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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code
  • the Constitution
  • Section C-12, Article Dhoti
  • Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 148, IPC (Indian Penal Code)
  • Section 302-149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Cr PC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code
  • the Constitution
  • Section C-12, Article Dhoti
  • Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 148, IPC (Indian Penal Code)
  • Section 302-149 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Cr PC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Mauza Dhadi, District Wardha (then Madhya Pradesh), was owned by nine brothers who were malguzars. Following disputes over unpaid grazing dues and rent, three of the brothers—Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Shiraz Ahmad—were brutally murdered on 25 July 1949 during a daytime riot in the village. Their servant Jilani’s nose was also cut.

The police filed four challans. Thirty-two villagers were committed to the Court of Session, Wardha, to face charges including rioting with deadly weapons (ss. 147/148 IPC), murder (s. 302/149 IPC), grievous hurt (s. 326 IPC) and dacoity (s. 395 IPC).

A jury and the Sessions Judge acquitted all accused on the murder and rioting counts; some were also acquitted on dacoity and grievous-hurt charges. The State appealed. On 5 February 1951 the Nagpur High Court reversed the acquittals for seventeen accused, convicted them of rioting and multiple murders, imposed life sentences on most, and sentenced three (Bhimrao Kadu, Abdul Gani and Sheshrao Patode) to death.

The present appeals, filed under Article 134 of the Constitution, challenge the High Court’s reversal of acquittal and the sentences imposed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Nagpur High Court had “substantial and compelling” grounds to set aside the jury’s and Sessions Judge’s acquittals and convict the appellants for rioting and murder under Sections 148, 147 and 302/149 IPC.
  2. Whether the testimonial and documentary evidence—particularly from eyewitnesses Biyabi, Ikrar Ullah, Jilani, Hayatbi and Radhi—was sufficiently reliable to support convictions.
  3. Whether the imposition of the death penalty on certain appellants was justified on the evidence and findings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • Presumption of innocence was reinforced by the trial court’s acquittal; interference required compelling reasons, which were absent.
  • The prosecution case was fabricated: the FIR was “sketchy,” police suppressed independent versions, and key roznamcha entries were allegedly lost.
  • Main eyewitnesses (Biyabi, Ikrar Ullah, Jilani, Hayatbi, Radhi) were unreliable—each had contradicted earlier statements or admitted tutoring and pressure.
  • Material witnesses (Bashir, brother of the deceased, and Subhan, a nine-year-old son) were withheld, inviting an adverse inference.
  • Several accused had credible alibis or injuries suggesting they were victims, not perpetrators.
  • The High Court acted on conjecture, treated probabilities as proof, and failed to give appellants the benefit of reasonable doubt.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State’s rebuttal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malak Khan v. Emperor, AIR 1946 PC 16 Prosecution need not call every conceivable witness; courts assess entire evidence while noting absence of expected witnesses. Cited to justify non-examination of Bashir and the nine-year-old Subhan; Court held their absence did not fatally weaken the prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a witness-by-witness and accused-by-accused scrutiny, emphasising its duty to separate “grain from chaff.” Key aspects of the analysis include:

  • Credibility of eyewitnesses: The Court agreed that some witnesses (Jilani, certain retracted statements of Hayatbi and Radhi) were unreliable, but found others (notably Biyabi) broadly trustworthy where consistent and corroborated.
  • FIR and corroboration: Although brief, Ex. P-14 was treated as contemporaneous corroboration for several identifications. Omission of a name was weighed but not always fatal.
  • Approach to reversal of acquittal: The Court reiterated that interference is permissible where the lower court’s view is “manifestly erroneous” or evidence ignored. It found the Sessions Judge had “taken an easy course” by discarding the entire prosecution case instead of assessing each accused individually.
  • Assessment of each appellant:
    • Bhimrao Kadu: Consistent testimony showed he struck the first spear blow; conviction and death sentence upheld.
    • Abdul Gani: High Court erred; his name absent from early statements; conviction set aside and acquittal restored.
    • Sheshrao Patode: Presence proven but leadership role unsubstantiated; death sentence commuted to life imprisonment.
    • For the remaining fourteen appellants the Court either affirmed or reversed convictions based on corroboration, reliability, alibi evidence, and presence of blood-stained articles.
  • Blood-stained articles: Positive human blood findings bolstered inference of participation; ambiguous or disintegrated stains were disregarded.
  • Sentencing discretion: Only those proven leaders or primary assailants merited extreme penalty; others, though culpable, received life terms.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: Appeals of six appellants (Pundalik Bajirao Mahar, Gendu, Gulab Chore, Sampat Manya Gawari, Baburao Chore and Gulab Lande) were ALLOWED; they were acquitted and ordered released. Convictions of Abdul Gani were also set aside. Convictions of the remaining appellants—including the death sentence of Bhimrao Kadu, and life sentences for Walayat, Pundalik Gulab Chore, Ramrao Wankhede, Dinya Gond, Shankar Mahar, Bhimrao Gawande and Govinda Gaikwad—were UPHELD. For Sheshrao Patode, the death sentence was COMMUTED to life imprisonment.

Implications: The judgment clarifies the Supreme Court’s approach to appellate review of acquittals: while deference is owed, reversal is proper where the trial court has failed to evaluate evidence rationally. It emphasises careful witness appraisal and sets guidance on when capital punishment is appropriate. No new legal doctrine was announced, but the decision underscores existing principles on credibility assessment and prosecutorial obligations.

    Abdul Gani v. Bhimrao Kadu

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Mehr Chand Mahajan, J.— These two appeals under Article 134 of the Constitution have been preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur, dated 5th February 1951, setting aside the acquittal of the appellants on charges of rioting and murder, and convicting them for the same.

    2. The facts are these: One Wazir Ali was the lambardar malguzar of mauza Dhadi, a village in tehsil Arvi of district Wardha (Madhya Pradesh). His widow Wazdi Begum succeeded him after his death to that office. She died in 1947, and the malguzari of the village was inherited by her nine sons viz. Hasan Ali (PW 22), Rashid Ahmad (PW 23), Asadali, Bashir Ahmad, Nazir Ahmad, Ashraf Ali, Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Shiraz Ahmad. The last three were murdered on the 25th July 1949, two at the house where Hafiz Ali was residing and Aman Ali at his own house.

    3. According to the prosecution they were murdered in the following circumstances. The villagers of Dhadi had a dislike for the malguzars, as some amount of grazing dues and rents were in arrear from them. The malguzars had not been able to meet the government demand for land revenue and on the 16th July 1949 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Arvi, ordered the sale of the malguzari rights of mauza Dhadi on account of this default on the part of the malguzars. On 24th July 1949 the station house officer, Ashti, one Dongar Sing, visited the village in connection with the investigation of a complaint filed by Hafiz Ali against a number of villagers for forcibly removing timber from a forest owned by the malguzars and converting the wood into charcoal. He arrested a number of persons including some of the accused. They were, however, released on bail on the 25th morning and accused Bhimrao Kadu stood surety for some of them. The sale of the village ordered by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had to take place after the rainy season. In order to avert this sale and meet the government demand, Hafiz Ali, Aman Ali and Bashir Ahmad, held consultations and decided to make an effort to realise the arrears of rent and gazing dues from the villagers. Accordingly, a demand for payment of these arrears was made by making a proclamation in the village by beat of drum on the morning of the 25th July. The demand for payment of arrears by a public proclamation excited the ire of the villagers who also held consultations between themselves and they decided to resist it. It is said that a meeting of the villagers took place in the morning at the house of Govinda Gaikwad (Accused 22), where it was decided that the demand should be resisted and if necessary, the malguzars should be severely dealt with. Hafiz Ali and Aman Ali, being apprised of this meeting, held consultations inter se and met at the house of Bashir Ahmad for the purpose of devising means to meet the situation that had arisen. A report was written out to be sent to the police. Aman Ali along with Jilani, a servant of Hafiz Ali, was deputed to take the report personally to Ashti. Leaving Jilani and Shiraz Ahmad at Bashir Ahmad's house, Aman Ali returned to his house to dress up and then proceed to the thana. Hafiz Ali also came back from Bashir Ahmad's house and on his way he found the accused assembled at the house of Abdul Gani (Accused 6). Some members of the mob attacked him with sticks and struck him a blow. Hafiz Ali thereupon ran into his house, and shut the door. The mob surrounded the house, dug out the small door and removed it. Hafiz Ali was standing near the door. Bhimrao Kadu (Accused 5) struck him a blow with a spear and then all the accused entered the house, and beat Hafiz Ali with swords, spears, sticks and stones and wounded him grievously. They then left him in that condition and marched to Aman Ali's house and burst into it. They struck him down with swords, spears and lathis and killed him. Shiraz Ahmad and Jilani on hearing the uproar and finding that the accused had left Hafiz Ali's house, arrived at his house and while they were there, the crowd returned to Hafiz Ali's house after having finished Aman Ali. Hafiz Ali was assaulted afresh and was killed. A search was made for Shiraz Ahmad who had hidden himself on the loft. He was pulled down and was murdered. The corpses of the two unfortunate men were dragged out of the house and were left lying, that of Hafiz Ali outside the door and that of Shiraz Ahmad near a well close by. The accused then turned their attention to Jilani, caught hold of him and marched him outside the house. He was tied to a wooden post and Sheshrao Patode (Accused 19), it is said, then snatched a sword from the hand of Abdul Gani (Accused 6) and cut his nose and the upper lip. The accused then broke open a box belonging to Hafiz Ali and carried away cash amounting to 600 in ten rupee notes and other papers. All this took place between 12.30 p.m and 2 p.m on the 25th July.

    4. At 7.45 p.m the same evening, the first information report regarding the murder of Aman Ali and the wounding of Hafiz Ali was recorded at the police station Ashti to the dictation of Ikrar Ullah, son-in-law of Hafiz Ali, who had managed to escape from the house of Hafiz Ali after the first attack had been made on him. Ashti is at a distance of six miles from Dhadi. He also informed Rashid Ahmad, another brother of Hafiz Ali, who resides at Ashti, of this incident. In pursuance of this report, sub-inspector Dongar Singh and circle inspector Kanetkar who was got from Arvi, proceeded to Ashti and started investigation. They reached the village at about 2 a.m in the morning.

    5. As a result of the investigation, the police put in four separate challans against the accused before Shri R.K Pandey, Magistrate First Class, Wardha. Thirty two persons were charged for rioting with deadly weapons and for the murder of Hafiz Ali, Shiraz Ahmad and Aman Ali and some of the accused were also charged with the offence of dacoity and causing grievous hurt, which offences were triable with the aid of jury. The Magistrate committed all these persons by one order dated 19th October 1949 to take their trial in the count of session. He was of the opinion that the offences under the four challans were committed in the course of the same transaction and could be tried jointly.

    6. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty regarding accused Sheshrao Patode of the charge under Section 326, IPC and also of the charge under Sections 326/109 against accused Shankar Mahar, Govinda Gaikwad, Gondu Mussalman, Sampat Gawari and Gulab Lande. A unanimous verdict of not guilty was also given by the jury regarding accused Walayut, Pundalik Chore, Shamrao Wankhede, Maroti Gawande, Ramarao Wankhede, Dinya Gond, Punjya Gond, Bhurya Gond, Sheshrao Patode, Bhimrao Gawande and Govinda Gaikwad on the charges under Section 395 IPC. These charges were in respect of the cutting of the nose of Jilani and of breaking open the box of Hafiz Ali and removing from it currency notes of the value of Rs 600 and other papers. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the jury and acquitted all the accused persons in respect of these charges.

    7. In respect of the charges of rioting and murder, the learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the majority of the assessors and found all the accused not guilty and acquitted all of them. In the concluding part of his judgment, the learned Judge observed as follows:

    “Out of the eleven eye-witnesses, five have gone back upon their statements made in the committing court. They are Jilani, Mahadeo, Sitaram, Radhi and Hayatbi. I will particularly refer to Jilani and Hayatbi who could have no reason to go behind their statements, they being personally affected by the offences. Jilani had his nose cut by the assailants and Hayatbi lost her husband at their hands. They could not go behind their statements if they had made true statements in the committing court. Their statements that they made false statements in the committing court at the instance of the relatives of the deceased and as pressure was brought to bear upon them by the police, therefore, does not seem to be improbable. Even if this was not correct, it is not at all safe to rely on the testimony of these witnesses at all, though law permits that if they are otherwise trustworthy they can be acted upon under Section 288, Cr PC.

    Shakir and Ikrar are not trustworthy and are proved to be perjurers. Ikrar went to the length of blaming the committing court in order to justify his perjured statement. Shakir has made very inconsistent statements. From the evidence of the circle inspector, it is clear that Ikrar was taking active interest throughout the investigation. In the circumstances, it is not possible to rely on the testimony of these witnesses. Gulzarali (PW 9) is a petty servant of the malguzars of Dhadi of whom three were murdered. Thus, his testimony cannot be said to be disinterested...Hassan Ali is brother of the deceased and has given a very unnatural story. I do not believe for a moment that he was present and had seen the assault on Hafiz Ali as stated by him. The next witness is Ibrahim who was not examined by the police for 21 days after the incident. He has also been proved to be perjurer. The statement of Biyabi is also unconvincing and her statement in this court is seriously impaired on account of the written and signed report taken from her during the investigation ... the investigation was not as impartial as one would expect it to be. The police officers seem to have acted at the instance of Ikrar right from the very beginning. They failed to take down material statements and effect the seizures in proper manner. Most of the seizures were unauthorised and illegal. In this state of affairs it is not possible to rely on the prosecution case laid in this court. It is no doubt true that it is probable that some of the accused might have participated in the offence but it is impossible to find out from state of the prosecution evidence who they were, with any amount of certainty. As I have already said, it is to be regretted that some of the guilty might go unpunished for such brutal and broad day light murders but in the state of the prosecution evidence, it would be a pure gamble to convict any of the accused.”

    8. The State Government preferred an appeal against the acquittal of these persons to the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur. The High Court reached the conclusion that the good evidence in the case was given by five persons whose presence at the spot could not be gainsaid. These witnesses were Biyabi (PW 1), Jilani (PW 3), and Ikrar Ullah (PW 25) for the murders of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad, and Mst Hayatbi (PW 6) and Radhi (PW 4) for the murder of Aman Ali. Reliance was placed on the statements of Hayatbi and Radhi made in the committal court and also on statement of Jilani made in that court in preference to their subsequent statements in the Court of session, which were considered as suborned and influenced by the accused. The High Court agreed with the view of the learned Sessions Judge that the evidence of the other witnesses was not reliable. As regards the offence of dacoity, however, the High Court took the view that there was no misdirection to the jury and the jury were therefore entitled to believe or disbelieve Biyabi and it could not be held that in disbelieving Mst Biyabi the jury had acted perversely. The verdict therefore of not guilty on the charge of dacoity against the persons concerned was maintained. As regards the cutting of the nose of Jilani, the High Court also maintained the verdict of the jury and found that it could not be held that the jury were acting perversely in not relying upon the testimony of Jilani about the identity of the persons concerned.

    9. As regards the offence of rioting with deadly weapons and murder, the acquittals of the appellants in the two appeals were set aside and they were convicted as follows:

    Name Sections of the IPC under which convicted 1. Walayat 302-149 (2 counts) and 148. 2. Pundalik Gulab Chore 302-149 (2 counts) and 148. 3. Bhimrao Kadu 302-149 (2 counts) and 148. 4. Adbul Gani 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 5. Pundalik Bajirao 302-149 (2 counts) and 147. 6. Ramrao Wankhede 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 7. Dinya Gond 302-149 (2 counts) and 148. 8. Shankar Mahar 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 9. Sheshrao Patode 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 10. Bhimrao Gawande 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 11. Govinda Gaikwad 302-149 (3 counts) and 148. 12. Gendu 302-149 (3 counts) and 147. 13. Gulab Chore 302-149 (2 counts) and 148. 14. Rahman 302-149 (2 counts) and 147. 15. Sampat Manya Gowari 302-149 (2 counts) and 147. 16. Baburao Chore 302-149 (2 counts) and 147. 17. Gulab Lande 302-149 (2 counts) and 147.

    10. The accused convicted under Section 148, IPC were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and those convicted under Section 147 were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Sections 302/149 Bhimrao Kadu, Abdul Gani and Sheshrao Patode were sentenced to death and the remaining appellants were sentenced to transportation for life on each of the counts for which they were convicted. It was ordered that the sentence of imprisonment awarded under Sections 147 and 148 would run concurrently with the life sentence. The acquittal of the remaining persons challenged by the police was maintained and they were ordered to be released.

    11. The learned counsel for the appellants in the two cases argued with much force that there were no substantial and compelling reasons for converting the acquittal of the appellants into conviction on appeal. It was contended that the presumption of innocence of the accused had been further reinforced by their acquittal by the trial court, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence and that the High Court was in error in interfering with that decision on a mere balance of probabilities and conjectures. It was said that the whole prosecution story was a faked one, that Ikrar when he made the first information report at 7.45 p.m on the 25th, did so in consultation with some of the brothers of the deceased and tried to implicate all the persons with whom they had enmity; that the police recorded a very brief report and did not examine Ikrar fully about the incidents of which he said he was an eyewitness; that when the police party started from Ashti to Dhadi soon after, it met two kotwars (village watchmen) on their way to the police station to make a report; that the sub-inspector and the circle inspector failed in their duty to take down the report of these independent persons which would have given the police a true version about the three murders; that it also met two of the accused persons Walayat and Chotu who had injuries on their person and who were on their way to the police station to make a report but it failed to record their report as well; that on reaching Dhadi for about five to six hours, the police did not take steps to record the statements of any of the eye-witnesses. In view of these acts of omission on the part of the police, it was suggested that a case was cooked up against the accused who were inimical to Ikrar and his people in consultation with him and the brothers of the deceased persons and that after due deliberations, at 8 a.m after the preparation of the inquest reports and despatch of the dead bodies for post-mortem examination and of the injured persons to the hospital, Ikrar wrote out a report (Ex. P-l), got it signed by Mst Biyabi and handed it over to the police, including in it the names of all the accused persons on whom he wanted to take his revenge and that evidence was later prepared to suit that story. It was further urged that from the statements of Biyabi, Ikrar and Jilani, it was clear that she (Biyabi) was not present in the house when her husband was murdered, but was either at Ashti or at Asadali's house and was brought by the police to Hafiz Ali's house on the morning of the 26th and was thus not an eye witness in the case; that even if she was there, in view of the material discrepancies her different statements, she was an untrustworthy witness and it was not safe to convict the appellants; on her evidence. As regards Ikrar, it was said that he was a liar and no reliance could be placed on his statement and that as a matter of fact, he was not in the house at all and never witnessed the occurrence, that had he left the house of Hafiz Ali as deposed by him, he should have reached the police station at 4 o'clock at the latest and that the delay in making the report was due to the circumstance that he was in consultation with two of the brothers of Hafiz Ali viz. Bashir and Rashid, so that a report be made to the police involving those who were inimically inclined to the malguzars, that in all likelihood the murders were committed by some of the servants of the malguzars who were not on good terms with them. Ikrar's evidence was criticised on a number of grounds, that the statement made by him in the committing court was in material points different from that made in the sessions court, that he changed statements to suit the prosecution and threw the blame for all his omissions on the police or, the Magistrate. As regards Jilani, whose nose was cut, it was said that he was wholly unreliable. He named Sheshrao Patode as the person who had cut his nose, but in the sessions court he said that though one Sheshrao had cut his nose, Sheshrao Patode was not that man. A person who could change like this and was prepared or ready to tell a lie on such a vital matter, it was said, should not have been relied upon on any point. As regards Hayatbi and Radhi, it was urged that these witnesses wholly retracted the statements they had made in the Court of the committing Magistrate and that there was no satisfactory reason why preference should be given to the statement made by them in the Court of the committing Magistrate over statement made in the Court of Session. Lastly, it was argued that an inference should have to be drawn against the prosecution because it failed to examine two very important witnesses in the case viz. Bashir, brother of the deceased persons and Subhan, son of Hafiz Ali, a boy aged 9, and that the defence was considerably prejudiced by the circumstance that it was not given copies of the roznamcha entries maintained by the police on the lame excuse that the roznamcha had been lost.

    12. After a careful consideration of the contentions raised by the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that though the prosecution witnesses accepted by the High Court have not told the whole truth and though from their evidence it is not possible to get an absolutely true picture of the events, and of the tragic drama that was staged by the villagers on the afternoon of the 25th July 1949 and which resulted in the murder of three persons and the cutting of the nose of a fourth, yet it is not possible to accept the contention that the prosecution case is a complete fabrication and that the murders of the three persons and the cutting of the nose of fourth did not result from a riot that occurred that afternoon in which some at least, of the accused participated. It is true that in the present state of the record, the story given by the eye-witnesses has to be carefully scrutinized and unless it can be said with reasonable certainty that a certain person took part in the riot, the benefit of doubt has to be given to him. The learned Sessions Judge was undoubtedly in error when he said that it was impossible to find out from the state of the prosecution evidence with any amount of certainty who among the accused persons participated in the offence and that it would be a pure gamble to convict any of the accused. He made no effort to disengage the truth from the falsehood and to sift the grain from the chaff but took an easy course and after holding the evidence discrepant held that the whole case was untrue. We are of the opinion that in the case of some of the accused persons, the material on the record is sufficiently convincing and there were no sufficient or satisfactory reasons for their acquittal, while in the case of some others it seems to us that the High Court erroneously converted the acquittals into convictions. Before considering the individual case of the appellants it is necessary to examine the merits of some of the points raised for the appellants and referred to above.

    13. The contention that Mst Biyabi was not present in the house of Hafiz Ali on the day of the occurrence cannot bear examination. In the natural course of events it has to be presumed that she was living with her husband unless it is found that she had gone out. All the prosecution witnesses unanimously stated that she was there. No evidence was led to show that she was residing at Ashti or was living at Asadali's house. Vague suggestions were no doubt made to her in the cross-examination that she came with the police party or that she was at Asadali's house, but she emphatically repudiated those suggestions. In support of his contention the learned counsel drew our attention to the following evidence. PW 14, Biyabi, in her deposition said:

    “Tukya Gawari had also hit my husband over the mouth with an axe at the time when he was being assaulted by the accused as a result of which his teeth had fallen down and uprooted.”

    14. The doctor, PW 23, stated:

    “I did not find any injury indicating that the teeth had freshly fallen.”

    15. On the strength of these statements the learned counsel argued that if Biyabi was there, she could not have said that the teeth had fallen down and were uprooted, which was not a fact. It seems to us that this argument is the result of an incorrect translation of the statement of the witness. It was nobody's case that the teeth of Hafiz Ali had fallen down and were uprooted. All that was mentioned in the inquest report was that the teeth became visible as the lip had been cut. Be that as it may, this statement does not in any way prove that Biyabi was not an eye-witness to the occurrence. Her description of the injury may not be very accurate. Again in para 19 of her statement Biyabi said as follows:

    “The sari Article A-12 belongs to me and I had wrapped this sari on my husband .... One burkha and 2 dupattas belonging to me were also soiled with blood... Some of the clothes of my child also were soiled with blood but they are not in court.”

    16. In para 56 she said as follows:

    “The two dupattas Articles C-38 and C-39 were on the rope in the house and they were soiled with the blood of Shiraz during the marpit …. Burkha was also hanging on the same string. The clothes that I was putting on were also besmeared with blood. I had shown my clothes to the police but they were not seized by the police I had also shown blood marks on my own clothes.”

    17. The sub-inspector Dondgar Sing in para 74 of his deposition said as follows:

    “I did not seize any wearing apparel put on by Biyabi at the time of the incident. If those clothes were bloodstained, I would have seized those clothes also. I would have seized the clothes of her son Subhan also if they were bloodstained.”

    18. It was contended that if Biyabi was present at the time of the incident it was unlikely that her clothes would not have been bloodstained and that her assertion that her and her son's clothes were bloodstained was untrue in view of the statement of the sub-inspector and that in this situation the only correct inference to draw was that the clothes were not bloodstained and this was so because she was not at the house at the time of the occurrence. We do not think that this inference is a legitimate one. There is no reason not to accept the statement of the sub-inspector on the point that neither the son's nor the woman's clothes were bloodstained. She was at some distance from the place where her husband was given spear blows and from where Shiraz Ahmad was murdered and there would be nothing strange if there were no bloodstains on her clothes or on the clothes of her son. It seems probable that in order to meet the defence suggestion that she was not there she somewhat exaggerated her statement and in order to repel that suggestion she asserted that her clothes and her son's clothes were also bloodstained. The next point relied on to show that she was not present at the occurrence is by no means a weighty one. In para 69 she deposed as follows:

    “The spear blow given by Bhimrao Kadu struck Hafiz Ali on the stomach. But I cannot say on what part of his stomach the blow fell. I had seen the blow tailing on the stomach. The blow did not fall on the chest, I can distinguish between the stomach and the chest. I had not stated before the police that the blow given by Bhimrao Kadu fell on the chest. I had not stated that Bhimrao Kadu speared Hafiz Ali on the chest I had not stated that the spear blow given by Bhimrao Kadu hit my husband on the chest.”

    19. Before the committing Magistrate and in her statement to the police she had said that the spear blow given by Bhimrao Kadu struck Hafiz Ali on the chest. The learned counsel placed considerable reliance on this discrepancy and urged that if Biyabi was there, how could she possibly make a statement to the effect that the blow fell on the chest, when as a matter of fact there was no such blow on the chest and he contended that she changed her statement before the Sessions Judge to make it in accord with the doctor's statement. It seems to us that this criticism has not much force because even in the inquest report the police described a wound on the chest and not on the stomach. The spear blow was on the upper part of the abdomen and quite near the chest and both the lady and the police when they examined the body at the time of the inquest considered this blow as having been struck on a part of the chest, while the doctor in the post-mortem accurately described it as an injury on the abdomen. From a discrepancy of this nature it is difficult to draw the conclusion that this error was made by her because she was absent at the time of the occurrence.

    20. As regards the omission on the part of the prosecution to examine Subhan and Bashir, this is not of a very serious character. The observations of Lord Porter in Malak Khan v. Emperor AIR 1946 PC 16 at p. 19 furnish a good answer on the point. The learned Lord observed as follows:

    “It is no doubt very important that, as a general rule, all Crown wit- nesses should be called to testify at the hearing of a prosecution, but important as it is, there is no obligation compelling counsel for the prosecution to call all witnesses who speak to facts which the Crown desire to prove. Ultimately it is a matter for the discretion of counsel for the prosecution and though a court ought, and no doubt will, take into consideration the absence of witnesses whose testimony would be expected, it must adjudge the evidence as a whole and arrive at its conclusion accordingly taking into consideration the persuasiveness of the testimony given in the light of such criticism as may be levelled at the absence of possible witnesses.”

    21. The evidence in the case has been examined in the light of the absence of the two persons mentioned above. Subhan, a boy of nine, could hardly have been a valuable witness in this case, and Bashir was not an eye-witness to the occurrence but was only a witness to some of the events that took place antecedent to the riot. The production of these two witnesses could not have materially helped the defence or thrown much light on the actual happenings and the murders.

    22. It was then urged that the first information report was a sketchy document and was intentionally kept in this state in order to leave enough scope for fabrication and that no reliance should have been placed upon it. So far as we have been able to see, the first information report has not been used as substantive evidence in the case at all by the High Court but has been used only to corroborate the statements of the eye-witnesses. It is not possible to accept the suggestion that because this report was not as full as it could have been, it should be ignored altogether. There is no warrant for doing so. Again the suggestion that Biyabi was tutored between 2 a.m and 8 a.m on 26th morning and that Ikrar wrote a report for her which she blindly signed cannot be accepted. We have very carefully read the statement of Biyabi and we have no hesitation in saying that in spite of the various contradictions and discrepancies in her statement, substantially her narration of the essential events of the 25th is a true one and it would be quite safe to base a conviction on it at least as regards the accused to whom she has ascribed an important part and in respect of whom she has neither contradicted her statement nor improved upon it in any manner what so- ever, especially where independent corroboration can be found for her statements.

    23. The loss of the roznamcha also, in our opinion, has not materially affected the result of the case because in respect of the statements of the eye-witnesses the police diary was supplied to the defence and was used by them for the purpose of contradicting the prosecution evidence.

    24. As regards the evidence of Ikrar, the criticism of the learned counsel to a large extent is justified and reliance on it should only have been made to the extent it was possible to say with any amount of certainty that he has made a true statement. As regards Jilani, our view is that the High Court was not justified in placing any reliance on his statement which in certain vital particulars is untrue. We would therefore ignore his evidence altogether.

    25. As regards Hayatbi and Radhi, they completely altered their statements in the Sessions Court and it would not be prudent to convert the acquittals into convictions merely on the basis of their statements made in the Court of the committing Magistrate without more. We now proceed to examine the case of the individual appellants.

    26. Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1951 has been preferred by Bhimrao Kadu, Abdul Gani and Sheshrao Patode. They have all been sentenced to death and also under Section 148, IPC. The High Court found that they were the important persons in the village and that they took a leading part and were the prime movers in these triple murders, that their presence and exhortation nerved the others to join them in this dastardly assault upon the unfortunate malguzars who were done to death on the 25th. The question for determination is whether there were cogent and substantial reasons of a compelling character to set aside the acquittal as regards all or any one of these appellants.

    27. As regards Bhimrao Kadu, Mst Biyabi stated that when the door was battered down he struck the first spear blow on Hafiz Ali. She also assigned to him a part in the second attack on Hafiz Ali and as having taken part in the beating of Shiraz Ahmad. Ikrar corroborated Biyabi's story as regards the first blow on Hafiz Ali and mentioned him as one of the rioters in Ex. P-14. The accused pleaded alibi, the evidence regarding which was disbelieved in both the courts below and his learned counsel was not able to give any adequate reasons for interference with this concurrent finding of fact on the question of credibility of witnesses. It was urged that Bhimrao was at village Tarasawanga on 24th July 1949 and that he stood surety for Walayat and Shankar Mahar on the morning of the 25th at 9 or 2.45 p.m, that sub-inspector Dongar Sing was with him till 9.30 or 10 p.m on the 25th at Tarasawanga and that in these circumstances it was unlikely that he would have been present at the meeting of the rioters at village Dhadi on the 25th before the actual riot took place at 12.30 p.m The sub-inspector however, deposed that he parted company from the accused about 10 a.m and that accused went on the road to Dhadi on horseback. The distance to Dhadi is about six to eight miles. There is no improbability in a man riding a horse reaching the village in time not only to take part in the rioting but also to be present at the fateful meeting. It was next contended that as he was one of the most influential people in the village and as Hafiz Ali has also included him amongst the persons complained against in the charcoal case, Ikrar son-in-law of Hafiz Ali, in consultation with Hafiz Ali's brothers included him owing to this enmity in the list of rioters in the FIR. This argument loses right of the fact that Ikrar did not state in the FIR that he was the person leading the rioters in the attack on Hafiz Ali. He gave no prominence in the FIR to this accused. If he had falsely mentioned his name, nothing prevented a court bird like Ikrar from ascribing to him a leading part in the FIR. The learned counsel very strongly urged that he was an innocent person and all the prosecution witnesses had conspired out of enmity to implicate him in the commission of these heinous offences. We have very carefully examined the evidence and it seems to us that Biyabi has given a very consistent story so far as the part played by this accused is concerned in the murders of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad. Her statement in the witness box is corroborated by the FIR. It is significant that he was the person who immediately after the breaking of the door struck the first spear blow on Hafiz Ali and it is not possible to believe that Biyabi who was standing there would have failed to notice the very first person who attacked him with a spear blow. No cogent reason has been suggested to us why Biyabi should start a story with a lie and assign a part to the accused which he never performed. Biyabi was cross-examined at great length as regards the part played by this accused and with respect to other matters and she gave detailed answers on all the points and stood the cross-examination well. After a careful consideration of the evidence we have arrived at the conclusion that there are no satisfactory grounds for rejecting her statement so far as the presence of this accused amongst the rioters is concerned and the part played by him. We therefore agree with the High Court that Bhimrao Kadu was a member of the unlawful assembly and was one of those responsible for the murder of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad and the result is that his appeal fails and is dismissed.

    28. As regards Abdul Gani (Accused 6), Biyabi deposed as follows:

    “While he (Hafiz Ali) was running he was hit by lathis and stones and he fell down near the bathroom. After he fell down, he was again hit by lathis and stones by the accused …. Abdul Gani was present at the time when my husband was being assaulted in my house .... The swords were held by Abdul Gani and Walayat .... After half an hour the accused returned again .... Abdul Gani hit my husband with a sword on his head .... Abdul Gani and Bhimrao Kadu then said that Shiraz Ahmad should be searched .... As soon as Shiraz Ahmad fell down Abdul Gani struck him with a sword. The blow hit Shiraz Ahmad on the head .... I would be able to identify the swords which were in the hands of the accused Abdul Gani and Walayat.”

    29. From this deposition, it appears that Biyabi ascribed a very leading part to Abdul Gani in the riot, and described him as armed with a sword. He is said to have taken part in the first assault on Hafiz Ali as well as in the second and also in the assault on Shiraz Ahmad. It is strange, however, that Ikrar did not mention his name in the FIR. He would not have failed to notice Abdul Gani, who was one of the leading men of the village and who was armed with a sword and who took part in the first assault on Hafiz Ali. The story given by Biyabi in respect of this accused therefore does not find corroboration from the version of Ikrar given on the evening of the 25th to the police and recorded in Ex. P-14. When Biyabi made a report to the police on the morning of the 26th she did not mention Abdul Gani as one of the persons taking any prominent part in the first attack on her husband or in the second attack made on him. She, however, mentioned his name in connection with the attack on Shiraz Ahmad but made no mention of any sword having been used by any of the accused persons. She did not then say that Abdul Gani was armed with a sword. No satisfactory explanation for this omission has been given by Biyabi when asked about it. When she was examined by the police on the evening of the 26th, her statement was materially the same as made in the report Ex. P-l. Though she mentioned that some of the persons had swords, she did not specifically name Abdul Gani as one of the persons holding a sword. The name of Abdul Gani was not even mentioned in the document (Ex. P-35) found in suspicious circumstances in the pocket of Hafiz Ali. Biyabi, so far as Abdul Gani was concerned, appears to have improved her statement on the suggestion of some of the prosecution witnesses or on the suggestion of the brothers of Hafiz Ali. In this connection, it is significant that he was charged for the murder of Aman Ali. Radhi stated that he gave a sword blow on Aman Ali's head, but in the Court of Session she retracted her statement. Her statement in the committing court that Aman Ali was given sword blow on the head by Abdul Gani stands contradicted by the doctor's evidence who could not ascribe any injury on the head to any such blow. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conviction of Abdul Gani could not be safely based on the testimony of Biyabi or of Ikrar, particularly when these witnesses failed to give any satisfactory explanation for the omission on their part in their earlier statements of the mention of the prominent part played by him. We think that in his case there were no substantial or compelling reasons to convert his acquittal into a conviction and that the verdict of the assessors and the finding of the Sessions Judge in respect of him should not have been set aside. For these reasons, we allow his appeal and restore the order of acquittal passed in his favour and direct that he be released forthwith.

    30. The last appellant in this appeal is Sheshrao Patode. Biyabi stated that he was present in the first attack on Hafiz Ali. Ikrar supported her statement and his statement is corroborated by the report, Ex. P.-14. In connection with the second entry of the rioters into the house of Hafiz Ali he was described as one of the persons who caught hold of the hands of Biyabi and as the man who cut off the nose of Jilani. Jilani identified him as one of the persons present along with the other rioters but when he came to depose about his own nose, he stated that this accused was not the Sheshrao who had cut off his nose but some other Sheshrao. The jury acquitted him of the charge regarding the cutting of the nose of Jilani and as the acquittal stands, the credibility of Biyabi and Jilani regarding that part of the incident must be considered as doubtful. Jilani, as we have already said, is not a witness of truth and his evidence is left out of consideration. The evidence regarding the alibi pleaded by Sheshrao has been disbelieved by both the courts below and we see no sufficient reason for interference with this concurrent finding. Biyabi's deposition regarding this appellant has been quite consistent, so far as his presence among the rioters was concerned. She ascribes to him no particular part in the first attack on Hafiz Ali. She has not improved her statement about Sheshrao in any manner whatsoever. On this evidence the High Court was justified in holding that Sheshrao Patode was one of the persons present among the rioters. But we see no justification for the finding of the High Court that he was one of the persons who led the mob or took a leading part in the happenings of the 25th. We therefore maintain his conviction but we think that this was not a case where the extreme penalty of the law should have been imposed. He should have been treated on the same footing as the other persons who took part in the riot but played no important role in it. We therefore set aside the sentence of death passed against him and sentence him to transportation for life. The sentence of imprisonment under Section 148 will run concurrently with the life sentence. His appeal therefore is allowed to the extent indicated above.

    31. So far as Appeal No. 26 of 1951 is concerned, the following persons are concerned in it:—

    1. Walayat … … Accused 1 2. Pundalik Gulab hore … … -do- 3 3. Pundalik Bajirao Mahar … … -do- 11 4. Ramrao Wankhede … … -do- 12 5. Dinya Gond … … -do- 13 6. Shankar Mahar … … -do- 17 7. Bhimrao Gawande … … -do- 21 8. Govinda Gaikwad … … -do- 22 9. Gendu … … -do- 23 10. Gulab Chore … … -do- 24 11. Rahaman … … -do- 26 12. Sampat Manya Gawari … … -do- 29 13. Baburao Chore … … -do- 30 14. Gulab Lande … … -do- 32

    32. They have all been sentenced to transportation for life.

    33. The evidence against Walayat consists of statement of Biyabi. He was described by the lady as being present in the first attack on Hafiz Ali and also when the accused re-entered the house and attacked Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad. He is said to have struck a blow with a sword on Hafiz Ali. This statement is supported by Ikrar who is corroborated in this matter by Ex. P-14, the FIR. Walayat had the following two injuries on his person: (1) A sharp weapon injury, 3” × ¼”, skin deep on back part of head on occiput bone, and (2) a contusion mark on the right knee joint one day old, ¼” × ¼”,. When he was examined by the court under Section 342 CrPC., he stated as follows:

    “I came from Sawanga at 11 o'clock. After taking meals I went to the river for easing myself. It was 12 o'clock then. While I was returning Nana Mahar, Ganesh Mahar, etc. were there sitting in the gothan armed with lathis etc. In front of Hafiiz Ali's house Jilani, Masud and one carpenter were doing the work of door .... While I was on my way Jilani was snatching the accused Chhotu's basket of cow-dung. In the meantime Masud came up and gave one lathi blow to Chhote. As soon as the blow was struck Hafiz Ali came running with a sword from his house and directly on coming gave one sword blow to Chhote.

    I said to him why he was assaulting a poor and innocent man. Thereat he said to me, ‘Well, sale, you too are making a recommendation' and saying so he dealt a sword blow at me also; and immediately following that Masud delivered a lathi blow on my right leg... In the meantime Baba Patel, Syed Miya and Ikrar's brother Aftab came there and following their arrival a vigorous quarrel began to take place between those two parties. Getting confused I ran away to my house. On going home I went to sleep.

    At 6.30 p.m in the evening Rahman came to my house and began to say that Hafiz Patel had beaten his brother and me also as stated my Chhotya. I told him to bring a cart on hire as I had to go to Ashti for making a report .... We four persons set out at about 7 o'clock. While on our way to Ashti we met the police constables and others at a distance of 4 or 5 miles and they began to ask us where we were going. I replied that Hafiz patel had struck me with a sword and I was going to make a report and that since they had arrived there only, the report be taken thither only.”

    34. It is clear from this statement that Walayat was present outside Hafiz Ali's house at the very moment the riot took place there. He was actually injured, though he gave a different version as to how the injuries came to be inflicted on him. According to the prosecution case, he was injured in the riot by mistake by one of the members of the attacking party. It is difficult to give a precise finding on the present record as to the manner in which he was injured, but there injuries prove the fact that he was one of the participants in the riot. His explanation that with the two wounds on his person he went home and fell asleep is on the face of it incredible and false. His further story that at the suggestion of Rahman at about 6.30 p.m he thought of going to the police station and making a report does not also seem to be true. The action of the accused in going to the police station for making a report was an attempt on his part to escape the consequences of his participation in the riot by taking advantage of the two wounds on his person. The learned counsel urged that Biyabi could not be believed when she stated that she identified the sword that Walayat had in his hands. The criticism is valid and in the absence of any identification mark on the sword it is difficult for any one to state positively whether the sword that was produced by the prosecution was the very sword that Walayat had in his hands. As a matter of fact, in cross-examination Biyabi stated that she could not definitely say whether Walayat attacked her husband with a sword but it was a mere presumption on her part that there must have been a sword attack by these persons as they had swords with them. Whatever it maybe, to the extent that his presence among the rioters is concerned, her statement finds corroboration from that of Walayat himself, apart from the mention of his name in Ex. P-14. Walayat had a grievance against the malguzars. He had been arrested in the charcoal case and was released only that morning on bail. There is no evidence that he was quietly sleeping at his house after the fight and it is improbable that he did. The learned Sessions Judge failed to take into consideration his admitted presence at the time of the riot outside the house of Hafiz Ali, and the wounds on his person. In these circumstances there were substantial grounds for the High Court for setting aside the acquittal in his case and to convert it into a conviction. We are satisfied that there are no valid grounds for interfering with the decision of the High Court in his case. His appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.

    35. The evidence against Pundalik Gulab Chore (Accused 3) consists of the statements of Biyabi and Ikrar, corroborated as they are by the FIR (Ex. P-14). The High Court left out of consideration the statement made by Biyabi that this accused broke her box on the ground that the incident might well not have taken place at all. The statement of Biyabi is further corroborated by the bloodstains on his shirt and banian (Articles C-30 and C-31). He explained that he had itch on his body and hands and two ulcers had grown and that the bloodstains were caused by the ulcers. There is no satisfactory evidence at all about there being any boils on his body which could have been responsible for the bloodstains on his shirt and banian. The accused pleaded an alibi. He said he was at Arvi on the day of the occurrence. He produced two witnesses to support this plea but their evidence has been rejected both the courts below. In these circumstances the High Court rightly concluded that his presence as a member of the unlawful assembly that was concerned with murders of Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad had been satisfactorily made out. In our opinion, this conclusion is correct and we therefore dismiss his appeal.

    36. Pundalik Bajirao Mahar (Accused 11) has been convicted by the High Court on the general evidence of Biyabi. She did not mention him as one of the persons who took part on the first assault on Hafiz Ali. He is described by her as having brought the news from outside that Aman Ali was running away and that it was on this information that the mob ran out to attack Aman Ali. This statement of Biyabi is contradicted by Ex. P-l, the report she made to the police early on the morning of the 26th as well as by her statement to the police on the evening of the same day. In both those statements she said that the mob left Hafiz Ali's house thinking that he was dead and not on account of the information supplied by this accused to the rioters. When faced with these statements she failed to explain the matter satisfactorily. Biyabi's general evidence therefore as regards this accused cannot be safely accepted, particularly in view of the fact that his name was not mentioned in the FIR, Ex. P-14. Ikrar has deposed that he was present at the time when the mob left Hafiz Ali's house and went to the house of Aman Ali, but in this he is not corroborated by the FIR. We think that the learned Judges in the High Court attached undue importance to the statement of Biyabi that the information that Aman Ali was running away was supplied to the rioters by this accused. On this material, it was not safe to convert the acquittal into a conviction as there were no compelling reasons for doing so. We accordingly allow his appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and acquit him of the charges levelled against him and direct his release.

    37. Ramrao Wankhede (Accused 12) was described by Biyabi as the person who struck the second spear blow on her husband. In this statement, she is corroborated by Ikrar, who is also corroborated by Ex. P-14, the FIR, in which he specifically mentioned this accused as one amongst the rioters. It is significant that Jilani (PW .) tried to help this accused by stating that the accused asked the mob not to beat him. This change in the statement of Jilani to favour the accused also fixes his presence amongst the rioters. The alibi set up by the accused has not been accepted by the two courts below and we see no reason for disagreeing with this finding. The statements made by Biyabi about this accused are not discrepant in any manner but she has consistently given him the same part that was ascribed to him in her original statement. There is no particular reason also for Ikrar to have falsely mentioned him in the FIR. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the High Court was justified in converting his acquittal into a conviction. His appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.

    38. Dinya Gond (Accused 13) was mentioned by Biyabi as being present in the assault. She ascribed to him a very significant part in the second attack on her husband. It was he and an absconder who pulled down Shiraz Ahmad from the left where he had hit himself. The incident seems to have been particularly observed by Biyabi. His name was mentioned by Ikrar in Ex. P-14, though Ikrar was not present at the time when the second attack was made on Hafiz Ali; but the fact that Ikrar specifically mentioned him by name in Ex. P-14 shows that he was present among the persons who took part in the first assault on Hafiz Ali. He pleaded alibi but this evidence has not been accepted in the courts below and we see no reason to arrive at a different conclusion. We are satisfied that there were no sufficient reasons for Biyabi to ascribe to him a part which he never played. For these reasons his appeal is also dismissed.

    39. Shankar Mahar (Accused 17) has been convicted on the statement of Biyabi, supported by Ikrar and the FIR (Ex. P-14). On the occasion of the first assault on her husband she ascribed no particular part to him but in connection with the second attack on her husband she stated that Shanker struck a blow on Hafiz Ali's face in such a manner that the spear came out on the other side. This accused was one of the persons arrested in connection with the charcoal case and was released on bail that very morning. The evidence against him is further supported by the recovery of a dhoti (Article C-12) from him, which was found to be stained with human blood. No satisfactory explanation was given by the accused about this bloodstained dhoti. All that he said was that the articles were not seized in his presence and that his signature on the recovery list was forcibly obtained. This is no explanation of the bloodstains. The alibi pleaded by him is not supported by any satisfactory evidence and was rightly rejected in the two courts below. The High Court found that the evidence about the presence of Shankar amongst the rioters was exceedingly cogent and the presence of blood on his dhoti was of considerable significance. In these circumstances, we see no satisfactory grounds for reversing the decision of the High Court and dismiss his appeal.

    40. So far as Bhimrao Gawande (Accused 21) is concerned, Biyabi said that he was present as a member of the unlawful assembly in the first assault. She did not ascribe any particular part to him. This statement is corroborated by the evidence of Ikrar who is corroborated in this by the contents of Ex. P-14, where the name of this accused is specifically mentioned. Biyabi stated consistently about his presence amongst the rioters. The alibi pleaded by him was based on very flimsy material and was rightly rejected in the two courts below. He was one of the persons involved in the charcoal case and it is very likely that he joined the rioters to take his revenge on the malguzars. We are not satisfied that there are any valid grounds for reversing the decision of the High Court as regards this accused and we therefore dismiss his appeal.

    41. Govinda Gaikwad (Accused 22) is the person at whose house, according to the prosecution witnesses, there was an assembly of the rioters. Biyabi identified him as being one of the persons present at the first attack, though she ascribed no special part to him. Ikrar supported her in this statement and he is corroborated in this by Ex. P-14. He pleaded alibi and said that he had gone out of the village previously in connection with some marriage negotiations. The evidence in support of the alibi is meagre and has been rightly rejected in the two courts below. He was also one of the persons included in the report about the charcoal case and had a very good motive for taking revenge on some of the malguzars. Biyabi made no improvements in her statement about this accused and consistently adhered to her first statement that he was one of the persons who took part in the assault on her husband. She could make no mistake about him as his house is quite close to the house of Hafiz Ali. In these circumstances, we think it is not possible to hold that the High Court was in error in converting his acquittal into a conviction. We accordingly dismiss his appeal.

    42. The case of Gendu (Accused 23) stands on a different footing. Biyabi named him as a member of the unlawful assembly and stated that he was one of the persons who broke open her box. Ikrar named him as one of the assailants without giving any details, but in this he is not supported by the FIR in which he did not mention his name at all. According to Biyabi, he was one of the persons who entered the house along with the rioters. Ikrar who said he was carefully watching the persons who entered the house would not have failed to mention him in the FIR, if in fact he had so entered. Ikrar had good reason against this accused to implicate him falsely in these murders. There was a case under Section 147 in which the party, of which Ikrar was a member, was fined, while the opposite party of which this accused was a member, was let off. It appears that on the morning of the 26th Ikrar when he wrote out Ex. P-l on behalf of Biyabi, included the name of this accused in the list of accused persons, though he did not mention his name in Ex. P- The High Court was impressed with the circumstance that a dupatta was discovered in his possession which was stained with human blood. The accused stated that the dupatta did not belong to him but belonged to Chhoru Rehman, his mother's sister's son who lived with him and who used to take his meals at his place. There is no satisfactory evidence for saying that the statement of the accused on this point is untrue. Chhoru Rehman would not take the risk of appearing as a witness for the defence as his admission that the bloodstained dupatta belonged to him might involve him in the case. We are satisfied that in this state of the record it was not safe to convert his acquittal into a conviction as there were no compelling and cogent reasons for doing so. The matter might have been different if there was satisfactory evidence as regards the ownership of the dupatta. We therefore allow his appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and acquit him and direct his release.

    43. As regards the case of Gulab Ghore (Accused 24), we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds exist for converting his acquittal into a conviction. Biyabi stated that in the first attack on Hafiz Ali he struck him a blow with a spear. She was supported by Ikrar in this statement but it is significant that he did not specifically mention his name in Ex. P-14. There is no satisfactory explanation for this omission on the part of Ikrar, particularly if the accused had really played the part ascribed to him by Biyabi. His name cannot be said to be included in the description of “and others” given in Ex. P-14 as he was clearly marked out as the person giving a spear blow. The High Court held that it would be unsafe to accept the general identifying evidence about this accused in the Aman Ali incident. In these circumstances we do not think it safe to rely on the evidence of Biyabi and Ikrar, as it is not corroborated by the statement in Ex. P-14. We therefore allow his appeal and acquit him.

    44. Rahman (Accused 26) has been convicted by the High Court on the evidence of Biyabi. She deposed that he was present in the first and second attacks on her husband. Ikrar supported her but his name was not mentioned by him in Ex. P-14. The omission of his name from Ex. P-14 is not very material because he is not a man of much consequence in the village and did not play any prominent part and can be said to have been included in the description of “and others” given in Ex. P-14. He was travelling in the same cart as Walayat and Chhotu when they were going on the 25th evening to the police station. He was leading the bullocks, though it was raining at the time. Jilani stated that he was the person who tied his hands. As already stated, it is difficult to place any reliance on the evidence of Jilani, but there are no sufficient grounds to reject the testimony of Biyabi so far as this accused is concerned. Ikrar had no particular enmity with him, nor had Biyabi and her husband any enmity with this accused so that they would name him falsely as one of the rioters. We see no reason for disagreeing with the High Court that the accused was present as one of the persons concerned in the attack on Hafiz Ali and Shiraz Ahmad. We accordingly dismiss his appeal.

    45. As regards Sampet Manya Gawari (Accused 29), the evidence against him is the general statement of Biyabi about the first attack on Hafiz Ali. The main evidence against him is of Jilani's (PW 3). Ikrar did not name him in Ex. P-14. The article seized from him could not be said to have been stained with human blood. If the evidence of Jilani against him is eliminated and Ikrar's evidence uncorroborated by Ex. P-14 is not accepted, on the mere general statement of Biyabi it is not safe to hold that he was amongst the rioters. The material against him is too meagre to convert his acquittal into a conviction. We therefore set aside the judgment of the High Court and acquit him and direct his release.

    46. So far as Baburao Chore (Accused 30) is concerned, Biyabi did not ascribe any special part to him. Ikrar did not name him in Ex. P-14, though he deposed in court that he was armed with a stick. The High Court placed reliance on the evidence of Jilani who stated that Baburao Chore released him when he was left tied at the khodang. The evidence of Biyabi regarding the participation of this accused in the riot cannot be accepted because he was not named by her as one of the persons who took part in the riot, in the Court of the committing Magistrate. All that she said about him was that long after the riot was over, at 5.30 p.m she saw him standing amongst other people near the house of accused Abdul Gani who were telling her not to weep. No satisfactory explanation has been given why she did not name this accused amongst the rioters in her statement before the committing Magistrate. This omission introduces an element of doubt in his case and in such circumstances it could not be said that there were any compelling reasons for the High Court to convert his acquittal into a conviction. It appears that the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to this omission. The High Court was impressed with the circumstance that a dhoti was recovered from him having on it five prominent bloodstains and that he gave no explanation for this, except that when he signed the seizure memo, it was blank. It seems to us that the High Court was under a misapprehension on this point. The report of the serologist shows that the blood marks were so disintegrated that it could not be said whether the marks were of human blood or not. That being so, no inference could be drawn as to the guilt of the accused from the bloodstains on his dhoti. We therefore set aside the judgment of the High Court and acquit this accused and direct his release.

    47. The last appellant in this appeal is Gulab Lande (Accused 32). Biyabi deposed as to his presence as a member of the unlawful assembly on both the occasions when Hafiz Ali was attacked. She stated that he was one of the persons who caught hold of Jilani and took him out of the house. His name was not mentioned by Ikrar in Ex. P- 14. No incriminating article was found in his house. Biyabi, when asked failed to give any explanation for the omission of the name of this accused amongst the rioters in her first statement before the police (Ex. P-l), and in her statement recorded by the police on the evening of the 26th. It seems that during subsequent developments of the case his name was also included among the rioters. The High Court has not convicted him in connection with the murder of Aman Ali on the ground that his presence was not proved amongst the rioters on that occasion. Jilani's conflicting testimony as regards this accused cannot be relied upon, and Biyabi's own statement about him being discrepant, it was wholly unsafe to convert his acquittal into a conviction. For these reasons we allow his appeal and acquit this accused and direct his release.

    48. The result is that this appeal is allowed as regards the following persons and the are acquitted: — Pundalik Bajirao Mahar (Accused 11), Gendu (Accused 23), Gulab Chore (Accused 24), Sampat Manya Gawari (Accused 29), Baburao Chore (Accused 30) and Gulab Lande (Accused 32). As regards the rest the appeal fails and is dismissed.

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    Abdul Gani v. Bhimrao Kadu
    (Mar 3, 1952)