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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 21 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 19 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, sub-section (1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 21 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 19 of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, sub-section (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants’ agricultural lands (Survey Nos. 281/2, 339/1-8 and 338/1-3) situated near Vijayawada alongside the Vijayawada-Eluru Road were acquired by the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) fixed compensation at Rs 3,500 per acre for two survey numbers and Rs 4,000 per acre for the third. Six appellants filed timely applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act seeking a reference to the civil court on the quantum of compensation, but no such reference was in fact made. A separate reference under Section 30 was, however, made on the limited issue of apportionment.

The Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada treated the Section 30 reference as encompassing the quantum issue and awarded a uniform Rs 10,000 per acre. On the State’s appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reduced the rate to Rs 4,500 per acre, yet entertained and rejected the State’s belated jurisdictional objection. The aggrieved landowners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of a valid reference by the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the civil court had inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of compensation.
  2. If jurisdiction existed or the defect could be overlooked, what was the correct market value of the acquired lands per acre?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The State waived its right to question jurisdiction by not objecting before the Subordinate Judge.
  • The High Court should have adjourned proceedings to permit the appellants to compel a proper reference from the Collector.
  • Sale deeds (Exs. B-1 to B-3) supported a higher valuation than Rs 4,500 per acre.

State’s Arguments

  • Without a Section 18 reference, the civil court lacked jurisdiction to revisit the Collector’s award on quantum; this defect is not curable by waiver or acquiescence.
  • The High Court correctly valued the land at Rs 4,500 per acre based on the reliable sale deeds (Exs. A-3 and A-4).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Khan v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor (Privy Council) Statutory jurisdiction arises only when the conditions prescribed by the statute are strictly complied with. Used to emphasise that a court’s power under the Land Acquisition Act is triggered exclusively by a valid reference; absence thereof results in lack of inherent jurisdiction.
Alderson v. Palliser (1901) 2 KB 833 When want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings, it cannot be waived. Cited to reject the waiver argument advanced by the appellants.
Seth Badri Prasad v. Seth Nagarmal (1959 SCJ 394) An illegality apparent on the record may be raised at any stage, even for the first time on appeal. Supported the Court’s willingness to entertain the State’s jurisdictional objection at the Supreme Court stage.
Venkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secretary of State AIR 1939 PC 39 Illustrates circumstances where a reference exists but is made on the application of an improper party. Distinguished on the ground that, unlike the present case, a reference did exist there; hence it did not assist the appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Lack of Reference Equals Lack of Jurisdiction. Sections 18, 19 and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act collectively render the Collector’s award final unless a valid reference is made. Since no Section 18 reference was forwarded, the civil court’s competence to reassess compensation never arose.

2. Waiver Not Available. Following Nusserwanjee and Alderson, inherent jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or failure to object. The High Court erred in treating the defect as procedural and waivable.

3. Evaluation of Evidence on Quantum (Assuming Jurisdiction). Although the jurisdiction point was dispositive, the Supreme Court independently reviewed the merits for completeness. The High Court had evaluated seven sale deeds, rejecting Exs. A-1, A-2, B-2 and B-3 for remoteness in time, distance or suspicious circumstances, and drew its valuation from comparable sales in Exs. A-3 and A-4. The Supreme Court found this assessment sound and saw no basis to disturb the Rs 4,500 rate.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to enhance compensation in the absence of a statutory reference, and, in any event, the amount awarded by the High Court (Rs 4,500 per acre) was appropriate. The immediate effect is that the appellants receive compensation at the High Court’s rate, and no broader precedent was set beyond reinforcing the importance of a valid statutory reference to invoke judicial jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act.

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    Kothamasu Kanakarathamma And Others v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

    Mudholkar.— This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which it reduced the amount of compensation awarded to the appellants by the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in respect of certain lands belonging to them which were acquired by the State.

    2. The lands in question, are survey Nos. 281/2, 339/1 to 8 and 338/1 to 3 which are situate at a short distance from the town of Vijayawada and lie alongside the Vijayawada-Eluru, Road. The Land Acquisition Officer had fixed Rs 3500 per acre for the first two of these survey Nos. and Rs 4000 per acre the third survey number. The learned Subordinate Judge granted a uniform rate, of Rs 10,000 per acre for the lands comprised in all the survey numbers. There were some disputes with regard to the entitlement to the compensation for survey No. 339/1 to 3 and the Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, made a reference to the Court for the apportionment of the compensation amount among the various claimants. Six of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and made applications in writing to him within the time allowed by law for referring the matter for determination of the court. It is common ground that no reference was made by the Land Acquisition Officer in pursuance of these applications. When the matter came up before the Court it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Officer was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but was also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection was, however, raised on behalf of the State that in the absence of any reference upon the applications of six of the appellants the Court was incompetent to deal with that matter. When the matter went up before the High Court by way of an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, the Government pleader raised the question that in the absence of a reference on the question of quantum of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer the Court had no jurisdiction to consider that matter at all.

    3. The High Court, though it ultimately reversed the finding of the court as to the amount of compensation, unfortunately allowed the plea to be raised before it but ultimately upon a consideration of certain decisions, negatived it. We say unfortunately because this is not a kind of plea which the State ought at all to have taken. Quite clearly applications objecting to the rates at which compensation was allowed were taken in time by persons interested in the lands which were under acquisition and it was no fault of theirs that a reference was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer. Indeed, whenever applications are made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference unless there is a valid ground for rejecting the applications such as for instance that the applications were barred by time. Where an officer of the State is remiss in the performance of his duties in fairness the State ought not to take advantage of this fact. We are further of the opinion that the High Court, after the plea had been raised, would have been well advised to adjourn the matter for enabling the appellants before us, who were respondents in the High Court, to take appropriate steps for compelling the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference.

    4. All the same since the point was permitted to be urged before it by the High Court and has been raised before us on behalf of the State it is necessary to decide it. On behalf of the appellants it was contended before the High Court that by reason of the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference the State must be deemed to have waived the point. The High Court accepted this argument upon the view that this was not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and that the defect in the procedure was such as could be waived. In our opinion the view of the High Court is not correct. Section 12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that after an award is filed in the Collector's office it shall, except as provided in the Act, be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The only manner in which the finality of the award can be called into question is by resort to the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, sub-section (1) of which reads thus:

    “Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.”
    The proviso to sub-section (2) prescribes the time within which an application under sub-section (1) is to be made. Section 19 provides for the making of a reference by the Collector and specifies the matters which are to be comprised in that reference. Thus the matter goes to the court only upon a reference made by the Collector. It is only after such a reference is made that the court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings before the court to consideration of the contention of the persons affected by the objection. These provisions thus leave no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. No doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but that reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the various claimants. Such a reference would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it. This is really not a mere technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Khan v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and a such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of the State to object to the proceedings before the court on the ground of an absence of reference insofar as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence.

    5. In Alderson v. Palliser (1901) 2 KB 833 the Court of Appeal held that where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings, it cannot be waived. In Seth Badri Prasad v. Seth Nagarmal 1959 SCJ 394 this Court has held that even the bar of illegality of a transaction though not pleaded in the courts below can be allowed to be pleaded in this Court if it appears on the face of the pleading in the case. The High Court has, however, based itself largely upon a decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secretary of State AIR 1939 PC 39. In that case there was in fact a reference by the Collector to the court but that reference was made by the Collector not upon the application of the person legally entitled to compensation but by a person whose claim to ownership of property had failed before the civil court but who was still a party to the land acquisition proceedings. In our opinion that decision is distinguishable on the short ground that whereas here there is no reference at all by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer, in that case the Collector had made a reference though in making it he had committed an error of law in that he acted upon the application of a person who had been found to have no interest in the land. Disagreeing with the High Court we, therefore, hold that the court had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation and thus go behind the order of the Land Acquisition Officer.

    6. Upon this short ground the appeal must be dismissed. We have, however, heard Mr Bhimasankaram on merits and in our opinion there are no substantial grounds which would justify interference with the conclusions arrived by the High Court.

    7. For determining the amount of compensation seven sale deeds were filed, Exibits A-l to A-4, on behalf of the State and B-l to B-3 on behalf of the appellants. A synopsis of the sale deeds has been made by the High Court in its judgment and we can do no better than to reproduce it:

    Sl. No. Exhibit Date Extent of landAcs. cts. AmountRs Rate per acreRs Proximity of the site acquired 1. A-1 15.2.46 0-40½ 1750 4240 Opposite to the suit land and abutting the main road. 2. A-2 25.8.46 0-65½ 2500 3800 Some distance away from the site of the acquired land towards Eluru. 3. A-3 9.10.46 1-00 4500 4500 Very near the acquired land the same vendeo. 4. A-4 9.10.46 1-00 4500 4500 Part of the same site, and the vendee. 5. B-1 14.10.46 0-70 7000 10,000 5 furlongs away from the suit site and nearer Bezwada. 6. B-2 14.2.47 1-09 Just over 12,000 12,000 5 furlongs away towards Bezwada. 7. B-3 24.1.46 0-36 1850 5000 It is a part and parcel of the same land that is sought to be acquired.

    Out of these sale deeds Exibits A-1 and A-2 were rejected by the High Court, A-l on the ground that it is several months earlier than the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act and Exibit A-2 on the ground that the land comprised in it is some distance away from the land under acquisition and is also further away from Vijayawada than this land. The High Court similarly rejected Exibit B-2 on the ground that transaction was entered into four months after the publication of the notification and on the further ground that; it is located in the direction of Vijayawada at a distance of five furlongs from the land acquired. It has apparently rejected also Exibit B-3, though the land sold thereunder is a part and parcel of the same land which is sought to be acquired. The ground appears to be that the land sold thereunder is only 36 cents in area. It has accepted Exibits A-3 and A-4 and on that basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs 4,500 per acre for all these lands. Insofar as Ext. B-l is concerned the High Court has taken the view that though it bears the date of October 14, 1946, the circumstance that it was actually registered or February 13, 1947 and some of the stamp papers used were in the names of persons unconnected with the transaction shows that it has really been ante-dated so as to make it appear to be earlier in point of income than the notification.

    8. In our opinion what the High Court has said about these three exhibits, B-l, B-2 and B-3, seems to have considerable force. At any rate we do not think that there are any substantial grounds upon which we can look at these transactions in a different way. If these documents go away, as also Exibits A-l and A-2, we are left with only Exibits A-3 and A-4. Some argument was advanced before us to the effect) that the lands comprised in the transactions represented by these documents have no direct access to the road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a good price. Bearing in mind the fact that these are all agricultural lands a rate of Rs 4500 per acre at which they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate. As regards access, it is sufficient to say that they are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road. Since the lands sold under these sale deeds were part and parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way over the land unsold so as to have access to the road.

    9. In the circumstances we bold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.

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    Kothamasu Kanakarathamma And Others v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
    (Jan 23, 1964)