AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 271(1)(c) of the I.T Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 271(1)(c) of the I.T Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Rajesh Balia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, referred a question of law to this Court arising from its appellate order dated 19.11.1984 in ITA No. 798.JP/83 relating to assessment year 1978-1979. The judgment was delivered by Rajesh Balia, J.

The assessee is a building contractor assessed as a registered firm. For the assessment year 1978-1979 the assessee returned a total income of Rs. 99,164/-. The Income-tax Officer (A.O.) noted defects in maintenance of accounts and, after discussion, the assessee agreed that a gross profit rate of 12% on contract receipts be applied as assessable income. On that basis the assessing authority computed the assessee's income at Rs. 1,27,680/-, resulting in an addition of Rs. 28,520/-.

The A.O. invoked Explanation I appended to Section 271(1)(c) (as amended with effect from 1.4.1976), raised a presumption that the additions represented income in respect of which particulars were concealed, and initiated penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c). The Assessing Officer imposed a penalty, which was affirmed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, however, made a reference to this Court on the specific question of law formulated by the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the concealment of income by the assessee could be taken at Rs. 28,520/- within the meaning of sub-clause (c) of Explanation I to Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act and consequently whether the minimum amount of penalty to be levied would be Rs. 19,629/- (as framed by the Tribunal in the reference).

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee was a building contractor who returned income based on books but admitted inability to produce full verificatory vouchers for certain expenses; for that reason the assessee agreed to an assessment based on a flat gross profit rate (12%) on contract receipts to avoid prolonged verification.
  • The assessee explained the hire of two trucks: Truck No. RRQ 6065 (hired Oct–Dec 1977) charged at Rs. 350/day (total Rs. 22,500) and Truck No. RJJ 1114 (hired 1.6.1977–15.7.1977) charged at Rs. 100/day (total Rs. 4,500). The assessee stated the smaller truck had a lower rate; diesel expenses were borne by the assessee and debited in accounts.
  • The assessee contended that the inability to substantiate certain expense entries arose from lack of verifying material and not from deliberate falsification; hence Explanation I's presumption (a rebuttable evidential presumption) should not be treated as conclusive proof of concealment or lack of bona fide.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Assessing Officer applied Explanation I to Section 271(1)(c) to raise a presumption that additions (the Rs. 28,520/-) represented income in respect of which particulars were concealed, and accordingly initiated and levied penalty proceedings.
  • The Assessing Officer treated some expense entries as not properly explained: he considered hiring charges for Truck RRQ 6065 (belonging to a partner) to be inflated and found diesel expenses debited for Truck RJJ 1114 even during periods it was allegedly not hired; therefore the assessing authorities concluded the assessee could not substantiate explanations and inferred lack of bona fide.
  • The Revenue relied on the amended Explanation I (effective 1.4.1976) to support the conclusion that the additions/disallowances, when unexplained or not substantiated, permit penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out and analyzed the statutory text of Section 271(1)(c) and Explanation I as they stood for the relevant assessment year (1978-1979), noting that Explanation I had been recast effective 1.4.1976. The Court's analysis proceeded in key steps:

  1. Nature of Explanation I: The Court reiterated that Explanation I is an evidential provision that creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of the Revenue — it supplies a rule of evidence to enable the Revenue to discharge its initial burden in penalty proceedings when additions or disallowances are made. It is not conclusive proof and can be rebutted by new material or existing material on the record.
  2. Factual basis of the assessment: The authorities accepted that the assessee's books and claimed results were not accepted and, to avoid further detailed verification, the assessee agreed to be assessed by applying a gross profit rate (12%) on gross receipts. That substitution produced the Rs. 28,520/- addition.
  3. Distinction between rejection of explanation and inability to substantiate: The Court emphasized a fundamental distinction in Explanation I between (A) an explanation that is "found ... to be false" (disproved) and (B) an explanation that "he is not able to substantiate" (not proved). The statute protects bona fide explanations that are not disproved: if an explanation is bona fide and all material facts have been disclosed, Explanation I will not apply to prevent penalty.
  4. Application to present facts: In the present case the assessment was made by substituting an estimated gross profit rather than by expressly rejecting specific explanations in respect of the contested entries during the assessment process. The assessee had explained the truck hires (different rates because of differing truck sizes; diesel expenses borne and debited); the fact of hiring was not doubted. The A.O.'s later inference that RRQ 6065's hire charges were inflated (because it belonged to a partner) and that diesel charges for RJJ 1114 included periods when it was not hired, was insufficient to treat the explanations as deliberately false.
  5. Limits of presumption and onus of proof about bona fides: Because the presumption generated by Explanation I is rebuttable, the Court held that mere inability to substantiate (owing to lack of verifying vouchers) is not itself proof of fraud, wilful negligence, or lack of bona fide. The question whether bona fides are lacking is a matter of evidence to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities and cannot be conclusively inferred from the mere fact that explanations could not be substantiated when the assessee had earlier agreed to assessment by substitution for lack of verification material.
  6. Procedural and logical error in tribunal's approach: The Court found that the Tribunal misapplied Explanation I when it treated the fact of assessment by application of a gross profit rate as equivalent to rejection of the assessee's explanations and as conclusive proof of concealment or lack of bona fide. The Court also noted a second error: penalty proceedings were initiated in respect of the additions made by substitution, but the enquiry was directed at different specific expense items which, in strict terms, were not the precise statutory basis (an addition of a specific amount or a disallowance of a specific claimed deduction) contemplated by Explanation I. The Court observed that substitution of a new estimated income figure is qualitatively different from a specific addition or disallowance of a particular claimed amount.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: On the facts, the Court concluded that the Tribunal's inference that the assessee's explanations were not bona fide was not supported by material and was an inference no reasonable person instructed in law would draw. The presumption under Explanation I gave jurisdiction to initiate proceedings but did not, by itself, displace the requisite evidential inquiry into bona fides.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The question referred by the Tribunal is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Direct effect on the parties: The Court's answer means that, on the facts before it, the addition of Rs. 28,520/- arising from assessment by substitution (application of a gross profit rate) could not be treated, by that fact alone, as concealment of particulars of income within the meaning of Explanation I to Section 271(1)(c) so as to justify imposing the penalty contended for by the Revenue. The Court ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion explains the proper scope of Explanation I — that it creates only a rebuttable evidential presumption and distinguishes between an explanation disproved (which may justify stronger inferences) and an explanation not proved for want of substantiating material. The Court did not purport to lay down any broader binding principle beyond the interpretation applied to these facts. No express statement was made in the opinion that a new legal precedent was being established beyond this decision on the facts before the Court.

    M/S. Shiv Lal Tak v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Jodhpur

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Rajesh Balia, J.:— Heard learned counsel for the parties.

    2. This reference has been made, at the instance of assessee, by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur for the opinion of this Court on the following questions of law, said to be arising out of appellate order dated 19.11.1984 in ITA No. 798.JP/83 relating to assessment year 1978-1979:

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the concealment of income by the assessee could be taken at Rs. 28,520/- within the meaning of sub-clause (c) of Explanation (4) to Section 271(1)(c) of the I.T Act and consequently the minimum amount of penalty to be levied would come to Rs. 19,629?”

    3. Brief facts of the case are that assessee is a building contractor and is being assessed in the status of a registered firm. The assessee submitted its return for the assessment year 1978-1979 showing total income at Rs. 99,164/-. The Income-Tax Officer noticed various defects in the maintenance of accounts. After discussion with the Assessing Officer and finding unvouched nature of expenses, the assessee agreed for application of gross profit at the rate of 12% on contract receipts so declared by the firm, to be taken as assessible income and, accordingly, assessee's income came to Rs. 1,27,680/-.

    4. In respect of said additions, the Assessing Officer, taking support from Explanation I appended to Sec. 271(1)(c)(iii), initiated penalty proceedings against the assessee for levying penalty, by raising presumption under the Explanation that the additions made in the total income returned, represent the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed and ultimately, levied penalty on finding that some of the expenses, referred to in the order, having been not properly explained equal to amount of income, held to be such in respect of which particulars have been concealed.

    5. Said order has been affirmed by CIT (Appeals) as well as by the Tribunal, by holding that Explanation I to Sec. 271(1)(c), as amended with effect from 1.04.1976, apply to the facts of present case.

    6. Before further examining contours of the controversy, it would be appropriate to reproduce relevant portion of Sec. 271 as they existed at the relevant time, covering assessment year 1978-1979:

    “271.(1) If the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner (Appeals) in the course of any proceedings under this Act, is satisfied that any person.

    (a) ………… …………….. …………………………………………………………………..

    (b) ………… …………….. …………………………………………………………………..

    (c) has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income,

    ………… …………….. ……………………………………………………………………….

    (i) ………… …………….. …………………………………………………………………..

    (ii) ………… …………….. …………………………………………………………………..

    (iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c), in addition to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less than, but which shall not exceed twice, the amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of the concealment of particulars of his income or the furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income:

    Provided that, if in a case falling under clause (c), the amount of income (as determined by the Income tax Officer on assessment) in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds a sum of twenty five thousand rupees, the Income-tax Officer shall not issue any direction for payment by way of penalty without the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.

    Explanation I: Where in respect of any facts material to the computation of the total income of any person under this Act,—

    (A) such person fails to offer an explanation or offers an explanation which is found by the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner (Appeals) to be false, or

    (B) such person offers an explanation which he is not able to substantiate,

    then, the amount added or disallowed in computing the total income of such person as a result thereof shall, for the purposes of clause (c) of this sub-section, be deemed to represent the income in respect of which particulars have been concealed:

    Provided that nothing contained in this Explanation shall apply to a case referred to in clause (B) in respect of any amount added or disallowed as a result of the rejection of any explanation offered by such person, if such explanation, is bona fide and all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his total income have been disclosed by him.”

    7. The facts noticed above goes to show that at the time of assessment also, the assessee was not possessed of full verificatory vouchers as necessary proof by which the expenses entered in the Books of Accounts could be vouched and verified. It was precisely for that reason that assessment was made by applying agreed rate of 12% on gross receipts by the assessee under the contract, in order to avoid any further investigation and verification of the receipts and expenses in detail.

    8. Explanation I to sec. 271(1)(c), which was amended with effect from 1.4.1976 in the above form, goes to show that-to discharge the Revenue of its initial burden to establish that there was concealment of particulars of income, when additions are made in the income or any disallowance of expenses claimed by the assessee has been made. It is to be noticed in the present case that result of the business as disclosed in the Books of Accounts having not been accepted, instead the assessing authority accepted and adopted gross receipts by the assessee as basis for applying flat profit rate, for making the assessment. That resulted in addition of Rs. 28,520/- in the income of the assessee and the Income-tax Officer was justified initially for holding satisfaction that assessee has concealed particulars of his income in respect of said additions made in the income and initiated penalty proceedings for that purpose.

    9. However, it is settled that Explanation I to sec. 271(1)(c) only provides a rule of evidence for raising a rebuttable presumption in favour of the Revenue and does no more. It can be rebutted by leading new material as well as from existing material on record. The presumption is not carried to height of a conclusive proof. Once jurisdiction has been assumed and matter has to be decided in terms of evidence that has come before the assessing authority and it must depend upon dealing with such matters by the Assessing Officer thereof.

    10. In the present case, while presumption has been raised in respect of additions made in the returned income of the assessee by applying flat profit rate on gross receipts by the assessee, the assessment order reveals that the enquiry has proceeded on the basis of finding whether the claim of deductions against the income had rightly been disclosed in the Books of Accounts and the same has been rightly rejected.

    11. On merits of the case, two items of expenditure which have been picked up by the Assessing Officer are in respect of hire of two trucks. Truck No. RRQ 6065 had been hired for 3 months, from October, 1977 to December, 1977 and Rs. 22500/- have been debited in the Books of Accounts, at the rate of Rs. 350/- per day. Another truck, No. RJJ 1114, was hired by the assessee for the period from 1.6.1977 to 15.7.1977 The hire charges in respect thereof have been debited at Rs. 4500/- at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. The diesel expenses in respect of these vehicles, according to the assessee were born by the assessee and, expenses in respect thereof have been debited in the Books of Accounts.

    12. The fact of hiring of these two trucks during the period in question has not been doubted. The explanation furnished by the assessee in respect of difference in rate of hiring of the two trucks has been that Truck No. RJJ 1114 was much smaller in size than Truck No. RRQ 6065 and, therefore, less rental was paid in respect of smaller truck. This fact has not also been found to be incorrect. However, solely on the basis of fact that Truck No. RRQ 6065 belong to one of partners of the assessee firm, the Assessing Authority has assumed that hiring charges in respect thereof have been inflated. In respect of Truck No. RJJ 1114, it has been found that some diesel expenses in respect of said truck, which belong to sister concern of the assessee, have been debited in the Books of Accounts even during the period when the truck was not hired with the assessee and on that basis, the Assessing Officer has not found the explanation, furnished by the assessee in respect of particular expenses in respect of which explanation was sought from the assessee, to have been substantiated by the assessee. It has also been stated in the order of learned Tribunal that the explanation furnished by the assessee can not also be considered to be bona fide in terms of second proviso to Explanation I read with Clause (B). The findings of the Assessing Officer has been affirmed by the appellate authorities, namely, CIT (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal.

    13. Having considered the facts and circumstances as emanating from the statement of case and contentions raised before us, we are of the opinion that learned Tribunal has misdirected itself in considering the ambit and scope of the said Explanation and also in dealing with the case-where additions have been made not on any specific count but by applying a gross profit rate while rejecting the result shown in the Books of Accounts, that is to say, not on the basis of entries made in the Books of Accounts. Once Books of Accounts were rejected and income was assessed by applying gross profit rate which resulted in addition of income, through the provisions of Explanation I to sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act may be attracted for the purpose of initiating penalty proceedings by raising presumption under the Explanation I but the same by itself could not take place of conclusive proof so as to discard the evidence and attending circumstances on that basis alone.

    14. It is not the case in the present context that the assessee has offered explanation which has been found by the Assessing Officer or the assessing authority to be false. It is a case, and findings are also to that effect, that the explanation was offered by the assessee but he has not been able to substantiate the same. To us, it appear that the authorities below have ignored that it was precisely for non-availability of necessary material to verify the expenses incurred and so entered in the Books of Accounts that the assessee has agreed for assessment at a flat profit rate on gross receipts resulting in addition of income. Thereafter, to put the assessee at the alter to satisfy the very same entries which during the assessment proceedings could not be verified for want of necessary material to be proved to hilt, when admittedly no evidence existed even at the time of assessment. Obviously in such circumstances, if enquiry was to be held for verification of expenses entered in the Books of Accounts, it would result in reaching a dead-end where explanation furnished by the assessee shall not be substantiated but that alone could not have been the reason to draw any inference of lack of bona fides on the part of the assessee. No deliberate, false entry has been found to have been made in the Books of Accounts, which could detract from the bona fide, failure on the part of the assessee to substantiate his explanation in respect of two of the entries of expenditure, entered in the Books of Accounts because of lack of verifying material with him. As would turn out from the petty nature of expenses referred to in the order of Rs. 40/-, Rs. 80/-, Rs. 1480/- etc., we are of the opinion that the findings of the learned Tribunal, that the explanation furnished by the assessee is not bona fide in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is not based on any material and is an inference which no reasonable person instructed in law would draw, particularly in cases where assessee has agreed for applying of gross profit rate, precisely for the reason that he was not in position to vouch each and every detail of the expenses entered in the Books of Accounts, to substantiate the result shown by him.

    15. It may be noticed that in the Explanation I to sec. 271(1)(c), as recast, while the expression “failure to return the total assessed income as not arising on account of any fraud or wilful negligence on the part of assessee” does not find place but clause (b) read with proviso (ii) makes it abundantly clear that where difference in the assessed income and returned income is not arising on account of any gross or wilful negligence on the part of assessee, still no penalty is leviable. The statute has clearly drawn distinction between furnishing a deliberate, false explanation by the assessee and an explanation, which may not be false but is not accepted because assessee was not able to substantiate it. While there is no relaxation in the rigour of Explanation in raising presumption against the assessee in the former case, in the latter class of cases, the statute itself relaxes its rigour by directing that where in respect of any amount, added or disallowed and any explanation is offered by such person (assessee) which is not accepted because the assessee has failed to substantiate the same, but such explanation is bona fide and all the facts relating to same and material to the computation of total income has been disclosed by him, the Explanation shall not apply. In other words, the cases under clause (A) of the Explanation I are those where explanation furnished by the assessee falls in the category of a fact ‘disproved’ whereas cases where an explanation so furnished falls in the category of fact ‘not proved.’ The expressions ‘proved’ disproved’ and ‘not proved’ has well known, distinct connotation in legal terminology, as may be apparent from the provisions of Indian Evidence Act. As per interpretation clause, a fact is said to be ‘disproved’ when after considering the matter before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. In contrast, a fact is said to be ‘proved’ when after considering the matter before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances in particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. In juxta position, the expression ‘not proved’ denotes a fact is said to be ‘not proved’ when it is neither proved nor disproved.

    16. With this, it is of significance that while with the addition of income or disallowance of expenses is attached, the presumption about non-disclosure or concealment of particulars of such additions or expenses, no such presumption about existence of lack of ‘bona fide’ of the assessee is raised in a case falling under clause (B) of the Explanation. On the contrary, on finding an explanation as was existent or disproved, a reasonable inference of lack of bona fide can be drawn, mere failure to substantiate the explanation as a fact not proved, can not raise a presumption about deliberate concealment and lack of bona fide. In such events, question of bona fide has to be proved as a fact like any other fact on preponderence of probability uninfluenced with any presumption.

    17. In the first place, we find in the present case that even during course of assessment, it was not a case of rejecting the explanation furnished by the assessee, before making any additions in its income. Once no explanation was said to be tested and rejected by the Assessing Officer before converting, the question of invoking Explanation I itself would not have arisen however. Explanation I was attracted for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to Assessing Officer for initiating the proceedings. It could not have further taken place of conclusive proof so as to discard the explanation furnished by the assessee, for the very same reason for which result shown by him in the Books of Accounts has been rejected, not by rejecting the explanation furnished by the assessee but by accepting the explanation furnished by the assessee that he does not have necessary material to verify each and every detail of the expenses and therefore, gross profit rate on the receipts has been taken by the assessee. Once the plea of the assessee has been accepted during the course of assessment and additions have been made at his behest, the question of making additions by rejecting explanation, which was not sustainable or could not be substantiated, would not arise and in that event, the question of bona fides of the assessee could not be doubted.

    18. We are not able to comprehend as to on what basis learned Tribunal has repeated the provisions of the Act ad verbatim that explanation furnished by the assessee can not be accepted as bona fide because additions were made at the behest of the assessee, by accepting his inability to furnish details of expenses during the assessment proceedings itself.

    19. Apart from the aforesaid, the order of learned Tribunal shows another error of law in perceiving provisions of 271 Explanation I to Sec. 271. While penalty proceedings were initiated in respect of additions made, the enquiry has been directed in respect of expenses which could have been disallowed in the course of assessment proceedings, had the same been not substantiated. But the fact remains that no deductions were disallowed and penalty proceedings have not been initiated for disallowance of any expenses claimed by the assessee. It was not permissible for the Assessing Officer to initiate penalty proceedings for one specific breach and directing enquiry to another set of circumstances, which were not foundation for initiating penalty proceedings.

    20. In this connection, the language of the statute suggests that recourse to Explanation can be had on specific addition of income of any particular sum or disallowance of any particular deduction on account of expenses claimed against gross income. The language of Explanation uses two expressions as independentany amount ‘added’ or ‘disallowed’. It postulates addition of specific amount in the income as income not disclosed or a specific amount claimed as deductions has been disallowed. In making computation of total income where income returned has been rejected by rejecting the trading results, finding some discrepancy in the Books of Accounts and substituting the same by estimated figure, in strict sense, can neither be said to be addition of any amount in the returned income or disallowance of any amount as deductions claimed. The word ‘amount’, of which additions made or deductions disallowed also denotes reference to specific item of amount added or disallowed as deduction in contrast of substitution of altogether a new estimated sum in place of income returned. It is a case neither of addition or disallowance but a case of substitution.

    21. For the aforesaid reason, we are of the opinion that the question referred to us should be answered in negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    M/S. Shiv Lal Tak v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Jodhpur
    (Feb 5, 2001)