Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Dr. Naresh Agarwal

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Dr. Naresh Agarwal, qualified the MBBS Examination in 1995 from RNT Medical College, Udaipur. The Principal and Controller of Associated Groups of Hospitals issued a certificate of his satisfactory behaviour dated 16.3.1996 (Annexure-1). While studying, a dispute arising from Student Union elections led to an FIR in 1994 under Section 323 IPC; that offence was compromised on 31.8.1994 and, in respect of Section 147 IPC, the petitioner was released under the Probation of Offenders Act (Annexure-3).

The petitioner was appointed as a Medical Officer initially on a temporary/ad hoc basis on 24.6.1998. Regular vacancies were later advertised on 22.9.1999 (Annexure-4), and the petitioner was selected and appointed (Annexure-5). His services were terminated on 20.12.1999 (Annexure-6) on the ground that character verification revealed his release under the Probation of Offenders Act.

The petitioner challenged the termination order (Annexure-6) by filing the present writ petition. He submitted representations (Annexures 7 and 8). The writ court considered the papers, the termination order, and various precedents relied upon by the petitioner.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a past conviction or release under the Probation of Offenders Act for offences such as those under Sections 147/323 IPC constitutes an offence involving "moral turpitude" sufficient to justify termination from a civil post.
  2. Whether mere existence of a conviction, without an application of mind to the circumstances and to whether the conviction involves moral turpitude or renders the person undesirable for civil service, is a valid ground for termination.
  3. Whether the termination order (Annexure-6), which refers to the conviction, is stigmatic and amounts to punishment without compliance with principles of natural justice.
  4. Whether Rule 12 of the Rajasthan Medical & Health Service Rules, 1963 (character certificate requirements and notes regarding convictions), and related authority should govern the assessment of suitability for appointment and retention in service.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The incident was a student dispute which ended in a compromise; any court order under the Probation of Offenders Act arising from that compromise cannot be termed an offence involving moral turpitude.
  • Under Rule 12 of the Rajasthan Medical & Health Service Rules, 1963, a character certificate from the Principal relating to the six months prior to application suffices; such a certificate had been furnished.
  • No moral turpitude was involved in the incident leading to the conviction/release; the conviction alone should not disqualify him.
  • The petitioner produced representations (Annexures 7 and 8) and noted that other doctors involved in the same election dispute remained in service (though the court observed that parity with others does not decide his case on its own facts).

Respondent's Position

  • The termination order (Annexure-6) was premised on confirmation from the S.P., Udaipur, that the petitioner had been punished in FIR No. 44/94 on 31.8.1994; in terms of the appointment letter, this ground justified termination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hanuman Singh v. State of Raj (as cited) Held that conviction under Sections 147 and 323 IPC cannot be termed as involving moral turpitude; recruitment rules did not intend to exclude convicts/ex-prisoners from consideration; absence of notice to show cause violates natural justice. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that convictions under 147/323 IPC do not ipso facto constitute moral turpitude and that punishment or termination cannot be imposed without applying mind and observing natural justice.
Sunder Lal v. State of Rajasthan (as cited) Held that conviction under Section 325 r/w 34 IPC does not involve moral turpitude; moral turpitude involves conduct that is dishonest, immoral or unethical; reference to Rule 4 of the Conduct Rules, 1971. The court cited this case for the principle that not all criminal convictions amount to moral turpitude and for the interpretive guidance on what constitutes moral turpitude when considering removal from service.
Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (Supreme Court, as cited) Held that conviction under Section 294 IPC on its own does not involve moral turpitude; moral turpitude defined as conduct inherently base, vile or depraved; reference to State policy listing offences constituting moral turpitude and subsequent modification. The court used this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that conviction per se (for certain offences) does not automatically amount to moral turpitude and that governmental policy/listing matters in determining rehabilitation or disqualification.
Bhanwar Lal Paliwal v. State of Rajasthan (as cited) Division Bench observation that a government servant who commits a serious offence involving moral turpitude should be placed under suspension. The court noted this authority to distinguish serious offences involving moral turpitude (which may justify suspension) from petty offences which do not automatically disqualify a person from service.
Thakorbhai Bhagabhai v. D.D.O. Surat (as cited) Suspension quashed where the alleged offence under Section 323 IPC did not involve moral turpitude. The court cited this case as further support that offences under Section 323 IPC do not necessarily amount to moral turpitude and that punitive administrative actions (like suspension) may be improper in such circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the factual matrix and the impugned termination order (Annexure-6). The termination was founded on verification by the S.P., Udaipur, confirming that the petitioner had been punished in FIR No. 44/94 on 31.8.1994. The court identified several key legal and factual considerations:

  1. The impugned order itself recorded the conviction and termination, and the court found that the order was stigmatic — the mention of the conviction in the termination letter amounted to a stigma and in effect was punitive.
  2. The court applied established legal principles from precedent: convictions under Sections such as 323/147 (and even 324/325 as held in other cases) have been held not to constitute moral turpitude per se. The court relied on authorities to show that mere conviction does not automatically disqualify a person from holding civil post.
  3. The court emphasized procedural and substantive safeguards: the authority ought to have applied its mind to the circumstances giving rise to the conviction — whether those circumstances justified removal from service — rather than terminating solely because of the conviction. The court noted prior holdings that removal requires consideration of whether the conviction renders the person undesirable for a civil post.
  4. The court observed the petitioner's subsequent conduct and career trajectory: after the incident he continued studies for 2–3 years, passed MBBS, obtained registration/enrolment as a doctor, and was initially appointed on temporary basis before regular selection. This factual background was treated as relevant to assess whether the past incident warranted removal.
  5. Given the combination of precedents, the Rule 12 framework (which contemplates that conviction may not of itself require refusal of a certificate where convictions do not involve moral turpitude), and the stigmatic nature of the termination order, the court concluded the termination could not be sustained.

The court therefore found that the authority failed to apply its mind to whether the circumstances of the conviction warranted removal, and that the order amounted to punishment (stigmatic) without adequate justification or consideration of relevant principles.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned termination order (Annexure-6) is quashed. The petitioner shall be treated as on duty as if no such order had been passed and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is restoration of the petitioner to service with consequential benefits as if the termination had not occurred.
  • The court applied established principles that a mere conviction, particularly for offences such as those under Sections 147/323 IPC (and similar petty offences), does not automatically amount to moral turpitude justifying removal; authorities must apply their mind to the factual circumstances and the question of suitability for service.
  • No broader or novel precedent was articulated by the court beyond application of existing authorities; the decision quashes the specific termination on the facts presented and enforces the requirement that administrative decisions of removal must not be stigmatic or purely punitive without considered application of legal principles.

This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided judgment text and does not add or infer facts beyond what was contained therein.

    Dr. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. v. State Of Rajasthan & Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    J.C Verma, J.:— The petitioner Dr. Naresh Agarwal had qualified MBBS Examination in 1995 from RNT Medical College, Udaipur. The Principal RNT Medical College and Controller of Associate Groups of Hospitals, Udaipur had also given a certificate of his satisfactory behaviour in the college as far back on 16.3.1996, copy of which is attached as Annexure-1.

    2. During the time of studies in MBBS in the College, because of certain dispute during elections of the Student's Union there was some hot deliberations amongst the students for which one group of students had also lodged an FIR in the year 1994 u/S. 323 IPC. However, immediately thereafter the students had compromised on 31.8.1994 itself so far the offence u/S. 323 IPC was concerned, but u/S. 147 IPC, he was released under the Probation of Offenders Act as per Annexure-3.

    3. He had applied for the post of Medical Officer and was appointed on the post on 24.6.1998 on temporary adhoc basis. Lateron for regular selection, the vacancies were also advertised vide Annexure-4 on 22.9.1999 The petitioner was found suitable and was given appointment as per Annexure-5. Vide Annexure-6 his services have been terminated on 20.12.1999 on the plea that on character verification, it was found that he had been released under Probation of Offenders Act.

    4. The petitioner has challenged Annexure-6 stating therein; (i) for some incident amongst students themselves for which there was a dispute which dispute ended into a compromise and out of that compromise if any order was passed by the court under Probation of Offenders Act, it cannot be termed to be an offence involving moral turpitude; (ii) as per Rule 12 of the Rajasthan Medical & Health Service Rules, 1963, a character certificate from the Principal is required to be produced to the effect which shall relate to six months prior to making of the application which certificate was furnished; (iii) no moral turpitude was involved. The relevant Rule 12 is quoted as under:—

    “Rule 12-Character-The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal/Academic Officer of the University or College in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with the College or University and not related to him.”

    “Note-(1) A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has as its object the overthrow by violent means of the government as by law established, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification.”

    “(2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated against on grounds of their previous conviction for purposes of employment in the service. Those, who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude or violence, shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent. After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district.”

    “Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude or violence shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent. After Care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons, to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After Care Home.” It is pertinent to mention here that the post of Medical Officer is included in the Schedule appended to the Rules, 1963, as such the services are governed by the present set of rules.”

    5. The petitioner had represented stating therein the facts as per representations copies of which are attached as Annexure 7 and 8; the petitioner also submits that there are many other doctors who were studying along with the petitioner at that time and were also involved in the dispute of election of the College, are still in service, even though no such plea can assist the petitioner in any way as his case is to be seen on its facts.

    6. To support his contention, the petitioner relies on a judgment Hanuman Singh v. State of Raj. (1), on Sunder Lal v. State of Raj. (2), Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (3), and Bhanwar Lal Paliwal v. State of Rajasthan (4).

    7. In the case of Hanuman Singh v. State of Raj. (supra), it was held that the conviction u/S. 147 and 323 IPC cannot be termed as conviction of offence involving moral turpitude. Relying on Rule 12, as reproduced above, it was held by this court that the rule making authority did not intend to exclude even convicts, Ex-prisoners, as also those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude, from the zone of consideration for the purpose of recruitment to the Subordinate Service in the Police Department and, therefore, so far as the rules of recruitment are concerned, fresh employment can be given to an Ex-Prisoners; there was hardly any justification for imposing major penalty on a Government employee, merely on the basis of his conviction for a criminal offence by a competent court of law, which does not involve of moral turpitude. It was further held that the absence of notice to show cause; there was violation of principles of natural justice in passing of the impugned order.

    8. This court in Sunder Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (supra), it was held that conviction u/S. 325 r/w 34 IPC does not involve any moral turpitude and it could not be said that the petitioner in that case had conducted himself in such a manner as to invite penalty of dismissal from service. The conduct of the petitioner when considered u/Rule 4 of the Conduct Rules 1971, can be held to be improper and unbecoming conduct amongst other things when he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; whether in the course of discharge of his duties or otherwise. When a person is charged to have committed offence involving “moral turpitude” it may mean that such conduct is arising out of an act, which is dishonest, immoral or unethical. From the facts of the incident described above, it cannot be said that his conduct arose out of any act, which can be termed as dishonest, immoral or unethical.

    9. In Thakorbhai Bhagabhai v. D.D.O Surat (5), the petitioner was suspended on account of an offence said to have been committed under Section 323, IPC. The suspension order was quashed and set aside on the ground that the alleged offence did not involve any moral turpitude in the conduct of the petitioner.

    10. The Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (supra) had held that the conviction under Section 294 on its own would not involve moral turpitude depriving the official of the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances, which had led to the conviction, meet the requirements of policy decision contained in the notification of the State Government. It was observed as under:—

    “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also social parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. The government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on February 2, 1973 (Annexure E in the Paper Book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for information and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the government of Haryana on 17/26.03.1975 explained the policy decision of February 2, 1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral turpitude as follows:”

    11. Division Bench of this court in Bhanwar Lal Paliwal v. State of Raj. (supra) had observed that where a government servant who commits a serious offence involving moral turpitude then certainly he should be placed under suspension.

    12. In the impugned order of termination Annexure-6, it has been mentioned that because of the verification made by the S.P, Udaipur, a confirmation had been received that the petitioner was punished in FIR No. 44/94 on 31.8.1994 and, therefore, in terms of the order of appointment, the services of the petitioner were terminated and was relieved from service.

    13. The order Annexure-6 shall cause a stigma on the petitioner. It would have been different matter if the authorities without mentioning the factum of conviction of the petitioner in FIR No. 44/94, would have terminated the services of the petitioner in accordance with the terms of appointment letter subject to its legality. The fact that the order itself is stigmatic is sufficient to set aside the order which amounts to have passed by way of punishment.

    14. Apart from above, as has been discussed above, mere conviction is not sufficient to de-bar a person to hold civil post under the State. The authority ought to have applied its mind and the fact whether the circumstances leading to such conviction were such as to warrant to remove the official from service or that he cannot be retained in service because of seriousness of the allegations. It had been repeatedly held that any punishment u/S. 323/147 of IPC does not amount to offence of moral turpitude. Even though this court had also held that the offence u/S. 324/325 is not an offence of moral turpitude. As already held by this court that if any ex-convict or prisoners under the rules are not debarred for holding the civil post, it cannot be imagined as to how the petitioner during his studies of MBBS and during election of students in the College and having been involved with a petty offence, which offence was also compromised u/S. 323 IPC and released under the Probation of Offenders Act and even continued the studies subsequent to that for about 2-3 years and having passed the MBBS examination, obtained the MBBS degree, even enrolled as doctor and having been appointed initially on temporary basis and then on selection basis, could be removed from the service for an offence which never amounted to moral turpitude. From the reading of the order it is very clear that he has been removed from service only because of conviction. It is also settled law that even though the conviction is of serious offence; conviction itself cannot be made a ground for removal from service; until and unless, the concerned authority applies its mind to the facts of the case and holds that the circumstances leading to and resulting in conviction and that such offence was of such a nature that a person is undesirable to be kept in a civil post; only and only then such an order could be held to be justified. But in the present circumstances, the order of removal cannot be sustained for the reasons and discussions mentioned above and is likely to be quashed.

    15. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. The petitioner shall be treated as on duty as if no such order had been passed. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits as well.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dr. Naresh Agarwal & Ors. v. State Of Rajasthan & Ors.
    (Feb 28, 2001)