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  • Section 148 of the Code, Civil Procedure
  • Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 21 Rule 89, Order 21 Rule 90, Order 21 Rule 91, Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 148 of the Code, Civil Procedure
  • Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 21 Rule 89, Order 21 Rule 90, Order 21 Rule 91, Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents, members of a Cooperative Housing Society, had mortgaged their property to the Society. Upon default, the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (1 May 1957) ordered them to pay approximately Rs 9,000 with 12 % interest from 1 August 1953, failing which the property would be sold and any balance recovered personally from the respondents. The amount remained unpaid, leading the Society to execute the order through a civil court. At the court-ordered auction held on 7 April 1958 the appellant became the highest bidder.

The respondents filed an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC to set aside the sale. On 7 October 1958, while that application was pending, the parties reached an oral compromise: the respondents withdrew their Rule 90 application and were granted time until 21 November 1958 to deposit the full decretal amount plus the auction-purchaser’s commission. No deposit was made. On 22 November 1958 the executing court refused a further oral request for extension, dismissed the compromise, and confirmed the sale under Order 21 Rule 92.

Appeals followed: the District Judge set aside the executing court’s order, relying on Section 148 CPC; a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court reinstated the executing court’s view; a Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal reversed that decision, holding that Order 34 Rule 5 applied and that time could be extended. Special leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an executing court can, after dismissing an application under Order 21 Rule 90 CPC, extend the time for payment that had earlier been fixed by consent of parties.
  2. Whether Order 34 Rule 5 CPC confers power on the court to postpone confirmation of sale so as to allow a mortgagor-judgment-debtor additional time to deposit the decretal amount.
  3. Whether Section 148 CPC permits the court to enlarge such time notwithstanding the mandatory language of Order 21 Rule 92 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents (Judgment-Debtors)

  • The court possesses an inherent or statutory power (including under Section 148 CPC) to extend time and postpone confirmation of sale to enable redemption.
  • Order 34 Rule 5 applies to mortgage decrees and preserves the mortgagor’s right to redeem until the sale is actually confirmed; therefore, refusal to extend time was improper.

Appellant (Auction-Purchaser)

  • Time fixed on 7 October 1958 was part of a consent compromise; absent renewed consent, the executing court lacked jurisdiction to enlarge it.
  • Order 21 Rule 92 is mandatory: once the Rule 90 application was withdrawn and the time expired without deposit, the court had to confirm the sale.
  • Order 34 Rule 5 gives a right to deposit before confirmation but does not empower the court to delay confirmation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, CA No. 1322 of 1966 Once the requirements of Order 21 Rule 92(1) are fulfilled, the executing court must confirm the sale. Relied upon to affirm that confirmation of sale is obligatory when the pre-conditions under Rule 92 are met.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, that Order 34 Rule 5 applied because the Registrar’s order functioned as a final decree in a mortgage suit. It analysed the interaction of Order 34 Rule 5 with Order 21 Rule 92 and Section 148 CPC, reasoning as follows:

  • Order 34 Rule 5 merely affords a mortgagor the right to deposit the decretal amount at any time before confirmation of sale; it does not confer power on the court to grant or enlarge time for such deposit.
  • Order 21 Rule 92(1) is mandatory: where no application under Rules 89–91 is pending (or, as here, such application has been withdrawn or dismissed), the court must confirm the sale. Continuous adjournments to accommodate a judgment-debtor would defeat this mandate.
  • The additional period up to 21 November 1958 was granted solely by a consent compromise. Because extension was consent-based, once the respondents failed to deposit within that period the executing court lacked jurisdiction to grant unilateral extensions; Section 148 could not override the agreed limit.
  • On 22 November 1958 no deposit had been made. Therefore, the prerequisites of Order 21 Rule 92(1) stood satisfied, obliging the court to confirm the sale. The District Judge’s contrary view—that the court “always” retains power to postpone confirmation—was inconsistent with the Code.
  • The Division Bench’s view that mortgagor rights persist until title is lost by confirmation conflated the right to redeem (which subsists) with a judicial discretion to postpone confirmation (which the Code withholds).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; orders of the Letters Patent Bench and the District Judge are set aside; the executing court’s order dated 22 November 1958 confirming the sale is restored.

Consequences: the auction sale in the appellant’s favour stands confirmed as of 22 November 1958, and the respondents are liable for the appellant’s costs throughout. Any money deposited by the respondents after the sale’s confirmation is returnable to them. The judgment clarifies that courts cannot, absent consent, enlarge time for payment after dismissal/withdrawal of Rule 90 applications, thereby reinforcing the mandatory operation of Order 21 Rule 92 and circumscribing the scope of Section 148 CPC in execution proceedings.

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    Hukumchand v. Bansilal And Others

    Wanchoo, C.J— This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Bombay High Court and arises in the following circumstances. The respondents were members of a Cooperative Housing Society and had created a mortgage on their property in favour of the society. As the amount due under the mortgage was not paid, the matter was referred to the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, and he made an order dated May 1, 1957 that the respondents should pay a sum of Rs 9000 and odd and interest at Rs 12 per cent per annum from August 1, 1953 till satisfaction of the debt due to the Society. The Registrar, further directed that if the amount was not paid in cash to the society, the property mentioned in his order would be sold in satisfaction of the amount. The order also provided that in case the amount due was not realised from the sale of the property, the society would have the right to proceed against the respondents for the balance. The amount was not paid as directed in the order. Consequently an application was made to the civil court as provided by law for recovery of the amount under the order of the Registrar which amounted to a decree. In consequence the property on which charge was created by the order of the Registrar was brought to sale. The sale was held on April 7, 1958 and the appellant being the highest bidder, the sale was concluded in his favour.

    2. Normally the sale would have been confirmed after 30 days, if no application had been made under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for Order 21 Rule 92 inter alia provides that “where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute”. As an application had been made on May 3, 1958 under Order 21 Rule 90, the sale could not be confirmed till that application was disposed of. Proceedings under Order 21 Rule 90 seem to have gone on upto October 7, 1958. On that day it appears that one of the respondents gave evidence as a witness. Thereafter it was the turn of the Society decree-holder to give evidence. But before the evidence of the society began, it appears that respondents requested for one month's time to deposit the decretal amount along with the auction- purchaser's commission. They also appear to have stated that in that event they were prepared to withdraw their application under Order 21 Rule 90. The society as well as the auction-purchaser had no objection to time being allowed. The executing court therefore granted time to the respondents till November 21, 1958 to deposit the entire decretal amount along with the auction-purchaser's commission. After time was thus allowed with consent of the parties, the application under Order 21 Rule 90 was dismissed as withdrawn with no order as to costs.

    3. On November 20, 1958, an application was made by the respondents in which they referred to what had been ordered on October 7, 1958. They further stated that November 21, 1958 was a holiday and it was not possible to deposit the amount on that day though they were prepared to do so. They consequently prayed for time for one day so that the deposit might be made on November 22, 1958. No order was passed on this application on November 20, 1958 though it bears an endorsement of the executing court to the effect that it had been filed on November 20, 1958. November 21, 1958 being a holiday it appears that the matter came before the executing court on November 22. On that day the court noted that no amount had been deposited. The order-sheet also shows that counsel for the respondents prayed for time for a fortnight. The society decree-holder as well as the auction-purchaser (appellant) opposed the prayer for extension of time. The executing court held that as the society decree-holder and the auction-purchaser were not willing to extend time the court could not extend time which had been given under an agreement of the parties by way of compromise. The court therefore rejected the prayer for extension of time and thereafter confirmed the sale as required by Order 21 Rule 92, as the application under Order 21 Rule 90 had already been dismissed on October 7, 1958.

    4. The respondents went in appeal to the District Judge. He held that the court had always the power whether under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise, to postpone passing of orders confirming sale of immovable properties. He went on to hold that the executing court erred in holding that it had no power to grant further extension of time. The appeal was therefore allowed, the order of the executing court set aside and the case remitted to the executing court for deciding the application for extension of time on merits. It may be mentioned that though the District Judge said in the order that the application presented on November 22, 1958 for granting further time would be disposed of after hearing parties and considering the merits of the case, there was in fact no written application on November 22, 1958 and there was only an oral prayer. That however makes no difference to the main question before us.

    5. There was then a second appeal by the appellant to the High Court. A question was raised in the High Court whether Order 34 Rule 5 applied to the present case. The learned Single Judge seems to have held that Order 34 Rule 5 did not apply. He further held that in view of the provisions of Order 21 Rule 92, the sale was rightly confirmed and Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not under the circumstances be invoked. The appeal therefore was allowed and the order of the executing court restored.

    6. Then there was a letters patent appeal by the respondents. The Division Bench appears to have held that Order 34 Rule 5 would apply in a case of this kind. It also went on to say that even if Order 34 Rule 5 did not apply, it was a fundamental principle that before a mortgagor could be prevented from making the payment and redeeming the property, his rights must have come to an end and they would come to an end only when his title was lost by confirmation of sale. It went on to hold that if the application for extension of time was wrongly rejected if the mortgagor had the right and the court had the power to grant adjournment it would be open in appeal to consider whether the executing court refused the adjournment properly or not. If in appeal the court came to the conclusion that the order of the executing court refusing extension of time was wrong, the confirmation which followed on such wrong order would fall and the mortgagor judgment-debtor would be entitled to deposit the amount. It appears that as the respondents had deposited some money after the order of the District Judge in appeal, the Letters Patent Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and restored the order of the District Judge and further set aside the order of confirmation made by the executing court on November 22, 1958. It also ordered that the amount lying in deposit should be paid to the decree-holder mortgagee and the auction-purchaser. It may be added that this deposit was not made before the confirmation of sale on November 22, 1958 but long afterwards in 1959. It further directed that if on making up the accounts, it was found that any additional amount had to be deposited, the court would give reasonable time to the judgment- debtors, namely, the present respondents before us. The High Court having refused leave to appeal, the appellant obtained special leave from this Court, and that is how the matter has come before us.

    7. The principal question that arises for decision in this case is whether the executing court was right in the view that it could not extend time which had been given by consent of parties on October 7, 1958. If that view is correct, there would be no difficulty in holding, in view of Order 21 Rule 92, that the order confirming sale was proper. We shall proceed on that assumption that Order 34 Rule 5 applies in the present case and that the order of the Registrar which was under execution was a final decree in a mortgage suit. Order 34 Rule 5(1) gives an opportunity to the judgment-debtor in a mortgage decree for sale to deposit the amount due under the mortgage decree at any time before the confirmation of sale made in pursuance of the final decree, and if such a deposit is made the court executing the decree has to accept the payment and make an order in favour of the judgment-debtor in terms of Order 34 Rule 5(1). Though Order 34 Rule 5(1) recognises the right of the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount in an execution relating to a mortgage decree for sale at any time before, the confirmation of sale, that in our opinion does not mean that the said rule gives power to the court to extend time for payment on an application made by the judgment-debtor. There is no provision in Order 34 Rule 5(1) like that contained in Order 34 Rule 4(2) to extend time for payment after the final decree is passed in a mortgage suit. As we read Order 34 Rule 5 it only permits he judgment-debtor to deposit the amount due. Under the decree and such other amount as may be due in consequence of a sale having taken place, provided the deposit is made before the confirmation of sale. But there is no power in Order 34 Rule 5(1) to grant extension of time and postpone confirmation of sale therefore. The observation of the District Judge that the court has always the power to postpone passing orders confirming sale of immovable property is in our view incorrect, in the face of the provisions contained in Order 21 Rule 92(1). That provision makes it absolutely clear that if no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91 or where such application is made and disallowed, the court has to make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale becomes absolute. It is not open to the court to go on fixing late after date and postponing confirmation of sale merely to accommodate a judgment-debtor. If that were so, the court may go on postponing confirmation of sale for years in order to accommodate a judgment-debtor. What Order 21 Rule 92 contemplates is that where conditions thereunder are satisfied an order for confirmation must follow. Further we have already indicated that Order 34 Rule 5 does not give any power to court to grant time to deposit the money after the final decree has been passed. All that it permits is that a judgment-debtor can deposit the amount even after the final decree is passed at any time before the confirmation of sale and if he does so, an order in terms of Order 34 Rule 5(1) in his favour has to be passed. With respect we cannot understand what the Letters Patent Bench meant by saying that before a mortgagor could be prevented from making payment and redeeming the property, his rights must have come to an end and that they could not come to an end unless his title to the property had been lost by confirmation of sale. It is true that so long as his right to redeem subsists the mortgagor may redeem the property. It is this principle which is recognised in Order 34 Rule 5 which provides that the mortgagor judgment-debtor can deposit the amount due even after the final decree has been passed but this deposit must be made at any time before confirmation of sale. It may be noted that there is no power under Order 34 Rule 5 to extend time and all that it does is to permit the mortgagor judgment-debtor to deposit the amount before confirmation of sale. It does not give any right to the mortgagor judgment-debtor to ask for postponement of confirmation of sale in order to enable him to deposit the amount. We have to interpret Order 34 Rule 5 and Order 21 Rule 92 harmoniously and on a harmonious interpretation of the two provisions it is clear that though the mortgagor has the right to deposit the amount due at any time before confirmation of sale, there is no question of his being granted time under Order 34 Rule 5 and if the provisions of Order 21 Rule 92(1) apply the sale must be confirmed unless before the confirmation the mortgagor judgment-debtor has deposited the amount as permitted by Order 34 Rule 5. We may in this connection refer to the decision of this Court in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh CA No. 1322 of 1966 where it has been laid down that once the conditions of Order 21 Rule 92(1) are complied with, the executing court must confirm the sale.

    8. It is on these principles that we have to decide whether the trial court was correct. We have already indicated that the sale was held on April 7, 1958, and in the normal course it would have been confirmed after 30 days unless an application under Rule 89, Rule 90, or Rule 91 of Order 21 was made. Besides, this case is, as we have already assumed, analogous to the case of a final mortgage decree. The judgment-debtor mortgagor had the right to deposit the amount at any time before confirmation of sale within 30 days after the sale or even more than 30 days after the sale under Order 34 Rule 5(1) so long as the sale was not confirmed. If the amount had been deposited before the confirmation of sale, the judgment-debtors had the right to ask for an order in terms of Order 34 Rule 5(1) in their favour. In this case an application under Order 21 Rule 90 had been made and therefore the sale could not be confirmed immediately after 30 days which would be the normal course; the confirmation had to await the disposal of the application under Order 21 Rule 90. That application was disposed of on October 7, 1958 and was dismissed. It is obvious from the order sheet of October 7, 1958 that an oral compromise was arrived at between the parties in court on that day. By that compromise time was granted to the respondents to deposit the entire amount due to the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser by November 21, 1958. Obviously the basis of the compromise was that the respondents withdrew their application under Order 21 Rule 90 while the decree-holder society and the auction-purchaser appellant agreed that time might be given to deposit the amount up to November 21, 1958. If this agreement had not been arrived at and if the application under Order 21 Rule 90 had been dismissed (for example, on merits) on October 7, 1958, the court was bound under Order 21 Rule 92(1) to confirm the sale at once. But because of the compromise between the parties by which the respondents were given time up to November 21, 1958 the court rightly postponed the question of confirmation of sale till that date by consent of parties. But the fact remains that the application under Order 21 Rule 90 had been dismissed on October 7, 1958 and thereafter the court was bound to confirm the sale but for the compromise between the parties giving time up to November 21, 1958.

    9. Now let us see what happened about November 21, 1958. On November 20, 1958, an application was made by the respondents praying that they might be given one day more as November 21, 1958 was holiday. No order was passed on that date, but it is remarkable that no money was deposited on November 20, 1958. When the matter came up before the court on November 22, 1958 no money was deposited even on that day. Now under Order 34 Rule 5 it was open to the respondents to deposit the entire amount on November 22, 1958 before the sale was confirmed, but no such deposit was made on November 22, 1958. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents prayed to the executing court for extension of time by 14 days. The executing court refused that holding that time up to November 21, 1958 had been granted by consent and it was no longer open to it to extend that time. The executing court has not referred to Order 21 Rule 92 in its order, but it is obvious that the executing court held that it could not grant time in the absence of an agreement between the parties, because Order 21 Rule 92 required that as the application under Order 21 Rule 90 had been dismissed, the sale must be confirmed. We are of the view that in the circumstances it was not open to the executing court to extend time without consent of parties for time between October 7, 1958 to November 21, 1958 was granted by consent of parties. Section 148 of the Code, Civil Procedure would not apply 702 in these circumstances, and the executing court was right in holding that it could not extend time. Thereafter it rightly confirmed the sale as required under Order 21 Rule 92, there being no question of the application of Order 34 Rule 5, for the money had not been deposited on November 22, 1958 before the order of confirmation confirmed was passed. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the order of the executing court refusing grant of time and confirming the sale was correct.

    10. It is however urged that it does not appear that the time was, ranted on October 7, 1958 by consent of parties because the respondents had only asked for one month's time and the court gave time for about six weeks. It appears however that the grant of time on October 7, 1958 was as a result of an oral compromise between the parties. This is quite, clear from the fact that the application under Order 21 Rule 90 was withdrawn on the basis that time would be granted. The fact that time was actually granted for six weeks does not mean that that was done without the consent of the parties. It seems to us that the whole thing took place in the presence of the court and the order granting time up to November 21, 1958 must in the circumstances be read as a consent order. It is borne out by the fact that on November 22, 1958 the same presiding Judge of the executing court said that time had been granted with the consent of the parties by way of compromise. We cannot therefore accept the contention that time was not granted by consent of parties and therefore the court had power under Section 148 to extend time which had already been granted.

    11. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Letters Patent Bench and of the District Judge and restore that of the executing court dated November 22, 1958. It follows that the sale stood confirmed in favour of the appellant on November 22, 1958. We direct that the respondents (judgment-debtors) will pay the costs of the appellant throughout. The money deposited by the respondent can be taken back by them.

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    Comments

    Hukumchand v. Bansilal And Others
    (Apr 19, 1967)