation is taken or subscribed. It seems to us that the expression "on the date fixed for scrutiny" in s. 36 (2) (a) means "on the whole of the day on which the scrutiny of nomination has to take place". In other words, the qualification must exist from the earliest moment of the day of scrutiny. It will be noticed that on this date the Returning Officer has to decide the objections and the objections have to be made by the other candidates after examining the nomination papers and in the light of s. 36(2) of the Act and other provisions. On the date of the scrutiny the other candidates should be in a position to

    5

    raise all possible objections before the scrutiny of a particular nomination paper starts. In a particular case, an objection may be taken to the form of the oath; the form of the oath may have been modified or the oath may not have been sworn before the person authorised in this-behalf by the Election Commission. It is not necessary under Art. 173 that the person authorised by the Election Commission should be the returning officer.

    818

    In Paynter v. James(1), Boyill, C.J., quoted, with approval, the passage from, the judgment of Tindal, C.J., in Reg v. Humphery(2), in which the following occurs:

    " .... we hold it therefore to be unnecessary to refer to instances of the legal meaning of the word 'upon' which, in different cases, may undoubtedly either mean before the act done to which it relates, or simultaneous with the act done, or after the act done, according as reason and good sense require the interpretation, with reference to the context and the subject-matter of the enactment."

    Bovill, C.J., observed that "that is a very clear statement of the various meanings of the word "on" or "upon"."

    In this connection it must also be borne in mind that law disregards, as far as possible, fractions of the day. It would lead to great confusion iF it were held that a candidate would be entitled to qualify for being chosen to fill a seat till the very end of the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. If the learned counsel for the petitioner is right, the candidate could ask the Returning Officer to wait till I k55 p.m. on the date fixed for the scrutiny to enable him to take the oath.

    Reference was also made to Form 2B in the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. It was pointed out that in this form there is no place where it can be stated by the candidate that he had taken the requisite oath or affirmation. But, this in our view does not mean that the oath or affirmation can be taken and subscribed on the date fixed for scrutiny. It seems to us that the nomination paper does not provide for the statement about the oath because the oath or affirmation has to be taken after a candidate has been nominated.

    Our attention was invited to an unreported decision of the Patna High Court in Shiva Shankar Kanodia v. Kapildeo Narain Singh(3). That decision proceeded on the basis that

    "one can be said to be so. nominated only when, after scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer finds him to be validly nominated, as provided under section 36(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951." With respect, the High Court proceeded on a wrong basis. The form of oath does not say "having been validly nominated" but only "having been nominated."

    In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal

    dismissed.

    Class(1866-67)L.R. 2C.P. 348. (2) 10A.

    D.&E. 335. (3) Election Appeal No. 4 of 1965: judgment dated September 22. 1965.

    819

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    Pashupati Nath Singh v. Harihar Prasad Singh .
    (Jan 22, 1968)