Das Gupta, J.— The three respondents, Venugopal, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah were tried along with one Mittala Kamal Sab by the Sessions Judge, Anantapur Division, on a number of charges. Kamal Sab was acquitted of all the charges against him, but these three respondents were convicted of several offences. All three of them were convicted under Sections 348, 331, and 201 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Venugopal was further convicted under Section 343 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under Section 348 the respondents were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years; for the offence under Section 331 of the Indian Penal Code each of them was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years; for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years each. Venugopal was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment under Section 343 of the Indian Penal Code. All of them were acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The sentences imposed on them were directed to run concurrently. These orders of conviction and sentence were set aside by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal and the three respondents have been acquitted of all the charges. Against that decision the State of Andhra Pradesh has filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.
2. Of the three respondents, Venugopal was the Sub-Inspector of Police, Vempalli Police Station, in Cuddapah District from July 20, 1956 to February 22, 1957; Rangaswamy was a Head Constable attached to the same police station from May 4, 1955 to February 20, 1957; Subbaiah was a Police Constable at that police station from April 10, 1955 to February 20, 1957. On July 21, 1952 Mittala Kamal Sab, a resident of Vempalli town lodged at the Vempalli Police Station an information of house-breaking and theft in his house. After investigation a charge-sheet was submitted by the police against one Patra Obanna and three other persons. Those three were arrested and tried and convicted on October 31, 1952; but Patra Obanna remained absconding and the case against him remained pending in the Magistrate's Court. After sometime the Magistrate wrote to the District Superintendent of Police of Anantpur, requesting him either to withdraw the case or to try and arrest Patra Obanna.
3. Thereafter, Venugopal, who was then the Vempalli Sub-Inspector of Police, took action in this matter and his attempt to arrest Patra Obanna met with success. Patra Obanna was actually arrested on January 6, 1957. On the same date on being informed by him that he had given the gold gajjalu which formed part of the stolen property to a person in Kadiri Taluk, Venugopal proceeded to Kadiri Police Station. On the night of January 6, Venugopal, accompanied by constables of the Kadiri Police Station and Rangaswamy and Subbiah, who had come with him to Kadiri went to Dasaravandlapalli in Gandlapenta police station and there on the identification of Patra Obanna as the person to whom he had given the gold gajjalu took one Arige Ramanna into custody. The police party then returned with Arige Ramanna to Kadiri Police Station. Less than three days later Arige Ramanna was found lying dead not far from the house of one Sugali Baginigadu, in Udmulagutta Thanda, in Kadiri village. There were a number of injuries on the body. The prosecution case is that these injuries had been caused by the three respondents acting in concert for the purpose of extorting from him information which might lead to the detection of an offence and restoration of stolen property. It is also the prosecution case that for this purpose these three respondents wrongfully confined Arige Ramanna in a room at the Kadiri Police Station and it was there when he was thus confined that the injuries were caused. The prosecution case further is that when after infliction of the injuries Arige Ramanna appeared to be in a bad state these respondents had him removed from the police station and his body thrown at the place where it was ultimately found with the intention of screening themselves from punishment.
4. As to the events which led to such acts by the respondents, the prosecution story is that Arige Ramanna had on being interrogated at the Kadiri Police Station given information that he had sold the gajjalu to Appalla of Nallasanivandlapplli. Following up this information the three respondents accompanied by Patra Obanna and Arige Ramanna went to that village and questioned Nallasani Appalla. One gold gajjalu was seized from his house and to check on Arige Ramanna's statement that this had been sold by him to Appalla in the presence of Fakruddin of Kataruppalli, the Sub-Inspector tried to contact Fakruddin. Fakruddin was found at Madanapplli on January 8, 1957; but he denied any knowledge about the sale of gold gajjalu by Arige Ramanna to Appalla. The respondent Venugopal then returned to Kadiri Police Station bringing Arige Ramanna and Appalla with him. It was then the early morning of January 9, 1957. Both Arige Ramanna and Appalla were then taken by Venugopal into the Sub-Inspector's room at Kadiri Police Station. Subbaiah and Rangaswamy also went into the room. There, after some further interrogation Arige Ramanna was beaten up by Subbaiah, Rangaswamy, and Kamal Sab, who was the complainant in the theft case, under the instructions of Venugopal.
5. These three respondents as well as Kamal Sab pleaded not guilty. We are not concerned with the case of Kamal Sab. He was acquitted by the Sessions Judge and after the State's appeal against the acquittal order was dismissed by the High Court the State has not sought to appeal against that order of dismissal.
6. The defence of these three respondents was that they had nothing to do with the injuries that were found on Arige Ramanna's body. The fact that Arige Ramanna was taken into custody and brought by them to the Kadiri Police Station was not disputed, though they dispute the correctness of the prosecution story that this happened on January 6, 1957. They do not also deny the visit to Appalla and the seizure of a gold gajjalu from his house and the visit thereafter to Madanapplli to meet Fakruddin nor the fact that Fakruddin denied having witnessed any sale of gold gajjalu. Their case however is that after the return from Madanapplli both Arige Ramanna and Appalla were asked to go away and they went away and did not come to the police station at all. After this they say they as well as Obanna came to the police station and slept there. According to them, the whole story of Arige Ramanna being taken into the Sub-Inspector's room and being beaten up there and then being taken away from there is entirely false.
7. On a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, and the statements of the accused persons the Sessions Judge believed the prosecution case about the confinement and beating up of Arige Ramanna by these appellants and that when Arige Ramanna was in a bad state after receiving the injuries they got him removed from the police station. He also rejected the defence contention that the investigation in the present case had not been made in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the Sessions Judge convicted these respondents, as already stated, under Sections 348, 331 and 201 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge also held that as after the arrest of Arige Ramanna on the night of January 6, 1958, he was not sent to the Magistrate and kept in restraint for three days, the respondent Venugopal committed the further offence under Section 343 of the Indian Penal Code. He found that the case against Kamal Sab had not been proved and acquitted him of all the charges.
8. When the appeal preferred by Venugopal, Rangaswamy, and Subbaiah came up for hearing before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh a preliminary point was raised on their behalf that the prosecution was barred by reason of the provisions of Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (hereinafter referred to as the “Police Act”). Thereupon Basi Reddy, J. before whom this point was raised framed the following question:
“In the circumstances of this case, is the prosecution of the appellants barred by limitation by reason of the provision of Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859?”
and referred it for determination by a Division Bench of two Judges. The Division Bench to whom the case was referred, referred this question and a further question framed by them viz. “In what circumstances, the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 53 of the Madras District Police Act would be available to an accused officer?,” for determination by a Full Bench. After discussing the relevant legal provisions and authorities the Full Bench disposed of the matter in these words:
“We would therefore answer the first question referred to us by saying that the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 53 of the Act would be available to an accused officer only when the act complained of his been committed in the discharge of his official duties. We have already laid down that the question as to whether a particular act would be regarded as having been done in the discharge of one's official duties would have to be determined on the facts and particular circumstances of the case. It is unnecessary for us to answer the second question. This will be decided by a Single Judge.”
9. The appeal then came to be heard by Mr Justice Anantanarayana Ayyar. The learned Judge was of opinion, after considering the decision of the Full Bench and certain observations in some other cases, that if the police officers were alleged to have committed the acts complained of “when” they were investigating into the cases of house breaking and theft, Section 53 of the Police Act would apply. Observing that there was no doubt or dispute about the fact that these officers were investigating the case of house breaking and theft officially at all material times they were alleged to have committed the offences which formed the subject-matter of the charges, he concluded, that as the prosecution was made beyond the period prescribed in Section 53 of the Police Act they were entitled to an acquittal. He proceeded however to consider the case also on the merits and came to the conclusion that on facts also there was room to doubt the guilt of these officers on the charges. In this view of the law and facts the learned Judge set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and acquitted these three respondents of the charges framed against them.
10. In our opinion, the High Court is clearly wrong in thinking that the prosecution was barred by Section 53 of the Police Act. That section provides in the first place for a period of limitation for certain actions and prosecutions and makes certain other provisions in respect of civil actions with which we are not concerned. The actions and prosecution for which the limitation prescribed can be best understood from the actual words used by the legislature, which are these:
“All actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise.”
It is plain that in order that any person against whom a prosecution has been launched can get the benefit of the three months period of limitation thus prescribed, it must appear either, (i) that the act complained of was done under the provisions of the Police Act or (ii) the act complained of was done under the provisions of some other law in force conferring powers on the police or (iii) the act complained of was intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act i.e though strictly speaking the act was not done under the provisions of the Act, the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act under the provisions of the Police Act or (iv) the act complained of was intended to be done under the provisions of some other law in force conferring powers on the police i.e though the act was strictly speaking not done under the provisions of such other law the intention of the accused in doing the act was to act under such provisions.
11. The Police Act contains several provisions under which the police officers or other persons may act or intend to act. Section 6 vests in police authorities appointed under the Act all powers not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act which up to the passing of the Act belonged by law to the existing police authorities. Section 7 confers full powers of a Magistrate on the Inspector General of Police and authorises the State Government to vest the District Superintendents of Police with all or any of these powers. Under Section 9 the Inspector-General may from time to time frame rules and regulations inter alia for collecting and communicating intelligence and information; Section 21 describes the duty of every police officer to be “to use his best endeavours and ability to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances; to preserve the peace; to apprehend disorderly and suspicious characters; to detect and bring offenders to justice; to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; and promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him”. Section 42 which is the next section in the Act — the original Sections 22 to 43 having been repealed by the Central Act 17 of 1862 empowers any police officer above the rank of a constable or any member of the Madras Fire Service above the rank of a fireman to do a number of things. These include the closure of a street or passage in or near which any fire is burning and the breaking into or through, or pulling down or using the passage of hoses or other appliances, any premises for the purpose of extinguishing the fire.
12. The effect of Section 53 of the Police Act is that all prosecutions whether against a police officer or a person other than a police officer (e.g, a member of the Madras Fire Service, above the rank of a fireman acting under Section 42 of the Act) must be commenced within three months after the act complained of, if this act is one which has been done or intended to be done “under” any of the provisions detailed above. The protection of Section 53 is not confined however only to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of the Police Act. It extends to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of any other law conferring powers on the police. One such law is the Code of Criminal Procedure which confers numerous powers on the police in respect of arrest, search and investigation. Among other laws conferring powers on the police may be mentioned the Oipum Act, the Excise Act, the Petroleum Act etc.
13. Any prosecution in respect of any act done or intended to be done under the provisions of any of these laws has also to be commenced within three months of the act complained of. It is clear that if in any of these cases the prosecution is commenced beyond three months after the act complained of, it will be the duty of the courts to dismiss the same. But it is equally clear that unless the act complained of appears to have been done or intended to be done “under” the provisions of the Police Act or of the other laws conferring powers on the police the protection of Section 53 will not be available. Thus, if the prosecution is for an offence under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by the act of closing a street or passage in or near which a fire is burning in exercise of powers under Section 42(b) of the Police Act, or for an offence under Section 426 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by the pulling down of a house for the purpose of extinguishing a fire, under Section 42(c) of the Police Act, the prosecution must fail unless brought within three months of the act complained of. So also if a police officer is prosecuted for an offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed in making an arrest, the prosecution must fail unless commenced within three months of the act complained of.
14. It is easy to see that if the act complained of is wholly justified by law, it would not amount to an offence at all in view of the provisions of Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Many cases may however arise where in acting under the provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police the police officer or some other person may go beyond what is strictly justified in law. Though Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code will have no application to such cases; Section 53 of the Police Act will apply. But Section 53 applies to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes the task of the court, whenever any question whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care on its decision. In doing this it has to ascertain first what act is complained of and then to examine if there is any provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on the police under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done. The court has to remember in his connection that an act is not “under” a provision of law merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time when some act in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done “under” a provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between the provisions and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done “under” the particular provision of law.
15. This aspect of the matter was emphasized by this Court recently in Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadawpur v. State of Mysore Criminal Appeal No. 144 of 1961 when examining the language of a similar provision in the Bombay District Police Act.
16. These principles apply equally to the decision of the question whether the act complained of was ‘“intended to be done” under the provisions of the Police Act or some other law conferring powers on the police. When we apply these principles to the facts of the present case we look in vain for any provision of law — whether under the Police Act or under some other law — under which the acts complained of viz. beating a person suspected of a crime or confining him or sending him away in an injured condition can be said to have any relation. Mr Keswani tried to say — it is fair to him to state, — rather faintly — that these acts were done under the provisions of Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section empowers any police officer investigating a crime or any other police officer acting on his requisition to examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. The section further provides that such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the provisions of this section authorise the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a particular statement. It is worth noticing here Section 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first sub-section of Section 163 prohibits any police officer from making any inducement, threat or promise for the purpose of obtaining a statement. The second sub-section provides that no police officer shall prevent by caution or otherwise any person from making a statement which he may be disposed to make on his own free will. The provisions of Section 163 thus emphasize the fact that Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorise the police officers to beat or to confine a person with a view to induce him to make a statement.
17. The act of beating or the act of confining was, it is true alleged to be done at a time when Venugopal was engaged in investigation. But it is not possible to see what reasonable connection these acts had with the process of investigation. Nor can one see how the act of sending away the injured person had any relation to the process of investigation.
18. The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at a time when the officer is engaged in investigating that crime should be held to be done in the discharge of his official duties to investigate and as such under the provisions of the law that imposed this duty on him. This view is wholly unwarranted in law.
19. In our opinion, it cannot possibly be said that the acts complained of in the present case were done or intended to be done under any provision of the Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers on the police. Section 53 of the Police Act had therefore no application to this case.
20. After holding that the prosecution was barred under Section 53 of the Police Act, the High Court still proceeded to consider the merits of the case and recorded a conclusion that the evidence left room for doubts as regards the guilt of the accused on the different charges. When the High Court held that the conviction had to be set aside on the preliminary ground that the prosecution had been commenced in contravention of Section 53, it might have chosen not to examine the merits of the case. When it did choose, however, to do so, it was necessary that this should be done with proper care. We are constrained to say that the examination of the evidence was done by the High Court in what can only be called a cursory or casual manner. It has been necessary therefore for us to try to assess the evidence for ourselves.
21. But before we proceed to the discussion of the evidence we must consider a contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the very trial was vitiated by the fact that the investigation was not done in accordance with law. The argument is that under the Madras Police Standing Orders, the investigation in cases against the police for torture and causing death has to be conducted by a person of the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police or by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In the present case, though the initial investigation was conducted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Penkondu, it was taken up from him by an Inspector of the Police, CID, Hyderabad. It was this Inspector of Police who completed the investigation and submitted the charge-sheet. It has to be noticed that the respondents do not say that the investigation was not in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their case, as raised before the Sessions Court, apparently at the time of argument and again repeated here is that the investigation by the Inspector contravened the Madras Police Standing Orders.
22. Order 145 of the Madras Police Standing Orders prescribes procedure in respect of charges of torture or of death or grievous hurt against a police officer. This order it may be mentioned, superseded the previous Order 157 on the subject and was in force in 1957. The main features of the procedure when the case occurs in the mufassal in the State of Madras are that:
(1) A gazetted police officer on hearing of such an occurrence on a complaint made to him or otherwise should immediately start an informal investigation but when an information is received by a police officer below the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police, he should instead of making an investigation himself report the case to his Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police. In either case a report should be sent to the Revenue Divisional Officer;
(2) The Revenue Divisional Officer should conduct an informal enquiry to see whether there are grounds for launching a criminal prosecution and to fix the responsibility on individual officers;
(3) Where a complaint has been filed in the Court of a Judicial Magistrate as regards the occurrence, the Revenue Divisional Officer should after arriving at his own findings keep them confidential and decide on the further course of action in the light of the judicial decision when it is available;
(4) When no complaint has been filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate the Revenue Divisional Officer should after completing the investigation submit his report to the Collector. The Collector shall where necessary issue instructions for laying a formal complaint by the Revenue Divisional Officer before the Court of the Ist Class Judicial Magistrate.
23. It is contended that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for investigation of crime are superseded by this Standing Order and so the investigation by the Inspector, CID, was illegal. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It appears to us that this Standing Order is nothing more than administrative instructions by the Government of Madras and has not the force of law. It is worth noticing in this connection that in the Madras Police Standing Orders as published by the Government of Madras it is mentioned in the prefatory note that the orders marked with asterisk were issued by the Inspector-General of Police under Section 9 of the Madras District Police Act. The Standing Order 145 is not marked with asterisk and it could be safely held that it was not issued under Section 9 of the Madras District Police Act. The marginal note against the order as printed shows that it was issued by a Government Order of the Home Department dated October 12, 1955. It does not appear that this was done under any statutory authority. There can be no doubt that quite apart from the fact that the Government may and often should issue instructions to its officers, including police officers, such instructions have not however the authority of law. We are not satisfied therefore that the Standing Order 145 had the force of law.
24. We are further of opinion that, in any case, the requirement of this order was merely directory and not mandatory. Non-compliance with the provisions of this Order therefore does not make the investigation of the case illegal.
25. It is also to be mentioned that no objection that the investigation had been conducted in violation of the Standing Orders appears to have been taken at any stage earlier than the trial in the Sessions Court. It will be proper to hold therefore on the authority of Rishbud case (1955) 1 SCR 1150 that even if the provision that the investigation had to be held and completed by a Magistrate had the force of law and was mandatory the trial would not be rendered invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice had been caused on account of the illegal investigation. Learned counsel was not able to show how the accused were in any way prejudiced by reason of the fact that the investigation was completed by the Inspector of Police. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the trial was bad in law because investigation was completed by an Inspector of Police. See Munnallal case.
26. Turning now to the evidence in the case we find it proved by unimpeachable evidence, and also undisputed fact that Arige Ramanna was taken away from his house by these respondents and was with them on January 8, 1957. It is also clearly proved and is not disputed that Arige Ramanna's dead body was found on January 9, lying by the side of a hut in Sugali Tanda. The report of the Assistant, Civil Surgeon who held the post-mortem examination of the body on January 11, 1957 shows that the body bore nine injuries. Seven of these were contusions on different parts of the body and two abrasions. One of the contusions on the right parietal scalp had the internal injury of the congestion of the brain with capillary haemorrhage corresponding to it. The doctor's report shows that this injury would be necessarily fatal. The question is: Has the prosecution been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt its case that these injuries were caused on the morning of January 9, at Kadiri Police Station by these accused persons?
27. To establish this the prosecution relies on the direct testimony of Nallasani Appalla, whom we have mentioned above, and the circumstances claimed to be established by the evidence of the Sub-Inspector and three constables of Kadiri Police Station and the evidence of Bashu, the driver of jatka. Obbayyia, the Sub-Inspector of Kadiri Police Station in January 9, 1957, has given evidence that when on January 9, 1957 he returned from his house at about 9 a.m he saw the Sub-Inspector, Vempalli, one old man and four others in mufti, that they were passing towards the wicket gate in the western direction. Two of the men in mufti were supporting the old man and taking him towards west to the wicket gate. (PW 14). PW 13 Balliah was Station Writer at Kadiri Police Station in January 1957. His evidence is that early on the morning of January 9, he came to his room and at that time saw the Sub-Inspector of Vempalli, the Head Constable and some other persons sleeping in it. But later on when after attending the drill he returned to the police station and went into his room, after leaving the musket in the guard room he saw something else. What he claims to have seen may best be mentioned in his own words:
“In my room Arige Ramanna was seated leaning to the wall, and stretching his legs. Then Vempalli Head Constable felt the pulse of Arige Ramanna. The Vempalli SI was standing in a depressed mood. Obbanna was trying to give coffee to Arige Ramanna but he was not able to take it. That Arige Ramanna appeared to be very weak.”
28. The witness further says that he asked Vempalli SI to take away the man and the Vempalli SI asked Vempalli Head Constable to get a jatka. The witness says that after this he went to take coffee and when he returned from the coffee house he saw the SI Vempalli and the Head Constable and the Police Constable — obviously referring to the three respondents, Obanna and Kamal Sab asking Arige Ramanna to get up. But Arige Ramanna was speaking in a feeble voice and was unable to get up. The witness further says that then Obanna and the Head Constable lifted Arige Ramanna supporting the arms and carried him saying that they were taking him to the jatka.
29. Narasimham, PW 15, was a Head constable at Kadiri Police Station, and he was at the Kadiri Police Station on January 9, 1957. His evidence is that after attending the drill up to 7.30 a.m he went to the police station to deposit the musket and then went to the Station Writer's room — i.e Balliah's room. He supports the account given by Balliah that Arige Ramanna was sitting “leaning to the wall with his legs stretched”. He says further that after a little while the Vempalli police constable got a jatka and informed SI Vempalli and others who were in the Sub-Inspector's room and that then 3 or 4 of these persons carried the man bodily outside to the jatka. The remaining witness from Kadiri Police Station is Nabi Rasool, PW 12. As to what he saw on January 9, 1957 the witness says:
“I came back to the police station to tell the writer there that I will go and have some coffee and return. At that time Balayya Station Writer was telling SI, and Head Constable of Vempalii to take away Arige Ramanna from there. At that time Ramanna was sitting reclining on wall in writer's room. The SI Vempalli said that he will take him away and so went into the room. At that time outside S.I's room were Head Constable, Police Constable of Vempalli, complainant, PW 1 and the prisoner.”
30. It is clear that by the “complainant” he was meaning the accused Mittalla Kamal Sab and by “PW 1” he was referring to Nallasani Appalla.
31. These four witnesses, all members of the police force, are wholly disinterested and independent. They have got no enmity against any of the respondents. Indeed, one might think that their sympathies would be with these respondents who are also members of the police force, now in trouble. An attempt was made to discredit them by a suggestion that after Venugopal, SI of Vempalii had sent Arige Ramanna and Nallasani Appalla away on the morning of January 9, 1957, the Kadiri police brought them to the Thana in connection with the investigation for some other crime of Kadiri police Station and tried to interrogate them. The obvious implication of the suggestion was that Arige Ramanna received his injuries from the hands of the Kadiri Police during such interrogation and so these witnesses of Kadiri Police Station have given false evidence to save themselves. This suggestion was put the Station Writer, Balliah and denied.
32. We cannot, find the slightest support in evidence for this suggestion. It is not even shown that there was any case of Kadir Thana in which Arige Ramanna was involved or suspected. The suggestion that Arige Ramanna received his injuries from the Kadiri police is a vain attempt to discredit these witnesses.
33. The main reason for which the High Court appears to have doubted the veracity of these witnesses is that the occurrence took place at Kadiri Police Station. So the learned Judge observes in his judgment: “It would be advantageous to them if it is shown that, some people other than the police of Kadiri station committed the offence, as alleged by the prosecution.” With great respect to the learned Judge, we are of opinion that this is a mere surmise for which there is absolutely no basis. The Kadiri police could have no reason to be afraid that they would be implicated. For, clearly there was no case of Kadiri Police Station in which Arige Ramanna was involved. Another reason which seems to have appealed to the learned Judge of the High Court is that the evidence of the police witnesses is not supported by any documentary evidence. In our opinion, it would be wholly unreasonable to expect that these officers of Kadiri Police Station would make any note in any of the records about what they saw on the morning of January 9, nor is there anything unusual in the fact pointed out by the learned Judge that the records of Kadiri Police Station do not contain any mention of the accused having come to the station or of any constable of Kadiri Police Station having been deputed to assist, SI of Vempalli.
34. We are bound to hold that there is no reason whatsoever to doubt the testimony of Kadiri Police Station witnesses viz. PWs 12, 13, 14 and 15 and that the High Court has acted arbitrarily in rejecting their testimony.
35. Along with the evidence of these witnesses it is necessary to consider the evidence of the jatkawala, Bashu. It was he who according to the prosecution carried Arige Ramanna from Kadiri Police Station to where his body was ultimately found. His evidence is that two policemen came to him at the busstand and took him with the jatka to the wicket gate on the western side of Kadiri Police Station and then those two men came back carrying one man bodily on their hands and laid him in the jatka. These two also sat in the jatka and asked him to drive. He thought that the man who had been laid in the jatka was sick and drove towards the hospital. But at the direction of the policemen in the jatka he took he road towards Kamatampalli. When they came near a Sugali Tanda he stopped the jatka on their direction and the policemen took down that man carried and placed him by the side of the wall of a hut in that Tanda and left him there. Bashu says that he then took the two policemen in the jatka to Kadiri Police Station and was paid Rs 3.
36. Though Bashu does not claim to know the man who was thus carried and left near the Tanda, there can be no doubt however when we read his evidence with the evidence of the Kadiri police witnesses and the fact later discovered that Arige Ramanna's dead body was found near the Tanda, that it was Arige Ramanna who was carried in Bashu's jatka on that date. Much has been sought to be made by the defence of the fact that Bashu's statement as recorded in the Sessions Court is that it was “afternoon time” when the policemen came and took his jatka to Kadiri Police Station. This is clearly contrary to the account given by the police witnesses that it was about 9 a.m in the morning that Arige Ramanna was taken away in the jatka from Kadiri Police Station. We have no doubt that this statement of afternoon time was a mistake due to the fact that Bashu, a young man of 23 years, was giving evidence more than 21 months after the incident. It is also to be noticed that later on in his examination-in-chief itself he said “that when he was paid Rs 3 at the police station on return from the Tanda it was little after noon time”. This itself indicates that his earlier statement of afternoon time was not correct. Notice may also be taken of the question that was put to the witness in examination-in-chief viz “Did not you see Razack when your jatka was taken by these people that morning?” The witness's answer was “No”. Nothing was asked about the time, in cross-examination. It is not unreasonable to think that the counsel of both parties had understood Bashu's evidence to mean that it was morning when the policemen came and called him to go with his jatka. That gives some support for Mr Chari's submission on behalf of the State that “afternoon time” was recorded by the Judge in error. But assuming the witness did say “afternoon time”, it must have been, in our opinion, due to lapse of memory on his part due to the fact that he was giving evidence on September 11, 1958 about something which happened on January 9, 1957; In our opinion, therefore, far from contradicting the evidence of the Kadiri police witnesses, Bashu's evidence supports and corroborates what they said about Arige Ramanna being taken away in a jatka from Kadiri Police Station on the morning of January 9, 1957.
37. Another witness who deserves mention is the gold smith, Gorantla Fakruddin examined as the 11th witness for the prosecution. He has identified the respondent Venugopal as the person who took him to the police station where in the presence of PW 1 Nallasani Appalla and Arige Ramanna he stated on oath in reply to SI's questions whether it was true that Arige Ramanna got gold gajjalu melted and gave the same to Nallasami Appalla, that he knew nothing about it; and that then he was sent back home. This he said had happened at Madanappalli. Fakruddin mentioned January 1956 as the time when this happened. Obviously this is a mistake for January 1957. His evidence thus proves the circumstance — which really does not appear to have been ever disputed and was not disputed before us — that on January 9, 1957, Venugopal was trying to verify Arige Ramanna's statement about a gold gajjalu and found that the information he had given was not true.
38. The circumstances that are established by the evidence of the witnesses already discussed may now be enumerated thus:
39. On January 6, 1957 Venugopal arrested Patra Obanna, the absconding accused in the theft case instituted in 1962 on the complaint of Kamal Sab;
40. Later the same date, the three respondents took Arige Ramanna into custody in connection with the same case;
41. On the following day i.e January 7, a gold gajjalu was seized in the same connection, by Venugopal from the house of Nallasani Appalla;
42. On the evening of January 8, Venugopal examined Fakruddin to verify Arige Ramanna's statement as regards the gajjalu and found that the information he had given was not true;
43. Early in the morning of January 9, Venugopal, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah and some other men were seen in the Sub-Inspector's room at Kadiri Police Station;
44. At about 9 a.m Arige Ramanna was seen in the Station Writer's room in that police station leaning against the wall with his legs outstretched; Rangaswamy was feeling his pulse, Venugopal standing by him in a depressed mood, Obanna trying to induce Arige Ramanna to take some coffee:
45. Just after this when the Station Writer, Kadiri Police Station asked Venugopal to take away the man, that is, Arige Ramanna, Venugopal asked Rangaswamy to fetch a jatka, a jatka was brought by Bashu and the three respondents asked Arige Ramanna to get up; Arige Ramanna was not able to get up. Then Obanna and Rangaswamy liftd Arige Ramanna into the jatka. Jatka was then driven to Sugali Tanda and two men who carried Arige Ramanna into the jatka, carried him out of the jatka and left him lying by the side of the wall of a hut in that Tanda;
46. Later the same day Arige Ramanna was discovered on that place dead and with a number of injuries which the medical evidence shows were ante-mortem.
47. When all these circumstances are considered together they show one clear connected picture that intent upon getting some clue about a gold gajjalu which had been stolen from Kamal Sab's house in 1952 and exasperated by what he thought to be Arige Ramanna's deliberate attempt to conceal the truth, Venugopal brought Arige Ramanna back to Kadiri Police Station on the morning of January 9, 1957 and there under his instruction, his subordinate the two police constables, Rangaswamy and Subbaiah, beat up Arige Ramanna and between them inflicted the injuries which were ultimately discovered by the doctor.
48. It is not possible to accept Venugopal's suggestion that after he returned from Madanappalli to Kadiri early in the morning of January 9, he asked Arige Ramanna and Nallasani Appalla to go away. It would not be normal human conduct for him to acknowledge defeat at that stage and the probabilities of the case strongly support what is proved by the direct evidence of the witnesses that Arige Ramanna was taken by him to Kadiri Police Station on the morning of January 9, and not allowed to go away.
49. We are unable to find a single circumstance inconsistent with the prosecution case that these three respondents beat up Arige Ramanna at Kadiri Police Station for the purpose of extorting from him information as regards the disposal of a gold gajjalu that might lead to further detection in connection with the case of house-breaking and theft committed at the house of Kamal Sab in 1952.
50. The circumstances that have been established are in our opinion incapable of explanation of any other reasonable hypothesis than the truth of the prosecution case that these respondents voluntarily caused hurt to Arige Ramanna for the purpose of extorting from him information regarding the disposal of the gold gajjalu which might lead to fuller detection of the crime. The circumstances speak so clearly that any other view would, we think, be unreasonable, arbitrary and indeed perverse.
51. On a consideration of the in juries that were caused, we do not find it possible to be certain that the respondents had the intention of causing grievous hurt to Arige Ramanna. What is proved beyond doubt however is that they voluntarily caused hurt to Arise Ramanna for the purpose mentioned above. Thereby, they committed an offence under Section 330 of the Indian Penal Code, though not under Section 331 of that Code.
52. In view of this conclusion from the circumstantial evidence adduced in the case it is hardly necessary to discuss the direct testimony given by Nallasani Appalla, the Prosecution Witness 1. As however the trial court on a consideration of the evidence believed it to be substantially true except as regards the fourth accused Kamal Sab, who is no longer before us, and the High Court has expressed a contrary opinion, we shall briefly refer to his evidence.
53. We think it proper to point out that the judgment of the High Court does not contain any discussion worth the name of what this witness has said or of the reasons which induced the High Court to characterize it as “unreliable”.
54. It has already been stated above that the three respondents came to the house of this witness on January 7, 1957 and a gold gajjalu was seized from his house and that on the following day this witness and Arige Ramanna were with Venugopal when he interrogated the goldsmith Gorantla Fakruddin as regards Arige Ramanna's story that he had given the gajjalu to this witness in Fakruddin's presence. After Fakruddin denied on oath the truth of this story, Arige Ramanna was brought back from Madanappalli, where Fakruddin was found and interrogated, to Kadiri. Nallasani Appalla has given evidence that Venugopal then took both of them into his room. As to what happened next he said:
“A-2 asked A-1 what Fakru Sab had said. A-1 replied that Fakru Sab had denied. Then A-2 began to abuse Arige Ramanna that he is a thief and is giving false information. A-3 also abused and A-2 began to beat him. A-3 also began to beat Ramanna. A-4 also began to beat him. They beat him with hands, fists and elbows. A-1 said that it is not the proper way and said that the hands should be tied. A-3 pushed me out and the door was closed. I stood at the window, opening into the verandah. The window was not closed. A-3 said to Ramanna “hold out your hands”, as he had folded his hands and requested that his hands be not tied. A-3 took hold of the tuft of Arige Ramanna and pulled him up and down. A-4 pulled out the hands of Arige Ramanna and A-3 tied patties used by police on their legs to the hands. The hands of Arige Ramanna were put back on his back by A-3 and A-4 put a stick between the hands and neck of Ramanna. A-3 and A-4 pressed the stick and Ramanna fell down on his face. A-2 abused Ramanna and hit him with a stick on his head, at back of the head. The stick was that used by the police. On being hit Ramanna cried out “I am killed” and he admitted that he gave the property to Tai people at Kadiri, on this A-1 told them to take out the stick and release the hands. It was done.”
55. This is the account of the beating given by this witness. The trial court has not believed what he said as regards the fourth accused, Kamal Sab and to this extent we must hold that the witness has not told the truth. That by itself is however not sufficient reason to disbelieve what he has said about the other accused persons. It seems to us very probable that Nallasani Appalla also would be taken by Venugopal to the thana on return from Madanappalli. It seems also more than likely that he would be interested to know how the police proceeded to tackle Arige Ramanna whose false word had brought him (the witness) to trouble. We find nothing improbable in the story given by him that from where he stood at the window he could see what was happening inside the room.
56. Mr Keswani drew our attention to the doctor's evidence that five of the nine injuries could be caused only by a stick with thorny surface or surface with thin points and commented that this showed that Nallasani Appalla who has not mentioned any such weapon, did not see the occurrence. We are not impressed by this argument. It has to be remembered that Nallasani Appalla himself must have been in great terror when he saw the way in which Ramanna was being treated. It is also necessary to remember that he was giving evidence on September 1, 1958, of an occurrence which took place on January 9, 1957. It is also not unlikely that though he could see from outside the room the beating that was being given, he could not clearly distinguish the details of the weapons that were being used.
57. We also do not find any substance in Mr Keswani's argument that the doctor's evidence that on post-mortem examination the stomach contents were found to contain about 15 ozs. of semi-digested liquid food and water, is inconsistent with Nallasani's story that after the beating some coffee and idli were brought but Ramanna sipped some coffee and said that he could not take any more. It is not improbable that though Arige Ramanna managed to take some idli also in addition to coffee, this was not noticed by Nallasani Appalla; or it may be that though he did notice it he did not remember this at the time he was giving evidence about 21 months after the occurrence. Even if it be believed that Arige Ramanna did not take idli that morning the presence of semi-digested liquid food might well be due to something which had been taken by Arige Ramanna before he reached the police station. The argument sought to be built by the learned counsel on the doctor's evidence as regards the stomach contents must therefore be rejected.
58. There can be no doubt that Nallasani Appalla must have been very angry with these respondents for the unjust search of his house and for the indignity to which he bad been put. We do not think however that could make him so bold as to give false testimony against persons in the position of these respondents.
59. On a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, we are of opinion that the Sessions Judge was right in his assessment of this witness' testimony against these three respondents and the High Court was wrong in considering his evidence as wholly unreliable.
60. Nallasani's evidence by itself would be sufficient to prove that the accused had committed an offence under Section 330 of the Indian Penal Code. But the circumstantial evidence we have discussed above so clearly establishes their guilt for this offence that it is unnecessary to seek any further support for it.
61. For the reasons mentioned above, we have come to the conclusion that the decision of the High Court that there was any doubt about the truth of the prosecution case that these respondents beat up Arige Ramanna does not bear scrutiny and it is wholly unjustified. The interests of justice demand that the High Court's decision on this question should not be allowed to stand.
62. Accordingly, we set aside the order of High Court acquitting the respondents altogether in respect of injuries caused to Arige Ramanna, and convict them all of an offence under Section 330 of the Indian Penal Code.
63. On behalf of the State Mr Chari does not press the appeal against the acquittal of the respondents on the other charges viz. Sections 343, 348 and Section 201 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
64. The learned Sessions Judge awarded a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 331 of the Indian Penal Code. Though we have altered the conviction to one under Section 330 of the Indian Penal Code, we do not think we shall be justified in reducing the sentence. A serious view cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was committed by these respondents in this case. It is necessary that deterrent sentences should be inflicted for such an offence when established.
65. Accordingly, we convict the respondents under Section 330 of the Indian Penal Code and we sentence each of them to five years' rigorous imprisonment.
66. The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as regards the acquittal of the respondents on other charges. The accused to surrender to their bail.